

START of file

Mr. B. Nason.

SECRET

ANGLO-IRISH SECTION

WEEKLY BRIEF

WEEK ENDING 27th JULY 1990



C O N T E N T S

1. Reports from Anglo-Irish Secretariat
 - Report on Secretary of State's reply to Parliamentary Question concerning Political talks
 - Report on Guide to the Emergency Powers
 - Second Annual Report (1989) of Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland

2. Contact and Information Work
 - Meeting with Mark Durkan, SDLP
 - Conversations with SDLP Councillors in Antrim

3. Report on Meeting of the Political and Security Sub-Committee of the British-Irish Interparliamentary Body

4. Paper on Economic Regeneration of West Belfast

5. Reports from Embassy London
 - The Ridley Affair - A Downturn in Conservative Fortunes
 - May Inquiry: Interim Report on the Maguire Case
 - May Inquiry: A Conversation with Alastair Logan
 - Conversation with John Lyttle, Advisor to the Archbishop of Canterbury
 - Conversation with John Smith MP
 - Conversation with Mike Gapes, International Officer of the Labour Party
 - Report on The Sun Newspaper

6. Report from Embassy, Washington
 - Telex on AOH Convention

231/2

1

SECURE FAXIMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

26 JULY 1990

FOR: H.Q.

FROM: Belfast

FOR: A/Sec Gallagher

FROM: N. Ryan

PST/psuc/AG
 Mr. Walker: POS
 re letter: 12
 Gallagher
 Box

The British side have now given me the text of an answer to a Parliamentary Question which the Secretary of State will give in Parliament this afternoon (this relates back to the question put down by Andrew MacKay M.P. on 19 July 1990, Hansard columns 1157-8). The text is being faxed to you now. In handing over the text the British side said the following:

- (i) the Secretary of State would not be doing any additional briefing on the background;
- (ii) he wanted us to know that when the so-called deadline was set it was not because of parliamentary imperatives but because the holiday season was looming and he anticipated that once the month of August commenced it would be difficult to carry the process forward in the absence of key players;
- (iii) the Secretary of State hopes that the political parties and also the Irish side will maintain discretion and hold the existing line during the pause;
- (iv) the Secretary of State wishes it to be clear that he does not rule out the possibility of a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs before September.

CONFIDENTIAL

231/3

Pursuant to answer to Arthur Markey MP
on 19/7/90 (Hansard cols 1157-8)

SECRETARY OF STATE

Despite a further intensive round of exchanges, it has not yet proved possible to secure final agreement on the basis for holding political talks.

After the holiday period, when all the main potential participants should again be available, I intend to resume my efforts to resolve the outstanding issues. For that purpose I plan to hold further meetings with the political parties and with representatives of the Irish Government in September.

CONFIDENTIAL

BÉAL FEIRSTE

BELFAST

25 July 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

1. cc *Chick* AI
Rox
2. *Mr. Munn*

Dear Assistant Secretary

Guide to the Emergency Powers

The British side have now presented us with the final version of the above Guide which is being published to-day and I am enclosing copies for information.

As you know, the Guide relates to the exercise by the police and the Army in Northern Ireland of their extensive powers of arrest and powers to enter and search houses and to stop, question and detain persons under both the PTA and EPA. It also covers the rights of suspects detained for questioning under the EPA (they can be held for up to 7 days) and guidance to the police on their treatment.

Broadly speaking, the Guide covers the same ground as the Codes of Practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act in England and the corresponding Order in Northern Ireland but is not as extensive in its treatment of the issues. The major difference, however, is that the Codes of Practice have statutory effect whereas the Guide is non-statutory.

The history of the Guide is that we were first given sight of it in draft form in 1988 and we offered extensive comments on it in a paper given to the British side on 16 December 1988. The British side responded in January 1989 saying, in effect, that they would be taking most of our comments on board.

The published version goes some considerable distance toward meeting one important outstanding point we had made on the meaning of "reasonable suspicion" (see paragraphs 5 to 7 of the opening section on page 7) and, while the guidance contained there is not as extensive as that contained in the Codes of Practice, it is helpful on the point about 'stereotyping' in that it provides clearly that reasonable suspicion can never be supported on the basis of stereotype images of certain persons or groups of persons.

The only other changes of note since the last published draft concerns a point made by Lord Colville in his report on mouth swabs in which he pointed out that the Guide had not covered arrest under S.14(1), Schedules 2 or 5 of the PTA. This is now covered in paragraph 91 (page 48).

Lord Colville's points on interview records in which he compared the Guide unfavourably to the Codes of Practice and also on guidance as to what constitutes oppression - covered in the Codes but not in the Guide - (see Colville's Report paragraph 6.4 (i)) have not been implemented.

Yours sincerely



Noel Ryan
Assistant Secretary

c.c. Mr. Paul Hickey, Department of Justice.

BÉAL FEIRSTE

BELFAST

25 July 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

cc
Gallagher #1
rev
2
M. W. W.

Dear Assistant Secretary

Second Annual Report (1989) of Independent Commission
for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland

The second report of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland covering 1989 has now been published and copies are enclosed for information.

As you know, the Commission was set up under the Police (N.I.) Order 1987 to oversee the investigation of complaints against the police. It commenced operation in February 1988. Its first annual report covered the 10 month period to end of 1988.

As the report itself makes clear, the Commission has a statutory duty to supervise any complaint involving death or serious injury and has discretion to supervise the investigation of any other complaint against a police officer if it considers that it is desirable in the public interest. In its supervisory role the Commission has the power to approve or veto the appointment of the investigating officer. At the end of an investigation which it has supervised, the Commission must issue a statement saying whether the investigation has been conducted to its satisfaction. The Commission has power to direct that disciplinary charges should be preferred against a police officer who has been the subject of a complaint.

Main points of interest

Points of interest in the statistical part of the report seem to me to be the following:

- The Commission's caseload did not substantially increase in 1989 (2057 new cases were notified as against 1678 for 1988 (10 months)).

- The number of cases supervised increased by about 20% (175 as against 111) but this still represents only 8.5% of the total.
- Only 31% of the new cases supervised in 1989 were completed during the year, confirming the picture that emerged in 1988 that investigations are slow.
- Assault is again the highest single category of complaint representing 41% of the total (most of these were referred to the DPP); next comes incivility and then irregularity in procedure.
- Of the cases completed to date, in only 11 of these (involving 14 charges) were formal disciplinary charges preferred during 1989 and in only 2 of these were convictions sustained - one of abuse of authority initiated by the police and one of disobedience to orders initiated by the Commission.
- A further 16 cases were still under consideration for formal disciplinary charges at end of 1989.
- Informal disciplinary action was taken in another 54 cases.
- 14% of all complaints relate to arrests under Emergency legislation.

Comments by the Commission

The Commission said that it was impressed by the standard of work of the investigating officers. (Police officers still conduct the investigations.) It explains in some detail the operation of the double jeopardy rule (see paras. 3.6 et seq) and says that, notwithstanding the operation of this rule, there were still cases where the Commission itself or the Chief Constable considered that disciplinary charges should be pursued even though the DPP had directed no prosecution. In one case where a charge of assault was ruled out by the DPP, a charge of disobedience to orders was sustained. In another case the Commission directed the Chief Constable to prefer a disciplinary charge.

The Commission says that it uses its 'experience' to draw attention to general issues arising from complaints and noted a number of remedial actions taken by the Chief Constable during the year. These included

- (i) revised procedures in a particular Division for directing an arrest;
- (ii) a full review of the Aliens Branch of the Service;
- (iii) new procedures on medical forms;
- (iv) the circulation to the Service of appropriate advice on the sensitivity of searching persons in public places;
- (v) changes in procedures for the distribution of duty programmes at a particular police station; and
- (vi) the introduction by Traffic Branch of a new system of keeping records of breath tests.

In informal resolution cases, the Commission believes it would be preferable to have on record the complainant's written acknowledgement of his satisfaction with how his complaint had been resolved; only about 6% of all completed complaints are resolved informally.

Comment

Clearly the presence of the Commission in this area is helpful - at least in the sense that the present arrangements are better than what existed previously - and its power to supervise complaints is, in practice, more far-reaching than the power to 'supervise' would imply. However, as the report shows, progress in completing complaints is woefully slow and, regrettably, the percentage of cases in which police officers have complaints sustained against them very low. Factors contributing to this are the double jeopardy rule, the high standard of proof required to sustain a charge (beyond reasonable doubt) and, presumably also, the fact that, notwithstanding the Commission's power to supervise, the police themselves still conduct the investigations.

The most important case dealt with by the Commission during the year concerned the events surrounding the death of Seamus Duffy, killed by a plastic bullet in Belfast in August 1989. This case was referred by the Chief Constable to the Commission. The case, though not completed by the end of the year, is dealt with in some detail in Appendix II of the Commission's report.

Yours sincerely



Noel Ryan
Assistant Secretary

c.c. Mr. Tom Goff, Principal, Department of Justice.

Confidential

Meeting with Mark Durkan, SDLP, Derry,

26 July, 1990.

Talks

1. He referred to the recent contacts between John Hume and the two Unionist leaders and to the positive spirit in which they were conducted. Durkan's growing impression is that both Molyneaux and Paisley see Brooke's initiative as perhaps their last chance to secure a deal into which they can personally have a significant input. Both are approaching retiring age and there is a consciousness - particularly on Paisley's part - that without some new arrangement which can be presented as an improvement for Unionists on the Agreement, their legacy will ultimately be a negative one (i.e. as the Unionist leaders who "allowed the Anglo-Irish Agreement to happen").
2. That is not to say that Molyneaux and Paisley are any closer to working out a joint position on what they want to achieve. Durkan believes that this remains a very large hurdle in their path. In that sense getting as far as the Conference table will be the "easy part" for them.
3. As regards the conduct of the full process, should it indeed get underway, Durkan believes that the best approach for Dublin and the SDLP would be one similar to that adopted by Brooke in his contacts with the Unionists to date - a slow, step-by-step process. Durkan believes that any presentation at the outset by either side of a "grand plan" would be disastrous - any final outcome would have to be seen to have evolved during the talks and could not be such as to clearly be the "brainchild" of one side or the other ("uncertain parentage" was the phrase he used).

Current nationalist grassroots view

4. In separate conversations yesterday with a number of SDLP Councillors and with Pat Hume, I raised the question of whether there was any increase in pressure at nationalist

grassroots level to get a talks process going (particularly against the background of Dr. Cahal Daly's remarks and claims in some quarters of the media that Dublin and the SDLP were becoming "obstacles" to the process). The unanimous (and emphatic) view was that there was no such increase in pressure from the ground and that the strong sense remained that the priority had to be on getting the process right ("if it is not right, far better to leave it"). Support, therefore, for the line being taken by the Government and the SDLP remained very firm.

Irish Presidency

5. Durkan referred to the continuing good publicity stemming from the Irish Presidency of the EC. He drew my attention to an article in The House Magazine (the weekly journal of the Commons and the Lords) of 2 July by George Jones, political editor of the "Daily Telegraph". The article (copy attached) refers in very positive terms to Ireland's handling of the Presidency. Durkan feels that this kind of publicity is invaluable and fully vindicates the decision by the Government to attach such high priority to the Presidency.

JJC
T. O'Connor.

27 July, 1990.

c/c Mr. Gallagher, Counsellors, Secretariat, Section, Box

WEEK OUT
WESTMINSTER

Dublin Summit Take Two

For a few moments the pressures of international summity were forgotten. Even Mrs Thatcher (hardly renowned for her liking for sport) went to the British delegation room in Dublin Castle to watch the dramatic penalty goal shootout which took Ireland's team into the world cup quarter finals.

The Taoiseach Charles Haughey was "over the moon" while Mrs Thatcher said she was "delighted" for the Irish. Scores of journalists from Britain and other EC countries broke off from reporting the European Council meeting to watch the Ireland v Romania game — cheering enthusiastically alongside their Irish colleagues.

Yet within a few hours, the bitter legacy of 20 years of troubles in Northern Ireland had intruded on the summit. The news of the bombing of the Carlton Club in London was relayed to Mrs Thatcher as she sat down to dinner with Mr Haughey and other EC heads of Government.

The atmosphere changed perceptibly. While the cheers of the crowds, celebrating their success well into the night, could be heard within the walls of Dublin Castle, the British press found themselves once again engaged in the sombre task of getting reaction to another terrorist outrage.

The bombing may have knocked the summit off the front pages — presumably the IRA's principal motive — but it should not be allowed to wreck a considerable Irish success in hosting the summit.

Until assuming the EC presidency, Mr Haughey had been stereotyped as an Irish nationalist politician, with little interest in international affairs. But he found himself presiding over the Community at a time of momentous events in Europe — Ger-

man reunification and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe as well as the quickening pace of political, economic and monetary union in the Community.

Dublin 1990 will go down as the summit at which Mrs Thatcher signed up to two inter-governmental conferences to be launched in Rome in December, which Chancellor Kohl of West Germany confidently asserted were the beginning of the road to a federal United States of Europe. It seemed a far cry from Mrs Thatcher's celebrated Bruges speech of 1988 where she hoisted her battle standard against a Euro-superstate.

"The EC presidency is an invaluable opportunity to bask in the international limelight"

A further indication of the accelerating pace of political union is the trend towards holding four instead of two Euro-summits a year. The French started it last year, calling an extra one to discuss the Community's reaction to the momentous events in Eastern Europe. Mr Haughey followed suit with an additional summit in April to discuss German unification (though it was hijacked by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand to put political union on the agenda).

Not to be outdone, the Italians (who have assumed the EC presidency for the next six months) arrived in Dublin insisting they, too, would have two summits — though they still had to find an emergency to call one. Fortunately the failure to reach agreement on a £10 billion package of aid to rescue the Soviet economy provided the Italians with just the excuse they needed.

Mrs Thatcher registered her annoyance. "I think it will not be wise if we go from one meeting to two meetings per presidency," she said. But she was overruled by her fellow heads of Government. She may have no difficulty in striding out on the world stage. But for other, lesser mortals the EC presidency is an invaluable opportunity to bask in the international limelight.

The Irish certainly approached the summit with conviction. An estimated £30 million was spent on refurbishing Dublin Castle and other works associated with the summit.

Within its walls, a well-equipped, international press centre had been set up with briefing rooms, desks and telephones, and satellite links for the hundreds of jour-

nalists covering the summit. Such events, with many languages being spoken seemingly all at once, are a veritable Tower of Babel. Yet the Irish coped brilliantly — it was certainly no occasion for Irish jokes.

It is to be hoped British officials were taking careful note. Next summer Britain will be hosting the G7 Economic Summit (the United States, Japan, Canada, West Germany, France, Italy and the UK) in London and in the second half of 1992 — the culmination of the single market in Europe — Britain will hold the presidency of the EEC.

Recently, EC and G7 countries have vied with each other in the lavishness of their preparations, using such occasions as a blatant showcase for national achievements. The Germans began a trend of presenting all those attending the summit with a compact disc of music by national composers. The French followed it up with more lavish gifts, including a free transistor radio at the economic summit last July, while last December at Strasbourg (which is campaigning to become the permanent home of the European Parliament) everyone was presented with a bottle of wine, local liqueurs, CDs and a paperweight.

The Irish, not to be outdone, handed out bags containing a bottle of 12 year old Irish Whiskey, two CDs of traditional music, plus videos and books on the attractions of Ireland — and a parting gift of a side of smoked Atlantic salmon.

One can just see the hullabalo that will occur if Britain follows suit at the forthcoming London summits: questions in the House about waste of taxpayers' money and lurid stories in the tabloid press about Euro-junketing.

As a regular attender at such events, I have to declare an interest. But there is a serious issue to be resolved. Such free gifts can easily, and probably rightly, be dispensed with. But arrangements for the hundreds of press and radio journalists who descend on London should not be skimped. The most recent NATO summit at Turnberry, Scotland, was a shambles with the international press accommodated in a leaky, storm-battered marquee, too few telephones and 'Portaloos' lavatories down a muddy path. If the Irish can make a proper job of arranging a summit, surely the British can too. ■

George Jones
Political Editor, Daily Telegraph



Prime Minister of Eire and current EC President, Mr Charles Haughey

Conversations with SDLP Councillors in Antrim, 25 July

Donovan McClelland

1. Cllr. McClelland is an economist who lectures at the University of Ulster in Jordanstown. He was first elected to Antrim Borough Council at last year's local government elections for the strongly nationalist area of Toome, where he unseated a Sinn Fein Councillor. McClelland has since been designated the SDLP representative for South Antrim and is very active on the party's policy committee.

Talks about Talks

2. While McClelland hopes that something positive will emerge from the present exercise, he is also quite sceptical about the serious commitment of the Unionists to the talks process. He fears that their primary purpose is to damage the operation of the Agreement. If the Unionists were serious about reaching a political settlement, one would expect to see some indications of the leadership preparing their followers for the kind of compromises and concessions which will have to be made. There is no evidence that such a reeducation process has begun. Even if a basis were to be found for talks to begin in the autumn, McClelland believes it will be very difficult to reach an accommodation since nationalists and unionists are "diametrically opposed" in what they wish to achieve from the negotiations.
3. Notwithstanding his scepticism about the prospects for talks, McClelland was conscious that there was an important propaganda dimension at stake. The SDLP leadership was very aware of the danger that the party could lose the moral high ground if it was perceived as the obstructionist element in the talks process. McClelland believed that the Unionist

strategy was to ensure that the SDLP would be seen as the intransigent party. He reflected that one byproduct of the current exercise is that, for the first time since the negotiation of the Agreement in 1985, the Unionists are engaging in real political manoeuvring and are showing some sophistication in the process.

4. McClelland said that the SDLP group of constituency representatives was doing some "think-tank" work in preparation for the talks actually getting off the ground. While he himself had favoured the party now preparing proposals on new structures/institutions which could be put on the table once the negotiations were underway, the party leadership had decided otherwise. Instead the leadership intends that the first phase of the talks would be used to talk about, and arrive at a common agreement on, what constitutes the problem. This would be incorporated in a statement of the problem which would be the point of departure for drawing up the relevant institutional proposals.

Electoral Prospects

5. In regard to West Belfast McClelland said that, given the relatively narrow Sinn Fein majority in 1987 and the effort which the SDLP was now putting into the constituency, the seat ought to be winnable at the next election. Nonetheless he admitted that, while Joe Hendron was universally liked and admired within the SDLP, he has a credibility problem as a candidate. For these reasons McClelland felt uncertain about the seat's winnability. In the mid-Ulster constituency McClelland thought that Denis Haughey was an excellent candidate and stood a very good chance of taking the seat at the election after next. While there has been a decline in the Sinn Fein vote in the constituency,

McClelland felt that this would not immediately translate into additional support for the SDLP. Disenchanted Sinn Fein supporters would most likely stay away from the polls at the next election; but they may be ready to vote for the SDLP at the succeeding one.

Malachy McSparran

6. Councillor McSparran is a farmer who comes from a well known nationalist family in the Glens of Antrim (his father was a founding member of the "Irish News"). He represents the area of Cushendun on Moyle District Council. Although not within the inner counsels of the SDLP, he is probably the most prominent nationalist in the Glens.

Talks about Talks

7. McSparran shared the unease of McClelland in regard to the talks process. He did not believe that the Unionists had changed their fundamental attitudes. As far as McSparran was concerned, such a change of heart was a precondition to any political accommodation in Northern Ireland. The speeches and addresses given by the Unionist leadership on Orange Order platforms over the last month (as reported in local newspapers) had still contained all the old triumphalist rhetoric. McSparran believed that the real motivation of the Unionist leadership was to damage the operation of the Agreement. Indeed, local Unionist Councillors in Antrim were already claiming that the Agreement would be set aside and the Secretariat stood down. McSparran said he would have no hesitation in opting for the maintenance of direct rule (tempered by the operation of the Agreement) rather than face the prospect of a Unionist - controlled devolutionary arrangement.

Moyle District Council

8. I asked McSparran about the circumstances in which Moyle District Council - which has a natural nationalist majority - has recently elected a DUP Chairman (Kane). McSparran explained that Kane was elected with the support of his own party, Official Unionists, two independent Unionists and the deciding vote of a nominal independent Nationalist from Cushendun (McDonnell). The quid pro quo was that McDonnell was elected Deputy-Chairman and McSparran thought that there might even have been a deal that the DUP would support McDonnell for the chair next year. McSparran said that McDonnell's support for the DUP had been a "24 hour wonder" and there had been no evident backlash against him in the area. He ascribed this to the high level of political apathy among the local population.

9. McSparran referred to the imminent Local Government Boundary Review and to media speculation that Moyle District Council might disappear and be amalgamated with other surrounding District Councils. (Comment : it had already been intimated to us in the Secretariat that one of the "sensitive issues" which the Review will face is the case for retaining Moyle as a separate entity). Mc Sparran accepted that it was difficult to defend the existence of Moyle on economic or administrative grounds. It was a small District Council and had one of the highest rates in Northern Ireland. This was because of the economic costs of maintaining over 30 miles of coast-line (including five harbours) and of providing the required seaside facilities for visiting tourists.

10. On the other hand, the continued existence of Moyle has an important political dimension. The Glens of Antrim is a

nationalist enclave surrounded on all sides by unionist heartlands (Larne, Coleraine, Ballymoney). Moyle District Council was specifically created in the early 1970s to give the nationalists of the Glens an opportunity to have some institutional voice at local government level. If Moyle disappears and the Glens area is incorporated into the larger neighbouring Districts, the Nationalist Councillors will be "swamped" by the very substantial Unionist majorities on these Councils. McSparran asked that we might make soundings in regard to the British Government's intentions for Moyle and keep him informed of developments.

Adrian O'Neill

Adrian O'Neill

27 July, 1990

c/c Mr. Gallagher
Joint Secretary
Counsellors A/I
Section
Box

Confidential

*File note +
on p. 2.*

3
*cc PST; PSM
H. Miller; PEE
H. Walker; H. Thomas
on H. Walker
Cusler #1
BOM*

Assistant Secretary Gallagher

1. I attach for your information a copy of my minutes of yesterday's meeting of the Political and Security Subcommittee of the British Irish InterParliamentary Body chaired by Deputy Peter Barry. You will note that the Committee has asked for general data on a number of areas covered in discussion. I am passing these on to my successor for follow-up in September along with notes on the Body's work for the rest of the year.
2. Members exchanged views at the beginning of the meeting about political developments in Northern Ireland and the following points were made:

Mr. Stanley Orme MP (Lab.) expressed concern about the perceived impasse in the discussions initiated by Secretary of State Brooke. He said that a reactionary element amongst Unionists was gleeful at present and regarded the Irish Government as being in the dock now. He thought that the Unionists would be seen as the winners unless the logjam was broken. He commented that Molyneaux didn't want integration and thought that he was much more difficult to deal with than Paisley. Unless there was progress the sincerity of the Unionists could not be tested. He understood the difficulties but was concerned at the moment. He added that the Brooke talks were over sold in Britain and expectations had been heightened as a result.

Mr. Michael Mates MP (Con.) thought that there was an element of bluff on both sides. The Unionists were now holding back until a process was formulated. He thought

that there was more than one logjam - the Irish side could not deliver ultimately on Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution for example.

Deputy Fitzgerald acknowledged that it was difficult to make judgements when none of those present were in possession of the full facts. He noted the problem of the timing of the Irish government's participation in talks and the reluctance of the Unionists to start a North-South discussion until the process of integration is started. He thought that the current problem was inevitable unless both Governments had been in agreement beforehand. However the Unionists were now seeking a veto and wanted to force the Irish Government to a deadline. He suggested that Mr. Brooke had brought his finessing too far and had created a problem for himself. He hoped that the two Governments would sort out the difficulties.

Mr. Mates thought that the Unionists' bluff should be called. He did not think that Mr. Brooke would make a statement to the House this week. He added that the Committee was not in a position to say much at this stage on the issue and would have to await developments.

Deputy Ahern commented that the Unionists feel that if they agree to a timetable they would be marginalised. They may feel they have the high ground now but the Irish Government had stood their ground and it would be wrong to give the Unionists a veto. The Committee agreed to discuss this again in the autumn.

Both sub-committees will meet again at the end of October with a view to reporting to the Dublin Plenary in December.

Orla O' Hanrahan

Orla O' Hanrahan

25 July, 1990

Copy : Counsellors,
1st Secs.
Mr. Joe Hayes, Embassy London

W4842,

Informal Notes

Meeting of the Political and Security Sub-Committee of the
British-Irish InterParliamentary Body.

Dublin : Tuesday, 24 July 1990

Present : Deputy Peter Barry (Chairman)
Mr. Michael Mates MP (Shadow Chairman)
Deputy Dermot Ahern
Deputy Brian Cowen
Deputy Garret FitzGerald
Mr. Jeremy Hanley MP
Mr. Stanley Orme MP
(Mr. Andrew McKay MP was unable to attend due to
official business in London).

1. The Committee met in Leinster House at 11.30 a.m. Deputy Barry welcomed the British members to Dublin and Mr. Mates responded.
2. Deputy Barry recalled that he had written informally to Mr. Mates regarding the topic to be examined by the Committee i.e. an assessment of the workings of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. He said that he had suggested some headings for discussion in the letter, but invited other suggestions from members. It was decided to discuss the following subjects:
 - accompaniment
 - extradition
 - International Fund

- confidence in the judicial system
- economic co-operation.

3. Following a general discussion on political developments in Northern Ireland, each of the above topics was discussed. It was decided to seek information as detailed below from the two governments with a view to examining data received at the next meeting:

Accompaniment

Following an exchange of views on this area, Mr. Mates responded to Deputy FitzGerald's expressed concerns about the question of accompaniment of UDR patrols by the RUC. He agreed to seek further information from the Secretary of State on the current position. The Irish side agreed to obtain briefing on the issue from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Extradition

The Committee discussed recent developments on extradition and noted that the Ellis case had begun that day. It was agreed to obtain up to date data on this question. The Committee asked for the following information:

- a note on the 1987 Act and the implications of the recent Supreme Court decision

statistics on the number of cases pending under the old act.

International Fund

Deputy Barry informed the meeting that he had recently spoken with Congressman Brian Donnelly about the Fund. He explained the Congressman's concern about the campaign against the Fund by groups such as Noraid and the Irish National Caucus who wanted to damage its image. Following further discussion it was agreed that the Committee should suggest that a helpful statement in support of the Fund should issue from the next Plenary meeting of the Body in Dublin in December. The Committee asked that copies of the Fund's annual report should be sent to members of the Committee in advance of the next meeting.

Judicial System

Members agreed that there was more confidence in the judicial system in Northern Ireland than heretofore. Discussion covered the courts, the Supergrass issue, the Stalker affair, shoot to kill. It was decided to monitor developments and not to seek further information at present.

Economic Co-operation

It was noted that part of this area would be studied by the EC Sub-Committee on Regional Aid chaired by Mr. Bell. Members thought that there was great potential for implementing cross border economic cooperation in a number of areas and many of the recommendations already made in cross border studies. The Committee noted paragraph 23 of

the Review of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and agreed that information should be sought from both governments about the process of economic co-operation addressed in that paragraph. Mr. Mates agreed that he would approach the Secretary of State Brooke on this. Members were agreed that they wished to establish what action was needed by both Governments in this area. Any appropriate material should be circulated in advance of the next meeting.

Date of next meeting

It was agreed that the Sub-Committee would meet next in London on Tuesday 23 October 1990 at 11.00 a.m. and the meeting would possibly continue into the afternoon. The objective of this meeting would be to examine the data received with a view to drafting a short report for submission to the Steering Committee in November, for discussion at the Dublin Plenary in December.

Orla O'Hanrahan

Orla O' Hanrahan
Clerk of the Committee
25 July, 1990

Copy : Members of Sub-Committee
 Mr. Christopher Durrance, InterParliamentary Union,
 Westminster

Telefón } (01) 780822
Tele }
Telex 25300

Tagairt }
Reference }



AN ROINN GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA 4
Department of Foreign Affairs

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH, 2.
Dublin 2.

16 July, 1990.

Joint Secretary,
Anglo-Irish Secretariat,
Belfast.

Dear Declan,

I refer to the recent British "response" to our paper submitted in the Secretariat at the end of March on the economic regeneration of West Belfast. Enclosed for your information is an internal note which offers some comments on the tone and content of the British paper and outlines our ideas as how the question might now be taken forward.

As will be seen from the enclosed note we consider the overall thrust of the British paper to be regrettably combative in tone. In marked contrast to our original paper - whose tone was constructive and where the language used was measured - the British response would appear to be characterised by a certain sense of petulance and some use of injudicious language (e.g. the statement that the comparison made between the levels of expenditure on MBW and the privitisation packages of Harland and Wolff and Shorts was "wholly fallacious" and the contention that, in our use of economic data relating to job creation figures, we adopted "a very selective and unhelpful approach").

It would also appear that, in some important aspects of detail, the British side seriously misconstrued the points being made in our paper and, based on such misconstructions, maintained that we were being selective in our use of evidence or inaccurate on points of detail (see paras 8-11 of the enclosed note). In addition, the British response contains an inference that the negative perceptions in relation to MBW which were articulated in our paper were unfounded criticisms emanating from the Irish side. However, the fact of the matter is that our paper was based on the critical perceptions of a wide range of responsible and authoritative contacts within West Belfast (see paras 4-6).

Notwithstanding these points (and the others mentioned in the enclosed note), we see little value in preparing a formal counter-paper which would, most likely, exacerbate the wounded sensitivities of the other side. Our primary consideration at this stage is to arrange an early meeting in the Secretariat for a full and hopefully positive discussion with the British side on the economic regeneration of West Belfast.

Nonetheless, in advance of such a meeting we feel it would be useful if you could convey to the British side our preliminary reactions to their paper. In doing so you might - in a suitably nuanced way - draw upon the points made in paras 21-23 of the enclosed note. The purpose of such an exercise would be to convey a signal to the British that while we wish to have a constructive and positive exchange of views with them on MBW and related questions, we nonetheless believe that our original paper constituted a fair and balanced analysis of local perceptions in West Belfast.

If you have any comments on the enclosed note - or indeed have views on how we might now best pursue the discussion of this issue with the other side - I would of course be grateful to have the benefit of your views.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Anderson

Anne Anderson.

Economic Regeneration of West Belfast : recent British paper in response to the earlier Irish paper of 28 March, 1990.

General tone

1. The most striking feature of the British response is its combative and petulant tone. Such a response would not seem to be warranted having regard to the measured tone employed in the original Irish paper. The rather disproportionate response betrays an evident hyper-sensitivity on the part of the British side towards any criticism (constructive or otherwise) of official efforts to economically regenerate West Belfast. This might be attributable to the direct involvement of certain distinguished individuals' in the NIO in the genesis of the MBW initiative (e.g. Minister Needham and Sir Kenneth Bloomfield) who regard the programme as a reflection of their personal commitment to West Belfast.
2. A great deal of the petulance displayed in the British paper stems from the contention that they had previously briefed us fully on developments in West Belfast. Hence it states that "It is disappointing, therefore, to find that almost all the specific issues raised in the Irish paper had been covered in earlier exchanges with the Irish side". They particularly mention a "lengthy and detailed briefing" which was provided in the Secretariat on 5 March, 1990.
3. It is true that MBW has been the subject of some discussion in the Conference in 1988 and 1989. However, it would seem that these exchanges were limited to noting and welcoming the launching of the initiative and its subsequent development. Moreover, the exchanges at official level during this period were largely unilateral briefings without (understandably) substantial inputs on our side. Now that the initiative has been operating for a period of nearly two years, it is not unreasonable, at this juncture, to formulate an Irish analysis of the efficacy of MBW based on our own research and contacts on the ground. The validity of the Irish paper (which represented the preliminary findings of such an analysis) is not rendered void simply because the

issue has already been the issue of some exchanges within the framework of the Conference.

Perceptions

4. In assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of MBW the Irish paper was clearly and explicitly based on the local perception of the programme as made known to us by a range of informed and responsible contacts in West Belfast (including strong critics of MBW - Dr. Alasdair McDonnell - and its public supporters - Fr. Matt Wallace and others involved in the WBEB). When we spoke of "widespread scepticism"; "the initiative running out of steam"; "marginal exercise"; "essentially presentational"; and lack of real financial additionality, we merely reflected the views of these authoritative contacts.
5. While taking umbrage at these criticisms (para 4.3), the British side appear reluctant to accept the fact that our paper was articulating a critical perception - which actually exists in West Belfast - and not advancing an independent and unfounded view. Their injured and dismissive response to these critical perceptions reflects a type of "shoot the messenger" approach.
6. In rebuttal of the "perceptions" articulated by us the British paper states that they (the perceptions) are "completely contrary to the views expressed by a wide range of individuals in the area". It cites expressions of support from Dr. Joe Hendron, Alderman Hugh Smyth, Bishop Cahal Daly and Dr. Alastair McDonald (sic). The fact of the matter, of course, is that there is often a substantial gap between the on-the-record statements of people in public life and their true feelings. For instance, Dr. Joe Hendron in a meeting between the Phoenix Trust and Department officials on 21 December 1989 expressed himself to be dubious about MBW. Dr. Alasdair McDonnell has been one of

the most trenchant critics - in public and in private - of MBW and Government efforts to regenerate West Belfast. The attitude of Bishop Cahal Daly towards MBW is perhaps more qualified than the British paper suggests. As reported recently by Mr. Collins, the Bishop believes that the British are on the right lines in their approach to West Belfast and that, while they deserved recognition for their efforts, they also need to be actively prodded to do more. Finally, it is worth noting that the recent NIO internal study on Community Alienation and Government Policy in Catholic West Belfast acknowledged that, despite the money being invested in the MBW initiative, there still remains widespread scepticism about the Government's willingness to properly address the problems of West Belfast (see page 11 of the extensive Secretariat report of 22 May on this study).

Fairness and accuracy

7. In a number of instances the British response contends that the Irish paper was factually wrong or unfair/selective in its use of evidence. The latter contention is particularly damaging since it calls into question our motives and good faith. In regard to factual material it is, of course, quite possible that our original paper contained some inaccuracies on particular points of detail. Nonetheless and despite the British response, I am satisfied that the Irish paper (as corrected by our addendum of 14 May, 1990) is, in most respects, substantially accurate. Where it is found to be inaccurate it is recommended that we acknowledge the fact (as has already been done in the case of the Adelaide Estate which was the subject of the above-mentioned addendum).
8. In paragraph 4.15 the British accuse us of adopting "a very selective and unhelpful approach" in choosing one particular and unrepresentative year (1982-83) from which to

select a job promotion/creation ratio. Moreover, their paper asserts that we were inaccurate in citing that rate as 22.8%; they maintain it was 22.4%. However, the fact of the matter is that the British entirely misconstrued the point made by us in para. 18 of our paper. We stated that one of the findings of the recent NIEC Report on the IDB was "that in Belfast (my emphasis) the jobs actually created with IDB assistance were as low as 22.8% of the original job promotion targets". In a footnote we cited the exact page of the NIEC Report to support the contention. A copy of the cited page, containing the appropriate table, is attached. As will be seen it provides a job promotion/creation ratio of 22.8% for Belfast over the full six years of the study.

9. The British seemed to have confused our point - which was clearly and unambiguously stated - with the overall job promotion/creation rates in Northern Ireland as a whole. Page 28 of the NIEC Report, Table 4.2, provides these rates. It will be seen from the copy attached that the rate for 1982/83 was 22.4%. But, of course, our paper was not referring to the rates for Northern Ireland as a whole; it was referring to the stated rate for Belfast and, in this respect, it was 100% fair and accurate.
10. In regard to accuracy, the British paper contends that a number of points in our original paper were factually wrong. For instance para 4.18 states that "the points made about IDB's industrial estates in West Belfast are almost all completely wrong". It then goes on to profile each of the four estates (Adelaide, Kennedy Way, Poleglass and Glen Road). However, with the exception of Adelaide (see para below) it would not appear to me that these profiles of the estates are in any way incompatible with the representation of them contained in the Irish paper.

11. Our addendum of 14 May sought to acknowledge and correct the erroneous picture of Adelaide Estate contained in the original paper. However, The British side even take issue with the addendum by refuting our alleged claim that the "majority of units" on Adelaide are occupied for storage/depot purposes. They say that "in fact almost 50% of the units there are occupied by manufacturing companies". A careful reading of our addendum shows that we did not make the alleged claim. The paper stated "A recent, more thorough, visit to the Adelaide estate would suggest that quite a few (my emphasis) of the occupied units are utilised for storage/depot purposes". Admittedly we also said that "the majority of units in the general vicinity of Boucher Road (my emphasis) - including the Balmoral estate - would appear to be distributive centres or retail showrooms". This claim however was not - contrary to the British contention - made in respect of the Adelaide Estate.

12. In relation to the validity of certain analysis contained in Irish paper, the British paper describes the comparison of levels of public expenditure on MBW and on the privitisation packages for Shorts and Harland and Wolff as "wholly fallacious" (para 4.9). It goes on to justify the privitisation packages having regard to the importance of the continued survival of both companies for overall employment prospects in Belfast and for the local economy. It concludes - somewhat sarcastically - that "it is presumed that the efforts to secure the future of these companies are welcomed".

13. The British response totally ignores our clearly stated recognition and appreciation of the fact that the purpose of the very high level of public investment in the two firms was to protect the substantial number of jobs involved. The Irish paper specifically stated that the comparison was

being made "to put the MBW allocation in perspective". It seems reasonable to make a comparative analysis between the level of public expenditure on MBW and the amounts committed to other sectors of priority Government spending (in this case Harland and Wolff and Shorts). The contention that such a comparative analysis has some validity - i.e. is not wholly fallacious - is supported by the inclusion of the very same comparison in the recent NIO internal study on Community Alienation and Government Policy in Catholic West Belfast (see page 11 of the aforementioned Secretariat report).

14. A final minor point concerning accuracy is revealing of the kind of pedantic approach adopted in the British paper. In para 4.29 the British state "The overall redevelopment proposal, known as the Springvale project, is under the leadership of the Department of the Environment (and not the Department of Economic Development as stated in the Irish paper)". While we stand corrected, it is a rather incidental point. The British correction (which seems overtly gratuitous) fails to allow for the fact that our paper was submitted before the formal announcement on Springvale was made (and, therefore, before anyone could possibly know the relevant sponsoring Department). Moreover, given that press speculation in February and March of 1990 was linking the anticipated initiative with Minister Needham, it was not unreasonable for us to assume that the DED were involved in its formulation.

IDB

15. One of the major themes in our paper was the role of the IDB in West Belfast and the "general perception" that it has "not to date attached sufficient priority to the attraction of inward investment into the area". After analysing IDB activity in the area we concluded that "the widespread perception in West Belfast is that the area does not figure

on the agenda of the IDB".

16. The British paper predictably takes issue with this conclusion which it regards as "wholly wrong". In support of its claim that the IDB "is fully committed under the MBW initiative to focusing the attention of the private sector on the West Belfast area" it provides some tangible indications of that commitment. For instance the paper refers to:
- (a) the formation of an internal Steering Group at senior management level to undertake a close monitoring of all IDB's activities in West Belfast;
 - (b) the "regular series of meetings" chaired by the Deputy Chief Executive of the IDB and the Phoenix Trust;
 - (c) work on the publication of an Area Profile for West Belfast "which has been prepared after taking account of advice from the Phoenix Trust's public relations consultant";
 - (d) the holding of local sourcing exhibitions in Andersonstown and the Shankill;
 - (e) the holding of a lunch at IDB House where their overseas representatives met community leaders from West Belfast;
 - (f) the announcement of two 15,000 square metre advance factories for West Belfast; and
 - (g) the inclusion of West Belfast "in many IDB itineraries for visiting industrialists, journalists and VIPs".

17. At first sight this seems quite impressive. On closer inspection however the positive impression is somewhat diluted. In regard to (a) it would be interesting to know when exactly the Steering Group was established. The "regular series of meetings" mentioned in (b) adds up to three meetings (26/11/89, 8/3/90 and 6/6/90). The Area Profile for West Belfast mentioned in (c) is a belated - but welcome - production of a general IDB promotion publication which already exists for a number of other areas in Northern Ireland (Derry, Carrickfergus, Lurgan/Portadown, Newry/Mourne etc). The initiatives mentioned in (d), (e) and (f) were all very recent and were announced after the submission of our paper. The announcement on the construction of the advance factories was made on 9 April and the other two events took place at the end of April. Finally, the inclusion of West Belfast in organised IDB itineraries comes as a surprise to some of our contacts on the local IDB estates. Contacts on the estates in Poleglass and the Glen Road say they have never seen any IDB sponsored groups visit those estates. The Manager of the Kennedy Enterprise Centre in Kennedy Way said he was aware of one sponsored IDB group visit to the estate recently (but this followed from his own initiative in encouraging the IDB to take more of an interest in the Enterprise Centre).
18. Notwithstanding the comments contained in the previous paragraph, there is some evidence that the IDB has in recent months been adopting a more active role in West Belfast as reflected in (d), (e) and (f) in para 16. As none of these developments were evident at the time of the preparation of our paper, we might avail of the first opportunity to place on record our support for these initiatives. It is to be hoped that these measures are the first indications of a more committed and proactive approach by the IDB to West Belfast. In discussion with the British side we might seek information on the plans of the IDB for developing the

advance factories (to be built) on the Glen Road and the Shankill and the recently constructed factory on Adelaide.

Positive Features

19. While the overall tone of the British paper is defensive and combative, there are a number of positive features which, if developed, would constitute good news for West Belfast. The following are worthy of note:

- the statement that the British Government "is committed to a long-term process in Belfast's disadvantaged areas" (para 1);
- the statement that MBW "is a strategy aimed at targeting need, which should lead to expenditure which is better suited to the needs of the disadvantaged, including those in West Belfast, but which will largely be directed through mainstream programmes taking account of the work done by MBW" (para 4.8);
- a recognition by the British Government of "the importance of involving the local community both in the production of plans for the area and in the subsequent delivery of services" (para 4.11);
- a statement that management in Montupet "have been encouraged to meet community leaders, clergy and influenced with the intention of employing as many of its workers from West Belfast as possible" and that "this process is continuing" (para 4.17); and
- an indication that the newly established Government Training and Employment Agency is considering the establishment of a single Community Training Centre in inner-West Belfast "offering increased opportunities for high quality training" (paras 4.47 and 4.48).

It is recommended that we welcome these statements of policy and encourage the British side to further develop such initiatives and measures.

Next Steps

20. While the tone of the British response to our paper - which was intended to be a constructive and helpful input into the discussion between both sides - is disappointing, there is probably little to be gained by a further counter-paper which would, most likely, exacerbate their sense of grievance. At the same time at least some of the points which are mentioned in this note ought to be put to the British side in order to demonstrate that we still consider our original paper to be a reasonably fair and balanced analysis of the perception of MBW and related policies which exists in West Belfast.

21. Consequently it is suggested that we proceed to a meeting in the Secretariat with the British side to discuss the general question of the economic regeneration of West Belfast. At the outset of that discussion we could indicate that:
 - we consider the tone of their paper to have been unduly aggressive in response to an original submission whose purpose was constructive and whose tone was measured and responsible;

 - their response failed to take account of the fact that the Irish paper was based on a critical perception of MBW which actually exists in West Belfast. Even if the British consider this perception to be unfounded, it still indicates a problem concerning a breakdown in communications between the authorities and the local community;

- certain criticisms contained in their response were based on misrepresentations/misunderstandings of the points made in our original paper (see paras 8, 9 and 11 above);

- much play is made in the British paper of the fact that MBW has been the subject of previous discussion in meetings of the Conference and of briefings given to the Irish side in the Secretariat. While this is accepted we would point out that these exchanges were, by their nature, of a limited and general kind. Now that the MBW initiative has been operational for nearly two years we felt it was timely to prepare a detailed analysis of how the programme was progressing based on the views and experience of community leaders in West Belfast. We had hoped that the British side might find such an analysis to be of some value. We were surprised and disappointed by the strong implication contained in their paper that the Irish side had no justification in advancing our own independently arrived at assessment of how the initiative was developing; and

- that, notwithstanding these regrettably negative comments, the Irish side welcomes a number of what we consider to be very positive elements contained in the British paper (see para 17 above) and look forward to further discussing these aspects with the British side.

22. Once those points are on the record we might then say that our primary consideration at this stage is to avoid a prolonged post-mortem over both papers with each side highlighting what it considers to be unfounded statements of fact or opinion. The purpose of the Irish paper was to open a process of dialogue and discussion with the other side on the strategy and policies being adopted in the economic

regeneration of West Belfast. In preparing that paper we drew upon the stated views and experiences of a wide array of contacts (the British suspect that we rely exclusively on Alasdair McDonnell) in West Belfast. The paper faithfully reflected the articulation of these views and opinions.

23. We might indicate that if during the process of discussion with the British side it becomes evident that certain contentions contained in the paper are untenable, we will acknowledge that fact (as we have already done in the case of our error on the extent of the Adelaide industrial estate). We wish to be helpful and constructive and to do whatever we can to contribute to the economic and social development of West Belfast. Through our network of contacts in the area we may be able to play a positive role in helping to avoid some misperceptions or failures of communication between the local community and the official authorities.

Irish Objectives for the Meeting

24. Heretofore our exchanges with the British side on the economic regeneration of West Belfast have been occasional and confined to the broad sweep of policy. If we are to make any substantial input into the MBW programme and related policies we need to be able to engage the British side in a sustained dialogue. Moreover, this sustained dialogue needs to be conducted at a level of detail which allows us to speak with some knowledge and authority on the various socio-economic issues which are of concern to the people of West Belfast. In this way there is some hope that our input may translate into tangible improvements on the ground.
25. We might seek to address this problem over the coming months by developing, with the help of the Secretariat, an appropriate range of contacts in the official Agencies and

in the MBW Central Unit. (In this connection, I understand that it is planned to invite some IDB officials to the Secretariat in the near future for an informal exchange of views over lunch/dinner. A Division presence at this meeting may open up channels of communication/information which could be used on an ongoing basis).

Adrian O'Neill

Adrian O'Neill

14 June, 1990.

IDB Job Creation by Location

4.30 With unemployment rates ranging widely across Northern Ireland, from 11 per cent in Ballymena to 30 per cent in Strabane (mid-1989 figures) it is important to know where IDB jobs are being created. The ideal situation would clearly be to create jobs where they are most needed. The information presented in Table 4.10 shows that IDB assisted firms in County Londonderry created 2,723 jobs, almost one-third of the overall total of jobs created. Indeed Belfast and Counties Londonderry and Down received almost two-thirds of all the jobs created. However, of these areas only in County Londonderry did IDB assisted firms achieve a significantly high attainment ratio.

TABLE 4.10
Job Creation by Firms Assisted by IDB,
1982-83 to 1987-88, by Location within Northern Ireland

	Employment Change 1982-83 to 1987-88	Attainment Ratio (%)
Co. Antrim ¹	915	25.7
Co. Armagh	1,157	38.8
Belfast	1,409	22.8
Co. Londonderry	2,723	60.9
Co. Down ¹	1,502	46.0
Co. Fermanagh	551	88.4
Co. Tyrone	1,006	56.0
Total	9,263	40.5

¹Figures for Counties Antrim and Down exclude those parts in Belfast.

Sources: IDB, NIEC

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performed better, with over 1,500 jobs created after just two years by firms first offered assistance in both 1985-86 and 1986-87. Unfortunately the unstable experience of earlier cohorts gives little indication of whether this performance might be sustained in future years.

4.13 Next it is possible to look at the important issue of how job creation from assisted firms compared with job promotion targets. When job promotion targets were revised as a result of subsequent offers of assistance the highest jobs target was used. Table 4.2 shows the attainment ratios (job creation as a percentage of job promotions) for each of the six cohorts of assisted firms. It is clear from Table 4.2 that for the three earliest cohorts of assisted firms the attainment ratios were very low with significantly less than 50 per cent of job promotion targets actually being achieved. In the 1982-83 cohort of assisted

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TABLE 4.2

Attainment Ratios (%) of IDB Assisted Firms

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
1982-83 ¹	12.3	14.0	18.1	7.6	18.4	22.4
1983-84		32.3	35.9	34.0	46.7	42.8
1984-85			41.0	25.2	26.8	28.5
1985-86				40.6	54.9	61.7
1986-87					35.7	56.7
1987-88						54.0
Total						40.5

¹Includes Lear Fan.

Sources: IDB, NIEC



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

17 Grosvenor Place

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5

cc PSJ: PSJ
H. Waffly: PSJ
C. Kelly/R
J.P.O.

20 July 1990

Dear Assistant Secretary

THE RIDLEY AFFAIR - A DOWNTURN IN CONSERVATIVE FORTUNES

1. Traditionally July is a difficult month at Westminster as the Government presses to dispose of urgent business before the recess and the opposition, mindful of the slow-down in political activity until the party conferences and resumption in October, seek for maximum political advantage in the closing weeks of the parliamentary term. Until the Ridley affair burst upon them, Government Whips had been congratulating themselves on a highly successful period for the Government stretching back to the local Government elections in May, in which the Labour Party, though winning seats, suffered a tactical PR defeat. After the uncertainty and disarray of the early months of the year, in the aftermath of Nigel Lawson's resignation, there appeared to be a new sense of unity and confidence in Conservative ranks. The Prime Minister had reasserted her authority, the Heseltine challenge had fizzled out and in the weekly Westminster gladiatorial contests at Prime Minister's question time, Mrs Thatcher continued to out-perform Neil Kinnock. The gradual but significant slippage in Labour's lead in the opinion polls also provided welcome reassurance for nervous backbenchers that the Government was now back on course with the Prime Minister firmly in control. In addition, several recent potentially awkward parliamentary hurdles had been successfully negotiated by the Government viz the Abortion and Embryology debate, reform of the NHS and the furore over the War Crimes Bill to mention just a few.

2. On the foreign policy front there was also every reason for satisfaction as issues which earlier in the year had added to the Government's discomfiture on the domestic front appeared now to be resolving themselves in a manner which reflected a greater degree of reasonableness on the part of the Prime Minister and a new sense of cohesion between herself and the Foreign Secretary. The London NATO summit, the Mandela visit and her trip to the Soviet Union were highlights of recent weeks where the media, in particular, also perceived a new restraint and reasonableness on her part and there was a growing feeling that her own political pragmatism aided by the efforts of the Chancellor and Foreign Secretary would nudge her, gradually but inexorably, toward entry into the ERM.

3. In terms of both substance and timing therefore Nicholas Ridley's "Spectator" interview has been doubly unfortunate for the Prime Minister and the Conservative party. In terms of Government policy it has re-opened the debate about the Prime Minister's instincts on European issues and in the process sparked off a fresh internal

controversy within Conservative ranks. Conservative Central Office are appalled at the damage done to party unity as backbench proponents of the various approaches to Europe follow each other in a succession of damaging TV and press interviews. There are few who defend the intemperate language used by the former Trade and Industry Secretary although those who know him well, while shocked at his naivety in speaking on the record to "The Spectator", are inclined to excuse him to some extent because of his well-known penchant for colourful rethoric and his aristocratic disdain for public opinion. There are, of course, many on the Tory backbenches who argue that his views on German re-unification and ERM reflect a widespread grass roots feeling among Tory supporters. This argument that there is a large unexpressed ground swell of support among Tory supporters which the Prime Minister and Nicholas Ridley reflect in their shared views on European issues and other foreign policy topics such as South African sanctions is a familiar one and was expressed to us previously by Charles Powell. This is one of the reasons advanced for the apparent belief on Ridley's part that he could in fact ride out the storm.

4. He was quickly disillusioned on this score by the Prime Minister who despite her friendship with him made it clear that he had no option but to resign. Since then in exchanges in the Commons she, clearly embarrassed, has been quick to distance herself from his views. It is clear that his resignation is a political and personal blow to the Prime Minister. They entered parliament together in the 1959 General Election. His unrepentant market forces monetarism, which led Ted Heath to transfer him in March 1972 from his post as Under Secretary for Trade and Industry, thereby forcing his resignation, was well rewarded by Margaret Thatcher who appointed him as a Minister for State in the FCO following her victory in 1979. Politically close to the Prime Minister and personally friendly with her he has consistently been one of her staunchest supporters in Cabinet. With him gone she is now seen to be increasingly isolated turning more to close advisers like Bernard Ingham and Charles Powell rather than to Cabinet colleagues.

5. Downing Street and Conservative Central Office have sought to play down the significance of the Ridley interview and the furore over Charles Powell's leaked minute of the Chequers seminar. They have been helped to a large measure by the muted German reaction (although Foreign Office contacts tell us that the German response has also been tinged with an annoying hint of condescension). On the broader political front, however, the affair has rekindled some of the lingering uncertainties and dissensions on the Government backbenches. Earlier this week, some Labour MPs were bemoaning the fact that Neil Kinnock was absent in Washington believing that Deputy Leader Roy Hattersley would not be able to exploit to maximum advantage the fall-out from Ridley's resignation. (The timing of Kinnock's visit to Washington, planned well in advance, was dictated according to sources in the Labour Party by his wish to avoid sharing a platform with Arthur Scargill at the National Union of Mineworkers Conference.) As the week went by, however, MPs on both sides of the House were remarking on the contrast between the Prime Minister - appearing harassed and tired -

under fire in the Commons, and the statesmanlike progress of Neill Kinnock in the US where the Bush Administration had clearly decided, in contrast to the reception accorded Kinnock by Ronald Reagan that they should treat him as a potential future British Prime Minister.

6. The outcome of the next general election remains open, but the polls are swinging again towards Labour. One poll last week gave them a 16% lead. The major issues (and major problems for the Conservatives) remain the economy, with inflation at about 10% and interest rates at 15%; the poll tax, the unpopularity of which will remain a live issue for every elector as demands by Local Authorities increase again next year; and Europe, an issue which will also remain to the forefront as the divisive issues of Economic Union and Political Union are debated in the forthcoming European Councils and the Intergovernmental Conferences.

7. Of these issues, Mrs Thatcher accepts that inflation and interest rates will be crucial in the election. There is a strong case made in the City that to reduce these rates, external support, that is, ERM membership will be necessary and that since the benefits of membership are likely to be transitory, the indicated time of entry, in order to get through the most likely election period (Autumn 1991, Spring 1992) in good shape, is the first months of 1991. After the Ridley affair, joining the ERM will be much more difficult politically. The question, cogently posed by city analysts, is more than ever an apposite one: "if Britain cannot accept the emerging commitment to accept a common European currency by the mid-90s, is it not inconsistent for her to join the ERM?"

Yours sincerely



Andrew O'Rourke
Ambassador

Mr Dermot A Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
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19 July 1990

Mr Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
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MAY INQUIRY: INTERIM REPORT ON THE MAGUIRE CASE

Dear Assistant Secretary,

As discussed, the following are some comments on the report. As you know, it concluded that the whole scientific basis of the evidence against the Maguires was so vitiated that on this basis alone the Court of Appeal should be invited to set aside the convictions. Some other points of interest in the report were:

- In the future, Sir John will inquire into other aspects of the case, including any allegations of deliberate contamination and the role of the Home Office.
- Much attention has focused on the alleged inadequacy of the 17 year-old laboratory technician, Mr Wyndham (his involvement in the Birmingham Six case is now being scrutinised), but the report noted that while he tested Annie Maguire's gloves, he did not test the hand swabs. The report states that while much has been made of his alleged inadequacies, nothing has been found to substantiate these criticisms. An error on his part, it said, could never have led to positive findings where there should have been none.
- The report exonerates Sir Michael Havers from having misled the court on specificity of the TLC test for nitroglycerine ("Exhibit 60") as his information is found to have been received from the scientist, Higgs. he also found that RARDE (the Ministry of Defence forensic laboratory) did not communicate results of further tests to the prosecution.
- The investigation of the RARDE revealed a number of disturbing features. Sir John finds some of the testimony of the RARDE scientists "hard to believe", "at least seriously misleading" and "simply inexplicable". One might query his belief though that two of these scientists, Higgs and Elliott, simply "failed to appreciate" the significance of a particularly damaging omission.

- The forms submitted to RARDE by the police recorded that the Maguires were suspected of bombing offences and the report concluded that it was questionable whether, "in the absence of this prompt", RARDE would have recorded a positive finding on Patrick Maguire.
- The trial judge, Lord Donaldson, now Master of the Rolls, is criticised for his handling of Exhibit 60, this being, in Sir John's view, partly responsible for any miscarriage of justice in the case.
- The Court of Appeal is held to have erred in upholding the judge's directions on this point.
- The report is critical both of the trial judge and the Court of Appeal for ruling evidence of random tests admissible.
- The report finds that while the failure of the Government scientists to disclose evidence was deliberate, it was not the result of conspiracy without providing really persuasive argumentation on this point.
- The report finds the prosecution's failure to disclose forensic material to the defence "regrettable and significant" and believes that had the material been disclosed, "events would have taken a different turn".
- At the trial, the defence was under no burden of proof to establish the source of any innocent contamination.

Police Investigation

Perhaps because May was concentrating on the forensic evidence, the section of the report dealing with the police's involvement is remarkably anodyne, even bearing in mind that the police would not reveal the documents in their possession. I have set out in an appendix the most striking features of the testimony of the police witnesses (Detective Chief Inspector Munday, Chief Inspector Day, Detective Sergeants Lawrence and Brian Vickery and Constable O'Connor) which might be summarised as follows:

- Even allowing for a gap of over fifteen years, the general inability of the officers to remember the circumstances, the search of the Maguire house and the swabbing of the suspects is striking.
- The issue of contamination by the police arises - Lawrence Vickery was at the scene of other explosions shortly before, one of them, the Talbot Arms, only three days previously.
- There was an unexplained five-day delay in sending the swabs to RARDE.
- Unusually, the swab bags were not labelled in a way which would have sealed the opening.

- The sniffer dogs would have picked up a contaminated towel but did not do so although it was not clear if they had gone to the bathroom.
- The search of the house was admitted to have been incomplete, surprising if the police expected it to be full of explosives.
- There was confusion about what might have happened to some of the forensic evidence (fingernail sticks and scrapings).
- There was doubt about prior police observation of the house (this would of course relate to the ability, or lack of it, of the occupants to move out any explosives).

I will report further when I have spoken to various people involved such as Alaister Logan, the Maguires' solicitor and the Secretary to the Inquiry (she is currently on leave).

Yours sincerely

PP Paul Murray

Paul Murray
First Secretary

Appendix: Testimony of police officers

Detective Sergeant Lawrence Vickery

He swabbed the hands of Guiseppe Conlon, Sean Smyth, Patrick O'Neill, and Paddy Maguire. He did not know:

- Why there was a delay (4 to 9/12/1974) in sending the swabs to RARDE.
- Why his statement at the trial omitted any mention that he had washed his hands between tests.
- If there was a wash basin in the room and if he had worn gloves.
- Why the bags containing the swabs were not sealed in the usual way to prevent tampering.
- What he had done with the fingernail sticks and swabs.

Some other points of interest were:

- He had to be reminded that he had attended other bombing incidents day before he went to the Maguires' house, with, of course, the consequent danger of contamination of the Maguire samples.
- He admitted at the trial that the search of the house was incomplete, strange, in the context of the fact that it was allegedly believed to have been a bomb-factory.

Chief Superintendent David Munday

He was in charge of the search of the Maguire house but could not remember:

- When the house had been kept under observation.
- If Guiseppe Conlon had been followed to England.
- Giving instructions to search the house.
- If sniffer dogs had gone to the house.
- John and Patrick Maguire returning to the house on 2/12/1974, and the O'Neill children and police officers being there that night.
- Other bombings he had gone to.
- If he had been in charge on 4 and 5/12/1974.

He was not aware of any tests being carried out on bomb squad officers to ensure that they were free of contamination at that time.

Chief Inspector Day

He took the swabs on Annie Maguire and her sons. He was very inexperienced and again one wonders why so important a task was entrusted to him in the circumstances. He could not remember:

- Being tested for contamination.
- Why the usual practice of sealing the swab bags was not followed in this instance.

- If he had been in charge on the second day.
- If he had had a role in choosing the rooms to be examined or the swabbing of furniture.
- Showing Mrs Maguire her gloves in the drawer.
- Why there was a delay in removing the gloves from the house.

Detective Sergeant Brian Vickery

He was a Laboratory Liaison Officer who carried out a forensic examination on the house on 4/12/1974 but did not give evidence at the trial. He believed that the sniffer dogs would have detected a contaminated towel but was not sure what rooms the dogs had gone to.

Constable O'Connor

Constable O'Connor's evidence was also characterised by inconsistencies and raised the question as to why so important a procedure as swabbing the house for explosives had been allocated to such an inexperienced officer.

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

Form to be completed and inserted in the original record in place of each part abstracted

(i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed:
840/3895

(ii) How many documents have been abstracted: Part of 1 document

(iii) The date of each such document: 26/07/90

(iv) The description of each document: Report of a conversation with Alastair Logan on the Maguires case

(v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8(4)b

Mary Doyle

Name: Mary Doyle

Grade: CO

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 24/11/20.

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

26 July 1990

Mr Brian Nason
Anglo Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs
Dublin 2

MAY INQUIRY/MAGUIRES: A CONVERSATION WITH ALASTAIR LOGAN

Dear Brian

I had a long conversation recently with Logan, solicitor for the Maguires, on the subject of the May Inquiry and, in particular, its likely future direction. The points of interest were:

- Lawyers for the Maguires will seek information on extradition requests to Ireland from Britain in the 1974/5 period in respect of Irish citizens suspected of acts of terrorism here. They want to find out what the police here knew about bombing suspects at that time and, by extension, to see if they actually suspected others for offences for which the Maguire/Guildford defendants were convicted. The warrants would have remained secret if they were not executed. If this information is not forthcoming from the British authorities, it may be requested from the Irish authorities.
- Asked about the seeming reticence on the subject of the police in the interim report, Logan felt that May was essentially reserving his position because the police had refused to submit documents and had given evidence only in relation to searching and swabbing.
- He was distressed that May had eliminated any possible contamination except the bathroom towels. Logan believes that accidental contamination of the swabs took place at RARDE, probably through the technician, Wyndham, using a contaminated glass rod to squeeze them but that there was deliberate contamination of Annie Maguire's gloves, because there was otherwise no evidence against her.


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This is interesting

CC PRT, PPH
H. Webb: JLP
C. Webb: M
R. P. P.

- Logan thinks that the Court of Appeal, miffed by May's criticism of Lord Donaldson and itself, does not want quashing of the convictions to go through on the nod and will encourage the DPP to argue the case against the appellants as fully as possible. He expects a "rough ride". Ultimately, he thinks that it may come to a "trade-off" between the culpability of the Court and Donaldson on one hand and the scientists on the other. There may be divergences between the tactics of the Maguire and Conlon legal teams. The hearing should take place in late October - early November and last 2/3 days.
- Logan sees a possibility that the verdict could go against the appellants if, for example, the Court decided that, notwithstanding the new evidence, the trial jury would still have reached the same conclusion. Personally, I very much doubt that the Court of Appeal would use this device in present circumstances. Another possibility, according to Logan, is a grudging quashing on the grounds that some of the appellants were guilty but could not be identified from the innocent.
- Phase one of the Inquiry, which has just concluded, is seen by Logan as having been relatively easy because nobody anticipated what would emerge and the scientists had few friends. Phase two will be the "big league" and Logan doubts that May will get the cooperation from potential witnesses that he did in phase one. He believes that May's powers will have to be strengthened to compel attendance by witnesses and production of documents.
- Logan proposed that the Irish Government should lobby for greater powers from May. In response to my suggestion that May himself might request these powers if he considered them necessary, Logan replied that May is having to play a very cautious game. He knows that he could be "scuppered" if his excellent support team were dismantled. Clarke, Counsel to the Inquiry, has been the catalyst of much of the progress to date, and he might be lured away by an offer to the bench (High Court), if the authorities were sufficiently desperate. He also thinks that May is being misled by the success of his persuasion policy in the first phase.
- Logan's overall view of the case is that there has been a "vast conspiracy" involving the highest echelons of the DPP, police and judiciary who suppressed evidence of innocence. Many of those involved occupy or have occupied the highest offices in the recent past. Lord Scarman had, he felt, chosen his words carefully when he spoke of shuddering at the prospect of what might emerge from the next phase of the Inquiry.

Yours sincerely


Paul Murray
Charge d'Affaires ai



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See pp 2-3 on Lyttle above

*cc PST; RSM
Mr. Hall; PRR
Coughlin A1
JRK*

Confidential

4 July, 1990.

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Dublin.

Conversation with John Lyttle
Adviser to the Archbishop of Canterbury

Dear Assistant Secretary,

I had lunch on 20 July with John Lyttle, the successor to Terry Waite at Lambeth Palace. Lyttle, who was closely involved with the SDP in its early days having worked for many years with Roy Jenkins, is generally regarded as a more astute low key operator compared to his flamboyant high profile predecessor.

Succession to Dr. Runcie

Lyttle spoke in general terms of the uneasy relationship between the Prime Minister and the out-going Archbishop. According to Lyttle, the Prime Minister liked "to lecture" Dr. Runcie, dwelling at length on what she saw as the need for "a greater Christian awareness" among the Hierarchy of the Church of England. While acknowledging her known affinity with the evangelical wing of the Church with its emphasis on personal morality and individual redemption, Lyttle felt that her concerns were more wordily reflecting a belief on her part that Archbishop Runcie had obstinately and mistakenly withheld the "ecclesiastical seal of approval from the Thatcher revolution."

Clearly the Prime Minister has strong views on the type of candidate she would wish to see succeed to the Archbishopric of Canterbury. She would nonetheless, in Lyttle's view, be very careful to avoid in any way being drawn into the public debate on the succession. Ultimately two names would be forwarded by the Crown Appointments Commission and the Commission Chairman, appointed by the Prime Minister, will play an important role in choosing the final two. The two current favourites are the Archbishop of York, Dr. Habgood - the most senior bishop after Canterbury, and the popular and evangelical Archbishop of Liverpool, Dr. Sheppard.

Earlier suggestions that Dr. Eames of Armagh stood a chance were, Lyttle contended, "media inventions" which he suspected "were constructed in Armagh." Lyttle, who has a sharp tongue, did not disguise his poor opinion of Dr. Eames whom he criticised particularly for excessive self-promotion and an absence of political judgement. He compared him unfavourably on a number of grounds with his Catholic colleagues in Northern Ireland with many of whom Lyttle is personally acquainted from the time of the Forum Report.

Hostages in Lebanon

Although guarded in his comments, Lyttle had some points of interest to make. He has had several recent meetings with the Iranians in Teheran, Damascus and Cyprus and has clearly enjoyed the full support of the FCO in these contacts. According to Lyttle, the Iranians are now conducting serious and intensive discussions with Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon. Recent meetings with the Iranians had taken place in Damascus but the Syrians refused point blank to give him a visa for his last meeting, telling him that Lambeth Palace should recognise that "Syria was not an Iranian colony." As a result his last meeting with the Iranians, ten days ago, had taken place in Cyprus.

According to Lyttle, Iran's commitment to ending the hostage saga can now be taken as genuine. Iran's efforts to move Hezbollah in this direction were however beset with difficulties viz. continuing dissension within the religious and political establishment in Iran; divisions within Hezbollah itself on the consequences of losing the insurance policy provided by the western hostages coupled with uncertainty as to the future direction of Iran; and, the fragile relationship between Damascus and Teheran.

Nonetheless, Lyttle could sense "the end in view." He was highly complimentary of the way in which we had managed our efforts on behalf of Brian Keenan sending, as far as he could judge, the correct signals to the main players especially to the Iranians who, in his opinion, were ultimately the more difficult to please.

He is closely involved in efforts to get a British parliamentary delegation to Iran. He spoke with a high degree of exasperation of the efforts of Peter Temple-Morris, whose wife is Iranian, to involve himself in this. According to Lyttle, Sir Geoffrey Howe, a friend of Temple-Morris, had, at the request of the FCO, advised him to say away from this issue since his wife's family connections with the Shah ruled him out completely as an acceptable go-between and his frequent media appearances some months ago on the subject of Anglo-Iranian relations were not considered helpful either by the Prime Minister or the FCO. The British parliamentary delegation is now likely to be led by Sir Ian Gilmour and may also include Cyril Townsend who travelled on a previous visit.

Efforts however to set up the parliamentary visit, Lyttle said, continue to fall foul of Iranian obstructionism and at a more fundamental level, conflicts between the FCO and Number 10 as to how best to get relations with the Iranians back on an even keel. Paradoxically this was an area, according to Lyttle, where the Prime Minister appeared to be ahead of her Foreign Secretary.

Lyttle also referred in passing to the visit this week to Syria by Gerald Kaufman, the Opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs. Kaufman, (who earlier in the week had spoken on the 'phone to me about his proposed meeting with President Assad) had sought to get the backing of Lambeth Palace for his efforts on behalf of the hostages. He had met with members of Brian McCarthy's family and Terry Waite's brother had agreed to see him briefly. Lyttle was wary of Kaufman's involvement, dismissing it as a political ploy in the afterglow of Kinnock's successful visit to Washington to bolster Kaufman's image as Foreign Secretary in waiting.

On the hostages themselves, Lyttle said that US psychiatric reports on Frank Reed suggested that some of his recollections were confused and contradictory. No doubt had been cast on essentials but on matters of detail he tended to confuse his recollection of recent events and his recall of experiences in the very early days of his captivity.

In formal terms, Lyttle's term of office expires with that of the outgoing Archbishop. His personal commitment to securing the release of Terry Waite is such however that he proposes to stay at his desk to see the final outcome. Dr. Runcie leaves Lambeth Palace at the end of this year and Lyttle assured me confidently that he will depart with him.

Yours sincerely,


Joe Hayes
Counsellor



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Confidential

25 July 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

A conversation with John Smith MP

Mr. Hayes hosted a dinner party in honour of John Smith MP at his home last night.

As you are aware, Smith is the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer and is widely tipped to replace Neil Kinnock as the leader of the Labour Party should the party fare badly in the next election. A shrewd and pugnacious Scottish lawyer, he has a superb command of his brief and demonstrates considerable tactical skills in Parliament. It is generally accepted that, if he took over from Kinnock, Smith would be a much more formidable opponent for Mrs Thatcher and would greatly improve Labour's chances of unseating the Tories at the subsequent election.

Smith made a number of points of interest in a conversation which I had with him last night:

Contact with the Taoiseach and the Irish Government

- Smith has never met the Taoiseach but described himself as "a long-time admirer". He spoke warmly of the Taoiseach's political skills and praised, in particular, the success of the Government's economic policies since 1987.
- He regards it as very important for the incoming Labour Government here to have good contacts with the Irish Government. He himself has had relatively little exposure to Irish Ministers and would be glad to have an opportunity to remedy this. Having visited Ireland only once (on his honeymoon), he would like very much to pay a return visit and would be very interested in the possibility of meeting the Taoiseach and other Cabinet members on that occasion.

*cc PST: PDM
Mally: PDM
Gallagher W I
JH*

Neil Kinnock

- Smith admitted frankly that he was not one of Kinnock's greatest fans before the latter became leader.
- However, he has been "pleasantly surprised" by Kinnock's performance since 1983. In particular, he has been impressed by the ruthlessness with which Kinnock has stood up to the party's left wing. Though never a radical left-winger, Kinnock came nevertheless from that side of the party and his courage in breaking with his own past must be recognised. He may not be a great intellect, and his emotional approach "wouldn't necessarily be mine", but he has proved to be a good leader of the party ("the right man at the right time").
- Kinnock has established very good personal relations with President Bush. (This has been made easier, Smith noted, by the Bush Administration's clearly-marked reluctance to become involved in domestic British politics). During his most recent visit to London, President Bush told Mrs Thatcher, after a dinner which was also attended by the Kinnocks, that "I was very glad to see Neil and Glenys here this evening". This remark - which was heard by several others and which, Smith understands, was prompted by Henry Catto (the US Ambassador to Britain) - reportedly infuriated the Prime Minister.
- Kinnock leaves the party's economic policy entirely to Smith. Mentioning that "he has never even telephoned me about it", Smith hinted that he would welcome a more active involvement by Kinnock in this area. He indicated some concern that, if he does not prepare himself thoroughly on the detail of economic policy, Kinnock could expose himself badly during the next general election campaign.

The next election

- Smith confidently expects a Labour Government after the next election. Several outcomes are possible, ranging from a clear Labour majority of up to thirty (the most optimistic scenario) to a hung Parliament with the Conservatives as the largest party (but unable to form a Government). In his own view, the likeliest outcome will be a small Labour majority.
- Smith would like to think that Labour will not require the support of other parties in order to form a Government. If the NI MPs have to enter the equation, Labour would be looking in the first instance to the SDLP (hopefully augmented by a member for West Belfast). Should they need to woo the Unionists, "nothing of any significance" will be offered to the latter in return for their support.

Northern Ireland

- Having briefly held Ministerial responsibility for Scottish devolution (1976-77), Smith is a keen advocate of devolution for Northern Ireland and fully supports Peter Brooke's current efforts.
- He confirmed that the next Labour Government will introduce a devolved Assembly for Scotland. Though it is not yet party policy, he also strongly favours devolution throughout the rest of Britain. He has in mind a series of regional Assemblies for Wales, the North-East, the North-West, etc. which would have powers in relation to employment, education, training, the environment and other areas (though central financial powers would remain with Westminster).
- On the assumption that a devolved Assembly of some kind will be established in Northern Ireland, and that it will have very close relations with the Government and Oireachtas in Dublin, Smith envisages steadily closer cooperation not just between the two parts of Ireland but also between them and the various regional Assemblies in Britain. This could lead ultimately to a kind of loose "Confederation of the British Isles".
- As regards the current talks process, Smith praised the pragmatic approach displayed by Brooke and was dismissive of the "ideological hang-ups" and "constitutionalitis" displayed by the Unionists in relation to Articles Two and Three.

Europe

- Finally, Smith welcomed Labour's shift towards more positive policies on Europe. He was particularly pleased with the party's recent decision in favour of ERM membership once it returns to power. He was contemptuous of the "little England" mentality demonstrated by the surviving handful of anti-Marketees in the party. "The thud of Nazi jackboots along English country lanes", he observed, seems to be as much of a nightmare for Peter Shore and Tony Benn as it is for Nicholas Ridley.

Yours sincerely

David Donoghue

David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer



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17 July 1990

pl. Newer

*(see Gapes 101)
Box*

Mr Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
Dublin 2

A Conversation with Mike Gapes
International Officer of the Labour Party

Dear Assistant Secretary

I had lunch yesterday with Mike Gapes, Senior International Officer with the Labour Party here and designated Labour candidate for the key marginal of Ilford South in the next General Election. Gapes is credited with being one of the main backroom drafters of Labour's defence review which got the party, successfully off the hook of unilateralism. I meet Gapes at regular intervals to discuss Labour's views on European affairs. Gapes makes no secret of his satisfaction with Labour's pro-EC stance.

After reviewing Ireland's presidency, on which Gapes was complimentary, recent events in Germany and the Soviet Union our discussion turned, inevitably, to the Ridley affair. Gapes noted with satisfaction the reaction among Tories. He observed that it was good to see the Tories savaging each other in similar fashion to the Labour Party of not so long ago. He echoed the view of many on the Labour side that Ridley had merely said out loud what the Prime Minister thought privately. While he felt that the episode would damage the Conservatives, both within the country and in terms of the Government's relations with certain EC partners, it was impossible to estimate at this stage whether there would be any lasting impact on the Conservatives' election prospects.

Gapes envisaged a scenario in which Britain would join the ERM in November in advance of the IGC's. Sterling would receive a further boost from this which would carry through into the early months of 1991. The higher pound would in the short term have a beneficial effect on the balance of payments. Assuming no further increases in interest rates the Government


would be able to massage the Poll Tax rates with a vengeance in the Spring of next year (they had been caught by surprise this time). A successful outcome to the IGC would be a further icing on the cake and the Government could then decide to call a General Election before things went awry. (It was here that Gapes saw some slight possibility that the Ridley affair might impact negatively on the IGC outcome from Britain's point of view.)

Gapes will be a candidate in Ilford South where the defending Tory has a majority of 4,572, representing a lead of 10.9% over Labour. The seat is one which Labour must win if it is to stand a chance of forming a majority Government. Significantly, perhaps, Labour polled comfortably more than the Tories in the recent local elections in the constituency. Gapes is confident that this lead can be sustained at a General Election.

Nationally Gapes was predictably upbeat on the possible outcome of the Election. He cited not only the encouraging local election results (the Conservatives had played up not their victories as much as the narrowness of their defeats) particularly outside London, but the sustained levels of support which Labour has held in opinion polls for the last year. While the lead over the Conservatives has fluctuated, the level of support for Labour has remained high, in the mid-forties. Morale in the party is high, Labour has established credibility as a party that can win the election (unlike 1983 or 1987) and this is reinforcing its standing in the polls. The Party Conference is unlikely to queer things (Gapes has seen the draft motions and is convinced that there is nothing in them to worry or embarrass the Party leadership unduly).

Gapes conceded that for Labour to win an overall majority would require the biggest swing since 1945 but was confident they would do so. In response to my question as to what Labour would do if it was the largest party but had no majority Gapes responded that Labour would "do whatever is necessary to form a Government".

Yours sincerely



Sean Farrell
First Secretary

c.c. Political Director

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PLEASE NOTE: Effective May 6, 1990
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Confidential

23 July 1990

*cc Mr. Kelly, PPP
Gen. James Lee
G. Sullivan R/
RCS*

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

The Sun

The Ambassador, who has departed on annual leave, has asked me to reply to your letter of 9 July concerning the Sun.

encl
We naturally shared your reaction to the Sun leader of 27 June. Even by that paper's own low standards, it was a particularly crude and offensive piece. However, the Embassy in fact received only two phone-calls, and no correspondence whatsoever, about it. We attributed this to a feeling in the Irish community here that protests about Sun leaders may serve merely to dignify the paper and to give it the impression that it is being taken seriously. While editorials which are targeted at the Irish community in Britain tend to generate more complaints to the Embassy, the particularly moronic content of this article may have led Irish readers to conclude that a protest would have served little purpose.

On each occasion when an offensive Sun leader appears, the Embassy weighs up the pros and cons of lodging a protest. On this occasion, having considered the matter carefully and having consulted with a number of contacts in media circles and in the Irish community, we concluded that the balance of advantage lay in ignoring this article.

The following are some general comments about Sun leaders and the Embassy's present relationship with the paper.

Sun leaders are written by Ronald Spark, who has been the paper's chief leader-writer since the late seventies. Spark is a crude and bombastic individual of extreme right-wing views who delights in the offence which these views, as articulated through his Sun leaders, cause to moderate opinion. As I know both from my own experience of him and from the experience of others, he is particularly pleased if his leaders cause offence to foreign Governments. He once admitted privately to me that,


to win and hold its target readership, the Sun must have "a few hate-figures", preferably politicians, and that, if these can be foreign politicians, so much the better.

In addition to this crude xenophobia, which is crucial to the paper's success with its readership, Sun leaders are designed to deliver a clear and simple "message", preferably in monosyllabic terms. Facts which conflict with the paper's preordained editorial line are dismissed. In private conversation, Spark defends the crude simplifications of his leaders, mocking the "On the one hand ... on the other hand" approach of quality leaders.

The complete indifference of the Sun to matters of truth, let alone to questions of balance and fairness, has made it extremely difficult to effect changes in its editorial line where Ireland is concerned. I have had regular contact with Spark and will pursue this contact in future. However, because of his own personality and (even more importantly) the criteria which determine Sun leaders, there are very clear limits to what can be achieved by means of personal cultivation. Having regard to the near-universal contempt which exists in British media and political circles for both Spark and his paper, the risk of lending undeserved status to the Sun by over-assiduous cultivation of Spark (who revels in free lunches but does nothing subsequently to merit them) must also be borne in mind.

However, despite the various difficulties, I shall be making contact again with Spark very shortly and will make every effort to bring about an improvement in the paper's editorial line.

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer

20 July, 1990

TO : HQ FROM : Washington
FOR : A/Sec Gallagher FROM : B. Scannell

AOH CONVENTION

1. The AOH Convention concluded last night at their Gala Banquet. The election of the officers for the coming two years were held earlier in the evening. As we anticipated, the new National President is George Clough Jr. from St. Louis, Missouri. The election of Clough is significant as the National President appoints the Chairmen of the various Sub-Committees of the AOH. Clough is a moderate and will therefore be in a position to "clean house". It is an open secret that he will announce replacements for Joe Roche, Chairman of the Political Education Committee of the AOH, and Michael Cummings, National Publicity Director, both of whom have been out-spoken on Northern Ireland issues. Michael Coogan, the outgoing President, exercised little or no control over either Roche or Cummings and consequently they were able to make radical statements under the umbrella of the AOH while in effect they were pursuing their own Noraid agenda.
2. The International Fund did not come up for discussion at the Conference Plenary and no resolution was tabled or discussed. I understand that some limited and inconclusive debate took place in a private caucus held by the New York/New Jersey Delegations.
3. The main speakers at the Banquet were Congressman Morrison (Democrat-Connecticut) and Ben Gilman (Republican-New York), both Co-Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs.

Morrison and Gilman were introduced by Joe Roche. Morrison was invited because of his importance on immigration matters (he is Chairman of the House Immigration Sub Committee) and Gilman is a personal friend of Joe Roche. Morrison spoke on the prospects for his Bill but also emphasised the Joe Doherty case, the MacBride Principles, and his efforts to obtain a visa for Gerry Adams. Gilman also referred to the Doherty and MacBride issues and made a short reference to the operation of the International Fund. Gilman said that the IFI had made some serious mistakes particularly in the early days but that he had been reassured somewhat in April when he met the new Chairman of the Fund, Mr. McGuckian and the commitment of the Fund towards the most disadvantaged areas.

4. I was invited to speak. I stated the Government's position on the MacBride Principles. I referred also to Gilman's criticisms of the Fund and I emphasised the success of the Fund, the commitment of the IFI to the disadvantaged areas, and the need for continued funding from Congress. I also highlighted and outlined the Government's commitment to the welfare of our immigrants and the need for immigration reform and mentioned the useful role the AOH could play in this area.

5. The Convention was harmonious. Domestic U.S. issues figured prominently in the Convention's deliberations, notably the AOH support for the right to life movement. Considerable time at the Convention was also devoted to ladies AOH business.

6. On Irish issues, Clough in his Presidential statement reaffirmed the AOH's backing for the MacBride Principles, their support for the release of Joe Doherty and their commitment to the reunification of Ireland. References by various speakers to the Joe Doherty case and the MacBride Principles were enthusiastically applauded.

7. The election of Clough is a positive development. Clough has a solid reputation and has worked closely in the past with our Consulate in Chicago. Clough is a moderate on Northern Ireland issues and will therefore steer away the AOH from involvement in issues which could be divisive for the rank and file membership. Clough is interested in visiting Ireland and promised to let me know his plans.

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