

START of file

Mr. R. Murphy

21 DECEMBER 1990

SECRET

ANGLO-IRISH SECTION
WEEKLY BRIEF

WEEK ENDING 21ST DECEMBER 1990



CONTENTS

1. Reports from Anglo-Irish Secretariat

- Lunch with John Chilcot, Permanent Under Secretary, NIO
- Political Talks: Conversation with Robert Alston, British Joint Secretary
- Nally/Bulter Dinner: Conversation with Robert Alston.

2. Contact with Information Work


- Meeting with John Alderdice, Alliance Party
- Closed Cross-Border Roads in Counties Leitrim & Monaghan
- Meeting with SDLP Councillors, Banbridge
- Meeting with Professor John Darby, Director of the Centre for the Study of Conflict, N. U. U.
- Conversation with Paddy McGrory, Solicitor

3. British - Irish InterParliamentary Body

- Report of the Plenary Session
- Session on the Irish in Britain

4. Reports from Embassy London

- The Birmingham Six Appeal: -
 - a) Legal Arguments
 - b) Home Office Reaction
 - c) Media Reaction
- John Major's First Commons Replies on NI
- Letter from Ivor Stanbrooke M. P., Chairman Backbench Committee on Northern Ireland



CONFIDENTIAL

18 December 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
 Assistant Secretary
 Anglo-Irish Division
 Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

Lunch with John Chilcot

The following are a few points that arose in conversation with John Chilcot over lunch today:

- He had heard from his own side that the brief meeting between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister in Rome at the weekend had gone well; he will be seeing Charles Powell later this week to discuss it. Chilcot cautioned in a very general way against expecting too much of the Prime Minister on Anglo-Irish relations. He had yet to acquire a political feel for the subject and, in this and other areas, he had yet to develop "the politics of gesture", by which he meant the flair for a phrase or a decision that would communicate far more than the briefing books which he has been reading aplenty on all topics. When I suggested that Major had shown himself at the Treasury to have fine judgement of signals to the markets and to his party, Chilcot agreed but believed that the markets were an arcane world and success within them did not always carry over to the wider political theatre. His basic point was that whereas Major, unlike Thatcher, would be unlikely to set Anglo-Irish fires ablaze by a stray remark, neither was he likely, at least for the foreseeable future, to capture the public mood in any dynamic way. All the more reason why, in Chilcot's view, things will be left to Peter Brooke.
- Chilcot said that Mr. Brooke reached a point "about three or four weeks ago", in which he developed a new sense of what

cc PST, POU
 McNeill & PPS
 McNeill 10/12
 Gallagher
 J. W.

was required. As Chilcot put it tactfully, Brooke decided that the responsibility rested with him to see the initiative through. It is perhaps due in some measure to Chilcot that Peter Brooke has resumed a longer view of the process.

- Contrary to the impression we gained at the recent Nally/Butler dinner, Chilcot did not envisage any communication with us on the initiative in the near future. He thought Mr. Brooke might wish to get into contact with the Minister in the second half of January before a further meeting with the Unionists. As with Mr. Brooke himself last week, I sensed no particular rush.
- Chilcot made no complaint about the President's visit to the North when it came up in conversation (you will recall the arrangements were the cause of a call by the British Ambassador to Aras an Uachtaráin and subsequently of your conversation with the Ambassador last Saturday). Chilcot had taken on board the briefing on the role of the President vis-a-vis the Government given by Dermot Nally at the Nally/Butler dinner in London ten days ago and showed sensitivity to the relationship between the President and the Government. While enthused by the President's interest in the North and very interested in its potential impact - he referred to invitations flooding into her from all over the North (?) - he spoke delicately of the dangers of a misstep in relation to the situation here.
- With regard to stories in today's press, notably the Irish News, about yesterday's Appeal Court hearing of the case of the Birmingham Six which had Lord Justice Lloyd saying "I don't think we are going to let this spoil our Christmas", Chilcot had inquiries made this morning and had been told that the Judge's remark was a wry reference to the reading the Judges would have to undertake over the Christmas period over and above their reading on other matters, rather than any sense that the Birmingham Six could wait while the Judges enjoyed their Christmas. Realistically, however, Chilcot expected the remark to go into the popular history of the case.
- Chilcot looked ahead to the possibility that Labour might form the next Government in Britain. He agreed with the opinion I offered that the political progress made so far this year would endure through a change of Government in Britain (which is a rather different view to that obtaining on the British side earlier this year) but he expressed some concern about the quality and extent of the briefing which Neil Kinnock gets on Ireland and also about the calibre of any likely Secretary of State (he was friendly but dubious about McNamara). He would hope that if Labour did come to

power the potential of political progress would be so evident that they would appoint a "heavyweight" to the Northern Ireland Office. He had no idea who this might be and discounted several possibilities including Roy Hattersley whom he thinks has become lazy in opposition.

- He spoke highly of Lord Belstead, the new Deputy Secretary of State in charge of Law and Order (whom I have found diffident and perhaps likely to be bulldozed aside by Brian Mawhinney). He said that unlike John Cope, who had come up only through the Whip's Office and who was inclined to agree with whatever was put in front of him, Belstead would bring the experience of a long and varied Ministerial career which included a stint at the Home Office. He was similar in manner and style to Peter Brooke (in other words, look for steel behind the gentlemanly mien).

4/15/88 //
- Chilcot said that he would be leaving the political side more and more to Joe Pilling until the initiative bears fruit, and would be taking a greater interest in the "interaction" between the security and political areas. I said it seemed to us at times that security considerations were a trump card and that more "interaction" was desirable. To our knowledge, a classic case of an insufficient political input was the withdrawal of funds from the West Belfast Committee of Glor na nGael. Chilcot did not disagree. (Note: His reference to Joe Pilling shows a natural desire to bring him more into the picture, but I wonder if Chilcot would have made it if he thought a denouement to the initiative was imminent.)

Yours sincerely

Declan O'Donovan

Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

601/2

SECURE FAX NO 601

14 December 1990

To: HQ
For: A/S Gallagher

From: Belfast
From: Joint Secretary

*cc per
Mr. Welch; per
Mr. de la...
Lavelle (H)
Roe*

Political Talks

1. Mr. Alston spoke to me this morning about last evening's meeting with the Unionists. He had just come from a briefing session with Mr. Brooke. He said both sides had agreed to go away and think very carefully about the discussion. Mr. Brooke wanted to reflect over Christmas on the present position and on what he should say to us. One of the lessons he had learned over the Summer was the danger of doing too much too quickly and he did not want to run that risk again. He would be surprised if he did not want to see the Minister in the first two or three weeks of January, before the next Conference if necessary.

2. I asked Mr. Alston if the phrase "useful progress" used in last night's statement had reflected some willingness on the Unionist side to accept Mr. Brooke's discretion in regard to timing, or if it simply reflected an exchange of views with no movement either way. Mr. Alston replied that there had been more than an exchange of views, there had been some movement but it was too early to say where it would lead. The Unionist leaders wanted to talk to their own parties and there was agreement that a further meeting would take place at the back end of January when Molyneaux will have returned from Australia.

3. Mr. Brooke was pleased with the slight dampening of expectations in the media today, notably Tom Kelly's piece on Radio Ulster this morning and he thought that the least said in public and least speculation by the press at this stage, the better.

601/3

4. I asked about Molyneaux's rather angry tone on television as he went into the meeting. Mr. Alston put this down to an anxiety to assure his supporters that he was not going to "sell out" and thought there was nothing more to be read into it than that.

5. With reference to my Sec. Fax 602 on the date of the next Conference, Mr. Brooke has now asked us to put the following possibilities to the Minister - Tuesday 29 January, Wednesday 30 January and (a distant third best) Friday 25 January. Mr. Brooke does not rule out an earlier date in January but understood from conversation at the last Conference that the Minister might have difficulty with that.

*it was
to Br. to
who has
is difficult*

6. Mr Alston recalled that Mr. Brooke prefers, if at all possible, to spend Fridays in London. As I have reported elsewhere there is increasing keenness on his part and the part of other Ministers here to spend more time in their constituencies as the next British election approaches.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 December 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

cc 204
M. W. H. P. S.
Chubb P. 1
[Signature]

Dear Dermot

Nally/Butler Dinner

Robert Alston has mentioned two points to me which he said had taken his side aback at the dinner last Friday. The first which I have mentioned to you separately was our account of the contacts about air transport in the Ellis case. (They have reflected on the matter and will want diplomatic clearance from the Department in the future). The second was the emphasis we thought the British side were placing on devolution. I give more on this point below.

I mentioned a couple of points that had struck us

- the anxiety on the British side about the security situation which seemed to be very deep. Alston agreed there was serious worry but discouraged the notion that it was of a new order of magnitude. (As against that, the intelligence on the IRA threat in the North was described to me here this week by the Under-Secretary in charge of Security as "frightening")
- John Chilcot's reference to speaking to us about a "solution" in the next couple of weeks. Alston thought Chilcot was referring to a formula for a way forward, not to any comprehensive result from the talks. As you know from a separate report on the Secretary of State's meeting with the Unionists, the British side do not expect to come back to us until the new year.

British emphasis on devolution?

In an effort to assure me that the British side were not seeking devolution on its own, Alston told me recently that Brooke did

not even use the word devolution, preferring vaguer expressions such as granting a measure of authority; and he repeated this today. I pointed out that the term had been extensively used in Brooke's Bangor speech and that we had heard the phrase "to or towards devolution" many times from Ian Burns. Alston then argued that it was a measure of the development of Brooke's views since the Summer and, indeed, his sensitivity to our position, that he no longer used the word. His side were surprised that we kept going on about an emphasis on devolution or internal arrangements which was not there. (Comment: I think there has been a marked sensitisation by the NIO to Dublin and SDLP views since the Summer, but the word devolution is now avoided because of its specific political baggage from the past, not just because of our views.)

I said we had no problem with the word devolution which was of course in Article 4 of the Agreement. What we had a problem with was any idea that a version of it could work more or less on its own. There was a united view on our side that Brooke's development of the three relationships theme was vitally important but there was also a doubt at times about how seriously this was taken in the British system and a real concern that it might be decoration for a devolved arrangement rather than an integrated political process. I recalled discussion on the July statement and the repeated approaches on the devolution theme in the Secretariat in August. I recalled also Brooke's recent speeches in Brussels and The Hague which had seemed to underemphasise the three relationships and concentrate heavily on devolution, as in the following passage from the Brussels speech of 13 November, repeated in The Hague two days later:

Last January, I made a speech setting out the underlying political realities of the situation in Northern Ireland, and explained that I believe it right to seek to transfer political power, authority and responsibility to locally-elected representatives in Northern Ireland. This is because the people of Northern Ireland deserve a greater say over their own affairs. There needs to be a greater local democratic input to the business of Government in Northern Ireland. This would make Government more directly responsible to local requirements and give the people of Northern Ireland a greater sense of involvement in political affairs. Overall, the best long-term prospect for achieving political stability within Northern Ireland would be to establish a local administration which both parts of the community could support and sustain.

Brooke had gone on to acknowledge the three relationships but in the context of devolution

(referring to the talks so far) we have developed a significant measure of agreement about various preliminary

points of principle (my emphasis) and about the structure, format and timing any talks might have. For example (my emphasis), it is generally acknowledged that the best chance of securing a comprehensive political accommodation lies through a process of dialogue which would address all three of the underlying relationships.

This was scarcely inspiring stuff about the three relationships, especially as it had been preceded by a reference to devoting efforts to "creating a climate in which talks between the main constitutional parties in Northern Ireland, bringing in the Irish Government as appropriate (my emphasis), might take place".

I said speeches could of course differ from context to context but The Hague and Brussels speeches were political set-pieces to the societies for international affairs in the respective capitals and we were entitled to take them seriously. These were speeches which differed remarkably from the Whitbread speech of 9 November although they held echoes of it. They would justify in themselves the views expressed last Friday and at the Conference when the Minister had warned that talks will get nowhere if they are felt to be essentially about devolution with a North/South dimension tacked on. I was glad to say we had been impressed by Brooke's response to the Minister that devolution had not been his central objective or sole agenda from day one.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Alston said he could see our point better and that his side could improve their presentation, although he minimised the importance of the speeches in Brussels and The Hague, perhaps fairly enough. On the substance, he repeated, however, that the British side saw that the question of internal arrangements had to be dealt with as part of the wider process, not as something to be aimed at on its own, and he suggested again that we had had an important influence on their thinking.

Yours sincerely



Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

Meeting with John Alderdice

Belfast 13 December 1990

1. I met John Alderdice at Alliance Party headquarters in Belfast on 13 December. He is very pessimistic about the talks process generally and considers that Dublin must accept a share of the responsibility for lack of progress over the past year. Although prefacing his comments with "I do not question anyone's bona fides" and "I see no point in attributing blame", it was clear that he is highly critical of what he perceives as our unwillingness to take risks in the interest of getting dialogue underway.

Need for Devolution

2. Alderdice's starting point is the urgent need for devolutionary structures of some sort in Northern Ireland. He argues that, in the absence of devolution, there is a "deep malaise" in the body politic; to make matters worse, the seriousness of the malaise is not fully recognised within Northern Ireland - he drew a comparison with an institutionalised patient who has grown used to dependency and needs to be guided, with a patient but firm hand, towards a more normal life in the outside world. (One had the impression he has used this analogy in urging the Secretary of State to be less reactive in his approach).

Prospects for Talks

3. He feels that the momentum has now effectively gone from the Brooke initiative - "no-body out there believes in it any more". With Westminster elections on the horizon, the inherent rivalry between the two Unionist parties will reassert itself. Alderdice added that he himself will be

doing his utmost to take Peter Robinson's seat in East Belfast. In such circumstances, how can anyone realistically expect the political parties to sit around a table and come up with an agreed way forward? The "window of opportunity" which existed in early and mid 1990 has almost certainly closed; if a dramatic gesture is made in the very near future, there may be a prospect of saving the talks - otherwise people may as well give up.

4. Alderdice expressed doubts as to whether the OUP, the SDLP or Dublin ever seriously wanted these talks - each, he said, probably takes the view that "the risks of doing something outweighs the risks of doing nothing". The OUP objective is a combination of integrationism and enhanced local government powers; while Unionists obviously continue to resent the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they increasingly see it as having little practical impact and are hoping it will eventually "wither away". The SDLP is content to talk about 1992 and the erosion of the border in practical terms; meanwhile they have the symbolism of the Anglo-Irish Agreement to be going along with. As far as Dublin is concerned, Alderdice said he believed the Taoiseach was conscious that anything which emerged from these talks would be a 'partitionist settlement' and his party would never subscribe to such an outcome.

Criticism of Dublin

5. From the outset of our conversation, Alderdice seemed determinedly critical of the Government's approach. He argued that we fundamentally misunderstand the Unionists - we harboured a hope, a couple of years ago, that Molyneaux

might agree to meet the Taoiseach but this was never likely to happen; now he believes we see Ken Maginnis as representing mainstream Unionism. Overall, Alderdice considers that we have no real sense of grassroots Unionism or of the constraints under which Molyneaux and Paisley must operate.

6. Alderdice said that when he met the Taoiseach last September, he had been reassured by the Taoiseach's comments about flexibility and had deliberately adopted an up-beat tone in subsequent comments to the media. Equally, a general sense of optimism had prevailed following the Taoiseach's meeting with Mr. Brooke in Ballyconnell; however, as far as Alderdice was concerned, it was all "just words" and did not translate into any real progress.

7. In response to these comments, I outlined in detail the flexibility shown by the Government from the outset of the process (including the fact that we had consciously desisted from asserting a claim to be present at the internal talks), the slippage from 19 April, the intensive meetings throughout the Autumn where we had put forward various formulae to overcome the remaining obstacles, the fact that ideas conveyed by us at the last Conference were now under discussion with the Unionists. As the Taoiseach and the Minister had repeatedly made clear, the Government were ready for wide-ranging talks, with everything on the table - it was nonsense to suggest that we were shying away from substantive talks because of concern about the possible outcome.

Secretary of State

8. Alderdice views the Secretary of State as an honourable and decent man, anxious if possible to achieve something worthwhile in Northern Ireland. But he is not driven by any consuming passion; he has the self-confidence and self-esteem that comes with his class and background and has no need to prove anything to or about himself. If this initiative fails, Mr. Brooke will not lie awake at night - "there's another cricket match tomorrow".

9. Alderdice had met the Secretary of State earlier in the week but the conversation does not appear to have been very detailed; certainly, it did nothing to dissuade Alderdice of his view that the present initiative is currently going nowhere. Neither did it leave him with any sense that Mr. Brooke is preparing any alternative set of proposals which he might present on his own behalf in the event of breakdown

Molyneaux

10. Alderdice sees the OUP leader as one of the williest operators on the political scene; while Molyneaux would prefer that talks did not get underway, he does not want to damage his standing with the British Government by appearing too obstructive. Recent statements by Willie Ross (to the effect that the OUP would not be prepared to have the Secretary of State decide on the timing of the move to the North/South framework) were another example of Molyneaux keeping his options open. Although he of course authorised these statements, this will not prevent Molyneaux from disavowing them in the future, if it suits him to do so.

Comment

11. Overall, Alderdice came across as disappointed, frustrated and negative; while our conversation ended on a cordial note, a number of the exchanges were fairly sharp. To some extent, Alderdice may be trying - in private as well as in public - to escape the Alliance image of well-meaning but woolly liberalism; he was very emphatic that he "is determined not just to get up and say nice things". It may also be that, in talking to us, he feels a particular need to concentrate on what he sees as our failings - presumably in talking to Unionists, the conversation takes on a different tone. That said, however, one was left with a sense of a lack of balance in his approach; when problems arise, his first instinct seems to be to attach a major part of the blame to Dublin and the SDLP rather than analysing the issues in a more rational and fair-minded way. There seems little doubt but that, if talks do get underway, the Alliance approach will be to seek a satisfactory internal settlement with scant attention paid to the all-island context.

A.A.

A. Anderson

17 December, 1990

c. c. P. S. M. , P. S. S. , Mr. Gallagher, Joint Secretary, Box.

Confidential

Visit to Counties Leitrim and Monaghan
Closed Cross Border Roads

1. The undersigned and Oliver Grogan visited County Leitrim on 13 December, 1990 to fulfil a promise made by the Minister to Leitrim County Council that he would send an official to look into their case for the reopening of some cross border roads and to gather material on the economic and social impact of road closures on the local communities concerned. On the following day, we made a similar visit to the Clones area.

2. Representations have been made in recent months - and indeed over the years - about the serious effect which the closures have had on the area. Leitrim County Council have pointed out that not a single cross border road in the county is open. Deputy Gerry Reynolds raised the issue of Leitrim's cross-border roads in the Dail on the adjournment on 13 December.

3. The people we spoke to were: in Leitrim, officials of the County Council in Carrick-on-Shannon who brought us to Manorhamilton and Kiltyclogher and to 3 of the closed border crossings in the area. Among the officials we met were Mr. Sean Kielty, County Secretary; Mr. Michael McGoey, County Engineer; Mr. Paul Ridge, Senior Roads Engineer; Mr. Gabriel Miley, District Roads Engineer, Manorhamilton; and Mr. Michael McCauley, Deputy County Development Officer. We met the headmistress of Kiltyclogher Primary School, Ms. Olive Gallagher, and the Church of Ireland Minister in Blacklion, Canon Robin Ritchie. In Clones we met Mr. Brian Curran, Acting Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Donald McDonald, a businessman and member of the local development committee, and the parish priest of Clones, Canon MacNaboe. We also spoke

briefly to the Chairperson of Clones Urban Council, Mrs. Patricia Donoghue. We visited the closed crossing at Lacky Bridge and a number of others, and saw the checkpoints at Wattle Bridge and on the Newtownbutler road.

County Leitrim

4. Although officially there are 10 border crossings between Leitrim and Fermanagh, only 5 of these involve public roads and the officials we spoke to were interested solely in these five. They consist of 3 crossings in the vicinity of Kiltyclogher (Kilcoo, Cashel Bridge, and Aghavanny), one at Rossinver/Dooard and one at Derrynaseer/Kinlough, the latter two being at either end of Lough Melvin. All of the crossings are over water.

History

5. The background to the closures was described to us as follows: at the start of the Troubles there were numerous incidents in the Kiltyclogher area (one person spoke of "gunfights from one side of the border to the other"); two incidents in particular are remembered: one was the killing of a UDR man named Fletcher in 1972 just across the border from Kiltyclogher. Fletcher was well known in the village (Fr. MacNaboe recalled attending his wedding) and his death shocked people and led to an exodus of Protestant families from the locality. The other incident was the bombing by the UVF of Kiltyclogher Vocational School in 1973, supposedly because they believed that two of the teachers there were involved with the IRA. The school has never been reopened.

6. The 5 roads were closed in the early seventies when unrest was at its height; after attempts by locals to reopen them, the British did a major cratering job using explosives and damaging several houses near the Cashel Bridge crossing in the process. Five or six years ago they put in a footbridge at

Cashel Bridge, mainly to facilitate Church of Ireland members on the Northern side wishing to attend their parish church which is in Kiltyclogher. This footbridge is sturdy and can be crossed on foot or with a bicycle. The other crossings are impassable except by foot, and then only with difficulty.

Effects of Road Closures

7. There is ample evidence of the harmful effects which the closure of the roads have had on the economic and social life of North Leitrim. Until the closures the region had strong family, business and social ties with communities on the Northern side of the border; today these ties have all but vanished. The harm that has been done is most clearly seen in Kiltyclogher, a place described by more than one person we met as "a ghost town". With mountains to the south, Kiltyclogher's natural hinterland lies to the north of the border and it was once a shopping and social centre for rural areas to the north and the village of Garrison. Today there are 4 shops left out of 7, there are 3 pubs compared to 5 a few years ago, there is no manufacturing industry, the school rolls have fallen from the 70+ to 40 or so, there is only one post-primary student from the town proper this year and the sole hotel has had to reduce its service to bed and breakfast and that only for part of the year. Kiltyclogher's population is about 120; it would be smaller if an old people's housing scheme had not been built there recently. The plight of the Protestant community on the other side of the border which has to make a difficult, dirty journey to church on foot over Cashel footbridge or, alternatively, drive around on a 26-mile detour has been the subject of a television documentary programme.

8. North Leitrim has great untapped tourism potential, and an outstanding natural resource in the shape of Lough Melvin. The lake contains salmon and trout and certain rare species of fish and holds great attractions for anglers. There are

private fisheries at the Bundoran end and support is being sought from the International Fund for Ireland for various tourism projects. We were told that it is crucial, if the lake's potential is to be developed, that the closed roads, and particularly the Dooard crossing, be reopened. The ring road around the lake, which would be a key feature in any development of the region's tourism, is cut in two by the closures at Dooard and Derrynaseer. (While we were looking at the Dooard crossing some tourists arrived in their car, thinking that they could go around the lake, but had to abandon the idea).

Priorities for Reopening

9. Of the five closed crossings, the officials listed their priorities for reopening as:

- (i) Rossinver/Dooard
- (ii) Cashel Bridge, Kiltyclogher
- (iii) Derrynaseer/Kinlough.

Of these, (i) and (iii) go together in that the argument is mainly economic and is specifically related to the development of Lough Melvin. The Dooard crossing is regarded as being by far the most important since it would open up the way to tourists coming from the south to have full access to the lake. Cashel Bridge would be the most useful of the three crossings to reopen in Kiltyclogher. We were told that there has been no serious security incident in the area for several years and that local people strongly feel that at least one of the crossings into the town should be open; their preference would be for Cashel Bridge.

10. Comment

We were given enough information and follow-up contacts to enable a paper to be prepared on the social and economic impact which the road closures have had on North Leitrim. Not

all of the region's economic problems can be attributed to road closures but there is persuasive evidence that these have played an important role in the area's decline. The security aspect will have to be considered, bearing in mind that the recent report by the Garda Commissioner did not recommend any change and that the price which might be demanded from us could be the setting up of a permanent checkpoint on our side. Canon Ritchie said that his Church of Ireland parishioners to the north of Kiltyclogher would not favour reopening roads, in spite of the inconvenience caused to themselves and others. Nevertheless, the economic and social arguments in favour of opening at least one of the closed crossings are strong. The best case on economic grounds could probably be made for the Dooard crossing and this is the one which is given the highest priority by Leitrim County Council. The Cashel Bridge crossing in Kiltyclogher would have strong social arguments in its favour.

Clones, Co. Monaghan

11. Clones is located at the very edge of north west Monaghan, in a niche formed by the border with Fermanagh. In fact, the border virtually surrounds it on three sides. Like Kiltyclogher, its main hinterland lies to the north of the border in South East Fermanagh and, until the crossings were closed, it owed much of its prosperity as a business centre and market town to customers coming in from towns like Rosslea, Newtownbutler and Lisnaskea and the surrounding countryside. The town lies between Cavan, Monaghan and Enniskillen and a large number of roads pass through it. The two principal roads leading north have been closed; the old Rosslea road is cratered while the main crossing to the north, Lacky Bridge, has been destroyed. There are permanent checkpoints on the other access roads, with the exception of the concession road to Cavan which crosses and re-crosses the border. The smaller link roads around the town have all been systematically cratered.

anti port road

Effects of Road Closures

12. The people of Clones are adamant that the closure of roads in the area, and especially of Lacky Bridge, has blighted the town's growth and prevented it from keeping pace with towns such as Monaghan and Cavan. Although work is under way on the Diamond (with a grant from the IFI) many shops on the main streets are closed. The Urban District Council has a lot of trouble collecting rates as businesses cannot afford them. The cattle mart business fluctuates as agricultural prices in the north and the south diverge, but a constant inhibiting factor has been the lengthy diversions which farmers are subjected to as a result of closed roads. For a town of 2,500 people there is little manufacturing industry. The CPV container factory and Tunney Meats are the main employers; of CPV's 120 workers about 30 live on the northern side of the border and have to cope with diversions and delays at checkpoints twice a day. The difficulties facing the town are set out in detail in the Needs Survey of Clones, published in 1985, a copy of which we were given.

Priorities as regards Border Crossings

13. The people we spoke to had two major concerns: the reopening of Lacky Bridge and delays and harassment at Permanent Vehicle Checkpoints. (There are other closed crossings in the vicinity which have been the subject of representations in the past but these were not mentioned on this occasion.) Lacky Bridge is on the main road to Lisnaskea; it was intermittently passable up to 3 years ago but has now been completely demolished and replaced by a footbridge. We were told that the road to Lisnaskea had been used for paramilitary activities in the seventies and that the closure resulted from strong pressure from Protestants living on the northern side. There used to be a PVCP at the bridge, even after it had been closed, but that is gone now. There

are some 700 Catholics living in Aghadromsee on the other side of the border; they are cut off from their own parish of Clones and could not attend church there without making a long detour. Very few of these people are willing to come into Clones for social or Church functions because of the roundabout journey they would have to make. On the economic front, apart from the hardship for workers living on the northern side, there is a proposal in the pipeline for a cooperative project between Clones and Lisnaskea which will be put to the IFI soon. That project would obviously have a far greater chance of success if the main road between the two towns were open.

14. Concerned though the people of Clones are about Lacky Bridge, it would be fair to say that they are equally upset about the delays and harassment experienced at permanent vehicle checkpoints in the area. The checkpoints of most concern are:

- Wattle Bridge (now closed at night),
- Kilturk on the Newtownbutler road and
- Annagmartin on the Monaghan-Rosslea road
(threatened with night closure).

Our contacts expressed a high level of anger at the delays at these checkpoints and the routine harassment, especially of young people. They queried the need for PVCs and claimed that mobile patrols would be more effective; they also thought that observation towers would be preferable. Complaints were made to us about a worker who was stopped and "grilled" every day because his car registration number had found its way erroneously into the computer system, about the absence of adequate signposting when checkpoints are closed for repairs - as they frequently are - and about the practice of holding up an entire line of cars if they are interested in one particular car, instead of sending it to one side as can be done in some PVCs. The most serious of these complaints they

saw as the persistent harassment of young people which they said would undoubtedly produce recruits for the IRA.

Nighttime Closures

15. We heard many expressions of concern on the same lines as were reported by Ms. Whelan after her visit to Co. Fermanagh. Some people referred to the nighttime closures as "the last straw"; others saw them as an admission by the British that their security policy had failed, since the soldiers who were ostensibly protecting others were themselves retreating behind barricades. The issue is a very live one in Clones because the new measures came into force after the proxy bomb attack involving the North family. This attack caused great shock because of the callous way it was carried out (one version we heard was that the 3,500 lb bomb could have been driven through the centre of Clones) and because the North family are well known in the neighbourhood. We were shown their home/business premises which the family have apparently not returned to, and their shop on the Cavan road which has been repeatedly attacked. In spite of peoples' concern about this attack - and a widespread fear that more locals would be used in proxy bombings - there was strong criticism of the nighttime closures and fear that there could be more in the offing. Rosslea was mentioned as being particularly hard hit and more or less cut off at night.

Comment

16. Clones has undoubtedly suffered as a result of its proximity to the border and because of the closure of Lacky Bridge in particular and this can be brought out in greater detail in a paper. A good case can be made for the reopening of the Lacky Bridge crossing as it has cut Clones off from its natural hinterland and has caused much social and economic hardship. Opponents will argue that the level of IRA activity in the area would not justify reopening but it could as well be said that the closure of the road has not stopped the IRA

PS: . pr

from carrying out attacks. It is noted that the Divisional Commander of the Gardai recommended that this crossing be reopened. The concerns of the people we met about delays and harassment at PVCs are not new - these checkpoints are a frequent source of complaint, especially the one at Kilturk.



Ronan Murphy

20.12.90

c. c. Mr. Gallagher, Mr. J. Brosnan, Secretariat, Counsellors
A. I., Box.

Meeting with SDLP Councillors: Banbridge: 12 December, 1990.

1. I met Mr. James Walsh, Mrs. Cassie McDermot and her husband Liam at Mr. Walsh's house on 12 December. Mr. Walsh and Mrs. Mc Dermot are SDLP councillors on Banbridge council. Mr. McDermot is also active in local SDLP politics. Mr. and Mrs. McDermot, who now lived in Banbridge, had left their home in the Loyalist town of Dromore some years ago following a petrol bomb attack.

Articles 2 and 3

2. All three expressed very strong concern at the debate over deletion of Articles 2 and 3. They said they felt a sense of "abandonment" over the debate, a sense that "despite all their suffering over the past twenty years, they would be left on their own". They saw the election of President Robinson as the catalyst for the current debate on Articles 2 and 3; and were concerned with the evidence of Unionist approval of her election. I pointed out that the government had expressed their strong opposition to the Workers' Party proposal; however, they were clearly unsettled and uneasy about the fact that the debate had taken place and about some of the contributions from the opposition parties.

Banbridge District Council

3. The Banbridge Council has a very bad reputation for sectarian abuse. In its latest report, the Fair Employment Commission (FEC) found there was "significant under representation" of Catholic employees on the Council workforce. Only one out of twenty eight staff positions was occupied by a Catholic: according to the SDLP councillors, the one appointment had been through an oversight! The first choice had been a Protestant who had unexpectedly refused the job. The Council had then discovered that, despite a "Protestant name", the second placed candidate in the competition was a Catholic whom they had no choice but to appoint.

4. Since the last local elections in 1989, the three SDLP members have been granted the Vice-Chairman position on the the full Council and on a number of its committees. The normal practice would be for the Vice-Chairman to progress the following year to the Chairmanship. However, this has not occurred. Despite certain reservations, the councillors have now decided to resign progressively any Vice-Chairmanships when it is clear that they will not be allowed to progress to the Chairmanship position in the usual way. In addition, they will not accept any new appointments. '

5. They stated that the present situation (ie the fact that Vice-Chairmanships had been offered to the SDLP) allowed the Unionist members of the Council to argue to the NIO that they were not sectarian. In the SDLP councillors' view, there had been a change in attitude by the British recently regarding Councils. The British would no longer so easily give money to Councils which fail to improve blatantly sectarian records. In their view, Minister Mawhinney's initiative regarding the appointment of Community Relations Officers (CRC) was connected with this attitude change. Banbridge Council had agreed to appoint a CRC because it was afraid of losing funding if did not do so. (The true DUP position had however emerged when they recently objected to a "mixed" schools project run by the CRC.) For the same reason, the Council had also dropped its opposition to Sunday opening of recreational facilities.

6. The Council recently again refused to provide funding to the GAA on the basis that the organisation would not allow members of the security forces to join GAA clubs. This was an ongoing problem.

NF

Accompaniment/harassment

7. A member of the UDR well known in the area had been imprisoned some time ago for passing classified information to loyalist paramilitaries. On accompaniment, Mr. Walsh felt that there had been some improvement in accompaniment in recent years. He said there was no particular difficulty with the RUC. He referred to an incident where the UDR had recently held Fr. Faul for a considerable period. Mr. Walsh had complained to the local RUC who had had Fr. Faul quickly released. In general, the RUC grudgingly carried out duties connected with the implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

SDLP organisation in Banbridge area

8. On paper, there should be about three thousand SDLP voters in the area. Active membership was only about seven and they received a mere eight hundred votes at the last election. They said that many potential supporters in the town were in "mixed" marriages where by tacit convention neither spouse would vote. Most SDLP supporters who contributed to party collections insisted on anonymity. They were frightened of drawing attention to themselves.

9. The local branch was anomalous in that it straddled the Westminster constituencies of South Down and Upper Bann. The fact that the branch had to contribute funds to both constituency organisations was clearly a grievance. They felt a tremendous effort would be required to re-elect Mr. McGrady; as in 1987, the postal votes would be very important. They said there was little enthusiasm for the campaign in Upper Bann where there was no chance of success.

C. Barrington

C. Barrington

17 December, 1990.

C.c. Mr. Gallagher, Joint Secretary, Counsellors A. I., Box

Meeting with Professor John Darby, Coleraine,

17 December, 1990

1. Professor Darby is the Director of the Centre for the Study of Conflict in the New University of Ulster at Coleraine. Until September he was a member of the Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights (SACHR) and is still an external advisor to the Community Relations Unit in the NIO. The following points of interest arose during our meeting:

Political Developments

2. Darby said he was very encouraged by developments in the political area over the last year. The media concentration on present efforts to overcome the final obstacles to the initiation of talks, obfuscates in some ways the dramatic progress which has been made in the last 12 months; the fact that all of the main parties now formally accept that the talks must address the three central relationships is a major step forward. On the negative side, he said that while it was very difficult as an external observer to read what was happening in the talks about talks process, the prevailing perception in the North in the summer and autumn was that Dublin and the SDLP were the main obstacles to the achievement of progress. The gap between all the parties was apparently now very slight and he hoped that it could be bridged. (In response to these comments, I reminded Professor Darby of how constructive and forthcoming the Government had been in facilitating the resolution of the Unionists original three pre-conditions; I also explained that the further "substantial progress" pre-condition was not simply a formality of timing, but was rather a crucial issue of substance which would affect the entire balance of the negotiating structure).

3. Darby predicted that - if the talks got underway - all of the participants would very rapidly have to examine their own policy positions with a view to defining realizable negotiating objectives. The SDLP are far better prepared for this confrontation with reality than Unionism and the conflicting tendencies within the two Unionist parties - integrationist versus devolutionist etc - would soon become apparent. At the same time, he felt that even the SDLP would find itself under some pressure - within a very short timeframe - to define its position on a number of sensitive areas of policy e.g. security matters. For these reasons, he believed that the period of the talks would inevitably be longer than the envisaged 2/3 months. Darby expressed some concern that the participants lack of practical negotiating experience - particularly on the Unionist side - could damage the prospects for a successful outcome to the talks.

4. In relation to the two Unionist parties, Darby said that the DUP was far more interested in the talks process than the OUP. There was an "intellectual ferment" going on within the DUP as its younger second-tier (Robinson, Dodds, Campbell) confronted the challenges facing Unionism; they realized that a fundamental accommodation was going to have to be made with nationalism. (Darby believes that Robinson is a politician of great ability whose only peer in Northern politics is John Hume. He felt that while Robinson clearly has his differences with Paisley, he enjoys sufficient support within the DUP to have the confidence to be his own man.) Within the OUP, on the other hand, there was no such reassessment of basic philosophy. The party leadership appears to have no genuine enthusiasm for the talks process and is moving covertly in the direction of integrationism. The only exception is Ken Maginnis and he would no longer appear to be representative of basic OUP opinion.

Security Forces

5. Darby said he was concerned at the most recent signs of a fortress mentality among the security forces - particularly within the RUC. The recent night-closure of four military check-points in Co Fermanagh demonstrated the primacy being given to security considerations over all others. There seemed to be no effort by the authorities to establish a balance between the demands of the security forces for certain restrictive policies/measures and the social/political consequences of such actions on the local communities. While some NIO officials were conscious of the counter-productive nature of these measures, they appeared to be unable to prevent the Government from acceding to the demands of the security forces.

6. Darby was particularly critical of the RUC. After the retirement of Hermon it was hoped that the RUC would become a more open, responsive and community-sensitive police force. He regretted that recent indications suggested the reverse and that Annesley, like his predecessor, was a victim of the "fortress mentality". This took the form of an institutional resistance to any change in policing practice and a tendency to reject the validity of any criticism directed at the force. Darby met Annesley a few months ago at a private dinner and was disappointed by the nature of his generally traditional and authoritarian views.

7. Darby mentioned in confidence that his Centre for the Study of Conflict has been endeavouring over the last year to persuade the RUC to cooperate with a study which it proposes to undertake on the nature and quality of policing in Northern Ireland. (The proposed study would have focussed on two particular aspects; the form of induction/training for RUC recruits vis-a-vis relations

with the community and the experiences of those target groups who allegedly are the victims of regular harassment by the RUC - in the main young unemployed Catholic males). Notwithstanding the support of some officials in the NIO, the RUC have refused to cooperate with the study. Darby said that it will, nonetheless, go ahead and that he has secured the necessary funding from a "squeaky - clean Trust". In the absence of RUC cooperation, however, the study will obviously not be able to investigate the quality of the induction/training given to RUC recruits.

Adrian O'Neill

Adrian O' Neill

20 December, 1990

c/c A/Sec. Gallagher
Joint Secretary
Counsellors A/I
Mr. McMahon
Box

W5258

CONFIDENTIAL

CC PST: 1204
Mr Nelly: PRR
Caulley R/

Conversation with Paddy McGrory
Belfast, 17 December 1990

Articles 2 & 3:

He articulated, in particularly forceful terms, widespread nationalist concern in Northern Ireland at the debate on Articles 2 & 3. In doing so, he offered the caustic comment that he could understand the Workers Party's search for respectability in the South - particularly in the light of Official IRA activity in recent weeks in Belfast which signalled the possibility of a renewed feud between the Officials and the Provisionals in the Markets area.

He was, however, bitterly disappointed at the stance of the Fine Gael Party which he felt displayed an unbelievable naivety about Northern Ireland. Changing or even deleting the Articles would not receive so much as a thank-you from the Unionists. They would simply pocket the concession and immediately move on to the next grievance. He recalled that some years ago the Unionists had a practice of making fiery speeches about Article 40 on the special position of the Catholic Church. When that Article was deleted, he had not heard "so much as a squeak of appreciation" from the Unionists.

He found the suggestion that Articles 2 & 3 were somehow used by the IRA as a justification for their campaign to be particularly absurd. In his practice he has represented hundreds of members of the IRA over the years. Never once has he ever heard anyone mention Articles 2 & 3 or indeed the Constitution which, in any event, they view as "a Free State document" and refuse to recognise its validity in any shape or form.

For nationalists, the tone of some of the speeches in the Dail clearly signalled their possible abandonment by the South and this had deeply angered many nationalists in the North. As an example, he mentioned that Brian Friel (a close personal friend) had phoned him earlier and had sounded off in particularly virulent terms about his sense of betrayal. [comment: I heard similar strong comments from every nationalist I met in Northern Ireland this week.]

Brooke Speech:

He had been very impressed with Brooke's "neutrality speech" of 9 November which he felt was bound to stimulate further debate within the republican movement. He speculated at some length on the capacity of the republican movement to respond in an imaginative way to the speech. In his view, Gerry Adams

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

- (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed:
840/3900
- (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: part of 1 document
- (iii) The date of each such document: 20/12/1990
- (iv) The description of each document: Confidential information relating to private individual
- (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8(4) b and c



Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*


Date: 24/11/2020

is one of the few people in the movement with a long-term view and with a capacity to think in an imaginative way. However, McGrory feels that Adams is very much constrained by the "Army" and is unable to make any significant move without the approval of the IRA.

Sandy Lynch:

McGrory is representing Danny Morrison who is still being held on remand facing charges relating to the imprisonment and attempted murder of the RUC informer, Sandy Lynch. (Ten others have also been charged in this case, including some senior IRA figures.) During the cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, Lynch revealed (to the obvious consternation of the RUC officers present) that he had been working for the RUC for 7 years. It was obvious to McGrory that Lynch was not supposed to have revealed that he had been working for the RUC for such a long time. It was also obvious from Lynch's demeanour in Court that he now fully identifies with the security services and not with his family or background. He displayed "not even a flicker of emotion or reaction" when his father shouted to him from the public gallery. McGrory commented that he had seen the same psychological transformation in some of the supergrass cases - most notably in the case of Harry Kirkpatrick.

According to Morrison, Lynch made a number of interesting revelations during his "interrogation" at the hands of the IRA, including the fact that he had been warned earlier in the week that he would be lifted by the IRA and was coached by the RUC as to what he should tell his interrogators. This had caused quite a few raised eyebrows within the IRA as it clearly implied that the RUC had another very senior source within the movement. It continues to be a mystery to the IRA as to how the RUC were able to pinpoint the house in West Belfast where Lynch was being interrogated. The IRA appear to have used the same house in the interrogation of Joe Fenton, another RUC informer murdered by the IRA in February 1989. [comment: It has been apparent over the past year, from the significant number of arms finds and raids on bomb factories (where a number of people have been caught red-handed) that the RUC may have a number of well-placed informers within the IRA in Belfast.]


Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
20 December 1990

cc A/Sec Gallagher
Counsellors A.I.
Secretariat
Box

the two Committees which had been active since the London Plenary. The morning session, which was held in public, was dedicated to the Report of Committee A on "Co-Ordination within the European Community in the context of Regional Aid and Associated Areas", chaired by Stuart Bell MP. The debate was non-controversial and enabled Members to discuss the wider issues of political and monetary union and the implications for both countries of Community policy. At a very early stage in the debate Sir David Mitchell attacked Arts. 2 and 3 of the Constitution to shouts of "out of order" from at least one British member.

The debate on the Report of the Political and Security Committee on "An Assessment of the Workings of the Anglo-Irish Agreement" was taken during a closed session in the afternoon. (I have reported separately on the discussions within the Committee which led to the adoption of the Report).

Barry, as Chairman introduced the Report and suggested that Mates, as shadow Chairman should wind up the debate.

Flannery said that he didn't understand why the Birmingham Six were being treated in the way that they were by the Courts. It was clear that the men were innocent. (He rebuked Mates who was muttering and making gestures at him). He said that the treatment of the B6 strengthened the hand of the terrorists. Kitt suggested that the Report might more usefully have focussed on more limited issues. Rees said that he had been responsible for putting the Criminal Jurisdiction Act through in Britain but he had to concede that it was "second best". Jacob disputed what Rees said. Ireland had been "ultra-responsible" on extradition and Britain should try and use the CLJA. He referred to the "horrific injustice" of the B6 case. MacKay said that it would be improper for him to interfere in the Constitutional debate on Arts. 2 and 3. However, there was a clause in the A.I. Agreement which contradicted the

Constitution and the latter should be brought into line with the former. He added that it was important to avoid any complacency on security matters.

O'Donoghue made a stout defence of Irish extradition procedures. Section 4 of the 1987 Act provided a "broad sweeping set of circumstances" which makes actions extraditable. The 1987 Act rightly protects Irish citizens. On Arts. 2 and 3, their removal would isolate the Nationalist community. Miscampbell said that the B6 should only be released by the Court of Appeal. He defended the former Home Secretary, David Waddington as a man of sound judgement. He would not have referred the case back to the Court of Appeal unless he had solid reasons for so doing. The 3 Appeal Court Judges were good men and would give the B6 "a careful, judicious inquiry". Winnick observed that N.I. had not been an issue in any of the last six General Elections in Britain. Kavanagh advocated the transfer of N.I.- born prisoners serving sentences on the mainland back to N.I., in view of high cost of travel for their families wishing to visit them. He hoped Britain would ratify the Convention(s) governing the transfer of prisoners. He welcomed the extended discussion areas (tourism, transport..) within the Inter-Governmental Conference referred to in para. 13 of the Report and hoped that this would be extended to the environment also.

Porter noted that the fundamental objectives of the A.I. Agreement are not even mentioned in the Report. He didn't accept the role of the Irish Government in N.I. affairs. It would be "helpful" if Arts. 2 and 3 were changed. He would like to see the Unionists participating in the Body. The Brooke initiative had foundered on the question of the involvement of the Irish Government in the affairs of N.I. Spring interjected to say that it was clear what Porter didn't want but that it wasn't clear what he did want. Andrews said N.I. was a failed entity and he sought the unity of Ireland.

He hoped that the B6 would get bail and hoped that the British members would bring their influence to bear to ensure early release for the men. Extradition should work well and could be made to work. He also referred to the vast cost to the Irish taxpayer of cross-border security. Wilshire said that public opinion in Britain was an important factor in A.-I. relations and should be taken into account.

Deenihan criticised the misuse of the PTA in Britain, saying that only 2% of those questioned had been detained. He also referred to the intimidation of GAA clubs and club members in N.I. through harassment. Carlile said that, on extradition, the ultimate aim was that people guilty of crimes be brought to justice "in a relevant jurisdiction". Extradition should only take place where necessary. The CLJA should be used - "your judges are as good as ours". As a QC, he was necessarily defensive of British Law. The Court of Appeal should be inquisitorial; this was not the first appeal. It was "unrealistic" to consider bail for the B6. Leonard raised the hardship caused to people in his constituency and elsewhere by the closure of border roads and the effects that had on the local economy.

Mitchell suggested that separate debates should be held on the political and on the security issues. Arts. 2 and 3 should be removed: "every dogma has its day". Ahern suggested that the Chairman of the Board of the IFI should be invited to address the Body. On cross-border security, "we spend more per head of population than you do". The Constitution cannot be changed piece-meal - the deletion of Art. 44 had not changed Unionist attitudes. Hughes said "the sooner the B6 were released, the better". He said that the constitutional imperative was "normal" and he referred to the German constitution to support this. It was a legitimate aspiration.

Mallon quoted the "consent" clause in the A.I. Agreement to

how that Unionists had the guarantees they wanted. It was ironic in the extreme that three Unionists had been in the same Dublin Castle only a week previously attending the inauguration of a President who swore to uphold the Irish Constitution which they were trying to change. A referendum on a negative proposal would probably not be carried and could do untold damage. A positive referendum on the three sets of relationships arising out of the political discussions would be a much better idea. He then read in full the note from the IRA recently handed out at checkpoints and to businesses close to the border to show that terrorism is a problem which affects everyone. O'Keefe said Arts. 2 and 3 should be changed to reflect the "consent" clause in the A.I. Agreement. He did not think that the current extradition legislation was tight enough. He also advocated the transfer of prisoners. Currie strongly supported the IFI and hoped that the Plenary would adopt the statement of support for it.

Mates rounded up the debate. He hoped that the Political and Security Committee would continue to meet. He hoped that it would suggest changes in the Constitution. He reminded those who advocated the transfer of prisoners from the mainland to N.I. that this was not about Britain ratifying any Convention but was an internal matter for decision by the British Government. He said extradition "raised the temperature" and that he was "fearful" that it would continue to be a controversial matter. On accompaniment, the British side would press to ensure that this could be done "where feasible". The N.I. Secretary had said that he was awaiting complaints (presumably from Mallon and others) about cases where the policy had not been complied with. He attacked Andrews for trying to put pressure on the British judiciary on the B6 case.

At the end of the debate, the Plenary adopted the Report of the Committee, including the statement on the International

Fund for Ireland. (The statement was issued by Press Section at the end of the debate).

3. Working Sessions - Wednesday, 12th December.

The sessions on Wednesday were devoted to a) the future of the Body and b) the work of Committees C and D.

a) Future of the Body: This was conducted in private session.

Manning suggested that the Body adopt resolutions on the basis of a free vote; that the question of a common tourism programme, North and South, which had been raised at the EC debate on the previous day be put to both Governments; that Plenaries be held more frequently but be of shorter duration; that the Co-Chairmen be elected on an annual basis and that there be a flow of information about the Body. Mallon suggested that each party nominate a spokesman to make a substantive input at the debate instead of the present situation with a multiplicity of speakers making short contributions; that the Body put pressure on Governments to "prize open the oyster", given that the two Governments were not committed to implementing EC directives; that "in the new landscape arising out of the Brooke initiative, one should consider the role of the Body in the changing set of circumstances". Dykes suggested that the frequency of Plenaries was right but that they might be shortened; that there should be a "dynamic injection of subjects"; that the Body consider meeting outside Dublin/London, even in Belfast which might encourage Unionists to join.

Spring suggested that in addition to addressing the Body, Ministers should also take questions and that there should be fewer speakers in debate. FitzGerald said that controversial issues should be tackled, noting that e.g. extradition does not only split along national lines; the Body should act like

a national parliament which would have the beneficial effect of putting pressure on Governments. Owen was opposed to party spokesmen but suggested grouping the issues. She suggested saving money on the Plenary so that Committees could have more resources. A series of motions should be tabled. (She mentioned in passing how the British Member sitting beside her had commented on the excellent briefing which the Irish side had which she had given him to read and wondered if both sides could arrange to exchange briefing material). Kavanagh suggested that the C.Es. of the Tourist Boards North and South could be asked to address the Body to explain what problems, if any, there were for a joint programme. Discrepancy in agricultural policy on both sides of the Border could also be addressed by appropriate Ministers or officials. Cowen said the Body should be mindful of its media image and should be able to discuss sensitive issues in public. The Body shouldn't waste time on issues which could only be dealt with by Governments or national parliaments e.g Arts 2 and 3. The Body should identify and discuss issues which it could change. Deenihan was unhappy with the passive role of Associate members and suggested that, at least, they be invited to attend "home" meetings. The Body should discuss immigration - "many Irish working in England, Catholic and Protestant, were regarded as Paddies" - and the establishment and promotion of training schemes. Prys-Davies suggested that documents for the Plenaries be circulated earlier so that Members would have time to give notice of amendments. Referring to the Minister's speech earlier which had mentioned the important Brooke speech, he said he had not seen the speech in question and suggested that a mechanism be set up to distribute all important statements to Members. Barry suggested that the two Committees which had reported to the Plenary continue to meet, while the other two Committees were active. Carlile said that the Body should sit like a Select Committee and be able to question Ministers, officials and heads of semi-state bodies. Currie thought it was a telling comment that (at least) one

→
The Brooke
Speech

British Member was not aware of the Brooke speech.

b) Work of Committees C and D. This debate was conducted in public.

- Committee C: Known as the Economic and Social Committee, this will be chaired by Dick Spring. It will deal with The Irish in Britain and Tourism, with the latter being covered by Sir Giles Shaw, who is the Shadow Chairman.

Spring referred to the plight of many young Irish people in Britain and quoted information from various sources, including the Manager of Conway House, on the levels of poverty, depression, mental illness and other social ills. He hoped that the Committee would meet for the first time in London in January to hear submissions from the various groups who were already aware that the Committee would be discussing this matter. Clohessy, Dennehy and MacGiolla also expressed concern about the plight of the (young) Irish in Britain. Prys-Davies said he was amazed at the claims about mental illness and asked Spring to furnish information on it. O'Donoghue said that the application of the PTA was "frightening"; the Irish were singled out for special treatment and their treatment was insensitive. Barry asked that he be allowed to record special appreciation to Nicholas Scott who was "invariably helpful" when approached on these issues.

(Mr. Joe Hayes will be reporting in detail on the above discussion on the Irish in Britain).

- Committee D: Known as the Culture, Education and Environment Committee, this will be chaired by Ken Hind (who had been obliged to return home early). Ahern said that the Committee would deal with the Environment, including Sellafeld and the Irish Sea, in the context of trawlers being interfered with by submarines.

A Summary Report of the Plenary will be prepared by Oireachtas staff and distributed in due course.


Brian Muldoon

14 December 1990

Ccd: Ass. Sec. Gallagher, Counsellors and First Secretaries
Anglo-Irish, Mr. James Farrell, Mr. Joe Hayes

BRITISH-IRISH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY BODY

Members attending Dublin Plenary

IRELAND

BRITAIN

Steering Committee

Jim Tunney TD, Co-Chairman
 Peter Barry TD
 Dick Spring TD

Peter Temple-Morris MP, Co-Chair.
 Stuart Bell MP (L)
 Ken Hind MP (C)

Dermot Ahern TD
 David Andrews TD
 Senator Sean Byrne
 Nora Owen TD
 Peadar Clohessy TD
 Brian Cowen TD
 Austin Currie TD
 John Dennehy TD
 Tom Enright TD
 Garret FitzGerald TD
 Colm Hilliard TD
 Joe Jacob TD
 Liam Kavanagh TD
 Enda Kenny TD
 Tom Kitt TD
 Jimmy Leonard TD
 Tomas MacGiolla TD
 Senator Maurice Manning
 Senator Brian Mullooly
 John O'Donoghue TD
 Jim O'Keeffe TD
 John Stafford TD
 Jimmy Deenihan TD

David Winnick MP (L)
 David Wilshire MP (C)
 Alex Carlile MP (Lib Dem)
 James Couchman MP (C)
 Kevin McNamara MP (L)
 Hugh Dykes MP (C)
 Martin Flannery MP (L)
 Merlyn Rees MP (L)
 Roy Hughes MP (L)
 The Lord Lyell (C)
 Andrew MacKay MP (C)
 Seamus Mallon MP (SDLP)
 Sir Giles Shaw MP (C)
 Michael Mates MP (C)
 John McFall MP (L)
 Norman Miscampbell QC MP (C)
 Sir David Mitchell MP (C)
 The Lord Prys-Davies
 Barry Porter MP (C)

1. cc per
of date: see
as document: signed #1
J. F. O.
B. Muldoon

Ass. Sec. Gallagher,

I attach for your information a copy of a fax from J. Hayes giving details on the debate on the Irish in Britain at the Plenary of the Inter-Parliamentary Body. (I was unavoidably absent for most of the debate).

It is proposed to hold the first meeting of the Committee in London on 15 January 1991. Deputy Spring as Chairman may decide to invite representatives of the various Irish or Irish-linked bodies dealing with immigrants to address the meeting and, if so, it is likely to generate a lot of interest. I am waiting to speak to Deputy Spring to ascertain his intentions in this regard.

Brian Muldoon
Brian Muldoon

20 December 1990

CCd: Ms. P. Cullen

cc'd: = Asst. Sec. Gallagher
 = Ms. Patricia Lullu

FAX

To: HQ
 To: Brian Muldoon

From: Embassy London
 From: Joe Hayes

19.12.90

Inter-Parliamentary Body
Debate on the Irish in Britain - Wednesday, 12 December 1990

1. The Body agreed the following appointments to the sub-Committee to consider the issue of the Irish in Britain.

Irish side: Dick Spring T.D.
 Colm Hilliard T.D.
 Enda Kenny T.D.
 David Andrews T.D.

British side: Sir Giles Shaw M.P. (Con)
 Jim Couchman M.P. (Con)
 Lady Ewart-Biggs (Lab)
 Jim Marshall M.P. (Lab)

Deputy Spring and Sir Giles Shaw were appointed co-Chairmen. The alternates are Joe Jacob, Sir David Mitchell (Con) and David Winnick (Con).

2. Deputy Spring opened the debate. Referring to the latest ESRI mid-term review which forecasts an emigration level of 36,000 in 1991, he spoke of the "failure of our political and economic system". He referred to data which indicated that there is a strong Irish concentration in the lower bands of economic activity in Britain and a disproportionate number of Irish occupants in privately rented accommodation. 76% of Irish male immigrants are within the three lowest manual grades of employment. One in every three occupants of London hostels is Irish and one in every seven living rough is Irish. He referred to what he described as "the disparagement of Irish people" and to their "alienation and isolation" which he said led to a high incidence of depression and mental illness. The sub-Committee should examine how best to "communicate the reality of being Irish in a country which has difficulty coming to terms with Irish culture and experience; how to ensure equity in relation to housing and employment; how to ensure an equitable distribution of public resources and how to facilitate the expression of a unique Irish culture in a multi-cultural society."

-2-

3. Of the British members, Lord Prys-Davies, Hugh Dykes and Sir Giles Shaw participated in the debate. Dykes paid tribute to the Irish community in his constituency which was fully integrated. He accepted however that more might be done in the area of housing. Prys-Davies expressed concern at the incidence of depressive mental illness in young Irish immigrants. Sir Giles Shaw stressed the need for accurate statistics. He referred to the rising graph of immigration and to the large increase of young immigrants in the 18-24 category. Irish members should examine the causes for this steep increase.
4. Other Irish members who spoke included Tom Kitt, Peter Barry and John O'Donnell. Deputy Barry paid tribute to the British Minister for Social Security, Nick Scott for his sensitivity and responsiveness to the problems of Irish immigrants. John O'Donoghue expressed concern about the operation of the PTA. Tom Kitt supported calls for adequate statistics and referred to the need for liaison between the Inter-Parliamentary Body and the Dion Committee.

c.c. Mr. Brendan Lyons
Mr. Paul Murray
Mr. Paul Cullen

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

TO HQ
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLAGHER

FROM LONDON
FROM PAUL MURRAY

BIRMINGHAM SIX APPEAL

My telex of yesterday, sent immediately afterwards, set out the essential outcome of the Appeal Court hearing, that the date for the full hearing had been set for 25 February 1991 and that the Court did not accede to the request that Gareth Peirce be allowed access to the material in the possession of the Devon and Cornwall Police.

This latter point is crucial and has been largely lost in the media coverage of the hearing, indeed, today's "Irish Times", which purports to be semi-verbatim, has got this point wrong, according to my notes and those of the Ambassador. Whereas the "Irish Times" states that Lord Justice Farquharson ruled that any further material could be disclosed at the preliminary hearing (to take place earlier in February), his actual ruling was that if fresh material came to light, then her Counsel (Mansfield) could renew his application for disclosure. This seemingly reasonable ruling is in fact unhelpful to the defence.

Peirce has complained often to me of what Mansfield called yesterday the "Slow dribble of information" to the defence and the manipulation of disclosure by the DPP. For example, he firstly delayed disclosing the Home Office Forensic report to the defence, then he did not release supplementary material, vital to understanding the report, until last week. Peirce feels that it is only by being allowed access to the mass of material being held by the Devon and Cornwall Police that she can really get to grips with the facts of the case.

Approach of the DPP

Probably the most encouraging sign at yesterday's hearing was the reasonable tone of Counsel for the DPP, Mr Boal. The Ambassador has commented on what seemed a virtual abandonment of the adversarial system and this is in line with private assurances I had received from the Crown Prosecution Service, that the Crown would seek to present the evidence in an essentially neutral light. I was told that the DPP himself felt that the vigour of presentation should be limited and the possibilities of the adversarial system not exploited to the limit.

Having said that, however, the substance of the DPP's approach cannot be said to unduly favour the appellants. The arguments of the counsel for the six, that the forensic evidence was discredited, seem to have been accepted by the Crown and Boal suggested the possibility of an agreed stance on this evidence. His argument that time had to be allowed for, among other things, a response to be received from Dr Skuse, smacked of prevarication however.

Similarly, the arguments of the appellants' counsel that the confessional evidence was discredited by the ESDA tests, that George Reade and other policemen must have lied at the trial, seem compelling. The DPP's argument, that time must be allowed to interview these Police Officers, may not be as reasonable as it seems. Reade was, after all, interviewed by the Devon and Cornwall Police before the last appeal and could provide no convincing explanation of the so-called "Reade Schedule", alleged by the defence to have been a blueprint for perjury. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal accepted his probity. If Reade and the other Policemen did perjure themselves, they demonstrated that they were skilful and convincing liars.

The assumption is perhaps being made that the Devon and Cornwall inquiry will inevitably be helpful to the defence. However, it is possible though I think it unlikely that by recording any defence made by the Police of their actions, they will provide the Court with the means of exonerating them and, by extension, sustaining the case against the six. The approach of the Court in 1987/8 should perhaps be recalled: then defence witnesses (including a Morecambe Magistrate) were simply disbelieved and those for the Crown given credence. In the forensic area, when Skuse was discredited, Dr Drayton was brought forward (and, it would seem, misinterpreted) to shore up the evidence.

New Forensic Evidence

As reported by telex yesterday, Mansfield alleged yesterday that two men on a ferry who tested positive for nitroglycerine in the same way as the Six had the results discounted on the basis of having been in contact with adhesive tape and, more importantly, that this was known to the Crown before the last appeal and not disclosed. This provides a parallel with the Guildford Four case where last week's BBC TV "Panorama" programme alleged that Crown Counsel did not disclose vital alibi evidence. If Mansfield's allegation proves correct, then the suspicion of official wrongdoing extends beyond Policemen and Scientists to the DPP, his Officials and Counsel.

Boal argued yesterday that the need to acquaint a new team of Crown Barristers with the case was part of the reason for the delay: Four of the Counsel who acted for the prosecution previously (two at the trial and two at the last appeal) were now on the bench. Some of them at least may be vulnerable if Mansfield's allegation about non-disclosure is true.

I was impressed by the seeming openness and neutrality of the judges yesterday and, conversely, worried by Mike Mansfield's inability to back off a line which he was being told not to pursue. Whatever the merits of that particular line, alienating the bench did not seem to be good tactics. On the other hand, Lord Justice Farquharson's comments that the judges would not allow the amount of reading they had to do on the case to spoil Christmas and a reference to not wasting taxpayer's money demonstrated a certain lack of sensitivity on his part.

Finally, I might mention a trivial point. Yesterday's hearing was held in a tiny courtroom which had a gallery that was however kept closed, notwithstanding the fact that the appellants were not appearing in Court and there was presumably no acute security factor. The same Court was used for the Winchester Three Appeal, one can only speculate that it is now favoured for Irish Political Cases with the intention of keeping attendance to a minimum. It took some effort on my part to get Deputies Roche and Andrews, as well as a representative of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy and myself into the Court.

W5257

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8


(i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed:
840/3900

(ii) How many documents have been abstracted: 1

(iii) The date of each such document: 19/12/1990

(iv) The description of each document: Personal comments relating to legal case

(v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8(4) c



Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 24/11/2020

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

17, GROSVENOR PLACE,
SW1X 7HR

Telephone: 01-235 2171

TELEX: 916104

FAX COVER SHEET

3096- 18ase

FAX NO:

DATE: 19/12/90

TO: HQ

FOR: OLIVER GROGAN

FROM: PAUL MURRAY

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: ONE

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL:

HOME OFFICE ADVICE ON HOME SECRETARY'S POWERS OF RELEASE FOR B6 IN CONTEXT OF DEPUTY BRUTON'S QUESTION.

HOME SECRETARY DOES NOT HAVE POWER OF RELEASE THAT WOULD MEET THE TERMS OF THE DEPUTY'S QUESTION. POWERS OF RELEASE ARE:

1. EXECUTIVE RELEASE, DESIGNED TO ALLEVIATE PRISON OVERCROWDING IN THE CONTEXT OF LARGE-SCALE ARRESTS FOLLOWING INDUSTRIAL ACTION. THIS POWER WAS NOT CONCEIVED AS APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL CASES AND IT IS NOT CLEAR IF IT EVEN REMAINS ON THE STATUTE BOOK. IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY:
2. RELEASE IN LICENCE. LIFE SENCENCE PRISONERS CAN ONLY BE RELEASED ON LICENCE (IE, THERE IS NO PAROLE) AND THEN ONLY IF THERE IS A POSITIVE RECOMMENDATION FROM THE PAROLE BOARD (THIS IS A LEGAL REQUIREMENT). THE SIX HAVE STATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT RELEASE ON LICENCE.
3. ROYAL PEROGATIVE OF MERCY. THIS CAN BE EITHER A FREE OR A CONDITIONAL PARDON (CONDITIONAL IS NOT USED ANY MORE: IT USED TO BE MAINLY FOR COMMUTING THE DEATH SENCENCE). ANY PARDON WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS OF INNOCENCE AND IS USED ONLY WHEN THE HOME SECRETARY IS CONVINCED THAT THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE SAFETY OF A CONVICTION WHICH CANNOT BE DEALT WITH BY THE COURTS. THE MOST CELEBRATED USE OF THE POWER WAS BY WILLIAM WHITELAW AS HOME SECRETARY IN THE LUTON POST OFFICE ROBBERY CASE BUT HE DID SO THEN ON THE ADVICE OF THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. AS THE CASE OF THE SIX IS CURRENTLY BEFORE THE COURT, THIS WOULD BE SEEN AS NOT APPLYING IN THIS CASE. THE SIX HAVE ALSO STATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A PARDON.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

17, GROSVENOR PLACE,
SW1X 7HR

Telephone: 01-235 2171

TELEX: 916104

Confidential

17 December 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

Media reactions to the B6 decision

In conversations this afternoon with a number of journalists who attended this morning's preliminary hearing of the Birmingham Six appeal, the following points of interest arose.

There was no real surprise that the Court decided on a full hearing and that this would not take place until 25 February. The decision by the defence not to apply for bail was also widely expected.

There had never been any likelihood of a Guildford-type outcome on this appeal, i.e., of the DPP throwing in the towel in advance of a full hearing. For a variety of reasons, including the reluctance of the courts to be seen once again to be preempted by the DPP, a full hearing was always the likeliest outcome - "if only for the optics", as one contact observed.

At the same time, it is clear to most journalists who have followed the case that the Devon and Cornwall team still has some distance to go before it can produce its final report. Several police officers have still to be reinterviewed and confronted with the new evidence. The Devon and Cornwall report must cover this ground if the Court is to be asked to consider the new evidence.

The date chosen is clearly a compromise between, on the one hand, the DPP's desire to hold over the full appeal hearing until after the report is ready and, on the other, the Court's (and perhaps the DPP's own) sensitivity to accusations of undue delay. Several journalists had been speculating on a date around the end of January or, more likely, some time during February.


*cc PSAT
re weekly press
statements, on 12
Gallagher
DM*

A point of interest yesterday, in conversations after the hearing, was whether the DPP might avail of the preliminary hearing scheduled for early February in order to "declare his hand". Having received the final police report, he might choose to indicate those parts of the evidence which he still proposes to defend and those on which he is willing to concede. Such an approach would enable the Court to work towards its own view of the case in advance of the full hearing. It might, therefore, decide that it could dispense with the need to summon a whole series of witnesses. This would have the obvious merit, from the Crown's point of view, of preventing court appearances by witnesses such as George Reade whose credibility has been seriously undermined. It should also make for a fairly expeditious hearing.

A second point of interest yesterday was the emergence of new evidence relating to swabs taken from two passengers on a ferry to "Ireland" on the night of the bombings. Most of my media contacts regarded this as a dramatic new development which could have a crucial impact on the outcome of the appeal. One or two intend to follow this up and hopefully to make contact with the two individuals concerned.

My contacts were also interested in the possibility that the Six might still apply for bail between now and 25 February. After this morning's hearing, Gareth Pierce indicated privately that she will keep the question of a bail application under review and is considering talking to the men again about it. There is a general view on the part of the journalists covering the case, which the DPP's Office has evidently done little to discourage, that a bail application would probably be successful. (A report in yesterday's Sunday Express, for example, suggested that Crown lawyers would have been sympathetic to any bail application; it also suggested that the DPP's staff had expected the Six to seek bail today). One advantage of a bail application for the Six, one contact observed, is that it would enable the defence to probe the extent to which the DPP plans to contest the appeal, something which was not revealed at today's hearing.

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

17, GROSVENOR PLACE,
SW1X 7HR

Telephone: 01-235 2171

TELEX: 916104

Confidential

*CC PRT; PRT
M. A. H.; PRT
G. H. H.
J. H.*

14 December 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

John Major's first Commons replies on NI

As you are aware, the Prime Minister replied to two questions of Anglo-Irish interest during Prime Minister's Questions yesterday.

The first question, by Peter Robinson, referred to Wednesday's debate in Dail Eireann and asked whether the Prime Minister would encourage the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. In response, the Prime Minister said that he certainly proposed to study carefully what was said the previous day.

The second question, by John Taylor, asked whether the Prime Minister recognised the unease and alarm caused by Peter Brooke's recent indication that the British Government has no strategic or economic interest in NI. Taylor asked whether the Prime Minister would prove that he is the leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party, not just the Conservative Party, and support and strengthen the Union between GB and NI. In response, the Prime Minister said that Taylor would know that troops were in NI both because that is the wish of the people of NI and to ensure the security of the people of NI. That is and remains the position. It is generally accepted throughout NI that the Secretary of State is one of the best friends that the province has had for a long time.

These replies, the first on Anglo-Irish issues since the new Prime Minister took over, were the subject of favourable comment among a number of Westminster journalists to whom I talked later. There was a general

view that, with Unionist MPs clearly trying to set traps for him, Major had shown himself to be sure-footed, keeping well away from the traps and confining himself to innocuous and non-committal language. John Cole remarked jocosely to me that the replies were proof that the new Prime Minister knows nothing about Northern Ireland - but, in contrast to his predecessor ("who also knew nothing"), he has the good sense to say as little as possible in public about it. One or two contacts observed that, with his effusive praise for Brooke as "one of the best friends the province has had for a long time", Major appeared to be overlooking the contribution made by Douglas Hurd. One contact remarked that, given Major's complete unfamiliarity with Irish issues, it was even possible that he had forgotten that Hurd had once held the NI portfolio.

By way of background to John Taylor's question to the Prime Minister, it is worth mentioning that, according to indications we had had, the Brooke speech of 9 November caused some flutters of concern not just among Unionist MPs but also in right-wing Tory circles (possibly inspired by the NI Conservatives).


Following the speech, Laurence Kennedy of the NI Conservatives complained bitterly to Peter Brooke about the suggestion that the British Government has "no selfish strategic or economic interest in NI". He argued that the British Government cannot be neutral in this matter and that its role should be one of actively shoring up support for the Union. Jonathan Caine of Central Office told me that, with his attacks on Brooke both in public and in private since the 9 November speech, Kennedy has been steadily eroding whatever little sympathy and goodwill the NI Conservatives enjoy within Government circles and at Central Office.

In a conversation in the Commons yesterday, Barry Porter MP, who attended this week's meeting of the B-I Interparliamentary Body in Dublin, said that he had detected a certain amount of "excitement" in Dublin, arising from the 9 November speech, about what was perceived there to be a shift of policy on the British Government's part. He had also detected a corresponding degree of concern on the part of Unionists about the speech. He therefore raised it with Brian Mawhinney on the margins of yesterday's meeting of the EPA Select Committee, suggesting that there was a need for the Government to make clear that there had been no policy shift. Mawhinney reportedly said that an opportunity would be found to make this clear.

The question from John Taylor then intervened. Porter was satisfied by the absence from Major's reply of any reference to, let alone endorsement of, the suggestion that Britain has no strategic or economic interest in remaining in NI. (He also noted that, in quoting the relevant phrase from Brooke's speech, Taylor had omitted the qualifying adjective "selfish" - a qualification which Porter found significant). On the other hand, Kevin McNamara, in a separate conversation, was pleased with Major's reply because it gave no comfort whatsoever to the Unionists.

It is worth mentioning, finally, that, in the context of a visit which Dr Garret FitzGerald is to pay to London next month, Barry Porter yesterday asked David Trimble whether he would be prepared to meet Dr FitzGerald informally. When Trimble reacted hesitantly, saying he had already met Dr FitzGerald on a previous occasion, Porter pressed him, saying that he would be inviting Ken Maginnis as well. Trimble remained non-committal. Explaining this approach in a private conversation afterwards, Porter said he had formed a strong impression from his contacts in Dublin this week that Fine Gael, Labour and the Workers Party are all "coming around to sympathy for the Unionists' position" (on Articles 2 and 3 as well as on other issues).

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place,
London SW1X 7HR.

18 December, 1990.

*cc Peter
M. Kelly, P.S.
C. J. A. I*

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Dublin.

Dear Dermot

You might be interested in the attached all too predictable letter from Ivor Stanbrook which was awaiting me on my return from Dublin. I had written to him a few days ago suggesting that we might get together for a chat. I might pursue the slight opening implicit in his willingness to meet socially although I can't say that I look forward to that particular cup of tea!

With kind regards,

Joe Hayes
Counsellor

From: IVOR STANBROOK, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

7 December 1990

Dear Mr Hayes,

Thank you for your letter.

It is kind of you to suggest that we meet. For social purposes I would be only too happy to join you at any convenient time and place - e.g. you could come to tea here at the House of Commons - but otherwise I fear I take the view that relations between Britain and other sovereign states are for the Foreign Affairs specialists. My interest in Northern Ireland is based on wanting to see it kept as part of the United Kingdom and while the Irish Republic's government seeks to interfere in its affairs I do not want to condone that interference by formal contacts.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Ivor Stanbrook".

END of file