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Gnó

ANGLO-IRISH SECTION
WEEKLY BRIEF
WEEK ENDING 22/06/90

An Uimhir ag Roinn
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SECRET

ANGLO-IRISH SECTION
WEEKLY BRIEF

WEEK ENDING 22nd JUNE 1990

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 - Report on Crumlin Road Jail
 - Dinner with John Cope
 - Report on Briefing by British Army
 - Visit by John Chilcot
 - Report on INTERREG
 - Discussion with Chairman of Northern Ireland Police Authority

2. Contact and Information Work
 - Conversation with Fr. Bennett, Belfast
 - Meeting with Paddy Roche, Unionist academic


3. Reports from Embassy London.
 - Letter from Sir John May concerning the Guildford and Woolwich Enquiry
 - Conversation with Sir Nicholas Lyell QC MP, Solicitor General
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 - Conversation with Gerry Bermingham MP, member of Home Affairs Select Committee
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National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

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Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

Crumlin Road Jail

You will have seen press reports concerning adjustments to prison policy at Crumlin Road where, as you know, the loyalist and republican paramilitaries have been campaigning for some time for segregation. I attach a transcript of comments made by the Minister of State, Mr. Cope, on 19 June when he was questioned about the changes by journalists. Neither he nor the NIO were very happy about what he had said, and he himself expressed some anxiety when he came to dinner on Tuesday, 19 June, that there might be a political rebound.

The position as we understand it here is as follows:

There has been no change in the segregation policy. The adjustments that have been made are designed to minimise the capacity of the paramilitaries on either side to cause trouble and put further pressure on the authorities. As a preliminary comment, the other side have pointed out to us that there are at present about 100 remand prisoners in Crumlin Road, among whom there is an unusually high proportion of "hard men"; on the loyalist side, they include a number of those picked up under the Stevens investigation; and on the republican side, they include a number of men from the South Tyrone area. The group also includes

of the UDA. Apart from the public campaign which has been going on in the media, there have been many threats to prison officers in the exercise yard and in other parts of the prison.

The paramilitaries want segregation on the landings. This continues to be refused, but the authorities have taken steps to balance the numbers of republicans and loyalists on each landing in order to prevent one or other getting the upper hand

and forcing a policy of segregation de facto. Secondly, they are now unlocking republicans and loyalists in separate groups (previously each cell was unlocked on a basis of alternation between republican/loyalist) and, thirdly, since a number of prisoners have been picked on for violent beatings with a view to forcing the authorities to bring in segregation, there is now heavier supervision with a view to preventing such beatings or, when they happen, stopping them and rescuing the intended victim. It has been put to us here that a republican prisoner, whose beating is reported in today's Irish News, was in fact saved from more severe treatment by the intervention of the prison officers (who were themselves injured). Fourthly, there is more controlled movement to the medical quarters. Essentially, the practice here has been that anybody reporting sick is sent to the medical quarters. The paramilitaries have taken advantage of this by instructing members to go sick, thus causing quite large processions to the medical quarters in the morning with consequent opportunities for confrontation and disruption. The authorities have now discontinued this practice and prisoners claiming to be ill are, if necessary, visited in their rooms. Hence, Minister Cope's public reference to "room service" which he regretted. But as Mr. Cope also said publicly, the intention behind this and other measures taken is to make it less likely that a person would be involved in a confrontation on the landing.

We would of course be glad to know the views of the Department's prison contacts on these matters.

Yours sincerely



Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

P.S. Mr. John Steele, Director of the Prison Service, came to a farewell party for Mr. Collins this evening. He confirmed the above but added that the most important change is the unlocking of cells by group.

File

TRANSCRIPT: MINISTER OF STATE DOORSTEPPED (TUESDAY 19 JUNE 1990

Interviewer:

Sir, just before we start, can you tell us about the changes that have been implemented in the supervision of prisoners at Crumlin Road jail?

Mr Cope:

There's no great changes. What we are trying to do is to manage the jail in a caring way as usual, but also to minimise the opportunities for confrontation within it, so as to ensure that it runs smoothly.

Interviewer:

I believe these changes centre around a certain number of individuals?

Mr Cope:

No not particularly, no. We have made certain changes in the management and the way it is run. For example the medication - a prisoner, normally speaking, is accompanied down to collect some medication from the Medical Centre. if he's going to be treated, but if he's going to collect some medicine from the medical place and instead we've instituted room service and that means he is less likely to be involved in a confrontation on the landings. It's things of that kind.

Interviewer:

But a few weeks ago the Northern Ireland Office did say that some of the disturbances were the work of a certain minority within the jail and it's my understanding that a certain number of individuals have been identified and that they are, shall we say, been given special supervision?

Mr Cope:

No. Of course it's true that we do move ^(O) people around from time to time for all sorts of different reasons, around the jail, but that's not the focus of what we are about.

Interviewer:

Have there been any changes in the way in which the prison staff then organise themselves to accommodate this change in the regime?

Mr Cope:

Yes, there's been small changes of the sort I've just been describing - management changes - to avoid as much as possible the opportunities for conflict and so on and confrontation with any, but it's not a major change we're about. It's small changes.

Interviewer:

Minister, could I just ask you about the current situation on the Continent. What's your reading of what the IRA is up to?

Mr Cope:

Clearly they have been having a campaign. They have extended their campaign to the Continent and to targets there. They have obviously made some mistakes by their own admission in doing so in the targets they have actually attacked, but at the same time there has been extremely welcome progress which I am very glad to see in the recent arrests in the last day or two.

Interviewer:

What do you think is their thinking and policy right now though?

Mr Cope:

Well, I assume that they have been having greater difficulty attacking targets here and they have therefore spread their attacks further and further afield, but it's always rash to try and guess what they're doing, because obviously they change their policy at frequent intervals in response to events and in response to what they think the easiest thing is to do. They tend, as you know, to look for soft and easy targets wherever they can and this is one way of doing so.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

Dinner with Mr. Cope

Mr. John Cope, the Deputy Secretary of State and Minister in charge of Security and Finance matters, came to dinner at the Secretariat last evening. The discussion was mainly of a social and general nature but the following were a few points of interest:

- Mr. Cope spoke at some length about his former colleague at the Whip's Office, John Wakeham. In response to my question, he felt that the choice of Mr. Wakeham as the new image co-ordinator inside the Government was a job for which he was ideally suited. He did not think, however, that it represented any advance in Mr. Wakeham's career. On the contrary, he felt that Mr. Wakeham's (Brighton bomb) injuries would not permit him to stay in office too much longer (the implication was that Mr. Wakeham's new appointment was accepted or tolerated by senior colleagues in this knowledge).
- In discussion of possible future moves, Mr. Cope admitted to an interest in a job at the Foreign Office, although he felt himself unlikely to be chosen because of his lack of foreign languages and indeed lack of foreign experience (it appears that he has travelled very little abroad). Perhaps for reasons of modesty, he indicated no ambition for higher Ministerial office.
- He expressed great admiration for Mr. Brooke's efforts to bring about political talks. No doubt this was to be expected; but I was struck by the warmth and sincerity with which he spoke of Mr. Brooke. At the same time, he expressed no great optimism about the talks and indeed

gave the impression that he did not rate the chance of success very high. He did think, however, that the very fact that various parties were prepared to consider talks and, at the least, were conscious of not being seen to frustrate them, was in itself an important advance.

- He expressed some apprehension about the adjustments which the Prisons Service has made within Crumlin Road Jail in order to ease the continuing controversy over the Government's integration policy. He hoped that there would not be a political rebound on the adjustments and the comments he had made that day (see separate report).
- He said that the British Embassy in Washington was concerned about the prospects for a further U.S. contribution to the International Fund for Ireland this year. The view was being expressed by the Embassy that tourism projects would be specifically excluded from support on conditions which Congress would attach to any renewed contribution. I said our Embassy was hopeful of a further \$20 million contribution for 1991; we were aware of the views of some members of Congress about tourism projects but I did not have the impression that the die was now cast on this point(?) I also said that we were concerned about renewed attacks on the Fund by figures associated with Noraid, working under cover of the AOH, and we had taken steps to counteract it. I mentioned in this connection that the Minister might take the opportunity fairly shortly of making a statement supportive of the Fund possibly on the occasion of the forthcoming visit by former Speaker Tip O'Neill. Mr. Cope mentioned in conversation that Mr. McGuckian had made a very good impression indeed on his visit to the United States as Chairman of the Board of the Fund.
- He expressed some concern that expectations were being raised too high about the likely level of funding by the EC Commission under INTEREG and that there would be political fall-out from unrealised hopes (the Northern side suggested to us here last week that the likely level of funding to North and South jointly would be about 80m. ECUs).
- Mr. Cope expressed some worry that the new Northern Ireland section or bureau in the British Embassy in Washington may have a downside if the "grandees" at the Embassy tend to leave Northern Ireland matters to the new section. As we have previously reported, the intention is to send two members of staff at First Secretary and Second Secretary level to man the new section. They are northerners selected from the Northern Ireland Civil Service (as it happens, both of them from the Department of Economic Development) and it is hoped they will tap Irish/American goodwill for purposes of economic investment in particular and support in general for British Government policy in Northern Ireland.

From the above, you will have noted that Mr. Cope made no pitch to us on security co-operation. This may have been partly due to the sociable nature of the occasion, but it may also be due to a feeling on his part that there was nothing to be gained by pressing us further on the issues that have been discussed in this restricted session at the Conference. He was aware, however, that we had had a British Army briefing on security matters earlier that day.

On our side, we touched generally on Stevens and the marching season but did not go into detail (we have handed over a paper in preparation for a comprehensive discussion on marches which will take place in the Secretariat tomorrow).

Yours sincerely



Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

Briefing by British Army

The British side of the Secretariat have arranged occasional formal briefings by the British Army from time to time (the most recent was in September 1988). A briefing was proposed for me after my arrival here in January and after some delays and rearrangements, it was given yesterday afternoon. The briefing is the standard presentation given to newcomers including senior members of the press. Although much of the content was already known to us, it was interesting to receive a direct sense of current British Army preoccupations; and, of course, we took the opportunity to put a number of our concerns directly to the Army authorities at the highest level. Although the exchanges were at times firm, they were always mild-mannered and courteous.

The General Officer Commanding the British Army in Northern Ireland, Sir John Waters, attended throughout. The Commander of the UDR, Brigadier Charles Ritchie, was also present. Senior Assistant Commissioner David Cushley attended from the RUC. The briefers were Col. David Strudley and Major Robert Edmundson Jones. I was accompanied by Mr. Ryan and Mr. Harwood.

The briefing took the usual form of the British Army's formal duties in Northern Ireland, casualty lists, assessment of republican and loyalist paramilitary threats, and so on. The following were points of interest.

Political Talks

You may recall that when I met Sir John Waters in January shortly after my arrival here, he expressed deep scepticism

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
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Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020

about the possibility of political progress (my letter of 30 January). In the formal circumstances of yesterday's meeting the General was more reticent. He did indicate, however, that his views had not changed; certainly, he expressed no optimism concerning Mr. Brooke's efforts or, in response to my question, on the possibility of a rethink in Sinn Fein/IRA circles.

Stevens Inquiry

The Army officers went out of their way to emphasise "contrary to some reports" that they had no quarrel with Stevens, that they had already taken steps to implement some of his recommendations before they were issued, for example, on screening of the UDR, and that they were looking positively at all of his recommendations, assessing them in the context of practicality and available resources with a view to implementation. Nonetheless, behind the positive and polite attitude adopted to Stevens, there was a clear determination that the Army itself would decide what it would or would not do; and there was little concrete information offered on changes in Army procedures. In response to our questions about screening of the UDR, the officers would not be drawn any further than to say the following:

- decisions regarding the recruitment of UDR candidates had always been a matter for Army Headquarters rather than for the UDR itself;
- there had been a considerable increase in staff (to 11) of the UDR screening unit at Army Headquarters;
- there always had been a police involvement in the process but this had been put on a new basis.

Brigadier Ritchie said there could be many borderline cases of men who had criminal records but who had turned over a new leaf or who, in any event, had no paramilitary associations. General Waters intervened to say that granted the catchment group of the UDR (i.e. working class and rural Protestants) it would always be difficult to rule out the possibility of some relationship or association with persons involved in paramilitary activity. Both he and Brig. Ritchie insisted, however, that the policy was that if in doubt, the Army did not recruit or retain a person falling under suspicion. Again in response to our question, Brig. Ritchie said emphatically that association with an organisation such as Ulster Resistance would be regarded as a bar to recruitment to the UDR and retention in it. (You may recall the members of the UDR (brothers) who were seen putting up Ulster Resistance posters in Co. Tyrone some time ago but who did not seem to be found by the Army to be so associated).

Role of the UDR/Issue of Plastic Bullets

I said that, as the officers were well aware, in our view the role and basis of the UDR was open to question. I did not propose to expand on that issue now but I did want to raise a number of particular questions.

I said that we had been appalled by the decision to issue plastic bullets to the UDR, that it was inevitable that we should wonder why this decision had been taken after twenty years of UDR existence, inevitable also that we should be deeply worried about the impact on community relations of any use of plastic bullets by the UDR, and concerned whether the decision did not portend an inclination towards increasing use of the UDR in nationalist areas and, indeed, contrary to established policy, for crowd control and anti-riot purposes.

General Waters said it was dismaying that I could express these views with obvious sincerity. It was very unfortunate that such misunderstanding should exist between friends who shared a common aim of defeating terrorism. He said he was personally associated with the decision to issue plastic bullets. There was no question of any change in the role of the UDR; they would not be used in riot situations and no training was provided to them for such a purpose. The decision had been taken only for the purpose of avoiding situations where the sole alternative would be to use live ammunition in defence of life or equipment. I pointed out that one of the more unexpected statistics in Northern Ireland (from a nationalist point of view) was that the UDR had been responsible for only seven fatal casualties out of a total of more than two and half thousand. Surely, one of the reasons for this was that the UDR had not been put in situations where the use of live ammunition would be even considered? General Waters did not give any convincing explanation as to why the policy had changed. He again mentioned one or two cases recently where the UDR had felt under threat from hostile crowds; and he referred to a separate incident at Cappagh, Co. Tyrone, which could have justified the use of plastic baton rounds. The reason in the Cappagh case was that a UDR unit had lost a very sensitive piece of equipment now carried by all soldiers (he gave no details - he may have been referring to a radio jamming device). The piece of equipment had been recovered. But what would have happened in circumstances where the UDR had tried to force its recovery from hostile hands? It would be simply appalling if sensitive equipment - which he again emphasised was carried by all soldiers - fell into the hands of the IRA.

(Comment: I recall General Waters laying stress on this point at my previous meeting with him in January, although he did not then mention the background to the Cappagh incident. We were left with the impression that the possibility of loss of sensitive electronic equipment by UDR soldiers was an important factor in the decision to issue plastic bullets.)

In response to our question, the officers said that to the best of their knowledge there had been no issue of plastic bullets to the UDR other than on the single occasion at Coalisland on 31 December of which we were informed.

I drew attention to the importance of police accompaniment of the UDR and noted to Mr. Cushley that we were awaiting a follow-up from the police to Mr. Annesley's presentation at the last Conference.

IRA Threat

The assessment of the IRA threat followed the same lines as that given by General Waters to me in January. The IRA is increasingly sophisticated, capable of undertaking operations simultaneously in Northern Ireland, Britain and the Continent, and capable at any time of inflicting casualties sufficient to cause the sort of outcry and political reaction which followed the Ballygawley bombing in 1988. I drew attention to the decrease in fatalities in Northern Ireland, especially among the security forces, in the last 18 months; but in the view of General Waters, which was strongly echoed by his fellow officers, it is simply a matter of luck that many more casualties and serious incidents have not occurred. The officers referred repeatedly to the intelligence shown in the planning, equipping and executing of IRA operations. They noted, for example, that in Northern Ireland last Thursday there had been no fewer than 18 bomb scares involving Belfast and the Dublin/Belfast railway line. All of these had proven to be hoaxes and the IRA operation had not received a great deal of publicity; but the city had virtually ground to a halt.

The officers' assessment was that IRA units in Belfast and in East and Mid-Tyrone are self-sustaining in the sense that personnel are not required from other parts of Northern Ireland or from the South. In all other areas, however, the border is used as a "resource" for movement of personnel; and in all cases, in the Army view, IRA units are supplied from the South. In this respect, the officers repeated the views which are well-known to you about the desirability of direct communication between the British Army and the Garda and our Army, additional facilities for overflights, surveillance in certain border areas, extradition handover points, and the use by paramilitaries of cross-border roads, such as BCPs 114/5 which had been used in the Derryard attack. Mr. Ryan is reporting directly to the Department of Justice on the detail of this part of the conversation.

In regard to cross-border roads, I said we were of course conscious of the security threat, and we were conscious also of the political problem faced by NIO Ministers. But, there was a political problem in the South also brought on by the inconvenience and economic hardship caused by closures - which had played a part, for example, in the decline of the entire town of Clones, Co. Monaghan. Sinn Fein and the IRA fed off the discontent and resentment the closures engendered; and portrayed themselves as the only ones willing to help the people, hence their recent border roads campaign. I said that within the security and political parameters on both sides, it should be possible to consider opening a very limited number of roads, e.g., in the Clones area and in Co. Leitrim which had no cross-border road open at the present time. I noted that all of this was being studied by the police on both sides and that we hoped they would be in a position to give their views shortly. Mr. Cushley intervened to suggest the RUC saw little prospect of re-opening any roads.

The officers gave full attention to our comments but we were left with the impression that their view is that there is no real pressure for the opening of roads and that the issue is being whipped up and manipulated by Sinn Fein.

Delays at British Army Checkpoints

We raised the question of lengthy delays at British Army checkpoints, such as Kilturk, Mullan Bridge and Gortmullan in Co. Fermanagh. We noted that we had received a string of complaints of lengthy delays at checkpoints in the Fermanagh border area since the beginning of the year. We emphasised that the delays of which we were speaking were regular and lengthy and that we would not, for example, be making representations about an isolated delay of ten minutes. We also noted that we were puzzled at the lack of reaction through the Secretariat to our representations. The ensuing conversation was not very satisfactory but the following points emerged:

- The Army itself and the Army civil representative, Ms. Taplin, who was also present, said that they had received no complaints directly themselves until we had started to make them. This was not said in any way to suggest that we were being used by malcontents or IRA elements, and it was accepted that there was a problem.
- The problem seems to have arisen because of the Army's anxiety about PVCs since the successful IRA attack on Derryard PVC last December which resulted in Army fatalities. In the aftermath of that attack, personnel at PVCs in the Fermanagh area were taking extra precautions for understandable reasons.
- Although they did not say so explicitly, we carried away the impression that we have gained in other conversations that the Derryard incident renewed a debate within the Government about the usefulness of PVCs. As you know, the British Army view is that they are a waste of resources and a risk to soldiers, whereas the NIO view is that they are required if only as a political or psychological reassurance to Unionists in isolated border areas. We suspect that in current circumstances the Army is not willing to deploy extra resources in order to deal with delays that may arise.
- General Waters commented that in the cases I had mentioned there was also a physical problem regarding the width of the road which, he thought, although he was not categorical about this, did not permit traffic to be processed other than through a single checkpoint. (If you have information which sheds other light on this, it would be useful to have it).
- In regard to the Quinn Quarry at Derrylin, I said to General Waters that surely the arrival and departure of

workers - whatever about commercial traffic - was predictable and that it should be possible to deploy more men for such peak periods?


- The officers agreed a little reluctantly and under pressure to investigate the matter again but we did not come away with a view that they were likely to take any urgent remedial action. They did, however, express appreciation for information which we have been giving them in recent years about events such as GAA championship matches which cause a predictable build-up of traffic at certain checkpoints including the ones we mentioned.

Complaints

General Waters stressed his anxiety to deal with harassment and to respond quickly to petty complaints (i.e. those falling short of those that would require police investigation for the purpose of possible criminal charges). He read a list of statistics for the last 18 months which showed a very high level of Army response and of complaints sustained. I said we thought progress was being made but it could vary from area to area and the Army should be conscious that many people still thought it useless and even counterproductive to complain. I mentioned the care we took to filter complaints coming to us in Dublin - we were not a post-office box and frivolous or doubtful complaints were not passed on - and referred again to delays we had experienced in getting replies through the Secretariat.

One good point made by the officers present and by the Civilian Representative was that speed in the making of a complaint was all-important. The Army was anxious to respond quickly not only because that made a good impression but also because it became very difficult to get to the bottom of a complaint against a soldier once he had left the North. General Waters added the view that Sinn Fein had a policy of getting people to put in complaints weeks or months after the event for the purpose of making the Army look unwilling or unable to deal with complaints.

Yours sincerely



Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

Visit by Mr. John Chilcot

Mr. John Chilcot called to the Secretariat this morning, accompanied by Mr. Ian Burns and Mr. Robert Alston. As you know, Mr. Chilcot, who is currently Deputy Secretary at the Home Office, will take Mr. Burns' place as Deputy Secretary at the NIO in charge of Political Affairs from next month; and will succeed Sir John Blelloch as Permanent Under-Secretary from October.

You will know Mr. Chilcot from dealing with him on the Birmingham Six and other Home Office issues. I found him to be a very pleasant man, looking forward with considerable enthusiasm to his forthcoming responsibilities at the NIO and keenly interested in the Secretariat. Most of the visit was devoted to physical inspection of the premises and a detailed briefing on how the Secretariat works, what issues arise, how they are dealt with, and so forth. I told Mr. Chilcot that we expected to let the NIO have plans for construction and reconstruction at Maryfield very shortly.

Before Mr. Chilcot left, I referred to the May inquiry and asked whether Mr. Chilcot thought Sir John May was likely to prove controversial in his conclusions. I noted some differing reports indicating in some cases that Sir John May was an Establishment figure who would not "rock the boat"; and, in others, that he would not hesitate from disobliging comments about the police, forensic and legal processes involved in the Guildford Four and Maguire cases, and that these might extend to the current Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, who has been criticised for his performance as trial judge in Maguire. Mr. Chilcot said that the second assessment of Sir John May would prove nearer the truth, tending to confirm views expressed to Embassy London by the Miscarriage of Justices' Section of the Home Office (Mr. Murray's telex of 15 June).

I also took the opportunity to mention the Birmingham Six and the continuing, strong pressure which is being exerted on both our Governments. Mr. Chilcot gave a friendly response, which contrasted notably in tone with the rather testy reactions which we tend to get from senior officials at the NIO on this case, but he said nothing of substance.

Incidentally, both Mr. Burns and Mr. Chilcot received CBs (Commander of the Bath) in the Queen's Birthday Honours. This honour is reserved to Deputy Secretary rank and is just short of a Knighthood. As you know, these distinctions are taken very seriously on the British side and we expressed suitable congratulations. Mr. Burns was heard to say a little wistfully that Mr. Chilcot would have a 'K' to put before the CB by the end of the year.

Yours sincerely

Declan O'Donovan

Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

copied: Secretary
Assistant Secretary O'Connor
Ambassador London

Mr. Chilcot's C.V. attached.

CHILCOT, John Anthony; Deputy Under Secretary of State, Home Office, since 1987; Director, RTZ Pillar Ltd, since 1986; *b* 22 April 1939; *s* of Henry William Chilcot and Catherine Chilcot (*née* Ashall); *m* 1964, Rosalind Mary Forster. *Educ*: Brighton Coll. (Lyon Scholar); Pembroke Coll., Cambridge (Open Scholar; MA). Joined Home Office, 1963; Asst Private Sec. to Home Secretary (Rt Hon. Roy Jenkins), 1966; Private Sec. to Head of Civil Service (late Baron Armstrong of Sanderstead), 1971-73; Principal Private Secretary to Home Secretary (Rt Hon. Merlyn Rees; Rt Hon. William Whitelaw), 1978-80; Asst Under-Sec. of State, Dir of Personnel and Finance, Prison Dept, 1980-84; Under-Sec., Cabinet Office (MPO), 1984-86; Asst Under Sec. of State, Home Office, 1986 (seconded to Schrodgers, 1986-87). *Recreations*: reading, music and opera, travel. *Address*: c/o Home Office, 50 Queen Anne's Gate, SW1. *Club*: Travellers'.

BÉAL FEIRSTE

BELFAST

Confidential

18 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

Dear Assistant Secretary

INTEREG

We had a meeting here on INTEREG on 14 June. The following is a short summary of this discussion in which we were joined on our side by Ms. Anderson of the Department of Foreign Affairs, by Messrs. Tutty, Connolly and O'Grady of the Department of Finance and by Mr. McCarthy of the Department of the Taoiseach and, on the Northern side, by Messrs. Spence and Wilson of the Central Secretariat and Messrs. Lynn and Galloway of the Department of Finance and Personnel.

It was accepted that the Northern side's redraft of the paper originally submitted to the Commission was no longer a suitable basis for discussion on the grounds that conditions had changed and that we would have to home in on a more restricted set of priorities; it was agreed that joint inter-departmental meetings should be convened by the Department of Finance on our side and by the Department of Finance and Personnel on the Northern side, with provision for attendance by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat as required, in order to consider projects in the following areas:

- tourism
- sanitary services
- water quality
- human resources
- aquaculture
- forestry
- rural development
- roads (some scepticism was expressed about the potential of this area.

The Northern side expressed some pessimism about the likely level of funding under INTEREG, suggesting that it might be about 80m. ECUs for the whole island.

There was considerable discussion of the question of consultation with local areas along the border. It was agreed that the Commission document, which is due for issue in July, should serve as a basis for a request to local authorities to consider the matter and to give their views.

It was agreed that neither side would volunteer to discuss the matter with the Commission further for the time being but, if, as the Northern Ireland side seemed to think likely, the Commission requested a discussion, that would be agreed to. The Northern side indicated that the Commission is thinking of extending the period for submission of applications from six to nine months (after the publication of the Commission document in July).

The understanding therefore is that the revised British document of 25 May is no longer in play; that joint inter-departmental meetings will now try to identify definite projects within the areas listed above for submission; that this process will go on through the Summer months and into September with a view to submitting a joint application to the Commission as soon as possible after that time.

The Northern side considered that the Commission would need to be persuaded of the need for flexibility in approaching the Irish situation and suggested a high-level approach would be required to try to ensure favourable treatment of our joint application.

Yours sincerely



Declan O'Donovan
Joint Secretary

BÉAL FEIRSTE

BELFAST

21 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

Discussion with Chairman of Northern Ireland Police Authority

Dear Assistant Secretary

The Chairman of the Northern Ireland Police Authority, Mr. Tom Rainey, visited the Secretariat briefly on Wednesday, 20 June (he was unable to attend the farewell reception for the undersigned on the following evening). Rainey is Chairman of a company (manufacturing horse transport boxes) which does extensive business in the South. He covered a number of issues in a brief general discussion.

The most significant point to arise was that Rainey was rather critical of the Stevens' Report, though he praised the alacrity with which the Chief Constable had moved to appoint Stevens in the wake of the collusion/missing documents episodes. He felt that the number of recommendations (83) in the Stevens' Report was a bit "over the top". If the word "and" had been used the recommendations could have been reduced to 30! Rainey said Stevens had spent too much time on procedural matters and not enough on criminal investigations. He (Rainey) was still very concerned that Stevens had not been able to get to the bottom of the issue of how documents had gone missing from police stations. It should have been possible, he said, to establish who had responsibility and who was at fault. He thought the recommendation on setting up an anti-terrorist unit was curious. Every police man in Northern Ireland had an anti-terrorist function. This looked like one former London man (Stevens) saying to another (Annesley), this worked well in London, maybe it will work in Northern Ireland. It did not seem to have been at all well thought out.

Rainey's relations with Hugh Annesley seemed to be good but he was not overly generous in his praise. Every Chief Constable, he said, had his faults as well as his virtues. He made it clear that, in appointing Annesley, the emphasis was on improving the management side of the RUC. Rainey went on to add that he thought the Chief Constable could do more in the public relations area, but Annesley took the view that when he had something of substance to say to the media he would say it and that would be an end of the matter.

Rainey was critical of former Chief Constable Hermon for letting the community contacts side of the RUC run down in recent years and his own personal priority is to bring it back to its previous level. A particular area of priority is to improve "normal" policing in West Belfast.

He expressed satisfaction with the performance of the RUC in Derry where he thinks good progress has been made in contacts with the local nationalist community. The Police Authority is briefing the press at the moment on plans for more community contacts, especially lay visiting and community liaison committees.

Rainey felt that the marching season would be quiet, foreseeing no particular problems. Trouble had, he felt, been more likely last year. Many of this year's parades were "church parades", that is, they took place around religious services and were therefore, generally, likely to be peaceful.

We agreed to maintain contact over the coming months.

Yours sincerely



Padraic Collins

Meeting with Eddie McGrady
Downpatrick, 19 June 1990

SDLP Meeting with the Secretary of State

- 1. McGrady was irritated to have missed the latest SDLP meeting with the Secretary of State. (He blamed Hume for mishandling the arrangements). He had subsequently been briefed by NIO officials - who told him that Mallon's tone at the meeting had been notably "unfriendly".

Secretariat

- 2. He was very concerned by Mallon's weekend comments about the Secretariat and Unionist counter-claims. He felt that Mallon's blunt language had put the talks process at risk and exposed the SDLP to accusations of attempting to sabotage the process. McGrady believes that the Unionist leaders have not been entirely honest with their own followers about how much they have ceded on the Secretariat; the claims made by Mallon enhance their vulnerability and may create pressure on them to renege on the bargain struck with Mr. Brooke.
- 3. In discussing the formula proposed by Brooke on the Secretariat, McGrady was quite sure that it would not be problematic for SDLP supporters. The "average punter", he said, needs to know that the Secretariat is still there and that it is operational but is not unduly bothered about the precise formula governing its operation. There is confidence in the Irish Government and the SDLP leadership to defend the nationalist interest and - at least in the talks about talks phase - a willingness to leave the detail of the negotiation in their hands. (Note: this is a considerably more relaxed attitude on McGrady's part than was evident at our last meeting.)

Comment by Molyneaux

4. McGrady was puzzled by a brief exchange he had with Molyneaux in Westminster last week. Molyneaux asked McGrady if he had the impression that attempts were being made to "long-finger" the talks and went on to express disquiet at the current suggestion that talks would not get underway until September; his own view, Molyneaux said, was that substantive talks should begin as soon as possible.

Timing and format of talks

5. McGrady expressed himself uneasy about what he perceives as a subtle change in the British approach - he feels they are edging away from the idea of an early agenda-setting exercise and concentrating instead on the concept of "organic" growth (He is worried that this might mean, in practice, that only the first couple of agenda items would be established in advance with subsequent items left to emerge as the talks proceeded). In his view, it is crucially important that a full agenda, covering the three sets of talks, be established in advance "so that everyone knows where we're going".
6. He is conscious of the problem of constructing a common agenda that would lead to the early opening of North/South talks and at the same time would achieve the desired "latticing" or interlinking effect between the three sets of talks. He argued that, even if a timetable for the gap were not spelled out publicly in advance, there would have to be a clear agreement with all the parties as to what that timetable should be (otherwise there is a risk of a Unionist filibuster on the first one or two items).

7. He made some suggestions, on an illustrative basis, as to what the initial agenda items might be and how these might be linked to a timetable. (For ease of reference, these suggestions - with a timetable which reflects the general thrust of McGrady's comments - are set out in tabular form in Annex 1). He underlined that, in the internal discussion on items 1 (presentation of positions) and 4 (possible structures) the SDLP would place a very strong emphasis on the North-South dimension, thus preparing the way for a natural transition of the discussion on all issues to the North/South framework.

8. The term "other signatory of the Anglo-Irish Agreement" is used in describing agenda items 3 and 5; McGrady was attached to this term on the grounds that (a) it would be easier for Unionists to swallow than a simple reference to the Irish Government and (b) at the same time, it would signal that the Government is involved in all aspects of this process as of right by virtue of the fact that we are co-signatories of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

AA:

A. Anderson
20 June 1990

W4722

c. c. P. S. M., Mr. Nally, P. S. S., Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Matthews,
Mr. Brosnan, Joint Secretary, Mr. Collins.

Agenda/Timeframe

Item No.	Title	Forum	Timetable
1.	Presentation of positions by the parties.	Internal talks.	Weeks one and two.
2.	Discussion of common themes emerging from opening presentations.	Internal talks.	Weeks three and four.
3.	Discussion of these themes with other signatory of Anglo-Irish Agreement.	North/South talks.	To begin in week five; if desired, to continue concurrently with item 4.
4.	Initial discussion of possible new structures (taking account of discussion on items 1-3).	Internal talks.	To begin in week seven; if desired, to continue concurrently with item 5.
5.	Discussion of structures with other signatory of Anglo-Irish Agreement.	North/South talks.	To begin in week nine.

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

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Form to be completed and inserted in the original record in place of each part abstracted

- (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed:
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- (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: Parts of 1 document
- (iii) The date of each such document: 21/06/1990
- (iv) The description of each document: Report of conversation with Fr Bennett relating to prison staff
- (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8 (4) (b)



Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020

CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Fr Bennett, Belfast, 21 June 1990

Fr Bennett is Catholic Chaplain of Crumlin Road Prison and I have reported previously on the escalating tension within the prison over the past few months - tension which has been reflected outside the prison with a campaign for the segregation of prisoners, been backed up with attacks by loyalist paramilitaries on the homes of prison officers.

Background:

Problems began last October with the appointment of a new Governor (Semple). Coincidentally, this change-over occurred at the same time as a major attempted breakout of the prison by a group of senior IRA figures, mostly from the Tyrone area.

The new Governor adopted a strict disciplinarian approach involving rigid enforcement of petty rules and imposing severe punishments for any infringements. According to Fr Bennett, Semple's new regime was actively implemented by two of the senior officers in the prison - . The upshot was a series of disturbances and minor riots within the prison and an escalating campaign for full segregation of loyalist and republican prisoners within the Crumlin Road - similar to the segregated regime in the Maze.

Recent Developments:

In recent weeks the prison administration decided to remove all young prisoners (ie those under 21) from the paramilitary wings (A wing and C wing) to a section of D wing of the prison. This was strongly resisted and there were serious disturbances when the young prisoners (both republican and loyalist) wrecked their cells in D wing. The prison riot squad was called in and apparently waded into the young prisoners in what Fr Bennett considered an over-reaction. In Fr Bennett's view, while the majority of prison officers in Crumlin Road are reasonable, there is a serious problem with a hard loyalist minority among the prison staff.

Over the past week or two, John Steele (head of the prisons department of the NIO) has been involved in attempts to defuse the situation and Fr Bennett reported a number of encouraging developments -viz-

- The young paramilitaries are gradually being moved back from D wing to their respective paramilitary wings - there are now only 5 young republicans left on D wing.
- _____ appears to have been largely removed from any involvement in adjudicating on cases involving infringement of prison rules and, while Pepper is apparently still involved in adjudicating cases, the sanctions being imposed on prisoners for infringements are less severe. There has also been a significant change on previous practice in that in some recent cases, the prisoners involved were actually found to be not-guilty of the infringements with which they had been charged.
- Semple is not presently in evidence in the prison and there are reports that he is currently on 9 or 10 weeks leave. In his place, the No 2 in the prison (Magee) is, according to Fr Bennett, a much more reasonable and fair minded man and much less confrontational than Semple.
- While there continues to be a hard loyalist minority among the prison staff, Fr Bennett had noted in recent weeks that quite a number of these types had been transferred.

Overall, there is an understanding that if the segregation campaign is toned down both inside and outside the prison, that certain changes will be made to the regime which will go a considerable way to meet some of the demands of the prisoners. Such changes will not go as far as meeting the prisoners' demand for segregation, but according to Fr Bennett, there are indications that some sort of formula of "separation" may be implemented in the medium term -eg: separate landings on wings for the different paramilitary groups. [It is interesting to note that the NIO appear to be using the chaplains as go-betweens in this process. Fr Bennett is in direct touch with John Steele who impressed on Fr Bennett that he was not to let anyone within the prison system know of the fact of their contact. Fr Bennett has in turn been dealing with Declan Murphy, the O. C. of the Provies in Crumlin Road.]

Comment:

Based on Fr Bennett's comments, one can be guardedly optimistic that the prison administration is beginning to come to grips with defusing the potentially very explosive situation in Crumlin Road. Should the present process continue, it is likely that the prison should return to some level of normality during the coming weeks.



Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
22 June 1990

cc A/Sec Gallagher
Counsellors A. I.
Secretariat
Box

Meeting with Mr. Paddy Roche (unionist academic) Belfast,

15 June, 1990.

1. Roche is an academic who lectures in economics at the University of Ulster in Jordanstown. He is a committed Baptist and does some lecturing on theology in Queens University. Although now not active in politics, he was in the past associated with the OUP and still maintains some contacts within the party (especially on its academic fringe). Our meeting was arranged on the recommendation of Donovan McClelland, an SDLP Councillor who is a colleague of Roche at Jordanstown.

Talks process

2. Although he is a very amiable person and expressed himself with eloquence and lucidity, Mr. Roche's views and analysis - for instance on the present prospects for political progress - were in substance quite hardline. From a unionist standpoint he had deep reservations about the advantage or utility of political talks at this stage. He was concerned that the anticipated format of the proposed talks - with its focus on the three related dimensions - would, in its structural organisation alone, concede an analysis of the problem which was fundamentally nationalist. The fact that John Hume was talking of "transcending the Agreement" indicated to Roche that the SDLP leadership had now concluded that the Anglo-Irish Agreement had for nationalists achieved as much as could be expected from its basic terms of reference and that it was now time to push their agenda a stage further.
3. Roche said that if he was advising the Unionist leadership on their approach to the talks he would advance the following agenda, each phase of which would be a condition precedent to the next:
 - insistence on the fulfilment of the Unionist suspension preconditions (gap in Conference meetings and a concurrent complete withdrawal of Secretariat

officials);

- inter-party talks and agreement on internal structures/arrangements for the government of Northern Ireland;
 - North/South talks on "the normalisation" of relations between both parts of the island (i.e. address Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution); and
 - wider North/South talks on economic/social issues of common concern.
4. Roche readily acknowledged that such an agenda would not be acceptable to the SDLP and that the talks would, therefore, lead to a stand-off. He felt, however, that such an outcome would not be uncongenial to the OUP leadership. While accepting that Paisley was fundamentally a devolutionist, he believed that Molyneaux would not in the final analysis commit himself to an arrangement which went against the grain of his basic integrationist instincts. The fact that such a stand-off implied the continued operation of the Agreement would not, in Roche's view, unduly perturb the OUP leadership. While the existence of the Agreement would constitute an ongoing irritation for unionists, it has - in terms of the satisfaction of nationalist aspirations - already achieved the limits of its potential and so poses no real further threat for Unionist integrationists.
5. I asked Roche why, in the light of the above analysis, Molyneaux appeared to be willing to enter the current talks process. He responded by saying that he hoped that the events of recent years had taught the Unionist parties some element of tactical sophistication. Roche felt that the true motives of the OUP leadership in entering the talks process were to discomfit the operation of the Agreement and

also to damage the political credibility of the SDLP by demonstrating that it is the nationalists - with their "unreasonable constitutional demands" - who are the "real obstacles" to political progress in Northern Ireland.

(Roche added that, in his view, the most effective long-term strategy for unionism is to seek to destroy the credibility of the SDLP in order to convince the British Government that the fundamental political choice in Northern Ireland is between the Unionist parties and Sinn Féin). Such a strategy was of course extremely risky since, unless very skilfully played, it could easily rebound on the Unionists who might themselves end up being regarded as the intransigent parties.

Comment

6. Although he is a committed unionist (on the integrationist wing), Roche expressed his views and analysis in a very dispassionate and clinical way. While he made a point of stating that he had no brief to speak on behalf of the OUP, I had the impression nonetheless that his expressed opinions might, to some degree, have reflected the current thinking within some elements of the party leadership circles.

Adrian O'Neill

Adrian O' Neill

22 June, 1990.

c/c Mr. Gallagher
Joint Secretary
Counsellors A-I
Box

THE GUILDFORD AND WOOLWICH INQUIRY

Mr. Manning

3.

The Rt Hon Sir John May

Whittington House
19 Alfred Place
London WC1E 7LQ
Tel: ^{C71}01-323 9652
Fax: ⁰¹¹01-636 4907

14 June 1990

His Excellency the
Ambassador for Ireland
17 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7HR


Dear Ambassador,

Thank you very much for sending me on 12 June a submission from the Irish Government on some of the issues I am examining.

I found the attached report from the Director of the Irish Forensic Science Laboratory of particular interest in the context of the current phase of the inquiry and I will study it with care.

I am also grateful to you for sending me a copy of the recently published Report of the Committee to enquire into certain aspects of Criminal Procedure.

I have no objection, of course, to your making the contents of your submission available to the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Yours Sincerely,


The Rt Hon Sir John May

*cc P/T; P/CA; P/S
Mr. Miller: P/S
Mr. Altham: P/S
Coulter: P/S
TSOX*

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

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(iv) The description of each document: Report of conversation with Sir Nicholas Lyell MP including confidential information

(v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8 (4) (b)



Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

Confidential17 Grosvenor Place,
London SW1X 7HR.

18 June, 1990.

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Dublin.

Conversation with Sir Nicholas Lyell, QC, M.P.
Solicitor-General

Dear Assistant Secretary,

The Solicitor-General was a guest at dinner on 14 June - the day the Home Secretary acknowledged in the House the unsoundness of the convictions in the Maguire case. Lyell, Solicitor-General since 1987, is a QC specialising in commercial and employment law. He holds the safe seat of Mid-Bedfordshire with an unshakeable majority of nearly 23,000. He is an affable and likeable man who is generally well disposed and well informed on Irish issues.

We know however from his previous conversations with the Ambassador that his views on the Birmingham Six have been consistently negative. In

Lyell's view is rooted primarily in his unshakeable faith in the Court of Appeal, reflecting a particular establishment view here which insists that if the Court of Appeal has looked twice at the case then there is unlikely to be any further room for argument.

Lyell spoke of the difficulty facing the Government. The findings in the May enquiry had been "a shot in the arm" for the Birmingham Six in terms of their public campaign but, he continued, no Government could refer the case to the Court for the third time "solely on the basis of political imperatives".

cc P. S. J. /
de arghas, P. S. J.
Ad de arghas, de P. S. J.
G. M. L. P. S. J.
J. M. L. P. S. J.

He sought to play down any similarities between the Maguire case and the Birmingham Six and he was critical of attempts to create what he described as "an artificial and unsustainable link" between the two. There was, he acknowledged, a widespread public expectation that the Home Secretary would have to do something but his approach would be determined solely on the basis of any material new evidence and for this we would have to await the outcome of the investigation by the Devon and Cornwall police.

Yours sincerely,


Joe Hayes
Counsellor



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place,
London SW1X 7HR.

cc PPP -
C. John R. S.
J. J.

Confidential

19 June, 1990.

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Dublin.

Conversation with Roger Stott MP
Labour Deputy Spokesman on Northern Ireland

Dear Assistant Secretary,

I had lunch on 13 June with Roger Stott, the number three on Kevin McNamara's team. Stott had been Labour's campaign manager for the by-election in the safe Merseyside seat of Bootle arising from the sudden death of sitting MP Allan Roberts and he was jubilant at the result which saw Labour taking nearly 70% of the vote. Talking to Stott it is clear that our initial instincts regarding his approach to Northern Ireland (cf. Mr. Donoghue's minute of 22 November 1989) were correct. Reflecting perhaps his sponsorship by the Post Office Engineering Workers Union - which provides his secretarial and research assistance and contributes substantially to electoral expenses - Stott continues to view events in Northern Ireland primarily in economic terms believing that a good job creation programme would go a long way to solving the problem.

Labour representation in Northern Ireland

He has visited Northern Ireland fairly frequently since his appointment to McNamara's team and he spoke warmly of his many trade union contacts. He was due to travel to Belfast sometime this week to meet with Union representatives in the various Northern Ireland transport agencies who are concerned, he said, at possible privatisation proposals mooted by Peter Bottomley. Stott is also a regular speaker at Northern Ireland branch meetings of the POEU.

The question of Labour representation in Northern Ireland crops up increasingly he said in his talks with Northern Ireland trade unionists. He sharply criticised Kate Hoey for continuing her personal crusade in support of Labour representation. McNamara, he said, was "furious" at her recent article in the House of Commons magazine outlining the arguments in favour. According to Stott, if she persists, Kinnock would have to call her in and remind her of the principles of party policy.

Stott hastened to tell me that Hoey's campaign had failed to make any real impact but he did concede that her sponsorship had provided a very potent shot in the arm for the Labour representation campaign. On the other hand, the dismal showing of Colette Jones in the Upper Bann by-election had bolstered the practical arguments against organising and there had, he said, been "absolutely no slippage" in the official line.

The Birmingham Six

As part of the process of reading himself into the Anglo-Irish agenda, Stott had sought to inform himself about the background to Irish miscarriage of justice cases. I adverted to Hattersley's low key and cautious approach to the Birmingham Six case in particular. From a subsequent telephone conversation with Kevin McNamara, it appears that both he and Stott met with Hattersley later that afternoon - a meeting which may have helped inspire Hattersley's surprisingly robust interventions at Home Office Questions the following day.

Domestic Situation

Stott spoke of the increasing speculation regarding the succession to Sir Bernard Weatherill as Speaker of the House. Weatherill who has been Speaker since June 1983 is expected to retire before the next election - although this is by no means certain. According to Stott, the Labour candidate will be Betty Boothroyd MP for West Bromwich. The Conservative candidate is expected to be Cranley Onslow, Chairman of the key 1922 Committee.

Yours sincerely,

PP *Joe Hayes*
Joe Hayes
Counsellor

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

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
(i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed:
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(iii) The date of each such document: 19/06/1990

(iv) The description of each document: Conversation with Gerry Bermingham MP containing confidential information

(v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8 (4) (c)



Name: Lauren Clifton

Grade: Archivist

Department: *Foreign Affairs*

Date: 07/12/2020



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place,
London SW1X 7HR.

Confidential

19 June, 1990.

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,
Assistant Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Dublin.

Conversation with Gerry Bermingham MP
Member of the Home Affairs Select Committee

Dear Assistant Secretary,

I had lunch on 15 June with the Labour MP Gerry Bermingham. Bermingham was born in Dublin where his family lived for a time in Sandycove. He has had a somewhat chequered political career beset in recent times by personal difficulties which fuelled an unsuccessful re-selection challenge earlier this year. He was a close political and legal adviser to Michael Foot, acting as solicitor for him in his legal challenge in the 1970's of the Boundary Commission's redrawing of the constituencies. Bermingham has since been called to the Bar and in the absence of any signs of political preferment under Kinnock he concentrates increasingly on his highly successful criminal law practice based on his chambers in London.


Birmingham Six

cc RPA
Gallagher OR 1
V. SOK.

Domestic political situation

One of Bermingham's proudest boasts is that he forecast well in advance the date and approximate outcome of the 1987 election. At present his forecast for the next election is that the Prime Minister will dissolve Parliament in the second or third week of June 1991 and in the ensuing election, Labour will take between 42 and 45 per cent of the vote and the Conservatives 32 to 35 per cent. On these calculations, Labour would form a Government with a majority of between fifteen and twenty seats. He advanced several reasons for his prognosis but the decisive factors in his view in determining the timing of the elections would be the Governments ability to reduce interest rates, reform the poll tax, control inflation and maximise the lingering sense that at the end of the day Kinnock could not be trusted to govern.

Yours sincerely,


Joe Hayes
Counsellor

AMBASÁID NA hÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON

17, GROSVENOR PLACE,
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Telephone: 01-235 2171

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PLEASE NOTE: Effective May 6, 1990
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Confidential

21 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

The Ireland Funds

The British-Irish Association offered lunch yesterday to visiting members of the boards of the various Ireland Funds. Last night, the Ireland Fund of Great Britain held its annual fund-raising ball in the Savoy Hotel.

The lunch drew an attendance of roughly seventy people, including Peter Brooke, Seamus Mallon, Kevin McNamara, John Taylor, Ken Maginnis and a variety of officials, academics and journalists. The gathering was addressed briefly by the Ambassador and by the Secretary of State and a question-and-answer session followed.

In his remarks, the Ambassador welcomed the visitors and paid tribute to the work of the various Ireland Funds and of the BIA. Noting the efforts being made by the Secretary of State to create the conditions for dialogue between the NI parties, he reiterated the determination of the Irish Government to lend all possible support. He recalled the tribute paid by the Taoiseach in London recently to the Secretary of State's skill and sensitivity in this regard. While the process is a difficult one, and there can be no certainty about its outcome, the Irish Government will spare no effort to maximise the prospects for its success. The Ambassador went on to underline the importance which both Governments attach to the Agreement and the indispensability of cooperation between Dublin and London in the search for lasting solutions to the NI problem.

The Secretary of State also paid tribute to the Funds and to the BIA. He underlined the Agreement's transformation of the ways in which London and Dublin cooperate in relation to NI. Quoting the language of Article 1, he drew attention to the important reassurances offered by the Agreement

cc
Mr. Wells: RGR
Mr. McLaughlin: JH/TZ
C. H. A.)
RGR

to both communities. The Agreement provides a framework in which the two Governments can consult together for the purpose of reconciling the interests of both communities, without, however, prejudicing the constitutional position of either. Consultations are regular and systematic and differences are tackled in a constructive fashion. As an example of the specific improvements which the Agreement has brought, he mentioned briefly the International Fund for Ireland.

On security cooperation, the Secretary of State noted that relations between the two police forces are much closer than they have ever been before ("the Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner have great personal and professional regard for each other"). The finds of arms and explosives made by the Irish security forces have saved many lives in NI and the British authorities are very grateful to the Garda Siochana and the Army. He also noted progress being made under the Agreement in relation to cross-border economic cooperation.

Turning to extradition, the Secretary of State said that some progress has been made but that "it would be idle to deny" that, following recent court decisions, the British Government does not regard the present situation as satisfactory. The Conference meeting on 19 April asked officials to examine current procedures with a view to making recommendations to a future Conference meeting.

Explaining the current talks process, the Secretary of State said that the British Government is fully committed to the Agreement but does not regard it as immutable or unimprovable. Recalling his Bangor speech, he indicated that, if new arrangements could be reached which commanded widespread support in NI, there would be substantial implications for the Agreement which both Governments would have to consider sympathetically. The success of the current process remains "a possibility rather than a probability". He would be tempting fate if he sought to predict the pace of further progress. However, he has been impressed by the progress which the parties have already made and his belief is that further progress is possible.

In the subsequent question-and-answer session, Brooke was asked about the reported compromise reached in relation to the Secretariat. He declined to go into the detail of his discussions until "all loose ends have been tied up" and he is in a position to make a comprehensive statement to Parliament. He has put certain propositions, which obviously included the Secretariat, to the parties. He has tried to test each proposition "to destruction" with his interlocutors in order to ensure that all of its implications are understood. Both the SDLP and the Unionist parties, he noted, left their respective meetings with him describing themselves as "well satisfied" or "encouraged" by the progress made. In reply to a further question, he would not confirm the first week of July as the date for a possible statement but indicated that one would be necessary some time next month before Parliament rises.

John Taylor took issue with the Ambassador's remarks, claiming that the Agreement is totally rejected by most people in NI. He asked if the Ambassador accepts the progress which is apparently now being made

towards an alternative to the Agreement. In response, the Ambassador referred back to what he had said earlier. Both he and the Secretary of State stated very clearly the importance attached by both Governments to the Agreement. The Irish Government, however, supports the Secretary of State's current efforts and hopes that he will make progress.


Following this exchange, John Taylor approached the Ambassador privately and said he hoped the latter understood that "I had to say that". Several participants expressed privately to us their disapproval of Taylor's intervention. One participant noted that Taylor was attending this function for the first time and may have felt obliged to "make his mark" in some way.

In conversation with the Ambassador afterwards, Ken Maginnis pointed out that "we Unionists listen carefully to every word you use"; he would, for example, have preferred the Ambassador to emphasize the Agreement's "adaptability" rather than its durability.

It is worth mentioning, finally, that the Embassy arranged to have copies of the Taoiseach's Belfast speech included in an information pack for all participants.

Later in the day, the gala fund-raising ball of the Ireland Fund of Great Britain took place in the Savoy Hotel. It attracted an attendance of over 400 people and aimed to raise £120,000. The programme for the evening included messages from the Taoiseach, Peter Brooke, Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney. The guest of honour was Chris Patten, Secretary of State for the Environment, who delivered an uncontentious speech which emphasized the cultural affinities uniting the peoples of these islands. However, a subsequent recitation (with texts selected and performed by T.P. McKenna and Jeananne Crowley) of literary and political quotations about the differences between Irish and British people offended some guests and their displeasure was conveyed to the organisers.

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer

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Confidential

15 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

cc PDR/
Gen. P. Porter 14/6/90
C. Conolly
USA

Dear Assistant Secretary

Lunch with Alan Cochrane, Mail on Sunday

Cochrane, a Scot with distinct Unionist sympathies, is the features editor (and former political editor) of the Mail on Sunday. He visited Ireland earlier this year and was very grateful for the briefings which he received from DFA officials on Anglo-Irish and Presidency matters.

The following points of interest arose:

Talks about talks

- Cochrane believes that the Anglo-Irish Agreement if put to a vote in Parliament, would still command the support of the overwhelming majority of MPs.
- In addition, the vast majority of MPs would support the efforts being made by Peter Brooke at present to achieve a devolved government in NI.
- However, according to Cochrane, a small number of right-wing Tory MPs have misgivings about the price which may have to be paid for this. Certain MPs (he mentioned Barry Porter but claimed that there are others) would be unhappy with an arrangement which granted too much influence over the affairs of NI to the SDLP. They would be concerned by any arrangement along power-sharing lines (which, in their view, would mean long-term political instability for NI) and, if the current negotiations seemed to be heading in this direction, might voice their concerns to Brooke.
- Cochrane was struck, in a recent conversation, by the degree of support which Barry Porter (whom he would normally have considered a devolutionist) expressed for Ian Gow's integrationist approach. His

own reading of this was that concern about the possible outcome of the current process might increase the attractions of the integrationist approach for MPs such as Porter.

- Cochrane himself is completely dismissive of integration as a solution to the NI problem. If anything, the trend in Britain at present is towards disintegration. Cochrane suggested that, one way or the other, the Union will not survive much longer in its present form. While the Prime Minister is deeply opposed to devolution for Scotland, she may have to change her tune if (as is widely predicted) she is returned next time by a slim majority and is dependent on the cooperation of smaller parties (including the SNP). Alternatively, if Labour secures outright victory, Neil Kinnock will start implementing devolution for Scotland straight away.
- Against this background, it is clearly "absurd and anachronistic" for a small number of MPs to continue to promote an integrationist approach to the NI problem.

Sir Geoffrey Howe

- There is growing speculation at Westminster that Sir Geoffrey Howe may be included in this summer's Cabinet reshuffle. Signs of Prime Ministerial displeasure with Howe have been mounting in recent weeks. With his authority diminished in various ways, Howe may not be able to withstand for much longer the pressure on him to leave the Cabinet and accept a peerage.
- Bernard Ingham, Cochrane noted in addition, has been doing nothing whatsoever to discourage this speculation.
- The next test of Howe's remaining political clout will be whether or not the Prime Minister entrusts him, as Deputy Prime Minister, with the delicate task of resolving differences between senior Ministers on budgetary allocations for next year. It is widely expected that this sensitive role (formerly performed by Lord Whitelaw as Deputy Prime Minister) will be assigned this year not to Howe but to John Wakeham.

Yours sincerely



David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

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Form to be completed and inserted in the original record in place of each part abstracted

- (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed:
840/3887
- (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: Part of 1 document
- (iii) The date of each such document: 18/06/1990
- (iv) The description of each document: Report of lunch with Anthony Hartley containing confidential information
- (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8 (4) (c)



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Confidential

18 June 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher
Assistant Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division

Dear Assistant Secretary

Lunch with Anthony Hartley

Hartley is the Editor of "Encounter" and a freelance contributor to the Sunday Telegraph and other papers. A former British diplomat and EC official who has good connections in political and media circles, he is also widely believed to have a background in the British security services.

The following points of interest arose:

The Birmingham and Guildford cases

- Hartley had a conversation recently about these cases with two senior contacts in the security services.
- "They have no problems at all with the Guildford Four", he indicated. They have always accepted that a mistake was made in that case.

*cc PRG
JL Weller; JEN
C. H. P.
G. P. H. H. H.
ROR.*

The succession to Mrs Thatcher

- Hartley expects the Prime Minister to win the next election by a small margin and to retire shortly afterwards, perhaps after six months or a year.
- He does not expect the Conservative Party to turn to Michael Heseltine as her successor. He believes that Heseltine's moment has passed; the steam has gone out of his campaign following the relatively successful local election results. More fundamentally, "the Tories will not want to replace one authoritarian leader with another". They will want a more emollient person than Heseltine to replace Mrs Thatcher, particularly if the party has been safely returned to power and the threat of a Labour victory has been averted.
- The successor, Hartley believes, will be either Douglas Hurd or John Major. Hurd is in many respects the traditional Tory but, on anecdotal evidence at least, he has abundant reserves of the "ruthlessness and cunning which every successful Prime Minister needs".
- Major lacks these qualities, though he has shown himself to be courageous and independent in forcing the Prime Minister to take a more flexible line on ERM membership. His principal asset is that, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he is ultimately more powerful than the Foreign Secretary. If (as many are now beginning to predict) the economy picks up later this year and he has a successful Budget, Major could lay a very strong claim to the succession.
- Hartley, however, is putting his own money on Hurd.

Yours sincerely

David Donoghue

David Donoghue
Press and Information Officer

END of file