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SECRET

ANGLO-IRISH SECTION

WEEKLY BRIEF

WEEK ENDING 6th JULY 1990

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June 1990
  
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Confidential

29 June 1990

cc PSW  
Mr. Necker; PDS  
Mr. De la Haye; H. T. G.  
Mr. ...  
Mr. Anderson

Mr. Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Anglo-Irish Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

Dinner with Mr. Burns

The following is an account of discussion at a dinner for Mr. Ian Burns here last evening, the essentials of which I have already mentioned on the telephone this morning. The dinner was arranged to say farewell to Mr. Burns who, as you know, is leaving the NIO next week to take up the post of Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office in charge of police matters. Mr. Alston and the other members of the British side of the Secretariat were also present.

Inevitably, since I had just arrived back from Dublin, Mr. Burns quizzed me on further reactions in Dublin to the Ministerial meeting on 27 June.

I confirmed that we could not accept the position taken by Mr. Brooke on Wednesday in regard to the timing of North/South talks. I said that reaction on our side had not been helped by the press accounts, which appeared to have come from the NIO, suggesting that Dublin was "rocking the boat" (Newsletter of 28 June). Mr. Burns said immediately that nothing (?) that had appeared in the newspapers had come from the British side. There had been no briefing and, indeed, Mr. Brooke had issued strict instructions to Mr. Wood (Information Officer) to offer absolutely no comment whatever on the talks. As against that, he had to say that the British side had been troubled by the lead story in yesterday's Irish Times which Mr. Brooke had circulated to the British Cabinet in the course of his report to them yesterday morning. Mr. Burns suggested that this was a classic instance of perceptions on either side mirroring each other in regard to press briefing.

I said that I hoped to have a message to give to the British side today which would provide the considered response they had requested on Wednesday. I added that in advance of that


message it would not be useful to go into any detail on our reaction. Conversation then turned to other topics, but towards the end of dinner the issues that divide us on the talks arose briefly again.

In these informal exchanges, Mr Burns seemed to show some understanding of our position. He thought the most difficult problem was the establishment of a specific date (his phrase) for the commencement of North/South talks. He suggested that if that was not insisted upon, there might be room for manoeuvre, ie, that it might be possible to move from the public expression by Mr Brooke of mere hope that discussions on all three relationships would be "in progress within weeks" (British text of 27 June) towards the sense of assurance we required that this was agreed on all sides. In summary, I understood Burns to mean that while it would not be possible to give us precision in the sense of a specific date, it might be possible to give us certainly that North/South talks would occur "within weeks" of the start of the gap.

He also threw in the suggestion that the Unionists' fear that the SDLP would be uncooperative in the internal talks could be assuaged to some extent by a public comment by the SDLP that they were committed to making progress in all three sets of talks. (Comment: This could be a helpful point. It might indeed be useful to consider, if agreement is reached, that coordination on statements should include the Northern Ireland political parties as well as the two Governments).

I should mention that in contrast with the tough and rather threatening language used by Mr. Alston on the telephone yesterday morning, the language and demeanour of the British side last evening suggested a greater interest in reaching an accommodation satisfactory to all sides (reflecting the political view taken in Cabinet?). You will also have noted the comparatively neutral tone in today's media here and, especially, Mr. Molyneaux's reported warning yesterday that the situation was "very sensitive".

Yours sincerely



Declan O'Donovan  
Joint Secretary

P.S. The Minister's letter to Mr Brooke was handed over this afternoon.

28 June 1990

*Feeney's letter contained  
is "repaired" consistently  
revised.*

*Maxima  
p.l. cc A/sec Gallagher  
+ P/H on Parades.*

1

*B.Y.C.W. 20/6*

~~CONFIDENTIAL FAX~~

*cc DSU; Maxwell; P/H  
Mr. McHugh; Mr. T...  
Graham A /*

To Belfast

From HQ

*RST*

For Joint Secretary

From M. Collins

Parades, your Fax 154 of 26/6/90 refers

The following relates to the Duncairn Gardens Parade and is based of feed-back which we have received from Brian Feeney. Material in relation to Newtownbutler will be forwarded seperately.

Brian Feeney, along with Paddy Hunter had been present in the area throughout the parade. He can only be described as "venomous" in his reaction to the event.

The march was 40 minutes long and concluded at 8.45 p.m. As usual, the entire lower Antrim Road was sealed off with black taxis coming from town stuck; people going out on the Friday night were sealed into their ghettos; the more wealthy people up the Antrim Road going into town were stuck; people coming from the Novena at Holy Family Church in Newington were forced to wait for half an hour on Atlantic Avenue - in other words, according to Feeney the nationalist people of the area were subjected to the usual restrictions in order to allow the orange-men march through this section of nationalist north Belfast. Nor (for good reason) were the nationalist people allowed to witness the event - the route was cleared of people who were kept behind the screens which were in place for the occasion.

There were no major incidents during the march, nor did the police misbehave. In that context, Feeney's presence may have been helpful, though he apparently "took a lot of stick" from the locals about the march.

Feeney received a hand delivered letter from McAtamney on the morning of the march, which attempted to answer some of the points which Feeney has been making about this march. Feeney considers the letter to be totally unsatisfactory and he has replied to it in very strong terms in a letter which he sent yesterday to Annesley. Feeney in his letter makes all the usual points and in addition, says that the decision to allow the parade demonstrates that Annesley has no concern in improving community relations in North Belfast nor in improving relations between the police and the nationalist community in the area. He

asserts that the local police are of the view that this decision is a major set-back to their community relations work in the area.

[In that context, Feeney had persuaded some local people from the New Lodge to attend a recent meeting with the police. That meeting had been an attempt by the police to set up a liaison committee and had been attended by people from both sides of the divide in the area. Feeney has told Annesley in his letter that he will be unable to arrange for nationalist attendance at future meetings of the group.]

Feeney is sending us a copy of this letter and it will be forwarded to you by fax upon receipt.

Comment:

It is clear from Mr Collins report of the meeting on parades of 21 June, "that the RUC take the view that they will only reroute a march if they are convinced that there is a serious risk of public disorder". In our view, there are dangers in this approach, which could be seen as implying that the only way in which the people in the Duncairn area can prevent this march in future is by rioting, and that representations by local constitutional nationalists carry little or no weight in the face of an assumed violent reaction from loyalists to any attempt to deny them the "right" to march through a nationalist area.

We face the same problem in relation to the parade along the Garvaghy Road in Portadown. You will have noted from our fax 108 of 19 June that Fr Lennon was infuriated that the RUC were adopting the same approach in relation to that parade. It would be useful if you could avail of a suitable opportunity to make it clear to the British side our profound objection to this approach by the RUC to the problem. As indicated in our fax 108, our approach continues to be the same as that enunciated by the Secretary of State in June 1986 -viz- that parades should not take place in an area or along a route where they are not welcome. We have received no explanation as to why the RUC are now articulating a policy which is substantially at variance with the 1986 approach.



**SDLP**

## Social Democratic & Labour Party

3 Bristol Avenue, Belfast. BT15 4AJ.  
Telephone 771497.

*cc 'ps' ; P+S, MALL  
Mr. McAtamney, M.P.  
Councillor A.J.  
SOS*

**CLL. BRIAN FEENEY**

27 June 1990  
Mr Hugh Annesley  
Chief Constable  
Brooklyn  
Knock Rd.  
Belfast

Dear Mr Annesley

I wrote to you on 16 June about an Orange parade through contentious areas of North Belfast. I received a reply from Mr McAtamney on 22 June. I am writing again to you because I do not feel happy to engage in correspondence with old 'maximum firepower, speed and aggression' himself.

I was glad to discover on 22 June that the parade was on 22 June. Since the people who took the decision are not all stupid the contents of his letter can only be regarded as arrogant, contemptuous and full of the insolence of office.

First the route: I measure the outward leg at 2.2 miles, of which exactly one mile is through the majority Catholic area. Of course if you double it up you arrive at 5 miles most of which distance is irrelevant. But it is the absurdity of the argument that is exasperating and insulting. The logic, for want of a more appropriate word, is that it would be acceptable, for example to force a march from the Shankill to Ballysillan through Ardoyne, because Flax St. and Etna Dr. would only be 400 metres of the total march! It's not the distance through the Catholic area that is relevant but the fact that it is forced through at all. The insult, humiliation and injustice felt by the Catholic community because of this seems to remain eternally beyond your grasp.

Second the duration: the parade did not take 20-25 minutes to pass. It arrived at the Antrim Rd at 8.05pm and the camp followers straggled past at 8.40pm. The Antrim Rd. at the New Lodge was sealed at 7.35pm and reopened at 8.45pm. It took longer to pass along Duncairn Gardens because several bands were allowed to pause at Halliday's Rd. for specially thunderous drumming, to stamp and jeer and for their supporters to chant obscenities. This display of power had the desired effect. Some of the Catholics in the 230 numbers knelt and prayed, some of them stood with buckets of sand or water, one

man with three teenage daughters trapped in the house wept with rage and impotence. They would all hate me for telling this.

The 'objective [was] to minimise the disruption to the life of the community'. I have to tell you there are two communities. If you are not sure where they live I would be glad to take you on a tour of the interfaces separating them, the last of which was erected less than one month ago to facilitate the policing of this parade. It is because one community seeks to impose its domination on the other that these parades take place in such a way as to give maximum offence. In contrast to the provocative behaviour at Halliday's Rd. my watchers on the Crumlin Rd., where the parade was in a Protestant area, tell me the bands played tunes such as Over the Rainbow, and were pleasant to listen to.

In these circumstances I find it hard to believe my eyes when I read the phrase, 'in the absence of a more tolerant attitude'. Tolerance by whom? By the Orangemen or their victims? How can I convince you that you are deciding to perform the equivalent of leading the National Front through Golders Green or Southall? I don't say leading the Ku Klux Klan through Harlem. Equally you wouldn't try to put a march through Ardoyne. Why are Ardoyne and Harlem different from Golders Green and Duncairn Gardens? Because the people in these latter places are relatively weak. They can be insulted and ridden over. Ardoyne and Harlem could look after themselves. A society is measured by how it treats minorities. Talking about one community means you don't recognise the existence of two: that helps explain the decision.

It also helps explain the responses of the police at the roadblocks on the Antrim Rd. I received a number of complaints from people who had tried to ask for directions and got no help. One woman in particular who was trying to reach a 12 year old in St Malachy's College and, being a Catholic of course did not know what was happening, worked her way round the periphery of the seal asking police how to reach St Malachy's College. Funny enough no policeman knew where St Malachy's is. She was furious. I told her to write to you because you were responsible, but I gave her my personal assurance nothing would be done.

Your decision also demonstrates the ineffectualness of legitimate politicians (I prefer that description to constitutional) to the people of Catholic working class areas. You took your decision in full knowledge of the damage to community relations in north Belfast where over 540 people have died violently and in contempt of the majority in the lower Antrim Rd. and all proper representations. The police in 'D' (with whom I have good relations) tell me this parade sets back all their efforts at building relations.

It is clear to me and my colleagues that in practice you have no concern for developing community relations and certainly no interest in improving relations with the Catholic community.

They may be the majority in the Antrim Rd, but the Orangemen own it and you are their guarantor. When the police in Hillman St. turn their backs on the screens and interface fences and point their rifles at the few residents who venture onto their own street, Supt. Foster's local liaison committee becomes as irrelevant as me at a meeting with a senior policeman.

Yours sincerely,

  
Brian Feeney.



Northern Ireland Security Situation, June 1990.

Fatalities in Northern Ireland

There were five security related fatalities in Northern Ireland in June, bringing the total for the first half of 1990 to 29 compared with 39 for the first six months of 1989. Four of the murders were carried out by the IRA bringing its total for the year so far to 17 (58%) compared with 22 (56%) at the same time last year. The UVF carried out one murder in June which means that loyalist paramilitaries are responsible for 6 deaths (20%) this year compared with 13 (33%) at this time last year. The British Army is responsible for 4 deaths (13%) so far this year compared with one at this time last year.

Two unarmed RUC constables (Harold Beckett and Gary Meyer) were shot dead in Belfast by the IRA on 30 June. Earlier in the month an IRA booby trap bomb killed retired RUC constable James Sefton and his wife Ellen, an action which was criticised by Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams. Twelve members of the security forces (6 UDR; 5 RUC; 1 British Army) have been killed so far in 1990 compared with 12 at this time last year (6 Army; 5 RUC; 1 UDR). The murder of Mr. Patrick Boyle, Annaghmore, Co. Armagh, by the UVF brings the number of uninvolved catholics killed this year to eight. Four uninvolved protestants, including Mrs. Sefton, have been murdered this year. Three people involved with republican paramilitaries and two UDA members have also been killed.

Events in Britain, Germany, Holland and the U.S.

A British Army Major, Michael Dillon-Lee was shot dead in Dortmund and private William Robert Davies was shot dead at a railway station in Lichfield, Staffordshire. This brings to five the number of fatalities outside of Northern Ireland so far this year. ( Fifteen people were killed by the IRA in Britain and Europe in 1989. )

In Britain, the IRA caused explosions at the barracks of the Honourable Royal Artillery, Islington, London, which injured 17 civilians; the unoccupied former home of Lord McAlpine in Basingstoke (no injuries); the perimeter of an RAF base at Stanmore, Northwest London (no injuries); and at the Carlton Club in central London, which injured seven people.

An Englishman, Nicholas Mullen was jailed for 30 years at the Old Bailey on charges of conspiring to cause explosions which arose out of a major find of weapons and semtex explosives at a house in Clapham, London, in December, 1988. His co-defendant, Eamon Wadley, was acquitted.

Police in Belgium arrested Donna Maguire (from Newry) after being alerted by members of the public who heard shots in woodland near the Dutch border. Gerard Majella Harte, (Lurgan), Paul Michael Hughes (Newry) and a person claiming to be "Michael Anthony Collins" but later identified as Sean Hick (Glenageary, Co. Dublin) were arrested later in Holland, and have since been charged with murdering two Australian tourists in Roermond. The Dutch authorities have indicated that they will seek the

extradition of Maguire from Belgium. Meanwhile, IPLO suspect, Anthony Patrick Kerr was extradited from Holland to Belgium. There are now fifteen republican paramilitary suspects and three members of Ulster Resistance facing serious charges in Europe.

In Boston, three U. S. citizens and one Irish citizen were convicted of attempting to export arms and missiles to the IRA from the U. S. In an unrelated case, two other Americans were convicted in Alabama of conspiracy to export weapons to the IRA.

#### Other Violent Incidents in Northern Ireland.

An off-duty UDR soldier in Lisnaskea lost a leg after a booby trap bomb exploded under his car. Two similar devices were discovered by members of the security forces in routine checks under their cars near Omagh and at Katesbridge, Co. Down.

A soldier was seriously injured when a foot patrol was ambushed near Pomeroy, Co. Tyrone. Two drogue bombs were later found at the scene. Drogue bombs were thrown at patrols in Oldpark, Andersonstown, and Stewartstown Road in Belfast, but there were no injuries. Police and soldiers on guard duty outside the Chichester St. Courts were fired on from the Markets area but escaped injury.

There were three unsuccessful sectarian murder attempts: Sinn Fein Director of Publicity, Sean Keenan, was shot and wounded at his home in West Belfast by the UFF; shots were fired at a car travelling on the Ligoniel Road in North Belfast; and in Glengormley shots were fired through a window injuring a 37 year old catholic man. There were ten "punishment" shootings reported in the media and one punishment beating in which a man in West Belfast had both of his legs broken with iron bars. According to our records, there have been at least 40 punishment shootings to date this year. The total for 1989 was 155.

The IRA planted bombs at the following locations:

Derry - on the site of the new RUC station;  
Lurgan - on the railway line;  
Cookstown town centre - a 500 lb bomb caused extensive damage;  
Dungannon - a bomb attached to a gas cylinder defused;  
Omagh - a 250 lb. device defused;  
Newtownbutler - a bomb destroyed a customs post;  
Wattle Bridge, Co. Fermanagh - 400 lb bomb defused;  
Near Armagh - an RUC patrol escaped injury when a booby trap bomb only partially exploded in a disused factory where they were investigating a hoax burglary;  
Newry station - an explosion disrupted the railway line.

#### Crumlin Road Prison

A prison officer was shot at in the Shankhill area of Belfast and the homes of a number of prison officers were petrol bombed in Lisburn earlier in the month. However, the number of incidents has declined following Security Minister Cope's announcement of changes in management and supervision at the prison to reduce the risk of confrontation between republican and loyalist prisoners.

Nevertheless, there have been a number of minor fights between prisoners reported since Cope's announcement.

#### IPLO

A protest march took place on the Falls Road to protest a particularly vicious gang rape allegedly committed by members and associates of the IPLO in the Divis Flats area. Sinn Fein/IRA issued a statement calling on the IPLO to "disband forthwith" which has given rise to fears of a violent confrontation between the two organisations.

#### Dublin Belfast Railway Line

In addition to the bombs at Newry and Lurgan referred to above, (which narrowly missed causing death or serious injuries to two teenagers) there were a number of scares and hoaxes at Belfast Central station and near Lurgan which caused additional disruption.

#### Marching Season

Controversial marches through nationalist areas in Newtownbutler, Co. Fermanagh, and the Duncairn Gardens area in Belfast passed off without incident although they gave rise to greatly increased tension and, in the case of Duncairn Gardens, a massive security force presence was required to ensure that the march passed off "peacefully". (These marches and other anticipated flashpoints for July have been raised in the Secretariat.)

#### Security Force Successes

Yet another bomb factory was discovered in a house in West Belfast where a substantial amount of bomb making equipment, including 900 lbs. of fertilizer, was found by the RUC. Two men were arrested after the raid. (This is the ninth major bomb factory raid or interception in Belfast since October, 1989; in nearly all of the raids the culprits have been caught red-handed in circumstances which suggest that the RUC is receiving very accurate information.)

A general purpose machine gun, grenades and ammunition were found in Dromore, Co. Tyrone. Two men were arrested in Newry after a 5 lb semtex device was found attached to railings in the town, and in Belfast, three men were arrested after a car chase in which shots were fired at the police.

J Farrell  
Anglo-Irish Section  
5 July, 1990

CC. Mr. Gallagher, Counsellors AI, Secretariat, Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Brosnan (D/Justice), Embassies: Canberra, London, Washington.  
Box.

	Civilians <sup>2</sup> (ie non-security forces)	Army	UDR	RUC	Total Security Forces Fatalities	Total Fatalities
1969	12	-	-	1	1	13
1970	23	-	-	2	2	25
1971	115	43	5	11	59	174
1972	322	103	26	17	146	468
1973	171	58	8	13	79	250
1974	166	28	7	15	50	216
1975	216	14	6	11	31	247
1976	245	14	15	23	52	297
1977	69	15	14	14	43	112
1978	50	14	7	10	31	81
1979	51	38	10	14	62	113
1980	50	8	8	9	25	75
1981	57	10	13	21	44	101
1982	57	21	7	12	40	97
1983	44	5	10	18	33	77
1984	36	9	10	9	28	64
1985	25	2	4	23	29	54
1986	37	4	8	12	24	61
1987	66	3	8	16	27	93
1988	54	22	12	6	40	94 <sup>3</sup>
1989	41	12	2	9	23	64 <sup>4</sup>
1990	17	1	6	5	12	29 <sup>5</sup>
Total	1924(69%)	424 (15%)	186 (6.5%)	271 (9.5%)	881(31%)	2805

<sup>1</sup>Source: Westminster PQ replies and Section records.

<sup>2</sup>For breakdown see Table 2. This column includes 26 prison officers.

<sup>3</sup>In addition, 3 IRA members killed by British security forces in Gibraltar on 6 March, 3 British soldiers killed in the Netherlands on 1 May, 1 British soldier killed in London on 1 August and 1 British soldier killed in Belgium on 12 August 1988.

<sup>4</sup>In addition, 1 British soldier killed in FRG on 2 July 1989, wife of British soldier killed in FRG on 7 September, 11 British soldiers killed as a result of explosion in Deal Barracks, Kent on 22 September, RAF corporal and his six-month-old daughter killed at Wildenrath, FRG on 28 October.

<sup>5</sup>In addition, 1 British soldier killed in London on 16 May, 2 Australian tourists killed in Roermond, the Netherlands, on 27 May, 1 British soldier killed in Lichfield, Staffs, on 1 June and 1 British soldier killed in Dortmund, FRG, on 1 June.

TABLE 2

Breakdown of Civilian (i. e. non-security forces) fatalities  
1969-end June 1990<sup>1</sup>

	Prov. IRA	INLA/ IPLO	Off. IRA	UDA/ UFF	UVF/ PAF	U. R. <sup>2</sup>	Non- Paramil.	TOTAL
1969	0	0	1	0	0	0	13	14
1970	5	0	0	0	0	0	18	23
1971	16	0	2	0	0	0	96	114
1972	58	0	8	8	2	0	251	327
1973	28	0	4	6	2	0	133	173
1974	14	0	3	2	2	0	147	168
1975	9	1	7	7	11	0	179	214
1976	14	0	0	4	1	0	224	243
1977	5	1	0	4	2	0	58	70
1978	6	2	0	0	0	0	37	45
1979	4	0	0	0	0	0	45	49
1980	3	1	0	1	0	0	44	49
1981	11	5	0	3	0	0	47	66
1982	7	2	0	2	2	0	42	55
1983	2	4	1	1	1	0	35	44
1984	11	1	0	1	0	0	21	34
1985	5	0	0	0	0	0	19	24
1986	5	0	0	0	1	0	33	39
1987	14	9	0	3	1	0	39	66
1988	9	1	0	2	2	0	40	54
1989	4	0	0	0	5	2	30	41
1990	1	2		3			11	17

Total: 231(12%) 29(1.5%) 26(1.5%) 47(2.5%) 32(1.5%) 2(0.01%) 1562(81%) 1929

<sup>1</sup>Statistics 1969-1986: Irish Information Partnership  
1986-date: Section records

(Note: Because of some differences in the way they compile their statistics, there are slight disparities between the figures produced by the RUC and the IIP; hence the totals above do not tally fully with Table 1 preceding.)

<sup>2</sup>Ulster Resistance

TABLE 3

Breakdown of all fatalities by Agency Responsible,  
1969-end June 1990\*

	RUC	British Army	UDR	Prov. IRA	INLA	Off. IRA	Other Nationst.	UDA/UFF	UVF/PAF	Non-spec. Loyalist
1969	7	2	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	2
1970	0	5	0	6	0	0	12	0	0	2
1971	1	40	0	57	0	3	33	0	0	21
1972	6	69	1	208	1	5	42	3	1	98
1973	1	29	2	111	0	1	17	14	1	66
1974	2	15	0	81	0	3	15	5	3	86
1975	0	7	0	51	3	2	45	8	17	91
1976	3	13	0	81	1	0	62	5	2	106
1977	2	7	0	47	0	0	23	3	2	20
1978	0	11	0	38	0	0	17	0	0	7
1979	0	1	0	50	2	0	38	1	0	12
1980	2	7	0	36	2	0	12	3	0	10
1981	6	11	1	46	11	1	20	3	1	7
1982	7	4	0	40	30	0	3	0	1	10
1983	6	5	1	41	6	0	3	0	1	9
1984	2	8	0	37	3	0	2	2	1	5
1985	1	3	2	43	2	0	0	1	1	0
1986	2	4	0	37	2	0	2	5	3	8
1987	0	9	0	54	10	0	1	3	1	10
1988	2	5	0	61	1	0	2	6	8	9
1989	2	2	0	38	0	0	4	4	9	5
1990 <sup>1</sup>		4		17			1	1	3	2
Total	52	261	7	1180	74	15	358	67	55	586
(2655)	(2%)	(10%)	(0.25%)	(44%)	(3%)	(0.5%)	(13.5%)	(2.5%)	(2%)	(22.5%)

\* Source: Statistics 1969-1986, Irish Information Partnership  
Statistics 1987-date, Section records.

The footnote to Table 2 also applies to this Table

<sup>1</sup>Person responsible for death of Clifford Lyness on 13.3.90 not disclosed.

Agency responsible for fatalities 1969- end June 1990:  
Breakdown by category of victim<sup>1</sup>

<u>Category of Victim</u>	<u>Agency Responsible</u>		
	<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Nationalist Paramilitaries</u>	<u>Loyalist Paramilitaries</u>
Security Forces	16	852	10
Nationalist Para.	117	141	20
Loyalist Para.	13	18	39
Civilians	174	590	638
Prison Officers	0	26	2
TOTAL	320	1627	709
As % of Total	(12)	(61)	(27)

<sup>1</sup>Source: Statistics 1969-1986: Irish Information Partnership;  
 Statistics 1986-date: Section records.

It should be noted that in addition to the above, there were about 160 fatalities for which the agency responsible is unknown.

TABLE 5

Breakdown of Catholic fatalities in Northern Ireland  
by Agency Responsible

(a) 1969 - end June 1990<sup>1</sup>

Agency Responsible	No. killed	% of total
Nationalist paramilitaries	449	37%
Loyalist paramilitaries	569	46%
Security forces	211	17%
TOTAL	1229	

(b) 1978 - end June 1990

Agency Responsible	No. killed	% of total
Nationalist paramilitaries	123	36.5%
Loyalist paramilitaries	124	36.5%
Security forces	93	27%
TOTAL	340	

<sup>1</sup>Primary source: Irish Information Partnership. For further background on the breakdown of the statistics on the period 1969 - date, see Table 6 following.

TABLE 6Breakdown of Catholic fatalities inNorthern Ireland by category of victim 1969 - end June 1990<sup>1</sup>

<u>Category of Victim</u>	<u>No. Killed</u>	<u>approx. %of Total</u>
Civilians killed by security forces	94	8%
Civilians killed by Nationalist paramilitaries in "mistake" operations	123	10%
Catholics killed by loyalist paramilitaries	569	46%
Nationalist paramilitaries killed in "own goal" operations	109	9%
Nationalist paramilitaries killed by security forces	117	10%
Catholics killed by Nationalist paramilitaries in "punishment/discipline" operations (alleged informers etc.)	176	14%
Catholic members of security forces killed by Nationalist paramilitaries	41	3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1229</b>	<b>100%</b>

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Irish Information Partnership and Section records.

TABLE 7

Fatalities arising from incidents in border areas<sup>1</sup>

	<u>1990</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1986</u>
Fatality					
RUC	2	5	3	3	10
UDR	1	1	4	1	4
Army	1	9	2	1	3
IRA	-	1	2	4	3
INLA/IPLO	1	-	1	4	-
Civilian(cath. )	1	4	3	2	2
Civilian(prot. )	-	-	6	7	3
Total	6	20 <sup>2</sup>	21	22	25

Fatalities in border areas: Breakdown by County

	<u>1990</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1986</u>
County					
Down	1	4	1	5	5
Armagh	3	6	10	7	9
Tyrone	1	3	4	-	4
Fermanagh		2	5	2	5
Derry	1	5	1	8	2
<u>Total</u>	6	20 <sup>2</sup>	21	22	25

<sup>1</sup>Border areas are defined as areas lying within a 10 mile radius of the border and include, therefore, the urban areas of Derry, Strabane, Armagh and Newry. The above tables are based on statistics which the Section has been compiling since 1986.

<sup>2</sup>This does not include the Protestant ex-RUC man shot dead by the IRA at Ballintra, Co. Donegal, on 15 January.



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place  
London SW1X 7HR

3

Confidential

3 July 1990

Mr Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
Dublin 2

cc RSO ✓  
Mr. Weller ✓; PPP ✓  
Mr. DeLoe ✓; Mr. P. ✓  
Cathal ✓  
Sax ✓


Select Committee on Northern Ireland

Dear Assistant Secretary,

To complete our account of developments in relation to the proposed establishment of a Select Committee on Northern Ireland as reported in my minute of 28 June, I enclose herewith a copy of a letter written by John Hume to Sir Peter Emery, Chairman of the Committee on Procedure on 27 June, the day on which the Committee was scheduled to commence final consideration of its recommendations on this proposal. The views set out in Hume's letter, echoed in debate by several Labour members of the Committee - at Kevin McNamara's prompting - appear to have effectively blocked progress on this proposal for the time being at least. In conversation with Mr. Donoghue last weekend, Mr. Hume reiterated his opinion that the idea of a Select Committee on Northern Ireland affairs was a non-starter from the outset.

Yours sincerely,

  
Joe Hayes  
Counsellor



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Our Ref JH/JG/3

27 June 1990

5 Hayview Terrace  
DERRY  
BT48 7BE

Sir Peter Emery MP  
Chairman of the Select Committee on Procedure  
Committee Office  
House of Commons  
LONDON  
SW1A 0AA

Dear Sir Peter

Thank you for your letter of 15 May last.

I am very sorry that I have not formally replied earlier. You will be aware that my colleagues and I have been engaged in discussions with both the British and Irish Governments about achieving dialogue which would involve the Unionist parties and ourselves. It is our hope that such a process of dialogue will cover all aspects of the various relationships which are involved in our political problem.

You will of course appreciate the delicacy of these matters and the need for sensitivity by all of us. It would not, in my view, be helpful for the Select Committee on Procedure to go any further on the question of a Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs at this stage. I would suggest that it would be appropriate to postpone consideration of the matter until an outcome of the proposed round of talks is apparent.

Yours sincerely

John Hume



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place,  
London SW1X 7HR.

cc P. S. O'Connell; P. P. O'Connell  
Mr. Walsh; P. P. O'Connell  
C. A. A. I.  
T. O'Connell

Confidential

3 July, 1990.

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,  
Assistant Secretary,  
Department of Foreign Affairs,  
Dublin.

Major changes in Labour's policy making process

Dear Assistant Secretary,

Neil Kinnock and his wife were guests of honour at a dinner hosted by the Ambassador on 28 June. The Labour leader was accompanied by Neil Stewart, one of his principal advisers who had travelled with him on his most recent visit to Dublin. Kevin McNamara was also present.

The previous day Kinnock had secured two extremely important victories in his efforts to affect fundamental changes in Labour's relationship with the Trade Unions. The party's National Executive Council had endorsed by an overwhelming majority (18 votes to 3) radical changes in Labour's policy making structure which will substantially dilute the influence of the Trade Union block vote. In a separate, though related, development the TUC endorsed Labour's proposals on the sensitive issue of employment law with Kinnock's left wing opponents losing the battle to prevent Trade Union support for proposals which rule out mass picketing and allow only restricted secondary strike action.

Kinnock's personal satisfaction was evident at what is seen as further evidence of his ability to mould the party to his liking in the face of lingering, if greatly diminished, left wing opposition. Given the social nature of the occasion, it was difficult however to draw him on the implications of the changes for Labour's future although he spoke confidently of a Labour Government under his leadership "within eighteen months".

Neil Stewart, a former senior Trade Union figure, described the changes as "bringing democracy to the Labour party". Both he and McNamara implicitly acknowledged however that the changes, although restricting Trade Union influence, will also greatly increase the power of Labour's National Executive thereby strengthening the ability of the leadership to control policy formulation and curbing the notorious capacity of the annual conference to force dramatic and - from the viewpoint of an increasingly pragmatic Shadow Cabinet - often unwelcome changes in party policy.


According to Stewart, the changes will come into effect after the next party conference in October. A new policy making forum will be created from which seven standing commissions will be chosen representative of MPs, MEPs, Unions, constituency associations and members of the Shadow Cabinet. These commissions will be charged with the task of formulating a rolling two year policy programme although the National Executive will have the all important power to amend the policy forums reports before, they are debated by the party conference. ,

Stewart expressed disappointment at the media coverage of the NEC and TUC debates which he felt had failed to appreciate the significance of the structural changes in policy formulation and - more to the point - underestimated the extent of Kinnock's personal victory in forcing them through while at the same time avoiding a break with the Trade Unions.

According to Stewart, the principal task for Labour in the lead up to the next election will be to combat Conservative efforts to focus increasingly on Kinnock's "ability to lead". Acknowledging that the Conservatives had out-manoeuvered them on the local election results, he emphasised the importance of projecting fully the significance of the previous day's events where, as he said, Kinnock "had beaten the bogey of the Union block vote".

Kinnock spoke repeatedly about his visit to Dublin in March which Glenys described as "the best ever". It is clear from their account, supported by the equally enthusiastic recollection of Neil Stewart, that the weekend trip was a memorable success. He avoided any substantive comment on Irish issues, deferring to Kevin McNamara, whos relationship with Kinnock was relaxed and confident.

Yours sincerely,

  
Joe Hayes  
Counsellor



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Confidential

4 July 1990.

Mr. Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Department of Foreign Affairs.

Dear Assistant Secretary,

Ken Maginnis and Articles Two and Three

Ken Maginnis launched a booklet which he has compiled on the McGimpsey case at a media breakfast in the Savoy Hotel yesterday. Jim Molyneaux and Chris McGimpsey were also present.

I have forwarded separately a copy of the booklet (which, I understand, Maginnis is launching in Dublin today). As you will see, it offers a heavily partisan account of the McGimpseys' challenge to the Agreement, accompanied by the texts of the High Court and Supreme Court judgements and by a selection of articles in the Irish, Northern Irish and British media which were, to one degree or another, sympathetic to the McGimpseys.

A number of questions were put to Jim Molyneaux about the current talks process. As indicated in a number of articles in today's press, he made the following points:

- While he is not making removal of Articles Two and Three a precondition for Unionist participation in talks, he wished to put down a marker nonetheless on this point. There can be no "meaningful relationship" with Dublin as long as the Republic claims territorial jurisdiction over NI;
- He conceives of the talks process as a "four-legged stool" which should start with a constitutional affirmation that NI is part of the UK. This would be followed by a discussion of relations between the NI parties, then a discussion of relations between NI and the Irish Government, ending with talks on relations between the UK and Dublin;
- Molyneaux is opposed to any formal structures between a future NI administration and the Republic, preferring mere "liaison and consultation";


- The present Agreement should be replaced with arrangements under the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council which would, inter alia, allow Dublin to put forward regularly its concern about the difficulties facing Irish emigrants in Britain in areas such as housing, education and employment;
- Molyneaux's principal proposal at any inter-party talks will be for a regional council along the lines indicated by Airey Neave ten years ago and recommended also by the Strathclyde Report.

Ken Maginnis and Chris McGimpsey called for the repeal of Articles Two and Three in the light of the recent Supreme Court ruling and claimed that leading Opposition politicians in the Republic are in favour of this. They indicated that they are considering taking a case against the Agreement to the European Court of Human Rights.

In private conversation, Ken Maginnis indicated to one journalist that there is some unease within the OUP about the talks process and about "what Jim may have agreed to". Molyneaux has so far provided virtually no information to the party about his discussions with Brooke.

Maginnis also said that, if talks do begin, Molyneaux intends to take Willie Ross with him as his deputy; he is determined not to be accompanied by either Ken Maginnis or Martin Smyth; if there is any opposition to Ross, he will go for either Josiah Cunningham (the OUP Chairman) or Jim Nicholson.

Yours sincerely,



David Donoghue  
First Secretary

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN



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Confidential

29 July 1990

Mr Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

The Unionists at Westminster

As you are aware, the Unionists have, at best, a fitful approach to public relations at Westminster.

Their latest exercise was a media reception which Jim Molyneaux held in his Commons room on Wednesday of this week in order to mark the arrival of David Trimble. A very small number of lobby correspondents were invited. The list of invitees, furthermore, had some curious omissions - a number of journalists whose Unionist sympathies are well known were not included. There were about as many MPs present as journalists: Molyneaux and Trimble were accompanied by Ken Maginnis, Willie Ross, Martin Smyth, Cecil Walker, John Taylor and - to the surprise of a number of the guests - Merlyn Rees. No speeches were delivered and it was with difficulty that the journalists present managed to bring conversations with the MPs beyond the level of small-talk. Apart altogether from the novelty of being invited to a drink by Jim Molyneaux, the journalists were bemused by the whole affair.

The principal points of interest which emerged were the following:


- In relation to the current talks process, Molyneaux and others seemed chiefly concerned to receive adequate advance notice of the statement expected on 5 July. They would have to react publicly to it and they wished to be fully prepared. Trimble wanted to have sight of the statement at least 24 hours in advance, whereas Molyneaux would settle for advance notice of "a few hours".

*cc P. S. J. ✓  
M. Walker; ASB  
Gallagher ✓  
E. J. ✓*

- In private conversation, Molyneaux indicated some concern about possible adverse reactions in his party to what he and Paisley have agreed to.
- Martin Smyth, however, was more confident. He underlined to Richard Ford the determination of the OUP to press ahead with bilateral talks with Brooke.
- Smyth also went out of his way to reject speculation that the Unionists would not deal seriously with Brooke in the hope of achieving more under a future Labour Government. He made it clear that he and his colleagues expect that, in the event of a hung Parliament, they would be wooed by the Conservatives as much as by Labour. Their calculation is that, one way or the other, they may be dealing with the Conservatives for some time to come. The likelihood is that either Mrs Thatcher will be returned with a clear majority or she will be returned in circumstances in which she requires Unionist support. Smyth suggested to Ford, therefore, that there might be more value for the Unionists in doing serious business with the present Government (with a view to presenting themselves as natural allies in the event of a hung Parliament) than in "playing the Labour card". (To Ford, however, the presence of Merlyn Rees at the reception suggested that Molyneaux sees things differently or that he is at least keeping his options open).
- Molyneaux hinted to some of the guests that he would favour Willie Ross as his successor.
- Some of the longer-serving journalists recalled that, up to the mid-seventies, the Unionist MPs at Westminster used to hold weekly media briefings. It was put to Molyneaux that more regular briefings ought to be held. The OUP leader replied merely by saying that he would "look into it".

Finally, I understand that Ken Maginnis is planning a media breakfast in the Savoy Hotel for next Tuesday for the purpose of launching a booklet which he has prepared on the McGimpsey case. I have arranged to be kept informed.

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue  
Press & Information Officer

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

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Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020

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Confidential

4 July 1990

Mr Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Anlgo-Irish Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
Dublin 2

Dear Assistant Secretary

Donald Anderson MP

At a lunch hosted by Mr Hayes on 2 July, I met with Donald Anderson, Labour MP for Swansea East and one of the Deputy Labour Spokesmen for Foreign Affairs. Mr Anderson is Labour Deputy Spokesman for Africa and Central America and is a long time and high profile anti-Apartheid campaigner.

Nelson Mandela and the IRA

Anderson arrived for lunch straight from a BBC TV interview at which he had been asked about Mandela's remarks in Dublin on the subject of negotiating with the IRA.

---

While going in to lunch, Mr Anderson stopped to speak to Lord David Pitt, the Labour life peer and one of Mandela's doctors, to urge him to get the message to Mandela to back off the subject. Labour's discomfiture

with Mandela's remarks was made more obvious subsequently by the strong tone adopted by Neil Kinnock when he described the IRA as a bunch of murderous gangsters who deserved no concession and no quarter.

#### Contacts with Irish TD's, the Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Body

Mr Anderson was in Dublin very recently to attend a Conference of the Association of West European Parliamentarians against Apartheid (AWEPAA). He mentioned in particular meeting, with Minister of State Calleary at a reception the Minister hosted in honour of the Association. He also spoke of his contacts with other Irish politicians, including especially Tom Kitt, Nora Owen and Brendan Howlin whom he met through AWEPAA. He spoke positively of his visit which was his first to Dublin though he has spent several holidays in Clare with family friends. He remarked that another Celt from Labour's front bench, George Robertson, had never been to any part of Ireland. He suggested that there was a lack of first hand experience of Ireland at Westminster which needed remedying. In this regard, he praised the setting up of the Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Body. Though not a member of the Body, he had had been involved in selecting the Labour nominees to the Body and expressed himself well satisfied with both the membership and the feedback from the initial meetings of the Body.

#### Labour and the EC


Anderson has always been pro-EEC (he was in the Foreign Office before entering politics). While he justified Labour's former anti-EC stance, chiefly on the economic ground that it involved higher food prices for Labour's traditional supporters, he is clearly happy that the Party has now put its opposition to EC membership behind it. He observed that the conversion is sincere and that it had come about not as a result of a tactical decision of the party leadership but rather as a result of the various major groupings within the coalition which is the Labour Party (Trade Unionists, Socialists, Environmentalists and Feminists) all coming around independently to a pro-EC stance. He did not think that past opposition to EC membership would have any adverse electoral effect on Labour. He did not go into detail on where Labour stood on EMU or EPU beyond reiterating the official Labour line that Britain should ensure she was a player rather than a spectator in the EC.

#### The Next General Election

In our conversation, Anderson referred me to an interesting article in the "Independent" on 29 June by Peter Kellner, which cited research and forecasts made by a unit at the University of Essex. Assuming some fall in the inflation rate (which Anderson clearly thought reasonable) and in interest rates after Britain joined the ERM, the Essex study forecast that, by the first half of 1992, the Conservatives would have 40% support as against 44% for Labour, with others 16%. Allowing for local

variations, this made for the prospect of a very close election. On the actual timing of the election, Anderson thought it unlikely that the Prime Minister would delay until the last possible moment. Assuming an upturn in the economy, followed by a relatively quiescent summer next year, he thought the most probable time was September 1991, or possibly early in 1992. (The only factor that might influence a June date was that Mrs Thatcher might consider that June was her lucky month!). Much would depend on how much money the Treasury was willing to make available to ameliorate the effects of the Poll Tax next year. Anderson concurred with the Kellner finding that the election would be much closer than current opinion polls suggested.

Yours sincerely



Sean Farrell  
First Secretary





IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

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SW1X 7HR

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Confidential

5 July 1990

Mr Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Anglo-Irish Division  
Dublin 2

An Overview of the Birmingham Six's Situation

Dear Assistant Secretary

In response to your request, the following is my best overall assessment of the current state of play. However, I should say that the signals we have been receiving are so contradictory that any attempt to accurately forecast the likely outcome on a rational basis is impossible.

Current Situation

The Devon and Cornwall Police are carrying out an investigation into the Birmingham Six case. Officially, it is into the new material submitted by Gareth Pierce but the scope of the investigation is actually much wider and includes the past records of the West Midlands detectives involved with the Six. Various figures have been given for the number of officers involved (ranging from over forty to over sixty). Notwithstanding this, they do not seem to have yet interviewed the new witnesses brought forward by Pierce. The Home Office explanation is that they are sifting through the enormous documentation in their possession. This suggests that the documents are seen as more promising than the witnesses. September is the earliest estimate of when the investigation may be concluded.

Negative Indications

We have consistency been told by political and senior official sources that the Six did not have "clean hands". There has been a whispering campaign suggesting that some or all of the men were not innocent. Most recently, the Solicitor-General took this line with Mr Hayes and myself. It may mean that a new emphasis is being placed on the circumstantial evidence or that there is evidence which has never been produced in court.

Chris Mullin MP thinks that the authorities here have dug their heels in and the Six will remain in prison for years to come. Gareth Pierce will not really commit herself, in my conversations with her at any rate, to a definite view of how the case will go; she detects less positive indications from official sources than was the case a few months ago. Mr Hayes has reported on the view of Richard Shepherd MP, a sympathiser with the Birmingham Six cause, that public opinion in the West Midlands would need someone to be punished for the bombings as a precondition for the Six's release. There is the problem that Lord Lane has staked his reputation on the case.

The Solicitor-General has stressed the need to preserve the primacy of the courts and, for better or worse, the 1987-88 Court of Appeal hearing dismissed what may be the bulk of new evidence likely to come to light. Our information suggests that the Appeal Court is highly unlikely to reconsider evidence previously produced before it in a new light.

In general, the Six still do not command the broad "Establishment" support that the Guildford Four had, though there has been positive movement on the part of important figures such as Cardinal Hume and Roy Hattersley in recent months.

Robert Baxter of the Home Office told me that there is a different "feel" in his Ministry about the Birmingham Six case, in contrast to the Guildford Four case, where there was a concern up the line about a miscarriage of justice for some time before their release. I got the impression recently that he would be happy to play for time on the issue. Gareth Pierce thinks that Baxter is ploughing a lone furrow in the Home Office on the case and that he has to be careful how he proceeds. He himself does not seem to know the mind of Mr Waddington and he is not comfortable with him the way that he was with his predecessor. He commented recently that he hoped Irish hospitality at a Trevis meeting in Ireland would "loosen up" the Home Secretary.

#### Positive Indications

It would appear that the May Inquiry will find that a perversion of justice occurred in the Maguire case involving dishonesty on the part of Government scientists and the prosecution. It may not be quite the massive conspiracy which the trial judge stated would have been required if the Six were not guilty but it would demonstrate, crucially, that the courts' (both at the trial and appeal) belief in the probity of official witnesses may have been excessive. The discrediting of the West Midlands Serious Crimes Squad can only have helped in this regard.

The setting up of the police investigation is an indication that the Home Secretary does not have a closed mind on the case. It was, after all, the Home Office which asked Gareth Pierce to submit new evidence. It is possible that this has been done to defuse pressure and to demonstrate that justice has, in fact, been done. Our hope must be that the investigation has been set up as a mechanism to find a pretext for releasing the men or at least that it will produce new evidence in their favour. The fact that the Home Office is considering ways of by-passing

the Court of Appeal, by means of an inquiry, for example, may point to an expectation that the police investigation will come up with new material which would cast doubt on the convictions but would not, in itself, amount to outright vindication. The drawback with this option is that the men might have to remain in prison while the inquiry sat. The attitude of prison staff, including the Governors, in the institutions where the Six are being held has undergone radical change for the better in recent months. One Governor said that they were all "rooting for" the Six.

### Conclusion

There may well be factions arguing contrary opinions within the Government on the issue. On the one hand it is likely that there are those who would like to see an end to the case and would be willing to use any excuse to release the men. The pressure from the Irish Government and the negative publicity being generated in the United States may be strong factors in support of this option. On the other hand, there may be an attitude that the system needs a breathing space before it can absorb another admission of failure. There may be a desire to show that, in at least one of these disputed miscarriage of justice cases, the system got it right. While, therefore, there are grounds for hoping that the case will move to an early and satisfactory conclusion, this cannot be taken for granted.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul Murray".

Paul Murray  
First Secretary

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Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020





Confidential

2 July 1990

Mr Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary  
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

Lunch with Donald McIntyre, Sunday Correspondent

McIntyre is the Political Editor of the Sunday Correspondent.

The following points of interest arose:

Talks about talks

- The line being put out by the NIO is that, if the major statement planned by Brooke for 5 July cannot be delivered, the momentum behind Brooke's current efforts will be interrupted - but not irreparably. The opportunity provided by Thursday's debate to place something on record is a valuable one, and one which Brooke does not wish to let slip. However, if necessary, he could find another opportunity to say something before Parliament rises.
- Regarding the major difficulty believed to be threatening the statement, NIO sources have suggested to McIntyre that the SDLP may be behind the Irish Government's insistence on very early involvement in North/South talks. In a private conversation with McIntyre, Richard Needham commented that, for the first time in this process, the difficulty is arising not with the Unionists but "on the nationalist side".
- McIntyre is basically sceptical about the prospects for progress. His own guess is that, in the course of bilaterals with the parties, Brooke will conclude that the gap between them is insuperable and that it is not possible to take the process any further at this stage.


*cc: P24  
McIntyre; P24  
Gen. P. Power  
Guthrie A1  
R24*

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

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Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020

David Trimble

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- In a conversation last week, Trimble remarked to McIntyre that it was wrong of Ian Gow (during the recent Friends of the Union press conference) to criticise Peter Brooke's initiative. While he himself is not hopeful about the outcome, he believes nevertheless that "we must at least go through the motions and see what can be got out of it".

European Council

- D* - McIntyre added to the general praise for the media arrangements at Dublin Castle which I have been hearing in British media circles.
- On Margaret Thatcher's European policy, he observed that there is no longer much appetite in Britain for stories from European Councils which portray a lone British PM battling against her European partners. While there used to be a perception that she was a feared adversary, the common view nowadays is that she is no longer taken seriously and that her isolation on key issues is damaging British interests. People are "bored with her posturing". On Europe, she is being abandoned not merely by large sections of her own party but also by the Labour Party, "where only a handful of left-wing extremists still share her paranoia". All of this may explain the markedly more conciliatory tone which she and her spokesman struck in media briefings at the Dublin European Council.
- In relation to aid for the Soviet Union, Douglas Hurd remarked caustically to McIntyre last week that "she loves Gorbachev - but not in her wallet".
- While in Moscow recently with the Prime Minister, McIntyre sensed a lot of common ground between Mrs Thatcher and Gorbachev on the subject of German unification. "They both hate the Germans and they both fear the implications of unification".
- N* - On the Thatcher/Hurd relationship, McIntyre observed that Hurd is particularly adept at handling the Prime Minister. Although they are two quite different types, Hurd can be charming in his own way and is able to "bend towards her" as the occasion demands. In contrast, she cannot abide Geoffrey Howe. She has told intimates that she dislikes even being in the same room as Howe. "The chemistry is all wrong": she is irritated by Howe's woolly, mumbling manner and far prefers Hurd's crisp and self-confident style.

Birmingham Six

McIntyre, who knows Waddington well, commented that, while the Home Secretary has a right-wing reputation, he does not like the police and, furthermore, becomes impatient at times with the judiciary. He is reportedly unhappy with the Birmingham Six case "hanging over him" and wishes to find some means of disposing of it - as quickly as possible.

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue  
Press & Information Officer

4



TEL. 267-9330

CONSULATE GENERAL OF IRELAND

535 BOYLSTON STREET  
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02116

cc psot ✓  
M. Neill; P.P.  
M. O'Brien; H. O'Brien  
Giblin & 1"  
J.P.

Confidential

June 26, 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher  
Assistant Secretary

Frank Costello, Mayor Flynn's Irish advisor confirmed that the Mayor had sent a letter to U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh criticising the continued incarceration of Joe Doherty of 7 years in spite of court rulings to the contrary (see attached articles in Boston Globe and Boston Herald of June 1990). Mr. Costello pointed out that the Mayor has made no judgement as to the innocence/guilt of Joe Doherty on the charges against him but is very unhappy that "due process is being ignored" in this case. The Mayor feels that the case gives a great boost to Noraid at a time when that organisations standing in the Irish/American Community is at an all time low.

Part of the Mayor's reason for making this move is to display his attitude to the affair at a time when Mayor Dinkins (a friend of Mayor Flynn) is naming a street after Joe Doherty in New York. While I understand Mayor Flynn will not follow suit, at least for the time being, I know he was under some pressure to make a statement on the case. I can confirm that it is a source of irritation to the Irish community in Boston even among those who would not support Noraid. I recall that when Cardinal O Fiaich was in Boston in February (after he had visited Joe Doherty) his statement calling the detention into question found a very enthusiastic reception among a group of church goers the overwhelming majority of whom I know have no connection with Noraid.

We have been able to remain outside the controversy . The weakness of Noraid because of the split has led to a relatively small "Free Joe Doherty" campaign in Boston so far. The potential is obviously there for this case to grow in importance especially if it were backed by liberal Americans.

*Liam Canniffe*  
Liam Canniffe  
Consul General

cc Ambassador, Washington  
Brian Nason

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