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National Archives
2020/23/53

F. 27/5

Anglo Irish matters 1981

Secretary's

Papers (11) relating to Hunger Strikes

(covers period June - July 1981 approx)

~~TOP SECRET~~


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Grade: *Archivist*
Department: *Department of Foreign Affairs*

Date: 02/11/2020
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Research's Statement of 31 July 1981

It should first be understood that the hunger strike is a crisis within a crisis. General conditions in Northern Ireland - economic, social and political - have steadily deteriorated in recent years. To the problems of a faltering economy and the highest unemployment rate in Europe must be added a marked political polarization between the two parts of the divided community, clearly shown in the District Council elections in May. Moderates of all allegiances are discouraged. Ordinary people in both sections of the community have experienced suffering and misery on a heart-rending scale. The happiness and hopes of an entire generation of young people have been blighted by twelve years of crisis and disorder. After over two thousand deaths, violence and intimidation continue.

This is the background to the hunger strike, which is the latest method chosen by the Provisional IRA to exploit the prison crisis. The prison protest which began several years ago was intended by the Provisional IRA to intensify their campaign outside the prison and the hunger strike weapon was in turn intended to intensify and raise the effects of the prison protest to a cruel and more dramatic level.

/.....

It is hardly necessary to describe in detail what the effects of the hunger strike have been ^{in here} [in this country] and abroad. We have seen ~~in both parts of the island~~ ^{both in NI and in the State} how the hunger strike generates propaganda which simultaneously not only appeals to extremists but also gains support from those who are moved by the loss of young lives and the bereavement of families.

in both parts of this island

Violence related to the hunger strike has occurred repeatedly in the North. Regrettably we in this ^{State} [part of the country] have also experienced a disgraceful upsurge of violence, destruction of property and intimidation associated with the events in the Maze prison culminating in a savage attack on the Garda Síochána in Dublin on Saturday, the 18th July.

One point is lamentably clear: the only beneficiaries of what is happening are the men and women of violence. ^N Our determination to uphold the institutions of the State ~~is the safety of it~~ has never been in doubt.

only those forces which are prepared to use violence to obtain their ends ~~will~~ ^{must} derive any benefit from what is happening. ~~These forces will be~~ ^{These forces will be} ~~unhappily~~ ^{unhappily} ~~encouraged~~ ^{encouraged} by the fact of the State's ~~inability~~ ^{inability} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~protect~~ ^{protect} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~peace~~ ^{peace} and the ~~free~~ ^{free} ~~institutions~~ ^{institutions} of the ~~people~~ ^{people}. ~~It~~ ^{It} ~~encourages~~ ^{encourages} them.

In Government, as in Opposition, we give to the solution of the problem of Northern Ireland the same high priority. It has been clear for some time that the protest has been exacerbating the existing problems of Northern Ireland, damaging the prospects of political progress and putting further off the day when stability and peace can be enjoyed by its suffering people

Our determination to uphold the institutions of the State 1.....

3.

We must also be seriously concerned at the effects of the hunger strike in this part of the country and at its potential effects on Anglo-Irish relations.

We assumed office at a time when the European Commission of Human Rights had made efforts to assist in a solution and when the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace had done a very great deal of work towards the same end. On our first day in office we urged on the British Government that the initiative of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace be facilitated. After some delay this was accepted. We have throughout been satisfied that the Commission's document, given to the British authorities on 6th July, after very full discussion with both them and the prisoners and representing a detailed description of an improved regime after the strike ended, formed an adequate basis for a solution that conceded no basic principles.

I regret to say that it was clear from the [dilatory] handling of the problem by the British authorities that their assessment of the gravity of the situation created by the hunger strike did not correspond with ours, and that they did not recognise the well-founded character of our concerns for the further consequences that would flow from its prolongation.

*invites resort
which will confuse
issue again*

/.....

4.

The responsibility for failure does not lie only with hesitation or delay on the part of the British. On the contrary, there is no doubt that intransigence was shown on the other side just when it seemed likely that the British, however belatedly, were proposing to take an initiative. On the 18th July, a statement issued on behalf of the prisoners rejected previous efforts at mediation and called for direct negotiations on the original five demands.

It seems to me to be no accident that as the efforts of the Irish Government to help solve the crisis became more public, the efforts of the Provisional IRA leadership to obstruct a solution redoubled. The hardening of the IRA line thwarted the efforts of those who had pressed for a humanitarian solution. They included, at different times, the European Commission of Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, and several eminent churchmen. In thwarting those efforts, the leadership of the Provisional IRA, far from saving lives, was once again facing all those concerned with a stark choice between total concession to their demands and the deaths of further hunger strikers.

/.....

The prisoners represent themselves as belonging to a military command structure. It is clear that those who are in charge of this structure can at any time end the crisis by ordering the hunger strikers to end their protest. They have not done so. They cannot, as they seek to do by manipulation of the media, evade responsibility in the deaths of the hunger strikers. *although*

Despite these events the efforts of the Government to help solve the impasse have continued and will continue. Besides its numerous contacts with non-governmental bodies and individuals of goodwill, this Government had almost daily contact about the hunger strike with the British Government since the evening of the 30th June. We have continued to press the British authorities to find solutions both in relation to the procedure for a settlement and in relation to putting before the prisoners details of a regime approximating to the ICSP proposals.

The Government refuses to believe that a solution cannot be found [even at this stage.] Thus, despite the demands from many who are themselves ^{*understandably*} under great strain, we ~~will~~ not make emotional gestures which would inevitably make it more difficult if not impossible for us to contribute further to a solution.

*own activity as
our acts*

*based on an emotional
response
as an emotional
response*

/.....

*will not take action which
is based on any ~~emotional~~
response to tragic events and*

~~From an hour~~
 Disappointment at successive setbacks to our hopes will not deter ^{the Govt} ~~us~~ ^{continuing its} from renewing ~~our~~ efforts to help find a solution before more young lives are thrown away and more deaths occur in the streets of Northern Ireland. ~~the~~

~~absolutely reject the claim that this~~ death or any other tragedy ^{must not} ~~should~~ be the pretext for ^{further} acts of ^{violence,} ~~vengeance or~~ hatred.

Note for the record.

Ambassador Figg telephoned at 5.30 p.m. on Sunday 19 July 1981.

He said the message given to him that morning had been passed on. He referred to the NIO statement of that afternoon regarding the willingness of officials to go into the prison to clarify statements and said that this had been conveyed to the prisoners.

Subsequently McFarlane had asked to see the Governor (or Deputy Governor) and had said that there was no point in anyone from the NIO coming into the prison to clarify existing statements. They must start again and negotiate something different.

The Ambassador said that while this did not purport to be a precise rendering of what had been said, it conveyed the gist. He was now conveying it to us in order to keep us informed and to illustrate the difficulties which existed. He added that these difficulties would not stop his authorities trying to find a way forward. It was not intended he said to publicise this.

I informed Rufener Doyl



Secretary
21 July 1981

CONFIDENTIAL

Call by British Ambassador on 31 July 1981

Ambassador Figg called on the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs to give the British Government's response to the Taoiseach's representations of 23 July about Prime Minister Thatcher's letter to American politicians.

Speaking on instructions^(x) the Ambassador said that Her Majesty's Government were concerned to hear that the Taoiseach regretted the reference to his views in the Prime Minister's message of 25 July to the Friends of Ireland. The Prime Minister was entirely unaware that she was in any way misrepresenting his views and would regret it if any difference between the two Governments should arise in consequence. Her Majesty's Government recognise that there are differences of appreciation between them and the Irish where the hunger strike is concerned but consider it important that our common opposition to terrorism should be recognised. They believe that the fullest trust, understanding and cooperation between the two Governments is vital if we are to beat our common enemies, the men of violence.

The Secretary said he would convey this reply to the Minister-Designate and to the Taoiseach. He enquired whether action was contemplated by the British authorities to counter the effects of their Prime Minister's letter in the U.S.A. A British Information Service document was circulating there which repeated the misrepresentation. The Ambassador said they had taken action to put a stop to that following our approach to the Embassy on the matter on 30 July.

The Secretary said we considered that the relatives of hunger strikers who were now apparently pressing the IRA to order a stop to the strike were showing thereby great courage. We thought that the proposal coming from the relatives and others for a monitoring committee to monitor the implementation in the future of prison reforms had value, and we wished to recommend the idea to the British authorities as part of a settlement.

*The Ambassador's
leaving note
is attached.*

The Ambassador took this point and said he would be in touch with the NIO later and would indicate our view. He agreed that the relatives were showing courage. He said he believed the NIO had no objection to the concept of monitoring - for instance they had hoped the ICRC would have that role. Asked by the Secretary, he said he did not know whether any submission had been received from the ICRC but would enquire.

The Ambassador indicated privately that he had had to press London to get the reply given above and also ascribed to the NIO the drafting of the letter to the Friends which we had objected to.


D.M. Neligan

31 July 1981

Minister (designate)

Careful consideration will need to be given to what is said in response to press enquiries about a reply from Mrs. Thatcher.

One way to deal with such enquiries - and I would recommend it - is to say that a reply has been received and that it is satisfactory; and to leave it at that.

 31/7/81.

Her Majesty's Government were concerned to hear that the Taoiseach regretted the reference to his views in the Prime Minister's message of 25 July to the Friends of Ireland. The Prime Minister was entirely unaware that she was in any way misrepresenting his views and would regret it if any difference between the two Governments should arise in consequence. Her Majesty's Government recognise that there are differences of appreciation between them and the Irish where the hunger strike is concerned but consider it important that our common opposition to terrorism should be recognised. They believe that the fullest trust, understanding and cooperation between the two Governments is vital if we are to beat our common enemies, the men of violence.

British Embassy re condition of hunger-strikers

31/7/1981

K. Doherty - unchanged

K. Lynch - deteriorating and unlikely to last until
tomorrow.

Quinn - we asked for a report which they will furnish
later in the day.

C220

URGENT

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON
FOR ASST SEC NELIGAN FROM AMBASSADOR

UUUOKMNB

U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND H-BLOCK

30/7/81 0935
J. B. Kelly

THE FOLLOWING ARE RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S. ADMINISTRATION POSITION SINCE OUR C200 OF 15 JULY. AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF C200, THE TAOISEACH'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT WAS REFERRED TO HEAD OF NSC. UNDERSTAND THAT SENIOR NSC OFFICIAL DISCUSSED MATTER WITH BRITISH EMBASSY AND THAT STATE DEPARTMENT ASKED U.S. EMBASSY, LONDON, TO MAKE ENQUIRIES. U.S. SOURCE EMPHASISES THAT IN NO WAY SHOULD THESE ENQUIRIES BE REGARDED AS QUOTE REPRESENTATIONS UNQUOTE. ARISING OUT OF THE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE U.S. OFFICIALS AND THE BRITISH OFFICIALS, A COMMON LINE EMERGED FOR DEALING WITH PRESS ENQUIRIES. BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICIALS HERE AND WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS REFERRED REPORTERS IN A GENERAL WAY TO STATEMENT ON IRELAND MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE HIS ELECTION BUT IN PARTICULAR REFERRED THEM TO A STATEMENT MADE IN LOS ANGELES ON 7 NOVEMBER WHEN, IN REPLY TO AN IRISH TIMES QUESTION ON ARMS SALES TO THE RUC, THE THEN PRESIDENT ELECT SAID QUOTE THE U.S. WOULD NOT INTERFERE OR INTERVENE IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNQUOTE.

2. CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON TOOK PLACE ON 16-17 JULY AND HE HAD PUBLICISED MEETINGS WITH HAIG AND SENIOR PEOPLE ON THE HILL CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HALF OF THE MEETING WITH HAIG WAS A TETE-A-TETE AND WE ARE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION AS TO WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. IRISH AFFAIRS WERE NOT DISCUSSED AT THE PLENARY MEETING. WHEN ASKED AT A BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS ON 17 JULY IF HAIG HAD RAISED THE H-BLOCK SITUATION WITH HIM, CARRINGTON REPLIED QUOTE NOT REALLY UNQUOTE. IT IS LIKELY THAT IRELAND WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY MAJOR WAY BETWEEN CARRINGTON AND HAIG THOUGH CARRINGTON DID COMPLAIN TO HAIG ABOUT THE LACK OF PROTECTION FOR BRITISH CONSULATES ESPECIALLY IN NEW YORK AND BOSTON WHOSE OFFICIALS WERE BEING SUBJECTED TO A LOT OF ABUSE FROM PROTESTING H-BLOCK SUPPORTERS.

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14/0

71-5PTI

RVRTGT

LKMGF

3. HAIG IS A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE BRITISH ROLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM I HAVE FOUND HIM TO BE EITHER WELL INFORMED ABOUT OR SYMPATHETIC TO OUR POSITION. AT A PRESS BRIEFING EARLY IN JUNE HE WAS ASKED WHY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INSISTED ON TREATING NORTHERN IRELAND AS AN INTERNAL BRITISH MATTER. HE REPLIED QUOTE I THINK PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS THAT. THAT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THERE AREN'T EXTERNAL FORCES INVOLVED FROM TIME TO TIME IN ONE OR ANOTHER ASPECT OF THIS ANGUISHING PROBLEM. BUT I THINK IT'S CLEAR THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM THAT MUST BE WORKED OUT INTERNALLY BY THE PARTIES. IT'S AN HISTORIC AGONY FOR THOSE PARTIES AND HAS BEEN. ONE MIGHT MAKE THE CASE IF THERE WERE NOT A GREAT BRITAIN PLAYING THE ROLE THAT IT'S PLAYING THERE TODAY, WE MIGHT EVEN HAVE TO CREATE ONE TO PREVENT A BLOOD BATH. I THINK WHAT WE ARE ALL INTERESTED IN IS PATIENTLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY TO DO ALL WE CAN IN AN EMPATHETIC WAY TO SEEK A RESOLUTION TO THESE HISTORIC PROBLEMS, BUT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE INTERNAL AND THAT FOR A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IN MY POSITION TO MAKE OFFHAND PUBLIC COMMENTS ABOUT IT ONLY AGGRAVATES A PROBLEM WHICH NEEDS NO AGGRAVATION; SO I WON'T DO IT UNQUOTE. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS AT A PRIVATE MEETING WITH A SMALL GROUP OF EUROPEAN BUSINESSMEN, INCLUDING DAVID KENNEDY OF AER LINGUS, THE SUBJECT ALSO CAME UP AND HE MODIFIED HIS REPLY SOMEWHAT TO INDICATE THAT THE WORLD WAS FORTUNATE THAT THE MAIN PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS PROBLEM WERE THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS WHO COULD BE RELIED ON TO HANDLE THE MATTER IN A RESPONSIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.

4. UNDOUBTEDLY, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENT OF CARRINGTON'S VISIT WAS A VERY SMALL PRIVATE DINNER PARTY ARRANGED FOR HIM AT A HOUSE IN GEORGETOWN ON 16 JULY AT WHICH THE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANIED BY MIKE DEEVER, WAS PRESENT. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IRISH MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL THAT EVENING AND IN PARTICULAR THAT CARRINGTON RELIED HEAVILY ON THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS INVOLVEMENT WHICH HAD COMMENCED JUST THEN. IT IS LIKELY THAT HE GOT AN INDICATION THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT BE GETTING INVOLVED IN RESPONSE TO THE TAOISEACH'S LETTER. ON THE EVENING OF 17 JULY A SENIOR NSC OFFICIAL TOLD ME THAT A NEGATIVE REPLY HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE NSC AND THAT HE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO SIGN IT AND HAVE IT TRANSMITTED TO DUBLIN BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE OTTAWA SUMMIT. IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS I ARGUED THAT A NEGATIVE REPLY THAT PARTICULAR WEEKEND WOULD BE VERY UNHELPFUL AND SUGGESTED THAT THE TIMING OF A REPLY SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CALCULATED PARTICULARLY IF THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE ANY PUBLICITY ABOUT IT. FOR REASONS THAT ARE NOT CLEAR AT THIS STAGE, THE PRESIDENT DID NOT SIGN THE LETTER BEFORE HE LEFT FOR OTTAWA AND THE LETTER WHICH WAS EVENTUALLY SIGNED ON JULY 23 AND TRANSMITTED TO THE TAOISEACH VIA THE U.S. EMBASSY IN DUBLIN IS SOMEWHAT MORE SYMPATHETICALLY DRAFTED THAN THE NSC VERSION OF 17 JULY.

5. I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH ANY CERTAINTY WHEN NORTHERN IRELAND WAS DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MRS THATCHER AND WHAT EXACTLY WAS SAID AND BY WHOM. BOTH U.S. AND BRITISH SOURCES HERE CONFIRM THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WAS DISCUSSED AND THE PROBABILITY IS THAT IT WAS DONE RELATIVELY BRIEFLY DURING DINNER ON SUNDAY 19 JULY AT WHICH OFFICIALS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY PRESENT. BOTH SIDES CONFIRM THAT THEIR PRINCIPALS WERE FULLY BRIEFED AND THE LINE THAT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED TO MRS THATCHER WAS THAT HER GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT OF THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE EFFORTS OF VARIOUS INTER-MEDIARIES WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN FULL CO-OPERATION BY THE RELEVANT BRITISH AUTHORITIES AT ALL TIMES. THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO A SETTLEMENT WAS THE FACT THAT THE PRISONERS WERE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR NOTHING LESS THAN THE FIVE DEMANDS. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEF DID NOT GO BEYOND HIS MARCH 17 STATEMENT.

6. THE LAST TWO WEEKS HAVE SEEN AN INTENSIVE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE DEMOCRATS ON THE HILL OVER A BILL THAT COULD MEAN 750 BILLION DOLLARS IN TAX CUTS OVER THE NEXT SIX YEARS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STRUGGLE IS THAT IT WILL EFFECTIVELY DECIDE WHO CONTROLS THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OVER THE NEXT YEAR. THE DEMOCRATS, OF COURSE, HAVE A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY BUT BY CLEVER USE OF WHITE HOUSE PATRONAGE THE PRESIDENT ALREADY SECURED ENOUGH DEMOCRATIC DEFECTIONS TO ENABLE HIM TO GET HIS BUDGET THROUGH EARLIER THIS YEAR. IF HE WERE NOW TO SUCCEED IN GETTING HIS TAX CUTS THROUGH, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE DEMOCRATS AND IN PARTICULAR SPEAKER O'NEILL, HAD EFFECTIVELY LOST WORKING CONTROL OF THE HOUSE. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER PUT THEIR PERSONAL REPUTATIONS ON THE LINE AND AS THIS REPORT IS BEING DICTATED IT SEEMS AS IF THE PRESIDENT WILL EMERGE WITH A STUNNING VICTORY. (FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW A SIGNIFICANT DEFECTION FROM THE DEMOCRATIC RANKS IS BIAGGI WHO HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE WILL SUPPORT REAGAN. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE PAY-OFF WILL BE BUT IT MAY WELL INCLUDE SOME RECOGNITION BY THE WHITE HOUSE OF BIAGGI'S ROLE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON IRISH AFFAIRS). AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO BRING TO BEAR ON THE WHITE HOUSE THE REALLY EFFECTIVE O'NEILL/KENNEDY PRESSURE. KENNEDY AND O'NEILL DID CONTINUE TO PRESS THE WHITE HOUSE TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONDED EVEN TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAD DONE EARLY IN JUNE WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED THAT O'NEILL AND KENNEDY'S CONCERN ABOUT THE HUNGER STRIKE - BUT NOTABLY NOT HIS OWN - SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES.

7. AS ALREADY INDICATED, I REMAIN OF THE VIEW THAT THE H-BLOCK SITUATION IS NOT ONE ON WHICH WE CAN HOPE TO SECURE A SIGNIFICANT U.S. ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT. THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OFFICIALS IN THE WHITE HOUSE CLEARLY SEE IT AS SIMPLY ANOTHER PRISON PROBLEM AND A PURELY INTERNAL BRITISH MATTER. EVEN ON THE BROADER ANGLO-IRISH POLITICAL QUESTION, IT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO SECURE SIGNIFICANT U.S. SUPPORT. WE ARE UP AGAINST A PARTICULARLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MRS THATCHER, A SECRETARY OF STATE HERE WHO, DESPITE HIS IRISH CATHOLIC BACKGROUND, HAS SHOWN NO SIGNS OF TAKING EVEN A MINIMAL INTEREST IN IRISH AFFAIRS AND A NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT WHO IS POSSIBLY EVEN LESS SYMPATHETIC TO OUR INTERESTS THAN THE TRADITIONAL STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUCRACY.

CORRECTION: PARA 2, SECOND LINE, READS AS FOLLOWS
 ..HE HAD PUBLICISED MEETINGS WITH HAIG AND SENIOR PEOPLE I
 ON THE HILL ETC ETC

CO ID LINE, READS AS FOLLOWS
MEETINGS WITH HAIG AND SENIOR PEOPLE I

THE HILL ETC
ETC

LJCK

URGENT

PLEASE ADD FOLLOWING TO C220 (FOR ASST SEC NELIGAN FROM AMBASSADOR)

UUUOKING

CONTINUATION OF PARAGRAPH 7.

IN OUR FAVOUR WE HAVE THE NOT INCONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM CAPITOL HILL EVEN AFTER THIS WEEK'S DEFEAT FOR THE DEMOCRATS AND, OF COURSE, THE QUOTE IRISHNESS UNQUOTE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH INCLINES HIM AT MINIMUM TO SOUND SYMPATHETIC. THE STATEMENT OF 17 MARCH WHICH REMAINS THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY AND THE EXPRESSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S OWN PERSONAL FEELINGS DOES INCLUDE THE STATEMENT QUOTE I ADD MY OWN PERSONAL PRAYERS AND THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THOSE IRISH - AND INDEED TO ALL WORLD CITIZENS - WHO WISH FERVENTLY FOR PEACE AND VICTORY OVER THOSE WHO SOW FEAR AND TERROR UNQUOTE. THE CHALLENGE FOR US IS TO FIND THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN PARTICULAR THE RIGHT ISSUE ON WHICH TO AVAIL OF THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES.

CORRECTION:

FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3. SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:

3. HAIG IS A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE BRITISH ROLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND IN VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM I HAVE FOUND HIM TO BE NEITHER WELL INFORMED ABOUT NOR SYMPATHETIC TO OUR POSITION.
ET C ETC ETC

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Misc.
F. 2.

Uimhir.....

To: Taoiseach,

From: Liam Hourican.

Adams, Carron, Ruddy visit to Prison.

Taoiseach,

This visit had its origin in the efforts over the past few days of clergymen (notably Bishop Daly), public representatives (notably Mr. Canning of Coalisland), and families (chiefly the Lynch's and Quinns) to devise a formula allowing the hunger strikers to quit "with honour", and in such a way as to throw the onus on the British to carry out the promises that they have made to the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace.

Bishop Daly thought of appealing to the hunger strikers in person at the weekend, but received negative indications on this from the prison Chaplains.

A meeting of all the parties mentioned plus H-Block committee members (Mrs. McAliskey included) was held in Toombridge on Tuesday night. The mood was anguished, but became angry when Adams and co refused a demand to join the discussion.

At midnight a delegation from the meeting drove to Belfast to confront Adams and Ruddy, and insist that they attempt to end the strike or face public denunciation from certain families.

Two options were discussed:

- (1) Complete cessation
- (2) Suspension of the strike for three to six months to allow time for the implementation of reforms.

Implementation would be monitored by a special committee to include figures such as the Cardinal, Bishop Daly, certain Priests, Jimmy Canning and John Robb.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Misc.
F. 2.

Uimhir.....

-2-

Adams apparently made it clear at once that he would resist the idea of monitoring. (This throws an interesting light on his claim after last night's visit that the hunger strikers had turned the monitors down).

Some relatives pressed Adams to order the prisoners off the strike. He was reluctant and evasive.

From this account, together with the reports of last night's meeting, the picture that emerges is of Adams being pressurised by people he tried to avoid, and then going through the motions of carrying out their demands, but without serious intention of achieving the result they required.

It is clear, for example, that he gave no orders to the prisoners, but instead, may have strengthened their intransigence.

Miam Hannon

30th July, 1981.

Copies sent to:

Professor Dooge,
Mr. Kelly,
Mr. Neligan,
Mr. Nally,
Mr. Kirwan,
Mr. Lillis.

Note:

I called Mr. Tatham, the Counsellor at the British Embassy to my office on 30 July and brought to his notice the British Information Service document attached (which we received from the Consulate General in New York on 29 July and which is referred to in Ambassador Donlon's telex no. C. 219 of that date).

I pointed out that the last paragraph of the document misrepresented our position on the hunger strike issue in the same way as the British Prime Minister's letter to U.S. politicians had done. The sentence in quotation marks had been taken from an Irish Times report of 22 July which attributed the sentence not to the Taoiseach but to Mr. Hourican, the Government Press Secretary and which was in any case inaccurate. The position about last week's press coverage had been made clear to the British Ambassador by the Minister Designate on 24 July when he had said that reliance could not be placed on press reports of the Government position appearing that week before 24 July.

Our complaint about the B.I.S. document was ancillary to our complaint about Mrs. Thatcher's letter. In the case of the document we wished to have the reference deleted and the document withdrawn in its present form. Mr. Tatham said he would act on that request without delay.

I asked him how matters stood in regard to the Taoiseach's representations to his Ambassador. He said he was uncertain as to how or when their Government would reply. The Embassy had however discovered that the letter to American politicians had been signed on Saturday, 25 July. I reminded Mr. Tatham of the Taoiseach's points that there had been time to correct the letter before signature or to intercept it after dispatch uncorrected.


D.M. Neligan

30 July 1981

BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

POLICY AND REFERENCE DIVISION

July 27, 1981

N.B. Bottom of page 3

POLICY BACKGROUND

3/81. NORTHERN IRELAND HUNGER STRIKES: WHO IS BEING INFLEXIBLE?

The British Government has variously been accused of "inflexibility," "intransigence," and of "not having been whole-hearted" in its efforts to bring the Maze Prison hunger-strikes to an end.

The following is a background note compiled from recent statements by the British Government detailing the efforts it has made to reach an accommodation with the strikers.

Visits to Maze

The British Government has over the past three months approved and supported a succession of visits to the hunger-strikers by groups and individuals who expressed a humanitarian desire to help bring the protest to an end. And the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Humphrey Atkins, has clearly spelt out the further improvements which could be made to an already enlightened prison regime. Copies of these proposals have been delivered to those on hunger-strike and officials from the Northern Ireland Office have visited the hunger-strikers to clarify doubts on any point in the lengthy statements made by the Secretary of State on June 30 and July 8.

Conditions Within the Prison

Those who examine the painful position at Maze Prison must first judge whether the hunger-strike protest is against conditions in the prison or whether it is in support of a claim for political status, either in name or by the acceptance of a set of demands which together add up to political or special status. The protesting prisoners at the Maze Prison have made five demands: the right to wear their own clothes; to associate freely with other prisoners;

/to ...

845 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y., 10022, Telephone: (212) 752-8400

to choose their own work; to have remission of sentences for good behavior restored and to get more letters and visits.

Not all prisoners at Maze Prison are on protest, and indeed those conforming to regulations already receive eight letters, four visits and four parcels a month -- more than the protesting prisoners are actually asking for. Conforming prisoners, many of them members of the Provisional IRA and convicted of similar offences, get a 50 percent remission of sentences. They wear civilian clothes issued by the prison authorities and have lengthy periods of association in the evenings and at weekends.

In his July 8 statement Mr. Atkins said that if the protest ended prisoners would get the association non-protesting prisoners now get, three hours each evening, all their weekends, plus periods for exercise, physical education, games and meals. The suggestion of the Commission for Justice and Peace that adjacent wings should share association in recreation rooms and exercise areas depended on satisfactory arrangements being made for supervising and controlling movement and it would take time to arrange the necessary physical facilities for it.

During association, prisoners would have the privilege of wearing their own clothes. At other times they would wear civilian-type clothing of a non-uniform kind. By comparison with most other western countries this was a liberal regime, but Mr. Atkins said he would not rule out the possibility of further development.

All prisoners were liable for domestic tasks inside and outside the wings -- e.g. for orderly duties and in the laundries, and kitchens. No-one would be excluded as of right from the liability to work in prison work-shops. The authorities would add to the range of activities so far as, and as quickly as, they could.

At the end of the day it would be for the prison authorities to decide what jobs a prisoner did.

Fifty percent remission was awarded for good behavior. It was forfeited by those who breached prison rules by protesting. In practice, prisoners who had given up their protest have had up to one-fifth of lost remission restored, Mr. Atkins said.

Efforts by Outside Bodies

The British Government has demonstrated flexibility in improving the regime at Maze Prison until it is already more liberal, in many instances, than those available in prisons elsewhere in the United Kingdom. It has given access to the prison and to those on hunger-strike to all those bodies and individuals who have shown a willingness to help. Every one of these approaches has in due course been rejected by the protesting prisoners.

/For ...

For instance:

1. Bobby Sands, the first hunger-striker to die, declined to associate himself with his sister Marcella's application to the European Commission of Human Rights on his behalf. Furthermore, ~~although the Government has declared its readiness to facilitate investigation by the Commission, no other prisoners involved in the current protest have asked the European Commission of Human Rights to intervene.~~
2. Father Magee, the Pope's Secretary, who travelled to Northern Ireland unofficially to demonstrate the Vatican's concern with the humanitarian aspects of Sands' case, saw Sands and the other three prisoners then on hunger-strike -- Brendan Hughes, Raymond McCreech, Patrick O'Hara -- but had no success in persuading them to end their strike.
3. The representatives of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace who visited the Maze on a number of occasions recently were finally rebuffed by the protesting prisoners' statement on July 11 that "The Commission's proposals are an unacceptable dilution of our five demands" (which they called on the Commission to support).
4. On July 18 a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross went to Maze Prison. Commenting on the visits, the Observatore Romano, the Vatican newspaper, in an editorial on July 17, expressed the hope that "the prisoners will give credit to this goodwill attempt by suspending the protest which has already claimed too many young victims." The protesting prisoners issued a statement on July 19 in which they said "there is no future role for the International Committee of the Red Cross in this dispute" and called for direct negotiations with the Government.
5. Following an indication, from a source close to the family of one of the hunger-strikers, that the hunger-strikers would welcome clarification of previous Government statements, two Northern Ireland Office officials visited the prison at 2.00 a.m. on July 21. They saw the relatives of two of the hunger-strikers and also the five hunger-strikers presently in the prison hospital, Kieran Doherty, Kevin Lynch, Thomas McIlwee, Patrick Quinn and Michael Devine. But the hunger-strikers insisted that Brendan McFarlane, self-styled Provisional IRA "Commander" in the Maze, be present -- something to which the officials could not agree, for to have done so would have been an implicit recognition of the Provisionals' command structure in the Maze.

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland said on July 21: "The Government has to point out that the action it required of the British was in fact carried out -- an official did go into the Maze to speak to the hunger-strikers."



EFpp

E N D

David Tatham of the British Embassy phoned regarding the position of the hunger-strikers. He said that Lynch was not at all good and went into unconsciousness yesterday. The impression was he would not last longer than another 12 hours. Doherty's condition on the other hand is static and the medical people would not make a prognosis on how much longer he would last.



M. Collins

30 July 1981

10.50 AM

c.c. PSM

PSS


Mr. Neligan

Mr. Whelan

Handwritten note: D/T... information

Condition of hunger-strikers

In response to a request from me the duty officer of the British Embassy contacted the Northern Ireland authorities to be informed that there was no change in the condition of Doherty and Lynch from what was reported yesterday.



M. Collins

29 July 1981

c.c. PSM

PSS

Mr. Neligan

Mr. Whelan

D/Taoiseach informed ✓

C219.

IMMEDIATE
=====

29/7
PS

1750

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON
FOR ASST SEC NELIGAN FROM AMBASSADOR

MMASDFG

TAOISEACH'S LETTER TO U.S. POLITICIANS

YOUR C193 OF 28 JULY

TAOISEACH'S PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO FOUR HORSEMEN DELIVERED TO THEM DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 28 JULY. IN EACH CASE THEY WERE ASKED NOT TO PUBLICISE THE LETTER BUT IF THEY WERE UNDER PRESSURE THEY COULD SAY THAT THE THATCHER LETTER MISREPRESENTED THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM THE TAOISEACH AND THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WAS IN FAVOUR OF A NEW PRESENTATION TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS BASED ON THE ICJP STATEMENT OF 6 JULY. ALL FOUR WERE APPRECIATIVE OF THE FACT THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD WRITTEN TO THEM IN SUCH DETAIL AND HAD GIVEN TO THEM A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY. KENNEDY AND O'NEILL, IN PARTICULAR, WERE ANXIOUS TO MAKE MILEAGE FROM THE TAOISEACH'S MESSAGE AND WERE RESTRAINED ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY.

2. THE LETTER TO CAREY WAS CONVEYED VIA THE ACTING CONSUL GENERAL IN NEW YORK WHO EMPHASISED TO CAREY'S ADVISOR, PETER QUINN, THE INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING PUBLICITY. SHORTLY AFTER CAREY RECEIVED THE TAOISEACH'S LETTER HE GOT A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES AT 5 PM ASKING HIM IF HE HAD RECEIVED THATCHER'S LETTER AND IF HE HAD ANY COMMENT TO MAKE ON IT. AT 7 PM QUINN TELEPHONED THE ACTING CONSUL GENERAL AND ASKED IF CAREY COULD RELEASE THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO THE NEW YORK TIMES IN REPLY TO THE 5 PM QUERY. HAMILL REPEATED THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PUBLICITY BUT TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION QUINN REVEALED THAT CAREY HAD IN FACT ALREADY AUTHORISED THE RELEASE OF THE LETTER BOTH TO THE NEW YORK TIMES AND TO SEAN CRONIN OF THE IRISH TIMES WHO HAD ALSO TELEPHONED FOR A COMMENT. CAREY AS YOU KNOW IS THE LEAST PREDICTABLE OF THE FOUR HORSEMEN AND HE WAS IN AN ESPECIALLY STRANGE MOOD YESTERDAY AFTERNOON NOT LEAST BECAUSE, WHILE THE OTHER THREE HORSEMEN HAD RECEIVED THATCHER'S LETTER, HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED HIS COPY BECAUSE OF SOME FOUL-UP IN BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS. HE INTERPRETED THIS AS A SLUR ON HIS OWN IMPORTANCE AS COMPARED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OTHER THREE AND HE WAS ANXIOUS TO SHOW EVERYONE THAT HE WAS A LEADING FIGURE IN IRISH-AMERICAN AFFAIRS. IT ALSO SUITED HIM IN LOCAL NEW YORK TERMS TO BE ABLE TO SHOW ONCE MORE HOW ANTI-BRITISH HE WAS. AS IT HAPPENS, TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES CARRIES NO REFERENCE TO THE TAOISEACH'S LETTER BUT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT AN INDEPTH PIECE IS BEING PREPARED WHICH WILL PROBABLY APPEAR IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. WHILE CIRCULATING THE TAOISEACH'S LETTER TO THE THREE IN WASHINGTON, IT CAME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT THATCHER'S LETTER HAD IN FACT GONE TO 10 SENATORS AND 27 MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE WHO HAD SENT A TELEGRAM TO THATCHER ON JULY 15. FOR LOCAL REASONS, IT IS IMPORTANT, NOW THAT THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEN TO DEAL WITH THE NEW LARGE GROUPING RATHER THAN THE ORIGINAL FOUR GROUPING AND I INDICATED TO A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT THEY TOO WOULD BE RECEIVING A LETTER FROM THE TAOISEACH. FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SO ARRANGE YESTERDAY BUT AS INDICATED TO YOU BY TELEPHONE LAST EVENING IT IS HOPED TO COMPLETE THE CIRCULATION TODAY.

4. IT HAS ALSO COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT THE BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES HAVE IN A RECENT POLICY DOCUMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND PERPETUATED THE MISREPRESENTATION OF IRISH GOVERNMENT POLICY. WHILE SUCH POLICY DOCUMENTS ARE NOT IN THEMSELVES MADE PUBLIC, THEY ARE USED EXTENSIVELY FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFING PURPOSES BY BRITISH OFFICIALS ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ASKING THE BRITISH TO WITHDRAW THE DOCUMENT BEFORE ANY FURTHER DAMAGE IS DONE. OBVIOUSLY, WE CAN DO SOME COUNTER-BRIEFING ESPECIALLY NOW THAT THE IRISH TIMES HAS CARRIED THE TAOISEACH'S LETTER BUT CLEARLY OUR RESOURCES DO NOT ALLOW US TO MATCH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE B.I.S. ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES.

5. OUR FRIENDS ON THE HILL REMAIN ANXIOUS TO HELP AND IN PARTICULAR TO BE SEEN TO HELP. MANY OF THEM ARE ANXIOUS TO DO SOMETHING OTHER THAN ISSUE MORE ANTI-BRITISH STATEMENTS AND THERE IS A GROWING FEELING THAT A NEW STEP SHOULD BE TAKEN HERE BEFORE CONGRESS GOES INTO RECESS AT THE END OF THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT WEEK. A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE UNDER GENUINE CONSTITUENCY PRESSURES CREATED BY THE CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY ORGANISED AND CO-ORDINATED BY NORAIID. THE CENTREPIECE OF THESE ACTIVITIES IS THE VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES BY RELATIVES OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS. A NEW SET OF RELATIVES SEEMS TO ARRIVE ALMOST EVERY WEEK AND A WELL ESTABLISHED CIRCUIT OF MEETINGS WITH LOCAL IRISH AMERICAN GROUPS AND APPEARANCES ON LOCAL RADIO AND TV PROGRAMMES HAS NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED. CIRCUIT ALSO INCLUDES 5 CALLS ON CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS IN THEIR LOCAL CONSTITUENCY OFFICES BY SOME OF THE RELATIVES AND ALL THOSE WITH WHOM WE ARE IN REGULAR CONTACT ON THE HILL AGREE THAT THE PRESSURE ON THEM IS NOW GREATER THAN IT HAS EVER BEEN IN THE LAST TWELVE YEARS.

6. THE NEW STEP THAT IS MOST LIKELY TO BE TAKEN IS THAT A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND WILL ASK FOR A MEETING EITHER WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE OR POSSIBLY WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WILL BE TO ASK THE ADMINISTRATION TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION SUGGESTED BY THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. A SEPARATE TELEX IS BEING SENT

TO YOU ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION SINCE MY TELEX OF 15 JULY REPORTING ON MY CONTACTS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE PREVIOUS DAY (OUR C200).

2931 JULY 1981
TIME SENT: 1235 HRS

Note:

Interview between Taoiseach and British Ambassador,
28 July, 1981

The Taoiseach summoned the British Ambassador on 28 July and received him at 4.30 p.m. for the purpose of discussing Mrs. Thatcher's letter to leading U.S. Politicians, published that morning. The Taoiseach based his remarks on the attached speaking note. (Annex I) The Minister Designate was present.

The Taoiseach said he was anxious to talk to the Ambassador as he took a serious view of the letter sent by Prime Minister Thatcher to a number of senior U.S. Politicians. Certain references to newspaper reports were misleading and he regretted that the letter had been delivered in America and published without consultation. The British authorities had known 48 hours before delivery of this letter that the press statement quoted in it did not represent the Taoiseach's position. The report on which Mrs. Thatcher was relying in her letter had been published on Wednesday 22 July and as the Ambassador knew we had told him that press reports previous to those of Friday 24 July should be ignored.

Two days before the letter to the Americans was delivered, the Ambassador had been told that Friday's papers correctly reflected our views, namely that the Irish Government still felt that the British Government should be readier to respond to the I.C.J.P. position. We also felt that the British should make a new presentation, possibly to the wider type of meeting which emerged from discussions with Councillor Canning, based as closely as possible upon the I.C.J.P. - Alison document of 6 July.

The Taoiseach said he found it difficult to see how the British Prime Minister could represent a version of our position to U.S. Politicians and to world opinion which was based on an inaccurate press report. He added that in the context of our efforts to form opinion in the USA this could only be unhelpful. The Thatcher letter was undermining the credibility of the

Government in the USA to the advantage of the IRA and its supporters. If Mrs. Thatcher's version of our position were believed in America by many people, and we must assume that it might be, that would undermine our efforts to counter the IRA and this would have as an after effect the weakening also of the British position in American public opinion.

The Taoiseach said that we had had little response over the past 4 weeks to our repeated efforts to get reasonable minimal movement on the Hunger-Strike. The continuance of the strike was having seriously adverse effects for us. Emotions were being raised by current events. It was against this background that we were faced with the difficulty presented by Mrs. Thatcher's mis representation. We were indeed put in an impossible position. We were tempted to respond vigorously but would be reluctant to do that and intended instead to issue a brief public statement to the effect that we noted the inaccurate representation of our views in the British letter and that we had discussed this and asked the British authorities for clarification. We would also say that we had conveyed our true position to the American recipients of the British letter. We should be glad to know the circumstances in which the British Prime Minister represented our views in the way she did.

The press report cited in the British letter dated from Wednesday last (22 July) was spurious. This had led us to brief the press and as a result a correct report of our position emerged substantially on Friday 24 July. This had been explained to the Ambassador by Professor Dooge on Friday 24 July.

The Minister Designate intervened to reiterate the points made to the Ambassador in this regard on 24 July. Commenting on newspapers published on that date, the Taoiseach said that one paper was not totally accurate in its report but others were correct.

The Taoiseach said he was astonished that the British Prime Minister should give an account of our position as to the accuracy of which the Ambassador was formally on notice that its basis should be disregarded. Three aspects have to be emphasised, firstly, that it was not for one Prime Minister to present publicly the views of another, secondly, that this should not be done on the basis of press reports and thirdly, that this should not be done given the fact that those reports had been specifically repudiated by our Government. A unilateral statement issued without consultation was very unusual, and all the more so since it was based on press reports which two days before had been the subject of an official indication to the Ambassador that they were not reliable. The Taoiseach commented that our relationship with Britain was, as we knew, unique and he had to say that there was certainly something unique about Mrs. Thatcher's approach in this case although not in the sense in which the word had been used up to then.

The Taoiseach said once more that he would be issuing a short statement to the effect that he was seeking clarification from the Ambassador to whom he then gave a copy of the press release (Annex II).

The Ambassador said he was unsighted on this problem. He had only seen the Thatcher letter that morning and had not known that it was coming. It was a new element in the picture as far as he was concerned. Referring to the second paragraph of our draft statement, the Ambassador said that it would clearly cause press interest in his reponse. He could not see what kind of answer would be returned. He felt some anxiety lest the affair would gain a momentum of its own over the next couple of days. He expressed surprise over the contents of Mrs. Thatcher's letter. He suspected that it had been drafted well before we had brought to notice our views about the previous week's press coverage.

The Taoiseach pointed out that even if that were so there had been ample time to intercept the letter. The Ambassador said that if he had known about the letter he could have taken certain action. His telegram had been very fully considered on Friday afternoon but he did not think that the press reporting point could have been picked up. At that stage the Prime Minister's letter had probably been drafted already.

The Taoiseach rejoined that the point was that the letter should have been delivered two days later. A reasonably efficient machinery of Government should have ensured that this could not happen. Over and above all that there still remained the impropriety of representing the Taoiseach's position on the basis of unvarnished press reports. The Ambassador said that there had been lots of quote marks and inverted commas in the Irish Times. The Minister Designate pointed out that the Irish Times itself had attempted to retrieve the errors made in the report on the following day. The Taoiseach said that the journalist responsible had tried to stop publication. The journalist who wrote the Irish Times piece of 22 July had not been present at the briefing. The Taoiseach really could not imagine how our position could have been described on the basis of unvarnished press reports. We might have to conclude that we would have to operate in this policy area on our own and by ourselves in future. Nine years' work by our Government in the USA might be undone by this misrepresentation. Our friends in America, who were also the friends of Britain, were unnerved by what had happened. The Taoiseach had done what he could, in explaining matters to the politicians concerned, to undo the damage and had referred in his messages to the Minister Designate's discussions with the Ambassador on 24 July. The Taoiseach did not wish to say any more until he had heard back from the Ambassador. In all fairness however, he had to say that our friends in the USA would wish to know very promptly what our public position is. Our Ambassador in Washington would try to reassure them but our friends in America might have to say something similar to our brief public statement so as to be able to hold their position against the enemies of both our countries against whom they had been battling for years. The Taoiseach asked if the Ambassador had any idea what reply would be offered. As for us we had the choice of saying everything now or of

holding over until a reply was received and meanwhile trying to calm down the problem only after much thought and discussion had it been decided that we could get away with so little by way of public response. The Taoiseach hoped that the British Government could give us some help and would do nothing to exacerbate the issue. However we had been working very hard for four weeks and after all that we felt that we had made no progress whatever. The continuation of the Hunger-Strike was doing terrible damage to our stability and was a boost to the I.R.A.. He felt that stability was at risk. It was difficult to face the IRA when the British Government brought about a situation where we appeared rather to be in conflict with them than with the IRA. The Taoiseach had deferred a statement in the Dáil on 23 July because he believed a solution of the hunger strike to be still possible, but if further deaths were now to occur we would have to come out publicly and say where we stand.

The Ambassador inquired whether we would still be recommending an approach by his authorities based on the ICJP position. The Taoiseach and Minister Designate confirmed that that was so. The Taoiseach said we would try to reorientate public opinion against the IRA but we would not be successful in this until we got things straight with the British Government. Two men were now very serious and it wasn't possible to be hopeful of a settlement in time to prevent their deaths. A general clarification of our position was needed and the tone of that clarification would not be helped if the British authorities behaved towards us as they had done.

The Ambassador said it might be better for relations between our two countries to end public interest now rather than to have the quarrel ongoing with continuing press interest for several days. Perhaps the Irish Government could express itself once and for all now using if necessary very strong language. The Taoiseach remarked that the following day the Royal Wedding would take place and said that it wasn't a time for argument and dispute between the two Governments. The Ambassador said it would be a pity if the press were to know that that consideration was in our minds. He would prefer very strong language now and later private explanation. The Taoiseach repeated that this was.

not the best day for strong language. We hoped to calm down reaction to the Thatcher letter and to head off some of its effects. The Minister Designate said that the arguments in favour of using strong language immediately were weak because of the coincidence of the Royal Wedding.

The Ambassador asked what the reaction of the four horsemen had been? The Taoiseach said he had suggested a minimalist form of words for their use. He did not like them to say openly that the British Prime Minister had written an incorrect statement after due notice that it was not correct had been given. It would be undesirable if the four horsemen were to use that information in America. The Ambassador confirmed that he had reported fully what he had been told last Friday. He had indicated that press reports during the week should be disregarded in favour of reports in the Irish papers on 24 July. However, he had not focussed on this aspect in his report but had rather focussed on the Financial Times story of 23 July.

The Taoiseach asked what were we to say about a position where a Prime Minister puts words in the mouth of another Prime Minister based on newspaper reports when those reports had been repudiated? How were the four horsemen going to explain this situation? We would have to say to them that our position is quite different from what had been stated in Mrs. Thatcher's letter, and that we were demanding a full statement now in Dublin about the unilateral and indefensible character of the misrepresentation of the Taoiseach's views, based on repudiated press reports. It could not help Anglo-American relations. It could not help us to win our common fight in the USA; on the contrary we may lose much support there. A full statement might cloud the atmosphere. The Foreign Minister Designate mentioned that one of Senator Kennedy's aides had asked us to supply material for a public statement.

- 7 -

The Taoiseach said he thought we should have to repeat our position to the British authorities publicly in due course, or we would lose ground to the I.R.A. at home. This would be a particularly unfavourable development as in other respects there had been some good developments in recent days, e.g. the G.A.A. position on the Hunger Strike. However to make a statement showing British misrepresentation would set back Anglo-American relations. Nonetheless silence on our part would cause us to lose out here and in particular would give an opportunity to the relatives of the Hunger-Strikers to criticise the Government and would seriously undermine the position we had established in the U.S.A. in the last nine years. The Minister Designate said it was very embarrassing for us to have to emphasise to the relatives that we were not washing our hands of the matter when they were to read the next day in the papers that the British Prime Minister held the same view as they did of where our Government stood.

The Ambassador said he saw the difficulty and regretted the situation very much. Speaking off the record he made a suggestion which the Taoiseach and Minister Designate said they would consider. The Taoiseach said the problem was basically one of consultation in the first place. The Ambassador agreed. He clarified his earlier remarks by saying that of course he could not welcome the use of strong language by our authorities in commenting on what had happened, but he made this suggestion because he was against allowing the affair to drag on.

The Minister Designate said he did not think the matter need be dragged out excessively. The Ambassador should consider the effect on our friends when they receive a letter which puts our Government in a false position. The problem caused by the letter was arguably even more serious in the U.S.A. than here. The Ambassador commented that our friends in the U.S.A. may have read the misleading account of the Government's position in the Irish Times anyway. The Minister Designate and the Taoiseach both emphasised that repetition of this erroneous account in Mrs. Thatcher's letter could not be defended as we had warned of its incorrectness in time. The Ambassador repeated his point about

the focus of his message of last Friday being on points other than this one about the general unreliability of press reports before 24 July, and indicated that he had nothing to say to the Taoiseach's point about failure to consult with us on our policy position. He left indicating that he would report and pursue the matters raised.

Adams

30/7/1981

ANNEX (I)

I regret that a letter from the British Prime Minister to U.S. politicians delivered on Sunday night and Monday morning and published without notice to or consultation with our Government contained a unilateral version of my position in relation to the hunger strike which is misleading and which was known to the British Government over 48 hours before delivery not to represent my position or that of my Government.

First, with respect to the question of press reports which have given varying versions of the Irish Government's position: the Minister designate for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador on Friday, 24 July, that he should ignore press reports which had appeared earlier in the week and which did not reflect our position. The press reports on which the British Prime Minister's letter relies had been published on the previous Wednesday and her Government was therefore on notice two days before delivery of the letter in Washington that such reports did not reflect the Irish Government's position. The true position was that the Irish Government's efforts to find a solution were continuing with urgency in view of the closeness to death of Kieran Doherty and Kevin Lynch and that the Irish Government still felt that the British Government should show itself more ready to respond to the proposals of the Commission on Justice and Peace.

In the course of his discussion with the British Ambassador, the Minister designate also pressed the desirability of taking the opportunity provided for progress by the proposal of Councillor Canning of Dungannon which, the Ambassador was told, we understood to have emerged in the first instance from discussions with a British official, Mr. Blackwell.

Finally during these discussions the Minister designate made it clear that it was the view of the Irish Government that the British authorities should make a new presentation of its position regarding present conditions as to the end of the hunger strike and that, as we had repeatedly stressed in the past, this presentation should approximate, as closely as possible, to that worked out on 6th July by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace and Minister of State Allison.

Against this background it is difficult to see how the British Prime Minister could seek to present a version of my position to U.S. politicians unilaterally and without prior notification or consultation. It is even less easy to understand how such statements about my position could be presented to world opinion generally through publication of that letter.

3.

The Irish Government cannot feel that such a presentation of my position can be helpful to the relations between our two countries which it has been the wish of our Government to improve and indeed to transform - or indeed helpful to the task of informing Irish-American opinion in the United States. This wish has unfortunately appeared to find little response in reactions by the British Government during the past four weeks, which in our view, repeatedly expressed, have had little regard for the seriously adverse effects in both parts of Ireland of the British Government's stance or for our efforts to maintain public opinion here in the face of emotions raised by current events.

ANNEX (II)

The Taoiseach is concerned that a letter from the British Prime Minister to four prominent U.S. politicians which has been released to the press contains an incorrect statement of his position on the hunger strike.

Before commenting further on the matter, the Taoiseach has asked the British Ambassador to clarify the circumstances in which his position came to be so represented.

The Taoiseach has communicated his true position to the recipients of the letter.

Condition of hunger-strikers

The following information was received from Tatham of the British Embassy at 10.50 today.

(1) Doherty - Condition stable. He is bright and alert. His condition has not changed in the last week. There is no sign yet of him dying; deafness etc is there but has been there for about a week. "There is no clinical evidence of hanky panky" (i.e. feeding).

(2) Lynch - much worse than Doherty. On balance should be all right for another 24 hours but heart is not good and could go at any time.

Tatham said that Stormont contact also mentioned the case of Patrick Quinn who began his hunger strike on 15 June 1981 he is very sick and miserable and while he is not in any danger Tatham said that he was not sure "whether they might have a Hurson on their hands".

The British Embassy will be closed tomorrow but Tatham promised to keep us informed on the prisoners' condition and would also of course notify us straight away in the event of a death.



M. Collins

28 July 1981

c.c. PSM /
PSS
Mr. Neligan
Mr. Whelan
Mr. Kirwan
Mr. Lillis

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335
28TH JULY 1981
TO WASHINGTON FROM HQ
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ASST. SEC. NELIGAN

Asst Sec Neligan

PRESS RELEASE

FOLLOWING STATEMENT ISSUED BY GOVERNMENT PRESS SECRETARY AT 18.00 :-

THE TAOISEACH IS CONCERNED THAT A LETTER FROM THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TO FOUR PROMINENT U.S. POLITICIANS WHICH HAS BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS CONTAINS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF HIS POSITION ON THE HUNGER STRIKE.

BEFORE COMMENTING FURTHER ON THE MATTER, THE TAOISEACH HAS ASKED THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO CLARIFY THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HIS POSITION CAME TO BE SO REPRESENTED.

THE TAOISEACH HAS COMMUNICATED HIS TRUE POSITION TO THE RECIPIENTS OF THE LETTER.

TEXT ABOVE IS TO GO TO 4 HORSEMENT AS ANNEX TO TAOISEACH'S LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

SENT AT 1846 HRS 28TH JULY '81
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QQQQQQ

C421
28/7/81

TO PMUN NY FROM HQ
FOR TED SMYTH FROM ASST SEC NELIGAN

MMHFJTG

HERE COPY OF CONFIDENTIAL TELEX SENT TO WASHINGTON

LETTER TO HORSEMEN
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM TAOISEACH TO BE TRANSMITTED TO
EACH HORSEMAN. UNDERSTAND THAT TAOISEACH INSTRUCTED YOU THIS
MORNING ABOUT HOW MUCH THEY SHOULD SAY PUBLICALLY, VIZ. THAT
THATCHER LETTER MISREPRESENTS OUR POSITION AND THAT WE ARE STRONGLY
IN FAVOUR OF A NEW PRESENTATION TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS BASED ON
THE ICJP STATEMENT OF 6 JULY.

A SHORT PRESS STATEMENT RELEASED THIS P.M. IS BEING SENT TO YOU
SEPARATELY.

MESSAGE	
URGENT	
CONFIDENTIAL	
DATE	TIME
28/7/81	1940
INITIALS	LS

AS YOU WILL ALREADY HAVE HEARD FROM SEAN DONLON MRS THATCHER'S LATEST LETTER TO YOU MISREPRESENTS MY POSITION AND THAT OF MY GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO THE H-BLOCK HUNGER STRIKE. HER LETTER REFERS TO A PRESS REPORT OF WEDNESDAY, JULY, 22 WHICH PURPORTED TO INDICATE MY GOVERNMENT'S POSITION FOLLOWING A VISIT BY BRITISH OFFICIALS TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS AT 2 AM ON JULY 21. THE LETTER SUGGESTS THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS NOW SATISFIED WITH WHAT THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAVE DONE TO SOLVE THE CRISIS.

LAST FRIDAY, JIM DOOGE, (THE MINISTER-DESIGNATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) TOLD THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT THIS PRESS REPORT, AMONGST OTHERS, SHOULD BE IGNORED AND DREW ATTENTION TO IRISH NEWSPAPER REPORTS OF FRIDAY JULY 24, AS REFLECTING THE TRUE POSITION OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT. THESE REPORTS IN FRIDAY'S PAPERS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS WERE CONTINUING WITH GREAT URGENCY AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT FELT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD SHOW ITSELF MORE READY TO RESPOND TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE IRISH COMMISSION OF JUSTICE AND PEACE SET OUT ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION WITH MINISTER OF STATE ALISON ON JULY 6TH.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS IN ANY CASE FULLY AWARE, FROM OUR CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATIONS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL CHANNELS ON VARIOUS MATTERS RELATED TO THE SEARCH FOR A RESOLUTION TO THE HUNGER STRIKE, THAT WE ARE NOT SATISFIED THAT THE APPROACH TO THE PRISONERS ON JULY 21 ADEQUATELY MET OUR EARLIER REPEATED REQUESTS FOR ACTION. ON THE CONTRARY WE STILL WISH, AND HAVE SO INFORMED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY AND URGENTLY, THAT THEY SHOULD MAKE A NEW PRESENTATION OF WHAT IS ON OFFER TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS. THE NEW PRESENTATION SHOULD BE IN OUR VIEW BASED AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE UPON THE POSITION ELABORATED BY THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE WITH MINISTER OF STATE ALLISON ON JULY 6TH.

AT A TIME WHEN BOTH THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS FACE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE FROM SUBVERSIVE ORGANISATIONS WHICH ARE USING THE HUNGER STRIKE AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF INCREASING THEIR SUPPORT THROUGHOUT IRELAND, IT IS MOST DAMAGING FOR PUBLIC OPINION BOTH HERE AND IN THE U.S. THAT SUCH A MISREPRESENTATION OF OUR POSITION SHOULD OCCUR, AND BE GIVEN SUCH WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY, THUS CASTING DOUBT ON OUR WILL TO ADVANCE A SOLUTION.

AS THE ATTACHED PRESS RELEASE INDICATES, I HAVE ALREADY CALLED IN THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY MRS THATCHER SHOULD WITHOUT CONSULTATION OR NOTIFICATION DESCRIBE IN A LETTER TO YOU MY POSITION IN REGARD TO THE HUNGER STRIKE ON THE BASIS OF A MISLEADING PRESS REPORT AND SHOULD ARRANGE FOR THIS MISREPRESENTATION OF MY POSITION TO BE MADE PUBLIC. I WILL INFORM YOU OF ANY EXPLANATION RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO THIS ENQUIRY.

~~~~~

MAY I AGAIN THANK YOU FOR ALL THAT YOU HAVE DONE IN THE PAST TO MAINTAIN A POSITION OF REASON ON THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND MAY I EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE PRESENT DISTURBING INCIDENT WILL NOT UNDULY DAMAGE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

YOURS SINCERELY

END

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
IMMEDIATE

TO HQ FROM PMUN GENEVA.  
FOR SECRETARY FROM PERMREP.

*Circulated by Mrs. Wlehel  
to c 28 hr.*

28/7/81

NMMHJUJT



ICRC VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND.

IN CONFIRMATION TELEPHONE CONVERSATION I WAS CONTACTED THIS MORNING BY MRS. SIMONEUS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR EUROPE, ICRC. SHE TOLD ME THAT MR. FRANK SCHMIT, DELEGATE GENERAL FOR EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, WHO HEADED THE NORTHERN IRELAND VISIT WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR SOME DAYS. ON THE QUESTION OF THE VISIT TO PRISONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND SHE PREFACED HER REMARKS BY SAYING THAT IT IS ESTABLISHED PRACTICE OF THE ICRC TO PROVIDE A REPORT OF THE NATURE ONLY TO THE REQUESTING PARTY AND THAT THE ICRC DOES NOT MAKE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIRD PARTIES. NEITHER DOES THE ICRC PUBLISH THE REPORT ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE PUBLISHED BY THE REQUESTING PARTY.

IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS SHE SAID THAT A PRELIMINARY ORAL REPORT HAD BEEN MADE TO ALISON LAST THURSDAY, BY THE VISITING TEAM, BUT THAT THE WRITTEN REPORT TO THE BRITISH WOULD TAKE ABOUT ONE MONTH. SHE COULD NOT HOWEVER GIVE THE EXACT DATE WHEN THE REPORT WOULD BE HANDED OVER. THERE MAY OR MAY NOT IN THE MEANTIME BE FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES. AS TO INDICATING TO ME THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REPORT SHE REFERRED ME TO WHAT SHE HAD SAID AT THE OUTSET THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES.

WHEN I QUESTIONED HER FURTHER ON THE POSITION IN REGARD TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS SHE SAID THAT THE VISIT WAS TO EXAMINE PRISON CONDITIONS GENERALLY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND WAS NOT CENTRED ON ONE GROUP ONLY.

INSOFAR AS THE HUNGER STRIKERS ARE CONCERNED THE ICRC DOCTOR VISITED THE PRISON INFIRMARY WHERE SOME OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS WERE AND "THAT ASPECT WOULD BE MENTIONED IN THE REPORT". I COULD NOT GET HER TO GO FURTHER THAN THIS.

I WOULD INFER FROM THE FACT THAT THE FINAL WRITTEN REPORT IS NOT GOING TO BE AVAILABLE FOR ABOUT A MONTH THAT WHATEVER REFERENCE IS BEING MADE TO THE HUNGER STRIKES IS NOT GOING TO AFFECT HAPPENINGS IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD OR FOR THAT MATTER IN THE NEXT FEW

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BRITISH AUTHORITIES.

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BEING MADE TO THE HUNGER STRIKES IS NOT GOING TO AFFECT HAPPENINGS  
IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD OR FOR THAT MATTER IN THE NEXT FEW  
WEEKS.

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ON THE QUESTION OF THE RETICENCE OF THE ICRC MY EXPERIENCE IS
THAT THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF REPORTS FROM THEIR SIDE
IS A MATTER OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY GIVEN THE FACT THAT THEY
ARE AT ALL TIMES ANXIOUS TO BE SEEN TO MAINTAIN THEIR REPUTATION
FOR OBJECTIVITY. THIS IS THE REASON, I SURMISE, FOR SCHMIDT'S
INAVAILABILITY WHICH I THINK IS UNDERSTANDABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

CORRECTION TO ABOVE: FIRST PARA. LINE 7 PLS READ "A REPORT OF
THIS REPEAT THIS NATURE ONLY....."

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P.S.S.

FAX 604 (8 pgs.)

FOR: WALSHE
FROM: SMYTHE

Copy Anglo Irish



Received
Consulate New York
Wed, July 29 '81
Ted Lynch

BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

POLICY AND REFERENCE DIVISION

N.B. Bottom of page 3.

POLICY BACKGROUND

July 27, 1981

3/81. NORTHERN IRELAND HUNGER STRIKES: WHO IS BEING INFLEXIBLE?

The British Government has variously been accused of "inflexibility," "intransigence," and of "not having been whole-hearted" in its efforts to bring the Maze Prison hunger-strikes to an end.

The following is a background note compiled from recent statements by the British Government detailing the efforts it has made to reach an accommodation with the strikers.

Visits to Maze

The British Government has over the past three months approved and supported a succession of visits to the hunger-strikers by groups and individuals who expressed a humanitarian desire to help bring the protest to an end. And the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Humphrey Atkins, has clearly spelt out the further improvements which could be made to an already enlightened prison regime. Copies of these proposals have been delivered to those on hunger-strike and officials from the Northern Ireland Office have visited the hunger-strikers to clarify doubts on any point in the lengthy statements made by the Secretary of State on June 30 and July 8.

Conditions Within the Prison

Those who examine the painful position at Maze Prison must first judge whether the hunger-strike protest is against conditions in the prison or whether it is in support of a claim for political status, either in name or by the acceptance of a set of demands which together add up to political or special status. The protesting prisoners at the Maze Prison have made five demands: the right to wear their own clothes; to associate freely with other prisoners;

/to ...

845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10022, Telephone: (212) 752-8400

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to choose their own work; to have remission of sentences for good behavior restored and to get more letters and visits.

Not all prisoners at Maze Prison are on protest, and indeed those conforming to regulations already receive eight letters, four visits and four parcels a month -- more than the protesting prisoners are actually asking for. Conforming prisoners, many of them members of the Provisional IRA and convicted of similar offences, get a 50 percent remission of sentences. They wear civilian clothes issued by the prison authorities and have lengthy periods of association in the evenings and at weekends.

In his July 8 statement Mr. Atkins said that if the protest ended prisoners would get the association non-protesting prisoners now get, three hours each evening, all their weekends, plus periods for exercise, physical education, games and meals. The suggestion of the Commission for Justice and Peace that adjacent wings should share association in recreation rooms and exercise areas depended on satisfactory arrangements being made for supervising and controlling movement and it would take time to arrange the necessary physical facilities for it.

During association, prisoners would have the privilege of wearing their own clothes. At other times they would wear civilian-type clothing of a non-uniform kind. By comparison with most other western countries this was a liberal regime, but Mr. Atkins said he would not rule out the possibility of further development.

All prisoners were liable for domestic tasks inside and outside the wings -- e.g. for orderly duties and in the laundries, and kitchens. No-one would be excluded as of right from the liability to work in prison work-shops. The authorities would add to the range of activities so far as, and as quickly as, they could.

At the end of the day it would be for the prison authorities to decide what jobs a prisoner did.

Fifty percent remission was awarded for good behavior. It was forfeited by those who breached prison rules by protesting. In practice, prisoners who had given up their protest have had up to one-fifth of lost remission restored, Mr. Atkins said.

Efforts by Outside Bodies

The British Government has demonstrated flexibility in improving the regime at Maze Prison until it is already more liberal, in many instances, than those available in prisons elsewhere in the United Kingdom. It has given access to the prison and to those on hunger-strike to all those bodies and individuals who have shown a willingness to help. Every one of these approaches has in due course been rejected by the protesting prisoners.

/For ...

For instance:

1. Bobby Sands, the first hunger-striker to die, declined to associate himself with his sister Marcella's application to the European Commission of Human Rights on his behalf. Furthermore, although the Government has declared its readiness to facilitate investigation by the Commission, no other prisoners involved in the current protest have asked the European Commission of Human Rights to intervene.
2. Father Magee, the Pope's Secretary, who travelled to Northern Ireland unofficially to demonstrate the Vatican's concern with the humanitarian aspects of Sands' case, saw Sands and the other three prisoners then on hunger-strike -- Brendan Hughes, Raymond McCreech, Patrick O'Hara -- but had no success in persuading them to end their strike.
3. The representatives of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace who visited the Maze on a number of occasions recently were finally rebuffed by the protesting prisoners' statement on July 11 that "The Commission's proposals are an unacceptable dilution of our five demands" (which they called on the Commission to support).
4. On July 18 a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross went to Maze Prison. Commenting on the visits, the Observatore Romano, the Vatican newspaper, in an editorial on July 17, expressed the hope that "the prisoners will give credit to this goodwill attempt by suspending the protest which has already claimed too many young victims." The protesting prisoners issued a statement on July 19 in which they said "there is no future role for the International Committee of the Red Cross in this dispute" and called for direct negotiations with the Government.
5. Following an indication, from a source close to the family of one of the hunger-strikers, that the hunger-strikers would welcome clarification of previous Government statements, two Northern Ireland Office officials visited the prison at 2.00 a.m. on July 21. They saw the relatives of two of the hunger-strikers and also the five hunger-strikers presently in the prison hospital, Kieran Doherty, Kevin Lynch, Thomas McIlwee, Patrick Quinn and Michael Devine. But the hunger-strikers insisted that Brendan McFarlane, self-styled Provisional IRA "Commander" in the Maze, be present -- something to which the officials could not agree, for to have done so would have been an implicit recognition of the Provisionals' command structure in the Maze.

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland said on July 21: "The Government has to point out that the action it required of the British was in fact carried out -- an official did go into the Maze to speak to the hunger-strikers."

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here today that President Reagan had also agreed to the Catholic Relief Agency's buying of surplus American food at low prices for shipment to Poland.

A State Department official said the United States considered the new \$50 million loan "a humanitarian gesture." He added that the Polish party congress earlier this month had shown that "im-

allocations in the 1981 budget. An additional \$5 million for transport costs would come from the unexpended portion of \$570 million in food credits given Poland last year.

The 350,000 tons of corn (about 1.4 million bushels) will come from the 1980 crop and will be delivered in August and

trying to help feed the people of Poland."

He said the relief agency would concentrate its buying on flour, rice, powdered milk, butter and cheese. These commodities are now stored in government warehouses as payment for price support loans.

to fill Western public opinion into a false sense of security and thus make it even more difficult for allied governments to permit the stationing of more and better American nuclear weapons in Europe.

Against this background, the Russians here have consistently argued that definition of the terms of reference of the European disarmament conference should be left to the conference itself.

Mr. Gorbachev echoed this position in his speech today, according to members of the Soviet delegation.

"Confidence-Building Measures"

The West countered with a proposal first advanced by France and later endorsed by other members of the Western alliance. The proposal, in its latest form, provides that the first point to be discussed by a European disarmament conference should deal with "confidence-building measures," including an obligation for each nation to give verifiable advance notice of any troop maneuvers it planned anywhere in Europe, including the entire European region of the Soviet Union.

This would mean a considerable strengthening of the 1975 Helsinki accords, which called for such prior notice but on a voluntary basis and only for Western Europe and a 163-mile belt of Soviet territory.

After the French proposal was broached early this year, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, indicated in a speech at the Communist Party congress that he would accept the extension of the zone covered by notification to the entire European part of the Soviet



N.Y. TIMES - JULY 29th - P. 43. Mrs. Thatcher Blames I.R.A. for Next Deaths

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

BELFAST, Northern Ireland, July 28 — Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain, in a letter to four prominent American politicians, said that the responsibility for further deaths among Irish Republican Army hunger strikers "rests firmly on the shoulders of those who are ordering these young men to commit suicide."

At the same time, Humphrey Atkins, the highest-ranking British official in Belfast, said in an interview today that the hunger-strike tactic was losing its impact in the Roman Catholic neighborhoods of Northern Ireland and that I.R.A. "inflexibility" was leading to the death fasts in Belfast's Maze Prison.

"This isn't the British Government being inflexible," said Mr. Atkins, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in his office at Stormont Palace. "It's the Provisional I.R.A. doing everything they bloody well can to get their way."

Mr. Atkins said that the British Government "will not give in to I.R.A. de-

mands, and the way this hunger strike will end is when the I.R.A. tells their chaps to start eating."

Six hunger strikers have died so far, and two others, Kieran Doherty and Kevin Lynch, reached their 69th and 68th day today without food. The prisoners, in jail on such charges as murder and carrying explosives, are seeking political prisoner status and have made five demands: the right to wear their own clothes, special work, more visits by friends and relatives, time off for good behavior and free association with other nationalist prisoners.

Mrs. Thatcher's letter to the four American politicians came after they had criticized the British Government's efforts to settle the hunger strike. The four are Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York; Governor Carey; Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., Democrat of Massachusetts, the Speaker of the House.

Their protest to Mrs. Thatcher was


especially significant because the four have adopted a moderate tone on the Ulster issue. They have strongly criticized the I.R.A. in the past, and they generally follow the line adopted by the Irish Embassy in Washington.

Although Mrs. Thatcher, in her letter, said that the Irish Government agreed with the British Government in its policies involving the hunger strikers, a hastily issued statement tonight from Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald's office in Dublin said that was "incorrect." It is known that Mr. FitzGerald's Government has, over the last few weeks, sought negotiations with the prisoners in an attempt to end the hunger strike.


Mr. Atkins noted that a key sticking point in talks with the hunger strikers was their insistence that the I.R.A. leader in Maze Prison, Brendan McFarlane, attend the talks. "We are not prepared to negotiate directly with the Provisional I.R.A." Mr. Atkins said.

Get new ideas on the Op-Ed Page

The Stendhal Clinic: wake up your skin and get beauty bonuses, too.



Destined to be The Belt this season, the criss-cross by Colony Design. With a great wrappy look held together with a concealed hook closure. What impact! In bronze or pewter metallic leather. Or have suede in either moss or amber color. In small or medium sizes. \$2.00 - Belts, Street Level



MISS BEF

The spirited shapes sweater of wool/an 86-l. Supple, smooth redwood. For 4 to Floor. Call our pers

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Memo.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Charles Rushing, Charge d'Affaires at the United States Embassy called on the Taoiseach at his own request this morning to deliver a copy of a letter from President Reagan to the Taoiseach in reply to the Taoiseach's letter to the President on July 14th. The President's letter is dated July 23rd and a signed copy will be delivered in due course. The Taoiseach stated that the Government regretted the publicity attaching to the delivery of the Taoiseach's letter to President Reagan and that this regret had been, as far as we knew, relayed to the White House. Mr. Rushing said that the State Department were aware of our expression of regret.

The Taoiseach wondered whether any reference to the hunger strike problem had been made in the exchanges between Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan in Ottawa. Mr. Rushing said he had no information on this point but would try and find out from the State Department. He added that he felt that Ambassador Donlon would be in a better position to find out in Washington whether any such exchanges had in fact transpired.

The Taoiseach said that the Government had had four reasons for making the approach to President Reagan:

- (a) The interest shown by the U.S. Government in the past in the problem of Northern Ireland including President Reagan's own statements;
- (b) The fact that the President was coming to a reception at the Irish Embassy;
- (c) The known influence of this Administration with Mrs. Thatcher;
- (d) The extreme urgency of the problem.

The Taoiseach said that it had not been the intention of the Government to "internationalise the problem". He mentioned the interest shown publicly by the French Foreign Minister, Cheysson and read out in translation selections from M. Cheysson's statement in the National Assembly. Mr. Rushing enquired whether there was anything in French politics which might impel Cheysson to show this interest. The Taoiseach said that, on the contrary, there were issues such as Brittany and Corsica which would impel an opposite attitude. He said that Cheysson was personally a warm and somewhat emotional man but neither these facts nor

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even the good relations which he had enjoyed personally with Cheysson, could fully explain the interest which was originally shown by the Elysee in our concern. The Taoiseach said that our State is now more threatened by terrorism than at any time since the thirties. He said that Britain had had a unique opportunity to end this threat which also affected the United Kingdom. Because of President Reagan's well-known commitment to oppose terrorism, it had been our hope that he would find it possible to persuade Mrs. Thatcher. It now seemed that the opportunity that she had had to end this threat had been lost, perhaps irretrievably. 7

Replying to questions from Mr. Rushing about the differences between the ICJP and British positions on what seems to be the only outstanding issue i.e. work, the Taoiseach said that he did not himself appreciate that any substantial difference existed. He added that the British position on the McFarlane issue was in fact dishonest given that the British had already negotiated with McFarlane and had indeed accepted his statement as representing the position of the hunger strikers on issues on which the hunger strikers had not themselves been consulted by anyone, even McFarlane.

The Taoiseach said that the British seem to want a complete victory. We are dealing with "impossible people" in London, notably Mrs. Thatcher.

The Taoiseach said that there had been a direct British negotiation with the Provisional IRA since our efforts began and of which, of course, we were not officially aware. During this negotiation, Joe McDonnell had died and this event had ended the negotiations.

The Taoiseach said that this group of hunger strikers, as far as we know, want to live. They would accept a modified form of the five demands. They would need to be satisfied that such a form of the five demands would be implemented.

The Taoiseach said that the Reverend Martin Smyth's statement of yesterday was a helpful development and answered the British objection that they could not make concessions because of a fear of Unionist reactions. He added that the UDA were also in support of concessions to the hunger strikers.

Mr. Rushing said that he had no information about the meeting between Carrington and Haig nor did he have any information about Carrington's mention of Northern Ireland, if any, in his meeting with congressmen.

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The Taoiseach said that there had been an opportunity to destroy the current massive IRA campaign of propoganda. The oppostunity had been lost. For us the consequences were at present unknown. It was not a question of us being soft on terrorism; we want to destroy it. Support for the IRA is now higher than since the thirties and the British are in effect fomenting this. Meanwhile, we are being impeded from developing good relations with the British Government.

The Taoiseach said that the Garda Siochana only just managed to hold the attack of the demonstrators on July 18th. In answer to questions from Rushing, he said that our information was that the performance of the attackers on the police was highly professional but that these attackers did not come by any means exclusively from Northern Ireland nor indeed from Dublin. They represented a cross-section covering much of rural Ireland. The British don't seem to care a great deal about the security of our State, given their lack of response to our representations. Despite our difficulties and the limitations on our security forces, we will hold the ground.

Mr. Rushing said that he would convey the Taoiseach's views and try to find out if anything had happened at Ottawa in relation to the hunger strike.

The Taoiseach said that in the period May 1979 to December 1979, it was very clear that the British were acting energetically under pressure from Washington, because of the pressure of President Carter on Mrs. Thatcher and of Harold Browne on Francis Pym. The British responsiveness declined when Senator Kennedy's chances of becoming the democratic Party candidate began to fade. Lord Carrington had told the Taoiseach this when the Taoiseach was in Oppostiion. His own assessment was that the Anglo-American relationship was a critical factor in British thinking, a substitute for Empire.

M. Gillis,
M. Gillis,
27th July, 1981.

cc Mr. Ross, Mr. T. P. O'Riordan, Mr. Doyle, Mr. Nash, Mr. Keenan, Mr. A. O'Riordan, Mr. McGuire



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

July 23, 1981

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have your letter of July 14 concerning the situation in Northern Ireland and the possible death of yet another fasting prisoner. I appreciate the depth of concern which prompted your letter and want you to know how sorrowfully I, along with millions of other Americans, view this tragic conflict.

Throughout the period of the hunger strike, we have made clear our regret at the deaths it has brought about, including those persons innocently caught up in the violence it has engendered. The recent deaths of Mr. Martin Hurson and Mr. Joseph McDonnell were all the more tragic at a time when it appeared that a way might be found to resolve this issue. I sincerely hope that the hunger strike can be brought to a peaceful conclusion with an end to the violence in Northern Ireland.

While the U.S. does not intend to intervene directly in the current situation in Northern Ireland, U.S. policy and my own personal feelings as expressed in my St. Patrick's Day statement are well known to the British Government.

I share your hope that the deep and longstanding division of Northern Ireland can at last be bridged by the good will and compromises of reasonable men and women on both sides.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Garret FitzGerald, T.D.
Prime Minister of Ireland
Dublin

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 17, 1981

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

St. Patrick's Day is not only the feast day of a great man of God, it is a symbol of the commitment of the Irish people to freedom, to justice and to the values upon which western civilization is built.

We in the United States know the great contribution made by citizens of Irish ancestry. From our Revolution to the present day, Irish-Americans have been at the forefront of the defense of freedom. By their labor and by their sacrifices, they have been a major force in building our Nation.

It is therefore gratifying on this St. Patrick's Day to be able to pay tribute to the great role Ireland and the Irish have played in defending and renewing the values we cherish.

But we are also conscious of the violence, bloodshed and despair which now haunt all of the people of Northern Ireland. This tragedy cannot go unnoticed by the United States which owes so much and has such close ties to the Irish.

As an American proud of his Irish ancestry and as President, I recognize the vital importance to our Nation and the western alliance of a peaceful, just and swift solution to current problems in Northern Ireland.

The United States will continue to urge the parties to come together for a just and peaceful solution. I pray and hope that the day will come when the tragedy of history which now afflicts Northern Ireland will be overcome by faith, the courage and the love of freedom and justice of the Irish.

We will continue to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence, for these cannot solve Northern Ireland's problems. I call on all Americans to question closely any appeal for financial or other aid from groups involved in this conflict to ensure that contributions do not end up in the hands of those who perpetuate violence, either directly or indirectly.

I add my personal prayers and the good offices of the United States to those Irish — and indeed to all world citizens — who wish fervently for peace and victory over those who sow fear and terror.

cc. P.S.M.
P.S.S.
Mr. Nugan
Mr. Whelan
Mr. Conroy

Gentry
28.7.

Statement from G.I.S.

Monday 27th July 1981.

On Saturday afternoon, 25th July, relatives of the hunger strikers requested a further meeting with the Taoiseach - the third to date.

Accordingly the Taoiseach accompanied by the Minister Designate for Foreign Affairs, - Prof. James Dooge, met relatives this afternoon and explained to them that, contrary to some reports last week, the Government has been continuing without interruption its efforts to seek a solution to the problem. The Taoiseach confirmed that the Government will continue to take action along those lines most likely to contribute to a settlement.

Draft of 27/7/81, for use in death *of* *either*
Doherty or Lynch (whichever first).

It should first be understood that the hunger strike is a crisis within a crisis. General conditions in Northern Ireland - economic, social and political - have steadily deteriorated in recent years. To the problems of a faltering economy and the highest unemployment rate in Europe must be added a marked political polarization between the two parts of the divided community, clearly shown in the District Council elections in May. The frustrations of direct rule are working their way to the surface. Moderates of all allegiances are discouraged. Ordinary people in both sections of the community have experienced suffering and misery on a heart-rending scale. The happiness and hopes of an entire generation of young people have been blighted by twelve years of crisis and disorder. After over two thousand deaths, violence and intimidation continue.

This is the background to the hunger strike, which is the latest method chosen by the Provisional IRA to exploit the prison crisis. The prison protest which began several years ago was, in the calculation of the Provisional IRA, intended to intensify their campaign outside the prison and the hunger strike weapon was in turn intended to intensify and raise the effects of the prison protest to a cruel and more dramatic level.

cc PSM
PSS
Mr. Whelan
Mr. Collins
A. ...

/.....

2.

It is hardly necessary to describe in detail what the effects of the hunger strike have been in this country and abroad. We have seen in both parts of the island how the hunger strike generates propaganda which simultaneously not only appeals to extremists but also gains support from those who are moved by the loss of young lives and the bereavement of families.

Regrettably we in this part of the country have also experienced a disgraceful upsurge of violence, destruction of property and intimidation associated with the events in the Maze prison.

Abroad we have witnessed further propaganda gains by the Provisional IRA and associated groups. Most significantly in the USA the commendable concern of many Americans about the crisis has been paralleled in certain circles by an increase in contribution destined for the coffers of the Provisional IRA.

One point is lamentably clear: the only beneficiaries in Ireland or abroad of what is happening are the men and women of violence.

When in Opposition the problem of Northern Ireland was a priority and accordingly we strongly supported the efforts of our predecessors in this regard.

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We assumed office at a time when the European Commission of Human Rights had made efforts to assist in a solution and when the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace had done a very great deal of work towards the same end. On our first day in office we urged on the British Government that the initiative of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace be facilitated. After some delay this was accepted. We have throughout been satisfied that the Commission's document, given to the British authorities on 6th July, after very full discussion with both them and the prisoners and representing a detailed description of an improved regime after the strike ended, formed an adequate basis for a solution that conceded no basic principles. We urged that it should be the subject of clarification to the hunger strikers in a simple and positive manner by a British official; we urged the view that any approach should be timely to be effective. I have to record that the response to our representations was neither as prompt nor as positive as we would have wished. In consequence an explanatory approach, by a N.I.O. official, was offered to the hunger strikers only at 2 a.m. on 21 July, three days after a statement had been issued ^{by the prisoners} reversing the conciliatory attitude shown on the 4th July and adopting a hard-line call for fresh negotiations on pre-conditions which were known to be unacceptable to the authorities. It was under these circumstances that the delayed British approach failed.

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I regret to say that it was clear from the handling of the problem by the British authorities that their assessment of the gravity of the situation created by the hunger strike did not correspond with ours and that they did not recognise the well-founded character of our concerns for the further consequences that would flow from its prolongation.

The responsibility for failure does not lie only with hesitation or delay on the part of the British. On the contrary, there is no doubt that intransigence was shown in another quarter just when it seemed likely that the British, however belatedly, were proposing to take an initiative. On the 18th July, a statement was issued to the press ^{by} rejecting previous efforts at mediation and calling for direct negotiations on the original five demands. I should add that this statement falsely alleged that the Irish Government had called on the British Government to initiate negotiations with the prisoners on the basis of the five demands.

It seems to me to be no accident that as the efforts of the Irish Government to help solve the crisis became more public, the efforts of the Provisional IRA leadership to obstruct a solution redoubled. The hardening of the IRA line thwarted the efforts of those who had pressed for a humanitarian solution. They included, at different times,
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the European Commission of Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace. In thwarting those efforts, the leadership of the Provisional IRA, far from saving lives, was once again facing all those concerned with a stark choice between total concession to their demands and the deaths of further hunger strikers.

A savage attack on the Garda Síochána was organised in Dublin on Saturday, 18 July.

Despite these events and taking into account the apparent acceptance that negotiation would not be insisted upon, ^{was not being made a precondition} contained in a statement signed by Mr. McFarlane on Saturday, 25 July, the efforts of the Government to help solve the impasse have continued and will continue. Besides its numerous contacts with non-governmental bodies and individuals of goodwill, this Government had almost daily contact about the hunger strike with the British Government since the evening of the 30th June. We have continued to press the British authorities to find solutions both in relation to the procedure for a settlement and in relation to putting before the prisoners details of a regime approximating to the ICSP proposals. Our efforts have yielded some progress but so far no solution. Thus we share the sense of tragedy and

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frustration felt by the great majority of those Irish men and women North and South who are concerned about the hunger strike. We share too their abhorrence of violence and, like them, we reject absolutely the claim that this death or any other tragedy should be the pretext for acts of hatred or vengeance.

The Government refuses to believe that a solution cannot be found even at this stage. Thus, despite the demands from many who are themselves under great strain, we will not make emotional gestures, the effect of which would inevitably make it more difficult if not impossible for us to contribute further to a solution. On the other hand, we take encouragement from the conciliatory statement of 26 July of the Rev. Martin Smyth which answers, at least partly, any justification claimed for inaction by the British Government on the grounds of possible Unionist reaction. Even if the situation were without hope, which it is not, the Government would fulfill its moral obligation to continue its efforts responsibly and energetically.

It is our hope that the hunger strike crisis will be solved by an end to the cruel manipulation of the strike through the adoption of inconsistent and intermittently hard-line positions by the Provisional IRA and by a

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greater show of commitment and flexibility on the part of the British authorities. For our part, disappointment at this latest setback to our hopes will not deter us from renewing our efforts to help find a solution before more young lives are thrown away and more deaths occur in the streets of Northern Ireland.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

July 23, 1981

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have your letter of July 14 concerning the situation in Northern Ireland and the possible death of yet another fasting prisoner. I appreciate the depth of concern which prompted your letter and want you to know how sorrowfully I, along with millions of other Americans, view this tragic conflict.

Throughout the period of the hunger strike, we have made clear our regret at the deaths it has brought about, including those persons innocently caught up in the violence it has engendered. The recent deaths of Mr. Martin Hurson and Mr. Joseph McDonnell were all the more tragic at a time when it appeared that a way might be found to resolve this issue. I sincerely hope that the hunger strike can be brought to a peaceful conclusion with an end to the violence in Northern Ireland.

While the U.S. does not intend to intervene directly in the current situation in Northern Ireland, U.S. policy and my own personal feelings as expressed in my St. Patrick's Day statement are well known to the British Government.

I share your hope that the deep and longstanding division of Northern Ireland can at last be bridged by the good will and compromises of reasonable men and women on both sides.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Garret FitzGerald, T.D.
Prime Minister of Ireland
Dublin

cc. PSM
PSS
M. Nuyta
M. Wheeler
M. [unclear]

Note

Mr. Neligan was informed (on Saturday evening 25 July) by Mr. Hourican (who had received the information from Mr. Canning of Dungannon) that Fr. Toner had a piece of paper signed by Brendan McFarlane, as follows

If NIO officials were to talk to us we will talk to them (meaningful dialogue) i.e. if their purpose is to clarify we will listen and pose questions. If they rule out negotiations for a settlement then it is blatantly obvious that negotiations will not take place.

(Signed) B. McFarlane
Witness T. Toner.

(Text may not be completely accurate).

Mr. Neligan conveyed this to Ambassador Figg at 10.30 p.m. on 25 July. The Ambassador's reaction was that it was "totally phoney". Asked to convey the information, he was reluctant, in view also of the late hour. Mr. Neligan argued him out of this line and told him we wished him to stress the importance of the development. The Ambassador said he regarded the method of communication as "weasly" ... McFarlane could communicate through the Governor. He would however pass on our message and report the Taoiseach's interest.

In the course of the conversation the Ambassador expressed considerable resentment at the fact that Canning had told the NIO that he (Figg) had said (in a conversation with the Minister-Designate?) that McFarlane could be accommodated at talks with the prisoners. He had not said this.

Mr. Neligan, who left for London on 26 July, will record his own note of these events on his return.



Secretary
27 July 1981

cc

PSM /
Mr. Neligan ✓
Mr. Keenan ✓ D/T
Mr. Hittler ✓ D/T
Mr. Whelan ✓
Mr. Burke ✓

Am intoshed

In response to a query to Mr. Tatham of the British Embassy he gave the following information on Doherty and Lynch:-

Doherty:

Condition stable, shows no sign of death; report in this morning's media about deafness etc. was "not their impression".

Lynch:

Irregular heart beat yesterday now stabilized.

Neither prisoner is as yet comotose. Both prisoners should be "all right for another two to three days".



Michael Collins

27 July 1981

c.c. PSM
PSS
Mr. Neligan
Mr. Burke
Mr. Whelan
Mr. Lillis
Mr. Kirwan

Note

Minister-Designates conversation with British Ambassador
on 25 July 1981

1. The British Ambassador having indicated at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday, 25 July that he had received a telegram in reply to his transmission on 24 July to London of the points made to him on 24 July by the Minister Designate concerning the hunger-strike, the Minister Designate agreed to receive the Ambassador at his private residence in Monkestown at 3.30 p.m.
2. The Ambassador referred to the message he had received as a "debating telegram". His own message the previous day had reached London in time to be considered at an NIO-FCO meeting and Mr. Atkins had been consulted in Belfast about the terms of reply. The following points were made by the Ambassador in response to the points in the Minister-Designates speaking note of 24 July:-
 - McFarlane's alleged statement of his willingness to participate passively in a meeting of the "conference" (hunger-strikers, relatives, priests, NIO officials) had not been "confirmed" as we suggested by the NIO whose only information came from press reports.
 - No request had been received from the prisoners for a meeting on the basis proposed (that McFarlane should be present as an observer). In regard to McFarlane the British authorities, made the following points:-
 - a) they did not feel that they had taken account of McFarlane's statements in the way we had suggested they had. They did not accord any status to McFarlane in practice or otherwise. Having him present but apart would not meet their position.
 - b) If McFarlane were admitted to a "conference" meeting on the understanding that he would remain silent, as now purportedly proposed, the British would have to break off the meeting if he spoke, thereby giving him the power to cut short the discussions at any time, which would be intolerable.
 - c) If the hunger-strikers really wished for clarification, then the presence of McFarlane would be unnecessary.
 - There is a gap of substance between the British position (vide Atkins's statements of 30 June and 8 July)

and that of the ICJP. This was so in respect of work and also affected association-although the prisoners perhaps understood what is on offer on association.

- A further point had already been made in Mrs. Thatcher's letter of 15 July but should be repeated, namely that the ICJP had all along underestimated the constraints placed on the British authorities by their determination to retain control of the prisons and what went on there.

3. The Minister-Designate offered some brief comments. On Mr. McFarlane's willingness to accept a role as observer, he enquired whether someone in the prison could not approach McFarlane directly and seek confirmation of the attitude which had been attributed to him. Such confirmation might enable us to advance even a small bit.

4. On the matter of withholding any status from McFarlane, the Minister-Designate recalled the NIO statement at one stage that it was no use having a discussion because the prisoners were only willing to talk on the basis of the five demands. On that occasion the NIO accepted McFarlane's word as expressing the prisoner's views. No action was taken by the NIO because of what McFarlane had said - he was accepted as representing the prisoners. Any modus operandi which did not go beyond that degree of recognition should be used to make progress.

5. On McFarlane's having power to disrupt the proposed wider forum simply by speaking, the Minister-Designate considered that if McFarlane were present a limited number of questions from him should not be judged sufficient to bring about closure of the proceedings. Argumentative and disputatious questions tending towards negotiation could be ruled out. Alternatively the device of having McFarlane available nearby for contact by either side might be resorted to - this would not delay the proceedings. On the point that McFarlane's presence would be unnecessary if the prisoners really wanted clarification, the Minister-Designate put it that the weakness of the hunger-strikers precluded long discussions on their part even if only for purposes of clarification.

6. The Minister-Designate hoped that the British Government would not obstruct the wider type of meeting by insistence on McFarlane's absence. The Government desire to see a solution if at all possible. If McFarlane can be present as an observer or available nearby, this should be done in view of our strong desire, the consequences of no solution being found and the physical state of the hunger-strikers.

7. The Minister-Designate recalled what the Acting Minister and he had said in London on 10 July, that the consequences of continuance of the hunger-strike would be very severe for political stability here. We were concerned at the effect of the hunger-strikes on public opinion. Even people who acknowledged that the IRA are terrorists were taking a sympathetic attitude to the prisoners. It might be said that this was a suspension of the critical faculty on their part, but it was a political fact and the Government had to cope with it. They would do so as determinedly as they could, and would resolutely oppose the ideals of the IRA and their activities and would maintain security at the border and elsewhere.

A continuance of the hunger-strike would make that task much more difficult. That is why we were anxious to see a solution. The Government believe that a solution is possible without granting political status or relinquishing control of the prisons.

8. The Ambassador said he would report the next day to London. The Minister-De-Signate mentioned the question of Fathers Faul and Murray to say that, while we know the NIO were opposed to their inclusion in the "conference", our understanding was that this was no longer a factor for the prisoners and their relatives who were asking only for the attendance of parish priests. The Ambassador said he thought Father Faul would not be unwelcome and that his presence would not be a decisive objection if it were the only objection. He then took his leave.

D. M. Neligan
25 July 1981.

Note:

Call by British Ambassador to Department, 24 July 1981

1. Summoned by the Minister Designate, Ambassador Figg came to the Department at 3.00p.m. on 24 July. The Minister Designate spoke to the attached speaking note. In regard to the Canning initiative he added the remark that we believed the proposed wider meeting formula might not have been entirely Councillor Canning's idea but had emerged after talks with Blackwell of the N.I.O.
2. Before all the points we wished to make had been expressed, the Ambassador intervened to say the British authorities felt that McFarlane knew exactly what was on offer, that there was no need to clarify anything to him and that he wished to be there for quite another purpose namely to ensure refusal by the hunger strikers of any proposal short of the five demands. The Minister Designate stressed in reply that an opportunity nonetheless might exist to make progress and that it should not be ignored. Continuing with our points, he emphasised the importance of the manner, which should be positive, of presenting British clarification of a new regime to the prisoners.
3. The Ambassador quoted Canning's remark, reported in the Irish News, that the success of the "conference" meeting would depend on the authorities presenting something new, and associated this with McFarlane's quoted dismissal of the ICJP document as being a dilution of the five demands and therefore unacceptable. The Minister Designate referred to the swings of opinion that appeared to be reflected in various IRA statements and put it that the more positive swings, such as that of the 4th July, should be promptly utilised in the search for a solution. The Ambassador said a little sharply that it was now 24 July. He wondered whether McFarlane had really said what was attributed to him in the papers. The Minister Designate said efforts to explore and use the apparent opportunity must be made very rapidly. The Taoiseach had asked him to say that the Government was hard pressed on this issue.

The Ambassador undertook to report fully on our views. He then expressed his puzzlement at recent press reports. There seemed to be "pointers pointing in every direction at once". He had to say how dismayed he had been by Stewart Dalby's report in the Financial Times of 23 July, especially since enquiry by the Embassy had elicited the "astonishing" claim from Dalby that his source was the Taoiseach himself. He was very reluctant to believe that this could be so but had felt he had to report the matter to London. The Minister Designate at once denied Dalby's claim strongly. He indicated that he knew who had spoken to the journalist, who had abused his confidence by publishing the report. The person in question had apologised to the Taoiseach - IPSO fact he was not the Taoiseach. The Ambassador expressed relief and said he would see to it that his telegram on the subject was ignored and suppressed. Referring to puzzlement about press reports in general, the Minister Designate said that reliance could be placed in today's Irish newspapers' reports on the Government's stance.

5. The Minister Designate then used point 9 in his speaking note relating to concealment from us of information about the Duke of Norfolk's visit to the Maze. He pointed out that this concealment occurred at a particular stage on Wednesday evening when we were attempting to make a full assessment of the whole situation so as to advise the Taoiseach on whether or not he should make a statement on the H-blocks in the Dail on Thursday, 23 July before the recess. We were concerned at the incident. We did not know whether the visit itself was important or unimportant but we hoped we could rely on full information on matters relating to the prison crisis. The Ambassador said he was very sorry about what had happened which was very "stupid". He felt sure the visit was unimportant and it had simply not occurred to someone in the N.I.O. to mention it when talking to us. He himself had not known of the visit until he read about it in that day's newspapers (24th).
6. The Minister Designate in conclusion referred again to press coverage to repeat that the Taoiseach had not seen Dalby and to say that Northern Ireland matters were being handled by the Taoiseach personally, by the Taoiseach's Department and by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Information emanating from other sources about this policy area should be ignored.

Draft Speaking note for meeting with British Ambassador

24 July 1981

1. It appears from reports in the newspapers, which we were confirmed with the NIO, that the prisoner McFarlane is now prepared to accept an inactive role in the meeting between the hunger-strikers, their families and priests, on the one hand, and British officials on the other which has been proposed by Mr. Canning of Dungannon.
2. This in our view constitutes an opportunity to make progress towards a settlement which should be explored and exploited without delay.
3. McFarlane's position was previously discussed with the Ambassador last Sunday. We then expressed the view that to rule out meetings because McFarlane would be there was too strict an interpretation of what was inadmissible when not only two lives but relations between two Governments were at stake.
4. That was our view at a time when McFarlane was adopting an intransigent line. Now that he was by all accounts being conciliatory, we put forward our view all the more strongly.
5. The question of recognising the status of McFarlane had been raised and on that subject we have three remarks to make:-
 - a) The British authorities may not recognise that McFarlane has any status - and we accept the reason for this - but at the same time they attach in practice considerable importance to what he does and says and indeed appear to take tactical policy decisions on the basis of McFarlane's attitude.
 - b) Participation as an observer in a meeting, can be conceded de facto to McFarlane (seizing the opportunity presented by his current stance) without according

to him any particular status. This could be made publicly clear if or when the need to "recover lost ground" were to arise after a failure to reach a settlement.

- c) The manner of McFarlane's participation might also be considered in terms of his being a little apart from the hunger strikers or even in an adjoining room.

6. The British authorities ought therefore in our view to find it possible to arrange a meeting including McFarlane and to make to it a new presentation of its position regarding prison conditions after the end of the hunger strike.

7. The presentation to be made, as we had repeatedly stressed in the past, should approximate as closely as possible to that worked out on 6 July by the ICJP and Minister of State Alison.

8. Very rapid action was clearly essential given the state of health of Doherty and Lynch and the consequences for both our Governments, and for relations between us, of further deaths and an avoidable continuation of the hunger strike.

9. On another matter, that of the regular and prompt transmission to us of information about all aspects of the crisis, which we had more than once requested in the past, we wish to say that information about the visit to the Maze by the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Elton, about which we had heard through other channels, had been concealed from us by the NIO on 22 July.

IMMEDIATE

TO HQ
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY NELIGAN

FROM LONDON
FROM MINISTER

24/7/81 1821
ZB

MMMLKJHG

1. I HAD DINNER AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS LAST NIGHT WITH MR TOM ARNOLD, M.P., PARLIAMENTARY PRIVATE SECRETARY TO MR. ATKINS. ARNOLD IS CLOSE TO ATKINS AND I HAVE FOUND HIM ONE OF THE MOST COMMUNICATIVE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND MINISTERS. HE INVITED ME TO DINNER BECAUSE, HE SAID, HE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO TURN DOWN TWO RECENT INVITATIONS TO MY HOUSE. FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY ARNOLD IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION.

2. I SAID THAT PUTTING THE STATEMENTS BY THE ICJP AND MR ATKINS X SIDE BY SIDE, THE GREATEST DIVERGENCES APPEARED TO RELATE TO THE AREAS OF WORK AND REMISSION. ARNOLD REPLIED THAT THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM WAS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION BECAUSE IT RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION OF WHO RAN THE PRISONS. THE PRACTICAL ISSUE WAS HOW BRENDAN MAC FARLANE GOT FROM POINT A TO POINT B AND UNDER WHAT SUPERVISION. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ADJACENT WINGS INVOLVED CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF THE MAZE AND RAISED IMPORTANT QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SAFETY OF THE WARDERS AND THE SECURITY OF THE JAIL, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF WARDERS AND THE ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED TO CONTROL GROUPS OF PRISONERS TWICE THE PRESENT SIZE. ALL OTHER ISSUES WERE OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. SOME MOVEMENT WAS POSSIBLE ON REMISSION AND WORK WAS IMPORTANT IN SO FAR AS IT AFFECTED ASSOCIATION. A FURTHER CONCESSION WAS POSSIBLE IN RELATION TO CLOTHING: IT COULD NOT BE MADE GRATUITOUSLY BUT ONLY AS PART OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. MOVEMENT ON CLOTHING WOULD NOT BE EASY TO SELL TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARTLY BECAUSE EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS INVOLVED AND COULD SEE THAT, IN THIS REGARD, THE PRISON REGIME IN NORTHERN IRELAND WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF BRITAIN. ARNOLD MENTIONED THAT IT IS PROPOSED TO MOVE THE PRISONERS AT PRESENT IN COMPOUNDS INTO CELLS (I THOUGHT HE SAID LATER THIS YEAR) AND THAT THIS MOVE WOULD CREATE ITS OWN PROBLEMS.

3. ARNOLD SAID THAT, APART FROM ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER MAIN PROBLEM WAS WHO WAS IN A POSITION TO MAKE COMMITMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PROVISIONALS. WAS IT THE PRISONERS OR WAS IT THE LEADERSHIP OUTSIDE THE PRISON? ONE OF THEIR PRINCIPAL FEARS WAS THAT THEY MIGHT AGREE TO PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AND WHICH MIGHT BE DISOWNED, POSSIBLY IN A MATTER OF HOURS, BY ONE SIDE OF THE PROVISIONALS OR THE OTHER.

4. ARNOLD WENT ON TO SAY THAT MR ATKINS ACCEPTED THAT FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BRING THE HUNGER STRIKES TO AN END BUT: (A) THE SCOPE FOR SUCH CONCESSIONS WAS LIMITED; (B) THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN AS PART OF A PROGRAMME OF PENAL REFORM; AND (C) THE BRITISH WOULD NEED TO BE SURE THAT ANY CONCESSIONS WOULD BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. AT THE LAST OF HIS WEEKLY MEETINGS WITH CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHERS, MR ATKINS HAD INDICATED THAT FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY: WHILE THE MPS' REACTION HAD BEEN NEGATIVE, IT HAD NOT BEEN UNMANAGEABLE. HE THOUGHT THE NIO WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SPELLING OUT IN DETAIL WHAT A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A PRISONER WOULD BE UNDER THE NEW REGIME.

5. ARNOLD SAID THAT CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL IMPRESSION, DECISIONS ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND WERE MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD, OF COURSE, TO BE BROUGHT ALONG AND THIS TOOK TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE REPORTS BEING RECEIVED FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WERE DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL AND WERE HAVING THE OPPOSITE EFFECT TO THAT INTENDED. THE MORE AMBASSADOR HENDERSON REPORTED ON THE ADVERSE REACTIONS TO BRITISH POLICY IN THE US, THE MORE DETERMINED THE PRIME MINISTER BECAME. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER MET HENDERSON RECENTLY (IN OTTAWA) SHE BERATED HIM (IN THE EARLY MORNING) ABOUT US ATTITUDES AS IF THEY WERE HIS FAULT. THERE WAS A SENSE IN WHICH US REACTIONS WERE MR ATKINS' PRINCIPAL PROBLEM. HENDERSON HAD RECENTLY REPORTED THAT MICHAEL ALISON HAD RECEIVED A "HOSTILE RECEPTION" FROM THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND GROUP. ALISON ON HIS RETURN WAS SURPRISED THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN DESCRIBED IN THESE TERMS BUT, AT THAT STAGE, THE HARM HAD BEEN DONE. ARNOLD WAS CURIOUS ABOUT WHY WE HAD CHOSEN TO RAISE THE HUNGER STRIKES WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN KNOWING, AS HE SAID, THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY GIVEN HIS KNOWN VIEWS ON TERRORISM. HE SAID THAT THE EXERCISE HAD BEEN USEFUL TO THEM IN A ROUND-ABOUT WAY IN SO FAR AS THE PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO PRESS THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE MATTER HAD HELPED TO PLACATE HER.

6. ARNOLD SAID THAT APART FROM CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHERS THE MAIN POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS UPON THE GOVERNMENT CAME FROM THE LABOUR PARTY AND FROM THE PRISON OFFICERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. CONCANNON, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF FOOT, WAS FOLLOWING A STRONG LAW AND ORDER LINE OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT. THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT LOOK BEHIND THE POSITION OF THE LABOUR PARTY LEADERSHIP TO THE VIEWS OF FACTIONS WITHIN THE LABOUR PARTY WHO TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW. HE DID NOT RESPOND WHEN I ASKED ABOUT POSSIBLE AMBIVALENCE ON THE PART OF LOYALIST POLITICIANS.

7. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE HUNGER STRIKERS THEMSELVES MIGHT DECIDE TO SUSPEND THE STRIKE. ARNOLD REPLIED THAT THE HUNGER STRIKERS WERE TOTALLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE PRISON. EVEN IF ONE OR TWO OF THEM BROKE OFF THE HUNGER STRIKE, IT WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE. IN REGARD TO THE RED CROSS, HE SAID THAT ONE OF HIS "NIGHTMARES" WAS THAT THE SWISS WOULD GO HOME AND SAY THAT THE MAZE WAS THE BEST PRISON IN EUROPE - I TOOK THIS TO MEAN THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO SAY ANYTHING OF THE KIND.

8. I MADE THE POINTS THAT: (A) APPEARANCES WERE IMPORTANT AND A MAJOR DIFFICULTY WAS THE UNIVERSAL BELIEF THAT THE BRITISH SIDE WAS BEING INFLEXIBLE; (B) THE FACT WAS THAT THE BRITISH HAD NOT TAKEN US INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE. I, FOR EXAMPLE, THOUGH GENERALLY WELL INFORMED, HAD NOT APPRECIATED UNTIL NOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH FREE ASSOCIATION WAS THE OVER-RIDING PROBLEM. OF GREATER IMPORTANCE HAD BEEN THE CONSISTENT FAILURE OF THE BRITISH AIDE TO TAKE OUR POINT OF VIEW INTO ACCOUNT. FOR THAT REASON, THEIR RECENT ACTION IN SENDING OFFICIALS INTO THE JAIL IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST WAS A WELCOMED DEVELOPMENT; (C) IT WAS ANOMALOUS TO TALK

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ON THE ONE HAND OF A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO HAVE A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF UNDERSTANDING AND EVEN OF COMMUNICATION IN RELATION TO THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL PROBLEM CURRENTLY AFFECTING ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS. ARNOLD SAID THAT HE TOOK THE POINT I WAS MAKING AND WOULD RAISE IT WITH MR ATKINS. HE ASKED HOW I THOUGHT THEY MIGHT PROCEED. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MATTER BUT THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER HAVING A WORD WITH DERMOT NALLY ABOUT IT WHEN HE IS HERE ON MONDAY.

9. I WENT ON TO STRESS AGAIN THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE JOINT STUDIES AND THE HUNGER STRIKE AND SAID THAT, AT EVEN THE BEST OF TIMES, IT WOULD BE A TASK OF GREAT COMPLEXITY, GIVEN OUR DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES, TO AGREE ON A COMMON PROGRAMME OF ACTION. ARNOLD RESPONDED THAT THE UK HAD NO OBJECTIVES IN REGARD TO NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE SAME SENSE AS WE HAD. THEIR APPROACH WAS TYPICALLY BRITISH AND PRAGMATIC. THEY STARTED FROM THE POINT THAT THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WAS NEEDED BEFORE ANY CHANGES COULD TAKE PLACE AND THEY RECOGNISED THAT REALISTICALLY THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF COERCING THE UNIONISTS INTO SOMETHING AGAINST THEIR WILL. HE WENT ON TO ~~DERIDE~~ DERIDE THE RHETORICAL EXERCISE IN WHICH THE LABOUR PARTY HAD BEEN ENGAGED HOLDING BOTH THAT THE UNIONISTS SHOULD NOT HAVE A VETO ON POLITICAL PROGRESS WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND THAT ANY CHANGES NEEDED CONSENT. THIS WAS A POLICY WHICH WENT AROUND IN A CIRCLE AND IT COULD BE TAKEN THAT THE LABOUR PARTY IN GOVERNMENT WOULD FOLLOW THE SAME POLICY AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

10. ARNOLD ALSO MADE THE GENERAL POINT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS NEEDED EACH OTHER, THAT CLOSER RELATIONS WERE INDISPENSABLE AND THAT COOPERATION WAS NECESSARY IF PROGRESS WAS TO BE MADE.

11. THE BRITISH ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICAL PARTIES WILL AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THE PROPOSED ADVISORY COUNCIL. PAISLEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN HIS ASSENT AND THE SDLP, ARNOLD SAID, WOULD BE FOOLISH NOT TO TAKE PART. THE OFFICIAL UNIONISTS WANTED STORMONT BACK AND MOLYNEAUX WAS CURRENTLY TALKING TO MR ATKINS. HOWEVER, THE PARTY WAS DIVIDED AND THE RR POWERFUL INFLUENCE OF ENOCH POWELL WAS BEING EXERTED AGAINST TAKING PART.

12. CONCLUSIONS: ARNOLD'S PRINCIPAL MESSAGE WAS THAT THE BRITISH ARE NOT INFLEXIBLE ON THE HUNGER STRIKES AND THAT THERE IS A LIMITED SCOPE FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE BRITISH SEEK A SOLUTION AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. IT IS, HOWEVER, THE FIRST INDICATION THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED HERE OF A DISPOSITION ON THE BRITISH SIDE TO BRING THE STRIKES TO AN END. SECOND, THERE WAS A CLEAR INDICATION OF BRITISH INTEREST IN THE CONTINUANCE OF THE JOINT STUDIES PROCESS BUT ON THE BASIS THAT IT WOULD FOCUS ON PRACTICAL BILATERAL MATTERS. IT MAY BE IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO STRESS THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE HUNGER STRIKES AND THE JOINT STUDIES PROCESS SINCE THE FORMER ARE AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF INTERNAL PROBLEM WHICH THE BRITISH WOULD WISH TO EXCLUDE FROM DISCUSSION IN JOINT STUDIES PROCESS. THIRDLY, THERE WAS A RECOGNITION OF OUR INFLUENCE IN NORTH AMERICA.

END

PD 24/7/81
TIME# 1813
25300G ESTR EI
916104 IVERNA G

Minister-Designate

The British Ambassador will come to your Office at 3.00 p.m. today as requested.

I attach a note of my conversation with an official of the NIO this morning. I also attach a record of your conversation with Ambassador Figg on 19 July when the question of the status of the prisoner McFarlane was referred to. A copy of the report in today's Irish Times reporting that McFarlane is now content to play an inactive role in a meeting of hunger-strikers, families and priests is also attached.

As regards the other subject which you wished to touch on with the Ambassador, the failure of the N.I.O. to inform us of the visit made by the Duke of Norfolk to the Maze on 22 July, the facts are that after the Taoiseach disclosed to us at about 6.00 p.m. that day his information that Norfolk and Lord Elton had made the visit, I telephoned Wyatt to raise this matter (and other points). During the conversation I posed at least three questions that would have given my interlocutor the chance to mention the visit. (Had there been any significant developments? Had there been any significant visits to the Prison? Were only relatives and clergy visiting the Prison that day? Had N.I.O. Ministers taken any initiatives that day?). He concealed in his replies to these questions that the visit we knew about had taken place.

From time to time since the hunger strikes began we have confirmed to the British the importance of keeping us informed about developments. We have made the point that the Government here is arguably under more pressure on the subject of the hunger strike than the British Government, and have asked for a full and rapid flow of information. They do give us some account of developments, notably in regard to the decline and death of hunger strikers. However it is in general the case that not much other information reaches us spontaneously, and we generally have to look for it. It is difficult to assess the importance of the Duke of Norfolk's visit, which to judge by statements he

made on N.I. BBC this morning may simply be another piece of Basil Humery aimed at producing from an imposing Catholic source the opinion that a hunger strike death is suicide. Important or not, an attempt was apparently made to conceal from us the fact of his visit.

We are preparing a speaking note for use when you see Ambassador Figg.



D.M. Neligan

24 July 1981

Note:

I telephoned Mr. Wyatt, Under-Secretary, N.I.O on 24 July, and raised with him the reports that MacFarlane, the Provisional I.R.A. "leader" in the H-Blocks had said that he was prepared to play a minor and apparently passive role in a meeting between British Officials, the Hunger-Strikers, their relatives and spiritual advisers. I said that we found this more conciliatory position interesting and expressed the hope that it would be followed up by the British authorities.

Wyatt said that they approached with caution remarks of this kind which are floated by I.R.A. spokesmen and often denied later. One has to be watchful and not take these statements at their facevalue.

I remarked that when the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace had been in contact with the Hunger-Strikers, contacts with MacFarlane had also been facilitated and he had been in an adjoining room or in the corridor outside and easily accessible at various times during those talks. This suggested an approach which might well prove fruitful if followed again particularly in association with a larger meeting of the kind proposed by Mr. Canning.

Wyatt replied that the position of the I.C.J.P. and that of the Government were very different. It was necessary to steer a line between withholding concession on a major matter such as recognition of MacFarlane's supposed status and allowing progress to be made. The NIO felt that they were steering such a line in letting MacFarlane talk for an hour with the Hunger-Strikers after Belloch's visit (he did not stipulate which visit, 15 or 21 July) and in letting MacFarlane talk directly to the ICJP. Wyatt added that while the Canning idea for Hunger-Strikers, relatives and priests to get together was potentially useful they felt that Mr. Canning himself made a point when (as quoted in the Irish News) he said that the arrangement would only serve a purpose if the British authorities had something different to say. There isn't anything different to say, said Wyatt, and a fundamental gulf on the

essential issues of work and association remains.

He expanded for sometime on these matters but was essentially repeating the British point that prisoners in the final analysis must do work that was assigned to them and that association could not involve more than two adjoining wings with celldoors closed. He incidentally acknowledged that clothing would not perhaps ultimately prove difficult.

I repeated our fundamental point that MacFarlane had now apparently taken up a more conciliatory position. There are periodic swings in the attitudes expressed by the IRA spokesmen and the prisoners. Hardline positions were regularly succeeded by suggestions of a softer line. We were now in the presence of what looked like a softer line and the opportunity could surely not be neglected to see whether or not it was genuine. The existence of the slightest opportunity of this sort was of great interest to our Government given the gravity of the problem and its effects. We would be very reluctant to believe that this opportunity should be ignored.

Wyatt replied that the main consideration in the British view was the outcome of any approach to the Hunger-Strikers. In the case of failure the British would be left just as they are now except for having given a status to Mc Farlane which had never up to now been accorded to him.

I said that status was surely a question of degree. Diplomatically people could be and frequently were admitted to talks without their been accorded the full status of participants. Perhaps MacFarlane could be admitted to the passive role he would now apparently be satisfied with. While the NIO would make it publicly clear that his presence did not represent recognition by the that he held any particular position. Something could surely be "fudged" so that the change of success which now seemed to exist would be taken up, but any ground lost towards MacFarlane in the process could subsequently be recovered?

Mr. Wyatt assured me that they are not going to ignore any opportunity. They would look for evidence that what he had described as a "swing" in this case was genuine. In conclusion he had to say however, that they did not see from all the contacts which they had pursued that the Hunger-Strikers and their supporters saw the strike as ending otherwise than on the basis of the five demands been conceded.


D.M. Neligan

24 July 1981

Note by the Secretary on Meeting between Minister Designate and the
British Ambassador, 19 July, 1981.

Ambassador Figg called on Professor Dooge at 12.30 p. m. on 19 July and handed him the Note attached. After reading the Note, Professor Dooge said that the Note referred to the fact that the protestors were calling for negotiations. Our Note of yesterday was not backing a call for negotiations, it was a renewal of our repeated call for a senior official of the Northern Ireland Office to visit the prison for the purpose of clarification and that this clarification should be positive and not merely a re-reading of statements or answering of questions. Professor Dooge said he had stressed this point to Sir Ian Gilmore in his second conversation with him last week. We feel, he said, that there should be a meaningful exchange of views.

The Ambassador said that the hunger-strikers had been told that Blellock would go in anytime.

Professor Dooge said his second point was that for the past 24 hours the main difficulty seemed to be whether the official would meet the eight only or the eight with McFarlane.

The Ambassador said he had been told earlier in the morning that if McFarlane was chairing a meeting this would be negotiations.

Professor Dooge agreed that this seemed to be the position of the British Government, our view is that it is too strict an interpretation when not only were two lives at stake, but also relations between the two Governments. He referred to the stress under which the hunger-strikers are and their decline in health and asked whether they should not have a person with them to assist in clarification. The Minister agreed that McFarlane, if present, might not have as his main objective to be helpful, but if this question were regarded as so serious, if his presence or absence would make such a difference to the British Government, then we would feel that this brings us back to the description of rigidity and inflexibility on the part of the British Government.

The Ambassador said he would convey this - he felt there was no point in arguing.

Professor Dooge, concluding, said the views he had expressed were also those of the Taoiseach with whom he had been in constant touch. The position was a serious one. Since 8 July and last week also there had been delays on matters which we do not think are matters of principle - even though the action we request might or might not lead to a solution - and if this continued it could not but have a serious effect on our relations.

The interview then came to an end, at about 12.40 p. m.

***Newspaper
article(s)/cutting(s)
have not been copied***

Draft Speaking note for meeting with British Ambassador

24 July, 1981

1. It appears from reports in the newspapers, which we have confirmed with the NIO, that the prisoner McFarlane is now prepared to accept an inactive role in the meeting between the hunger-strikers, their families and priests, on the one hand, and British officials on the other which has been proposed by Mr. Canning of Dungannon.

in our view

2. This constitutes an opportunity to make progress towards a settlement which should be explored and exploited without delay.

3. McFarlane's position ~~was~~ ^{was} previously ~~discussed~~ discussed with the Ambassador last Sunday. We then expressed the view that to rule out meetings because McFarlane would be there was too strict an interpretation of what was inadmissible when not

only two lives and relations between two Governments were at stake.

4. That was our view at a time when Mr Farlane was adopting an intransigent line. Now that he is by all accounts being conciliatory, we put forward our view all the more strongly.

5. The question of recognising the status of Mr Farlane had been raised and on that subject we have three remarks to make:-

a) The British authorities may not recognise ^{that} Mr Farlane has any status — and we accept the lesson for this — but at the same time they attach in practice considerable importance to what he does and says and indeed appear to ~~participate~~ take tactical policy decisions on the basis of Mr Farlane's attitude.

b) Participation as an observer in a meeting can be conceded de facto to Mr Farlane (seizing the opportunity

presented by his ~~current~~ current stance) without according to him any particular status. This ^{could} ~~can~~ be made publicly clear if on when the need to "recover lost ground" ^{was to arise} ~~is~~ after a failure to ^{reach} ~~get~~ a settlement.

c) The manner of Mr Farlane's participation ^{might also} ~~should~~ be considered in terms of his being a little apart from the hunger strikers even in an adjoining room.

6. The British authorities ought therefore in our view find it possible to arrange a meeting including Mr Farlane and to make to it a new presentation of its position regarding prison conditions after the end of the hunger strike.

7. The presentation to be made, as we had repeatedly stressed in the past, should approximate as closely as possible to that worked out on 6 July

by the ICJP and Minister of State Atison.

Every rapid action was clearly essential given the state of health of Doherty and Lynch and the consequences for both our Governments, and for relations between us, of further deaths and an ^{avoidable} continuation of the hunger strike.

9. On another matter, that of the regular and prompt transmission to us of information about all aspects of the crisis, which we had more than once requested in the past, we had to ~~complain~~ complain that information about the visit to the Maze by the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Eltor, about which we had heard through other channels, had been concealed from us by the N.I.O. on 22 July.

Draft Statement on Anglo-Irish relations
and the Hunger-Strike.

I wish to place on record in the Dáil before the recess the Government's views on the situation in Northern Ireland, with particular reference to the agonising problem of the hunger-strike in Maze prison.

It should first be understood that the hunger strike is a crisis within a crisis. General conditions in Northern Ireland, economic, social and political, have steadily deteriorated in recent years. To the problems of a faltering economy and the highest unemployment rate in Europe must be added a marked political polarization between the two parts of the divided community, clearly shown in the District Council elections in May. The frustrations of direct rule are working their way to the surface. Moderates of all allegiances are demoralised. Sickening violence and intimidation continue.

This is the background to the hunger strike, the terrain on which the Provisional I.R.A. has chosen to stage the gruesome prison drama.

I hardly need to describe in detail to the House what the effects of the hunger strike have been in this country and abroad. We have all seen the further raising of the level of inter-communal tensions, hatred and fear in Northern Ireland; the increase in support for paramilitary organisations; the violent street battles and continuing attacks on the security forces, and the cowardly crimes of terrorist intimidation. In our own part of the country, we have seen how the hunger strike generates propaganda which simultaneously appeals to the extreme and potentially violent element in society and to those who are moved by the loss of young lives and the bereavement of families. Regrettably we have also experienced a disgraceful upsurge of violence, destruction of property and intimidation associated with the events in the Maze prison. These intrusive developments led to the election to the Dáil of two prisoners, thus conferring upon the illegal interest which they represent a standing and a respectability which it would not otherwise enjoy.

Abroad we have witnessed further propaganda gains by the Provisional I.R.A. and associated groups. Most significantly in the U.S.A. the commendable concern of many Americans about the crisis has been paralleled in certain circles by an increase in contributions which have been shown beyond reasonable doubt to be destined for the coffers of the Provisional I.R.A.

I believe all Deputies will recognise that my description of the situation precipitated by the hunger strike is factual. These are the effects of the crisis which we face. One point is lamentably clear; the only beneficiary of what is happening is the I.R.A.

Let us now consider the other party to the confrontation, the British Government,, I may say at the outset that the Government agree with the British authorities on two points in its approach to the hunger strike, that political status should not be accorded to the prisoners and that control of the jail should not be handed over to the prisoners.

The Government lost no time in taking up and pursuing discussions with the British Government after we assumed office. I regret to say that we found the British authorities did not share our assessment of the situation created by the prison crisis, nor our fears for the consequences of its continuation. They did not therefore share our sense of the urgency of a solution. We pressed for the rôle of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace to be accepted; we urged that the Commission's conclusions, elaborated after very full discussion with both the authorities and the prisoners and representing a detailed description of an improved régime after the strike ended, should be the subject of clarification by a British official to the hunger strikers; we urged the view that any approach must be timely to be effective. I have to record that the response to our representations was neither as prompt nor as positive as we would have wished. In consequence the clarificatory approach to the prisoners we had so repeatedly requested of the British Government was only to take place at a stage when the prisoners, or at least spokesmen for the organisation of which they are members, had adopted a hard-line call for fresh negotiations on pre-conditions

which were known to be unacceptable to the authorities. Not surprisingly, the delayed British approach failed.

We regret that these delays took place.
[The fault does not lie entirely with the British. Far from it.]

Answer

[In fact,] there is no doubt that the greater intransigence was shown in another quarter during the past several days, just when it seemed likely that the British, however belatedly, were proposing to take an initiative. It was at this point that statements were issued to the press purporting to come from the prisoners themselves, rejecting previous efforts at mediation and calling for direct negotiations on the five demands.

In other words, a dramatic hardening of the IRA line thwarted the efforts of those, ourselves included, who believed that it was necessary that the British should send an official into the prison to explain what was on offer. In thwarting those efforts, the leadership of the Provisional IRA was ensuring the death of Kieran Doherty. Last Saturday, the same people were organising an attack in Dublin on the Gárda Síochána. It is not surprising to learn that, since then they have made it clear that a part of their strategy is to create a political crisis in the South which would bring their cause to the attention of world opinion and that their objective in Northern Ireland is to use the impact of the hunger strike crisis to destroy the courageous, moderate political entity which has virtually alone given hope of political progress to the minority.

facts ?

Let the Provisional IRA be aware that the people of this country and their leaders see through the strategy of the men of violence with all the cruelty and misery it envisages. Let them be clear that we are ready to confront them with all the resolution necessary. Before this election I said that in Government everyone would be clear where we stand on the safety of our people. There is no doubt in the minds of men and women of goodwill on that point. Let there be no doubt in the minds of the men and women of violence.

The continuance of the tragedy in the Maze prison may be in small part attributed to the failure and delay of Britain, but the main responsibility rests with the leadership of the Provisional IRA. We shall not be deterred by this set back from renewing our efforts to solve the crisis.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To: Taoiseach,

From: Liam Hourican.


Taoiseach,

Mrs. Bernadette Mc Aliskey telephoned to say that press reports indicating Government reaction to the visit by officials to the Maze, suggested that the Irish Government was now "going to side with the British Government when Kieran Doherty is about to die".

I pointed out that this was a quite unreasonable construction to put on what had been said. There had merely been an expression of limited satisfaction at the belated acceptance by the N.I.O. of one request which had been made from here.

There was no general approval of the British Government's handling of the affair. But, I pointed out, the Taoiseach had regretted the failure of Tuesday morning's visit which seemed to be attributable to unreasonable pre-conditions demanded by the prisoners.


Mrs. Mc Aliskey asked how did the Government know what had happened. I said this was the account we had received, and that it had not been seriously contradicted in any quarter. She said it must be difficult for the Government to know what went on when it would not talk "to the people who have the information." I said that if she wished to convey any information to me informally, I would undertake to pass it on.



22nd July, 1981.

Note

Smith of the British Embassy said that the condition of Doherty and Lynch today is very much as yesterday. They are both lucid and their condition is static. Short of a heart attack they are now expected to last at least another 24 hours. Smith emphasised that this did not mean that the British think that they are both going to die tomorrow.



M. Collins

22-7-81

11.45 a.m.

c.c. PSM

PSS

Mr. Neligan

Mr. Whelan

Note

Taoiseach's Department Mr. Murray informed of the above.

Draft 21/7/81

Intro: Condemnation of Provisionals; Criticism of British

The death of Kieran Doherty is a tragedy for his family. To ^{the} whom we extend the sympathy of all of us. It is also a setback to our efforts to promote good relations between the Governments and peoples of these islands. In that sense it is also a tragedy/.

This Government recognised that the continuation of the hunger strikes created tensions throughout Ireland which threatened the democracy of the Republic and damaged the already very strained relations between the two sections of the community in the North as well as the relations between North and South.

Also: Propaganda success for Provisionals.

As such, we gave to the solution of that crisis our highest priority. For several weeks we have made an unprecedented effort, working literally day and night with every available responsible body, to persuade the British Government to take what we believe to be the measures necessary to find a solution. Thus we urged the British Government to avail of the extraordinary opportunity for a solution created by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace whose efforts deserve the gratitude and admiration of all people of goodwill. The Commission succeeded, we believe, in creating a highly propitious atmosphere during which the prisoners themselves took a clearly more conciliatory approach in their letter of 4th July. The failure of the Commission's initiative arose principally we believe from a series of inexplicable delays and hesitations on the British side. As you are aware, they did not approach the hunger strikers until hours after one of their number Joe McDonnell had died. Nothing could have been more calculated to arouse the suspicions or to exacerbate the despair of people in that condition.

/

Clear Statement of why we became involved.

Since that moment, the Government has concentrated all its efforts on persuading the British Government to send an official to talk directly to the hunger strikers and to tell them simply and in practical terms what would and what would not be on offer following an end to the protest. We urge the British to act speedily and particularly not to wait until one or more hunger striker was at the point of death, when the suspicions, already deep, of the hunger strikers would be at their most acute.

Following yet another week of delays, during which the hopes of those closely concerned - notably the relatives of the hunger strikers - were successively raised and dashed several times, two officials of the Northern Ireland Office were finally sent into the Maze this morning, days after the death of Kieran Doherty had been ^{reported} regarded to be imminent. *Perhaps the British knew it was not imminent?* Their attempt to clarify the Government's position was rejected

It is with sadness that I now report to the House that the Government has not encountered on the British side either the sense of urgency we believe to be necessary to solve this crisis or an adequate appreciation of the very serious consequences that a continuation of the hunger strike has for this island, North and South. As a result, damage has been done to the quality of the relationship between the two countries.

is from entirely judging?

The fault does not lie ^{only?} entirely with the British. Far from it. In fact, there is no doubt that the greater intransigence was shown in another quarter during the past several days, just when it seemed likely that the British, however belatedly, were proposing to take an initiative. It was at this point that statements were ^{passed} passed to the press purporting to come from the prisoners themselves and setting pre-conditions for so-called negotiations which were known to be unacceptable to the British Government.

In other words, a serious attempt was mounted to thwart the efforts of those, ourselves included, who believed that it was necessary that the British should send an official into the prison to explain what was on offer. In seeking to thwart those efforts, the leadership of the Provisional IRA was ensuring the death of Kieran Doherty at the same time as they were organising an attack in Dublin on the Garda Síochána. It is not surprising to learn that, since then, they have made it clear that a part of their strategy is to create a political crisis in the South which would bring their cause to the attention of world opinion and that their objective in Northern Ireland is to use the impact of the hunger strike crisis to destroy the courageous, moderate political entity which has virtually alone given hope of political progress to the minority.

Let the Provisional IRA be aware that the people and their leaders see through the strategy of the men of violence with all the cruelty and misery it envisages. Let them be clear that we are ready to confront them with all our resources. Before this election I said that in Government everyone would be clear where we stand on the safety of our people. There is no doubt in the minds of men and women of goodwill on that point. Let there be no doubt in the minds of the men and women of violence. This tragic death need not have happened. It was caused by the failure and delay of Britain and the cruel malevolence of the leadership of the Provisional IRA. We shall not be ^{we} ~~detained~~ by this set back from renewing our efforts to solve the crisis.

Taoiseach's Suggestions: Necessary to -

1. Cover ourselves against charge of vulnerability to Provisional IRA.
2. Stress we did not support either political status, or, contrary to statement, negotiations.
3. Expose use of Provisionals of "^{Prisoner} torture statements", if possible.
4. Provisional intransigence grew with involvement of Irish Government.
Provisional intransigence grew with involvement of Irish Government.
5. We will defend our institutions against all difficulties whether caused by British or Provisionals.
6. End with rallying call to people to support institutions.

Note

The Taoiseach and Minister Designate met with officials on 20 July. After discussion, the Taoiseach gave the following directions:-

- A statement should be prepared for public use at an appropriate stage containing a positive and clear repetition of the message we have given repeatedly to the British Government in our efforts to get a solution to the H-Block hunger strike.
- Our Embassies abroad should be fully briefed on the same matters so that they would be in a position to brief the press and answer queries.
- The Embassies should be instructed to monitor opinion in their countries of accreditation and report back so as to enable us to assess when or whether or to what extent we should internationalise the problem.
- Following what was apprehended, the death of Doherty and Lynch, and the failure of our requests to the British to move, there should be full and mature evaluation of where we stand.
- The Ambassador in London might be recalled for consultations but not until after the royal wedding on 29 July which he should attend.


D.M. Neligan

20 July, 1981

N.I.O. Note for Press Briefing 21 July 1981

Northern Ireland Office officials visited the Maze during the night in order to clarify previous Government statements to the hunger-strikers because an indication had been received (contrary to previously expressed views) that this would be useful. They saw the relatives of two of the hunger-strikers and the five hunger-strikers in the prison hospital, however the hunger-strikers, when asked, did not wish to take up the offer.

received from British Association
(on response)

21.7.81

cc. Mr. M. M. M. M.
Mr. M. M. M.

[Signature]
21.7.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To: Taoiseach,

From: Liam Hourican.

Miss McKeown, one of the hunger striker's relatives who you met on Friday telephoned on Saturday night to make a vigorous protest about the behaviour of the Gardai at the British Embassy.

She claimed that her sister had been beaten into the ground and said she had no more faith in the Irish Government which was 'just using us'.

I undertook to convey her remarks to you.

Liam Hourican

20th July, 1981.

c.c.

- Mr. Nally,
- Mr. Nelligan,
- Mr. Kirwan,
- Mr. Lillis.
- Professor Dooge.

Note by the Secretary on Meeting between Minister Designate and the
British Ambassador, 19 July, 1981.

Ambassador Figg called on Professor Dooge at 12.30 p.m. on 19 July and handed him the Note attached. After reading the Note, Professor Dooge said that the Note referred to the fact that the protestors were calling for negotiations. Our Note of yesterday was not backing a call for negotiations, it was a renewal of our repeated call for a senior official of the Northern Ireland Office to visit the prison for the purpose of clarification and that this clarification should be positive and not merely a re-reading of statements or answering of questions. Professor Dooge said he had stressed this point to Sir Ian Gilmore in his second conversation with him last week. We feel, he said, that there should be a meaningful exchange of views.

The Ambassador said that the hunger-strikers had been told that Blellock would go in anytime.

Professor Dooge said his second point was that for the past 24 hours the main difficulty seemed to be whether the official would meet the eight only or the eight with McFarlane.

The Ambassador said he had been told earlier in the morning that if McFarlane was chairing a meeting this would be negotiations.

Professor Dooge agreed that this seemed to be the position of the British Government; our view is that it is too strict an interpretation when not only were two lives at stake, but also relations between the two Governments. He referred to the stress under which the hunger-strikers are and their decline in health and asked whether they should not have a person with them to assist in clarification. The Minister agreed that McFarlane, if present, might not have as his main objective to be helpful, but if this question were regarded as so serious, if his presence or absence would make such a difference to the British Government, then we would feel that this brings us back to the description of rigidity and inflexibility on the part of the British Government.

The Ambassador said he would convey this - he felt there was no point in arguing.

Professor Dooge, concluding, said the views he had expressed were also those of the Taoiseach with whom he had been in constant touch. The position was a serious one. Since 8 July and last week also there had been delays on matters which we do not think are matters of principle - even though the action we request might or might not lead to a solution - and if this continued it could not but have a serious effect on our relations.

The interview then came to an end, at about 12.40 p.m.

Handed to Professor Dooze by

British Ambassador

NOTE VERBALE

on Sunday 19 July 1981.

19/7/81

With reference to the Note Verbale of the Department of Foreign Affairs of 18 July about the hunger strike in the Maze prison, Her Majesty's Government would like to make the following points.

We agree that only paramilitaries would benefit from any bad effect in Anglo-Irish relations of any further deaths of hunger-strikers. To avoid such a situation it would be of great help if all concerned could continue appealing to the hunger-strikers to end their action.

The latest statement from the protesters calls for negotiations. That is not possible. If the British authorities allow negotiations now they will be faced with all manner of requests in future, with possible threats of further hunger strikes if negotiations are not again granted.

The British Government have made clear their readiness to clarify to the hunger-strikers the Government's position as set out in the statement of 8 July. That statement reflects what was said to the ICJP about the areas in which movement is and is not possible. The ICJP statement did not make clear the limits to Government action and as such is not a basis on which a Government official could speak to the hunger-strikers. There is no solution already arrived at.

M. Lillis reported following conversation between Wyatt, NIO, and H Logue at 12.30 p.m.

Wyatt said:

We are trying to find a formula which will allow us to address both the prisoners and McFarland and allow both us and them to come off the hooks. We are trying to amplify our position. I expect we will act in the next couple of hours.

Mind you, I have not said that we will act.

H. Logue asked what the terms of the amplification were Wyatt replied that there was no change "in what we told you on Monday 6 July"

He went on to say that the principal difficulty they have is in presenting the negative side of the offer in as positive a way as possible

Care should be exercised in using this information - it was a private conversation, from Wyatt's point of view.

Note of Ambassador Kennedy's oral remarks when delivering
Note Verbale on 18 July 1981

E. Kennedy indicated the grave situation was one which would very possibly involve his withdrawal for consultations and that among the matters which might be included in the consultations he understood to be the possible internationalisation of the issue.

He was received by two resident clerks.

They did not comment on the substance.

E. Kennedy put greater emphasis on urgency than on the oral comments above.

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TO HQ FROM PARIS
FOR P. WALSH FROM C. O'FLAHERTY
NY 279

P Walsh

1. FOLLOWING IS J.O. REPORT OF M. CHEYSSON'S REPLY TO
M. DEROSIER'S QUESTION ON NORTHERN IRELAND:

M. LE PRESIDENT LA PAROLE EST A M. DEROSIER

M. DEROSIER. MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, SI LE GROUPE SOCIALISTE AVAIT
ADOpte LA MEME ATTITUDE QUE LES GROUPES R.P.R. ET U.D.F. PENDANT LES
VINGT-TROIS ANNEES DURANT LESQUELLES IL ETAIT DANS L'OPPOSITION,
NOUS N'AURIONS PAS BEAUCOUP SIEGE COMPTE TENU DES REPONSES DU
PRECEDENT GOUVERNEMENT ET DE L'ANCIENNE MAJORITE. (APPLAUDISSEMENTS
SUR LES BANCS DE LA MAJORITE.)

MA QUESTION S'ADRESSE A M. LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES.

DEPUIS DE NOMBREUX MOIS, LES REPUBLICAINS IRLANDAIS SONT EN LUTTE
CONTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE AFIN QUE SOIENT RECONNUS LES
DROITS DE L'HOMME LES PLUS ELEMENTAIRES.

CERTAINS N'HEsITENT PAS A FAIRE LE SACRIFICE DE LEUR VIE EN
S'ENGAGEANT DANS UNE GREVE DE LA FAIM QUI A CONDUIT SIX D'ENTRE
EUX A LA MORT.

L'INDIFFERENCE DU GOUVERNEMENT DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE BOULEVE
L'INDIGNATION, LA COLERE DE TOUS CEUX QUI SONT EPRIS DE LIBERTE
ET DE JUSTICE. LE GOUVERNEMENT FRANCAIS EST ATTACHE A CES
PRINCIPES.

JE VOUS DEMANDE, MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES,
D'USER DE TOUTE L'INFLUENCE DE LA FRANCE DANS LES RELATIONS
QU'ELLE ENTRETIENT AVEC LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE DANS LE CADRE EUROPEEN
POUR QUE CEsSE CETTE HECATOMBE EN IRLANDE DU NORD.
(APPLAUDISSEMENTS SUR LES BANCS DE LA MAJORITE)4

M. LE PRESIDENT. LA

PAROLE EST A M. LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS
EXTERIEURES.

M. CLAUDE CHEYSSON, MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES. LE
13 JUILLET DERNIER, EN EFFECT, LE SIXIEME GREVISTE DE LA FAIM
IRLANDAIS EST MORT.

NOUS SOMMES ENTRES DANS UN CYCLE INFERNAL D'HORREUR, DE HAINE ET
DE BANG.

CERTAINS POURRONT PARLER DE FANATISME EN VOYANT CES HOMMES QUI
CONSENTENT LE SACRIFICE SUPREME. IL N'EN DEMEURE PAS MOINS QUE
C'EST LE SIXIEME HOMME, EN DEUX MOIS ET DEMI, QUI A EU CE COURAGE,
DEPUIS BOBBY SANDS. CELA MERITE LE RESPECT. SOMMES-NOUS SURS QUE
NOUS SERIONS TOUS CAPABLES, POUR UNE CAUSE, DE CONSENTIR UN
SACRIFICE AUSSI GRAVE?

D'AUTRES POURRONT PARLER DE BRAVOURE AU SERVICE D'UN INTERET
NATIONAL. IL N'EN DEMEURE PAS MOINS QUE, PENDANT LES DERNIERES
ANNEES, DES BOMBES ONT ECLATE, DES MASSACRES ONT EU LIEU. IL Y A
EU 2100 MORTS PAR ATTENTATS DE L'IRA EN IRLANDE DU NORD, PARMIS
LESQUELS 1500 CIVILS ET DE NOMBREUX ENFANTS.

UN DRAME AFFREUX, FAIT DE HAINE ENTRE
LE GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS ET LE GOUVERNEMENT IRLANDAIS DOIT ÊTRE REVISITÉ POUR

NOUS, FRANÇAIS, PLUS QUE BIEN D'AUTRES - M. DEROSIER A EU RAISON
DE LE SOULIGNER - DEVONS PARTICIPER A LA RECHERCHE D'UN REGLEMENT.
QUEL HORRIBLE MOT DEVANT CETTE SOUFFRANCE HUMAINE.

COMMENT LE FAIRE?

FAUT-IL ETRE IRRESPONSABLE? FAIRE DES DISCOURS? PROVOQUER
L'OPINION D'UN COTE OU DE L'AUTRE? INTERVENIR DANS DES CONDITIONS
QUE L'ON DENONCERA COMME DES INGERENCES DANS LES AFFAIRES
INTERIEURES D'UN PAYS ALLIE?

FAUT-IL MARQUER PROFONDEMENT NOTRE SYMPATHIE A CE PEUPLE, A CES
HOMMES ET, ALORS, GUETTER, CHERCHER CHAQUE OCCASION? LE DEBAT AU
SEIN DE CETTE ASSEMBLEE EST FONDAMENTAL SUR CE PLAN.

M. DEROSIER A TRES JUSTEMENT PARLE DE L'INFLUENCE DE LA FRANCE, DE
SES RELATIONS, DE SES POSSIBILITES D'ACTION, D'INTERVENTION AU
SEIN DE L'EUROPE. JE CROIS QUE C'EST LA VOIE DANS LAQUELLE NOUS
DEVONS ESSAYER DE PROGRESSER.

A CET EFFET, J'EXPRIME PAR AVANCE L'ADMIRATION ET LE SOUTIEN DU
GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS A CE QUE LE NOUVEAU GOUVERNEMENT DE DUBLIN,
QUI VIENT D'ETRE FORME, DANS SA RESPONSABILITE ETATIQUE, POURRA
FAIRE A L'EGARD DE SES FRERES. IL EST DIRIGE PAR UN PREMIER
MINISTRE PLEIN D'IMAGINATION ET D'AUDACE. ESPERONS QU'IL SAURA,
EN TANT QU'IRLANDAIS ET AU NOM DES IRLANDAIS, PROPOSER DES SOLUTIONS.

QUE L'ASSEMBLEE SACHE QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS USERA ALORS DE
TOUTE L'INFLUENCE DONT IL PEUT DISPOSER, COMME M. DEROSIER L'A
BUGGERE. (APPLAUDISSEMENTS SUR LES : ' * * * * *
(END)

2. EMBASSY WASHINGTON (F. SHERIDAN) HAS REQUESTED TEXT IN
ENGLISH. TRANSLATION WILL FOLLOW FOR TRANSMISSION.

PARIS

17.7.1981

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IMMEDIATE

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ENGLISH VERSION OF OUF 282 FOLLOWS (EXTRACT FROM NAT. ASSEMBLY DEL. TE 15 JULY)

M. BERNARD DEROSIER (SOCIALIST DEPUTY, NORD): Y QUESTION IS ADDRESSED TO THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS. FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PAST, THE IRISH REPUBLICANS ARE ENGAGED IN A STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO GERECOGNITION OF THE MOSTELEMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS.

SOME DO NOT HESITATE TO SACRIFICE THEIR LIVES BY ENGAING IN A HUNGER STRIKE WHICH HAS BROUGHT SIX OF THEM TO THEIR DAH.

THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AROUSES THE INDIGNATION AND ANGER OF ALL WHO ARE ATTACHED TO LIBERTY AND JUSTICE. TY FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS ATTACHED TO THESE PRINCIPLES. I ASK YOU, MINISTER, TMAKE USEMF ALL FRANCE'S INFLUENCE IN THE RELATIONS SHE MAINTAINS WITH GREAT BRITAIN IN THESUROPEAN CONTEXT, TO BRING AN END TO THE SLAUGHTER IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

MR. CHEYSSON: YES, THE SIXTH HUNGER STRIKERFIED ON 13 JULY. WE ARE IN A CYCLE OF HORROR, HATSAND BLOOD.

SOME MAY SPEAK OF FANATICISM, SEEING THESE MEN WHO MAKE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE. THE FACT REMAINS THAT THIS IS THE SIXTH MAN IN TWO AND A HALF MONTHSWHO HAS HAD THIS COURAGE, SINCE BOBBY SANDS. DRAMKZBBVBBCBSMESTIOURBBAIBOBE FBATAWCWDBED ALL BE CAPABLE

OTHERS MAY SPEAK OF DARING COURAGE IN THE SERVICE OF NATIONAL INTEREST. THE FACT REMAINS HW DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS, BOMBS HAVE GONE OFF, KILLINGS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THERE HAVE BEEN 2,100 KILLED IN IRA ATTACKS IN N. IRELAND, INCLUDING 1,500 CIVILIANS AND MANY CHILDREN. WE ARE IN A DREADFUL CRISIS BASED ON HATE BETWEEN TWO COMMUNITIES WHICH SHOULD NEVERTHELESS HAVE A LOT IN COMMON IN LOOKING FOR A FUTURE FOR N. IRELAND.

WE FRENCH, MORE THAN MANY OTHERS - MR. DEROSIER WAS RIGHT TO EMPHASISE IT - MUST TAKEPART IN THE SEJCH FOR A SETTLEMENTM WHAT A MRRIBLE WORD IN THE FACR OF THIS HUMAN SUFFERING. HOW CAN IT BE DONE?

MUSTISQBBEBRIRHRESBONGBLEINTAWENSPRNCBBSA APRBVOKE OPINION ON ONRESSEBEEONEBRE BRBROKE OPINION ON BRBVBSBEOBENIEN OMHER? INTERVENE IN SUCH A WAY AS WILL BE DENOUNCED AS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRES OF AN ALLIED COUNTRY?

MUST WE SHOW OUR DEEP SYMPATHY WITH THIS PEOPLE, WITH THESE MEN, AND THEN WTCH OUT, LOOK FOREVERY OCCASION? THE DEBATE IN THIS ASSEMBLY IS FUNDAMENTAL IN THIS REGARD.

MR. DEROSIER SPOKE VERY RIGHTLY OF KANCE'S INFLUENCE, OF HER CONNECTIONS, OF HER POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION AND INTERVENTION IN EUROPE. I THINK THIS IS THE WAY WE MUST TRY TO ADVANCE.

TO THIS END, I EXPRESS IN ADVANCE THE ADMIRATION AND SUPPORTMF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR WHAT THE NEW DUBLIN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS JUST BEEN FORMED MAY DO FOR ITS BROTHERS, WITHIN ITS STATE RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS LED BY A PRIME MINISTER WHO IS FULL OF IMAGINATION AND COURAGE. LET US HOPE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE AS AN IRISHMAN AND IN THE BAME OF THE IRISH, TO PROPOSE SOLUTIONS.

I WOULD LIKE THE ASSEMBLY OKNOW THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL THEN MAKE USE OF WL THE INFLUENCE OF WHICH IT CAN AVAIL, AS MR. DEROSIER HAS SUGGESTED.

PSM


Secretary (for ~~for~~ ~~for~~)

The Minister designate was anxious to have some background information on the International Red Cross and I attach same hereto.

The information is all I could obtain at present and undoubtedly there are many other Resolutions of the International Conference of the Red Cross than the one quoted which might be of interest.

I have also only dealt in a very general fashion with the Geneva Conventions since it appears that the note which the Minister required was one dealing with the Red Cross in particular rather than with the Conventions.

Please let me know if the Minister requires further information on any aspect and I will try to obtain same.



Legal Adviser
17 July 1981

The International Red Cross

On 17 February 1863 the International Standing Committee for Aid to Wounded Soldiers was set up. It changed its name in 1880 to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Its first Conference which met in 1863 established the Red Cross Movement. Its purpose, was that each country should, in time of peace, set up a relief society to aid the army medical services in time of war.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is an independent association constituted in accordance with the Swiss civil law. It is international solely in action. Its members are recruited by co-option, exclusively from Swiss citizens the maximum number being 25.

The International Committee of the Red Cross was the initiator of the first Geneva Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.

It was in 1929 that the International Red Cross became a collective organisation under that name with its own Statutes which were adopted by the International Conference of the Red Cross in the Hague that year and revised in Toronto in 1952. The Statutes cover both the International Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies (this is the multinational umbrella body for the national societies.)

.../...

It maintains the fundamental and permanent principles of the Red Cross namely: impartiality, action independent of any racial political religious or economic consideration; the universality of the Red Cross and the equality of the National Red Cross Societies.

It undertakes the tasks incumbent on it under the Geneva Conventions and accepts the mandate entrusted to it by the International Conference of the Red Cross, its supreme policy-making body, which normally meets every 4 years.

It takes any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a specifically neutral and independent institution and intermediary and considers any questions requiring examination by such an institution.

The XXth International Red Cross Conference adopted a Resolution which referred to "armed conflicts not of an international character and disturbances occurring in recent years" and urged the International Committee of the Red Cross to continue its work with the aim of strengthening the humanitarian assistance of the Red Cross to victims of non-international conflicts. It recommended that Governments of States' Parties to the Geneva Conventions and national societies should support these efforts in their respective countries (Vienna 1965 Resolution No. XXXI). This may have been an attempt by the International Conference of the Red

Cross to get around the restrictions imposed by the Geneva Conventions which require the acknowledgment of the existence of an armed conflict before they can be invoked.

It seems that in any case the International Committee of the Red Cross has a sufficiently wide mandate to operate for humanitarian reasons outside the Geneva Conventions though since 1949 its many activities are based on, while not being governed by, the Geneva Conventions.

The four Geneva Conventions relate respectively to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (I); the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (II); the Treatment of Prisoners at War (III); and the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War (IV). They were ratified on behalf of Ireland in 1962.

All the Conventions have a common Article relating to conflicts not of an international character. This Article provides that an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. It also provides that the application of the provision shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. This last clause was considered essential since without it it is unlikely that a provision to this effect could have been adopted. It meets the fear that the application of the Conventions, even

to a very limited extent, in cases of civil war may interfere with the de jure Government's acts or confer belligerent status, and consequently increased authority and power, upon the adverse Party.

A further article common to the four Conventions leaves the International Committee of the Red Cross scope for initiative. However, all these cases depend on the existence of an armed conflict. "An armed conflict not of an international character" is not defined because of the difficulties which the Conference experienced in agreeing thereon. However, certain criteria which emerged from the debate constitute a convenient list for guidance and are as follows:-

1. That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organised as military and in possession of a part of the national territory.
3. (a) That the de jure Government has recognised the insurgents as belligerents; or
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purpose only of the present

Convention; or

(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

4. (a) That the insurgents have an organisation purporting to have the characteristics of a State.
- (b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate portion of the national territory.
- (c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organised authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
- (d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Convention.

The Red Cross is of the view that the above criteria are useful as a means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganised and short-lived insurrection.

On 8 June 1977 two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were adopted unanimously. These were signed in December 1977. Protocol I extends and updates the protection afforded to the sick, wounded, medical personnel and civilians in

international armed conflicts and also applies to certain non-international armed conflicts involving national liberation movements which comply with certain conditions. Protocol II extends the provisions in the Convention relating to victims of non-international armed conflicts and extends many of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to internal conflicts. It is concerned with situations involving a lower level of violence than in international conflicts or wars of national liberation and does not extend the status of "Party to a conflict" to such dissident forces. The provisions of Protocol II are of a humanitarian nature. Broadly speaking the purpose of both Protocols is to develop and codify the pre-existing international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. They have not been ratified by the U.K. and are therefore not in force in Northern Ireland. As regards the situation in Northern Ireland it does not appear that the Protocols would have any applicability in any case to the present or any future foreseeable situation there unless the Government here or a third Government formally took steps and succeeded in securing recognition of the applicability of the Protocol to a significant extent internationally.

Note

The British Ambassador called to see the Minister-designate, Professor Dooge at 12.30 p.m. to-day, at Professor Dooge's request.

Professor Dooge began by saying that while there might be many things to talk about, minds were engaged on the short term problems. Making it clear that he was quoting from the record of the meeting between the Taoiseach and the Ambassador last evening and emphasising that this point is the essence of the Government's position the Minister said that the following was the last point made by the Taoiseach at that meeting:

"The success of the present British initiative will depend on the extent to which the clarifications, offered by the official visiting the prison of the movement the British Government is prepared to make after the hunger strike ends, would go to meet the position set out by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace!"

The Minister repeated this passage twice and the Ambassador took note of it.

Professor Dooge went on to say that he accepted that the Taoiseach's view could not have been taken into account in regard to last night's visit because of the timing involved. Nevertheless we were disappointed at the degree of clarification imparted during the visit for whatever reason.

The Ambassador intervened to say he was surprised at this. An official went in to the prison to explain the initiative in regard to the Red Cross, which took the prisoners' interest. He then called them back to the statement of 8 July and asked them if they had studied it and if they had any questions. It was clear that they were anxious to speak to M^{rs} Farlane about the Red Cross and did not take up the offer. It was in fact a very clear effort to clarify what was on offer.

Professor Dooge said he accepted what the Ambassador said. He was not concerned with the reasons for the lack of clarification but considered that, if the problem were to be resolved, then there must be clarification. This was a point which had been returned to repeatedly on the recent Ministerial talks. For whatever reason, the result of last evening's visit to the prison was disappointing to us and must also be disappointing to the Ambassador's Government.

Professor Dooge then went on to refer to Mr. Kirwan's understanding, in the course of his second phone conversation with the Ambassador last evening, that a further visit would be possible and, moving

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on to the small hours, to a request to the Ambassador from the Taoiseach, who had received information from a reliable source that the clarification was inadequate, that arrangements be made for a further visit.

The Ambassador responded that he had been woken up from a very deep sleep and had only an imperfect recollection of his conversation with the Taoiseach. He had been surprised at the manner in which the matter had been put to him - an accusation that the Taoiseach had been misled.

Professor Dooge enquired whether the Ambassador considered that no request had been conveyed for further visits. The Ambassador replied that his recollection was that he had said that he would find out what had happened but that he found it difficult to understand why it was thought that no attempt had been made at clarification. Regarding visits, the position was that this would be considered when requests were received.

Professor Dooge said that it is the view of the Taoiseach that it is highly desirable that a further visit be arranged to pursue clarification; it was also highly desirable that this happen before the Red Cross visit, without, however, delaying that visit. The Taoiseach was under the impression that he had conveyed this request. The Ambassador said that he would convey it now. Professor Dooge went on to say that we do request a second visit. It was our position that this degree of clarification was essential - not only on the role of the ICRC but also on the statement of 8 July.

The Ambassador indicated agreement and said that Blelloch had asked (suggesting he was quoting) "Have you reflected on the Atkins' statement? I am ready to answer questions". Professor Dooge said he was concerned that we should get back to the position reached by the ICJP as a basis for a solution. The point had been made to Mr. Atkins that the essential exercise was to put the statement of the ICJP and the Atkins' statement side by side. It would in our view become clear that very little separated them - points of emphasis only.

The Ambassador said he fully understood. He went on to say that the Red Cross were going in this afternoon. He raised the question of the feasibility and even the desirability of a further visit by an official in the meantime. A clear offer had been made but had not been taken up. The prisoners knew that if there were a further request the official would go in.

In regard to the timing of the Red Cross visit, the Ambassador thought it might be about 4 p.m., but he was not sure. Asked if Blelloch would accompany the Red Cross officials he said he thought not and that it would not be desirable that they be accompanied by anyone from the NIO.

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Professor Dooge then asked whether, in the Ambassador's view, Mr. Kirwan's understanding and the Taoiseach's request had been overtaken by events. The Ambassador replied that he had discussed the matter with Blelloch and that it depended on a request from the prisoners. Such a request would be considered carefully, though the Ambassador could not commit Blelloch. Pressed on the probable response, the Ambassador said his hunch was that Blelloch would agree. Asked if he would consider that the offer to answer questions is open, the Ambassador said he would be surprised if it were not.

Professor Dooge said the Ambassador would be aware of the elements which concern us. Firstly the seriousness of the situation, for the British Government and for us. Secondly, urgency. He wished to say, even if it were already known, that the latest estimate is that Doherty might not live the night and he would like this information conveyed to London. Estimates could be wrong, either way, but it would be wrong if this advice were not conveyed to the British Government, which had the responsibility. We were very concerned about the short term situation and it was for this reason he had to concentrate on this - minds must be concentrated on it.

The Ambassador said that the Minister's position was very clear. He hoped he, also, had made his position clear. He would like to pass the information back.

Professor Dooge urged him to do so, as speedily as possible.

The interview ended at about 12.50 p.m.

A speaking note used by Professor Dooge is attached.



Andrew O'Rourke
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs.
16 July 1981

Points to be made to the British Ambassador

16 July, 1981.

1. X The success of the present British initiative will depend on the extent to which the clarifications, offered by the official visiting the prison, of the movement the British Government is prepared to make after the hunger strike ends, would go to meet the position set out by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace. X
2. We accept that the Taoiseach's view could not have been taken into account in regard to last night's visit because of the timing involved.
3. Nevertheless we are disappointed at the degree of clarification imparted during the visit yesterday evening, for whatever reason.
4. Mr Kirwan, when speaking to the Ambassador for the second time (9.15 p.m.) after the visit concerning the degree of clarification achieved, enquired whether a further visit would be possible. We understand that the Ambassador responded that this would not give rise to any difficulty.
5. The Taoiseach on hearing a separate report from reliable sources expressed his concern at the lack of clarification imparted and he asked the Ambassador to request a further official visit within twelve hours in order to allow for further clarification.
6. The Minister Designate would be glad to know the outcome of this request.

16-7-81

WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING SUPPLIED STATEMENT TO OUR OFFICE FROM THE PRO H BLOCKS LONG KESH.

" LAST NIGHT AT 7P.M. ALL OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS WERE BROUGHT TOGETHER IN THE PRISON HOSPITAL. AN N.I.O. OFFICAL NAMED BLELLOCK AND HILDITCH, THE PRISON GOVERNOR, PRESENTED THE HUNGER STRIKERS WITH HUMPHREY ATKINS JULY 15TH STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE INTERVENTION OF THE INTERNATION COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS.

BLELLOCK STATED THAT HE WAS THERE NOT TO NEGOTIATE BUT TO READ OUT HUMPHREY ATKINS STATEMENT. BRENDAN MCFARLANE WAS BROUGHT TO THE PRISON HOSPITAL AFTER BLELLOCK AND HILDICTCH HAD LEFT. HE AND THE HUNGER STRIKERS HAD A DISCUSSION ON WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE FOLLOWING POSITION WAS AGREED.


'IN VIEW OF THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT A NUMBER OF POINTS NEED STATING.

1. WE CONSIDER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE CONTINUING TO PLAY BRINKMANSHIP WITH THE HUNGER STRIKERS LIVES AND THE RED CROSS IS THE NEW PAWN IN THIS GAME.
2. TO PROVE THIS POINT WE ASK WHY AFTER SIX YEARS HAVE THE BRITISH CLEARED THE RED CROSS TO GET IN.? AND MORE IMPORTANTLY WHY DID THEY WAIT UNTIL KIERAN DOHERTY IS SO SERIOUSLY ILL.
3. WE WILL APPROACH THE RED CROSS WITH CAUTION BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THE BRITISH ARE INTENT ON USING THEM AGAINST OUR INTERESTS.
4. FINALLY WE REITERATE THAT DIRECT TALKS W BETWEEN OURSELVES AND BRITISH OFFICALS ARE THE BEST WAY OF RESOLVING THE HUNGER STRIKE."

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1614 CAPO EI

cc Mr. Haveran
Mr. Nally
Mr. Kieran

Mr. Heligan
I will then explain
Deer with
See under
in particular  *15.7.81*
Mr. Burke
To see per


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23985 EMIR E
15/7/81
C116

TO HQ FROM MADRID
URGENT

FOR G O'CONNOR FROM BARNWELL
MMM

15/7/81 1320
of Bailey

THARMOJUHY

THERE IS NO INFORMATION AT THE EMBASSY ABOUT CASES IN SPAIN WHERE AUTHORITIES NEGOTIATED DIRECTLY WITH PRISONERS IN DISPUTE (YOUR C65 REFERS). THERE WAS SPECULATION AT THE TIME OF THE KIDNAPPING LAST YEAR OF JAVIER RUPEREZ, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE GOVERNING PARTY UCD (AND NOW SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO THE CSCE) THAT HIS RELEASE WAS ARRANGED AFTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ETA PRISONERS. THE PRISONERS WERE MOVED TO ANOTHER PRISON. A CONDITION OF ANY CONCESSIONS MADE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THAT ETA SHOULD NOT MAKE PROPAGANDA ON THE SUBJECT. (SEE PR 63/79, PARA 5 AND PR 5/80 PARA 3.)

WE FEEL THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO GET PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT PLEASE LET US KNOW IF YOU WISH US TO APPROACH THEM ON IT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE COULD ASK THEM FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE HUNGER STRIKES.

WE HAVE SOME INFORMATION FROM NEWSPAPER REPORTS ABOUT THE HUNGER STRIKES. 17 MEMBERS OF GROUPS CALLED GRAPO AND POR ARE ON HUNGER STRIKE IN DIFFERENT PRISONS IN PROTEST AGAINST THE PRISON REGIME OF THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON HERRERA DE LA MANCHA IN THE PROVINCE OF CIUDAD REAL. ON 19 JUNE ONE PRISONER DIED IN HOSPITAL AFTER BEING ON HUNGER STRIKE FOR THREE MONTHS. ON 27 JUNE IT WAS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THAT THE PRISON AUTHORITIES HAD AGREED TO SOFTEN THE PRISON REGIME IN THE PRISON CONCERNED, FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF RED CROSS AND LAWYERS FOR THE PRISONERS. THE HUNGER STRIKE, HOWEVER, HAS CONTINUED AND ACCORDING TO THE LATEST PRESS REPORT (11JULY) SOME OF THE PRISONERS HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL.

END OF MESSAGE



ROINN AN TAOISIGH

LE DEA-MHÉIN AN RÚNAÍ

DERMOT NALLY

16/7/81

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

H-BLOCKS: HUNGER STRIKES

1. The British Ambassador phoned me this morning, in a state of considerable anxiety, to say that he had been phoned last night by the Taoiseach who, he said, had indicated his view that he (the Ambassador) has misled him in saying that an official from the Northern Ireland Office would go into the prison to "clarify" the July 8th statement. The Ambassador said that he wished to explain what exactly had happened. In view of his anxiety and clear wish to get the record straight, urgently, I said that I would see him immediately. He was particularly concerned that the visit to the prison by the N.I.O. official, which he had brought about by his personal intervention, appeared, in the Taoiseach's eyes, have to have gone badly wrong. This distressed him greatly.
2. The Ambassador, when he called, said that he had spoken to Mr. Bleloch and had obtained the following account of what had happened, directly from him. Mr. Bleloch had gone into the prison and had spoken to all eight of the prisoners. He had said that the purpose of his visit was primarily to explain about the Red Cross. He had said that it was an international organisation - neither British nor Irish nor Catholic nor Protestant but international. That it would make an initial visit and that there would or could then be follow-up visits. The prisoners had been concerned primarily with the timetable for the visit. To their questions on this, Mr. Bleloch had said that the first visit would occur today.
3. The second main interest of the prisoners was what would happen if they refused to see the Red Cross. Mr. Bleloch had said he did not know.
4. He had then gone on to ask if the prisoners had studied and reflected on the Secretary of State's statement of 8th July. He had indicated that if they had questions to ask on the statement that he was there to answer them. The prisoners were, he said, more interested in discussing the Red Cross with Brendan McFarlane. They had not asked any questions of substance.
5. Finally, Mr. Bleloch had indicated that he was there to answer questions but had no power or authority to negotiate
6. After the discussion the eight went off to see Mr. McFarlane, and Bleloch waited around in the hospital to see if they had any further questions or wanted any other clarification. They did not come back to him but went to bed.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

-2-

7. I said that our basic point was that, somehow, what was on offer to the prisoners must be brought as close as possible to what had been the position of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace when their intervention had been suspended. I said that I thought that, on all indications, there was the basis for an honourable settlement in their proposals.

16th July, 1981.

IMMEDIATE

TO HQ
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY NELIGAN
MMMSAZXQ

FROM LONDON
FROM DEMPSEY

HUNGER STRIKE

1. I CALLED THIS MORNING ON PATRICK EYERS (FCO) TO DISCUSS THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HUNGER STRIKES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE ICJP INTERVENTION, EYERS SAID THAT A BASIC PROBLEM WAS THAT THE ICJP PROPOSALS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY WELL TIED DOWN. THE BRITISH HAD BEEN DEALING WITH THE PROVISIONAL IRA FOR MANY YEARS AND HAD GREAT EXPERIENCE OF THEM. THEY WELL KNEW WHAT "SLIPPERY" CHARACTERS THEY WERE. THE ICJP BOTH UNDER-ESTIMATED THE DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEM AND OVER-ESTIMATED WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. HE RECOGNISED THAT THE CHURCH HAD ITS SOURCES OF INFORMATION, ONE OF WHICH WAS THE CONFESIONAL. THE LATTER, HOWEVER, WAS NOT WITHOUT ITS PROBLEMS. THE BRITISH, FOR THEIR PART, HAD THEIR OWN SOURCES, DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS, AND FROM THESE THEY HAD A GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THE PROVISIONALS WERE UP TO. A FUNDAMENTAL BRITISH OBJECTIVE WAS THAT WHATEVER SOLUTION EMERGED SHOULD BE A DEFINITIVE ONE. THEY WISHED TO AVOID "PUTTING DAMP SODS ON A SHOULDERING FIRE", ONLY TO HAVE THE FIRE BREAK OUT AGAIN LATER. IN SOME WAYS, EYERS SAID, THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION WAS LIKE SELLING A USED CAR. THE BUYER MADE A FINAL OFFER BUT, IF IT WAS NOT ACCEPTED, HE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER HE HAD UNDER BID BY £5 OR £1,000. HIS FEELING WAS THAT THE LAST BRITISH OFFER TO THE HUNGER STRIKERS HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE INDEED TO THE MARK.

2. A FACTOR IN BREAKDOWN HAD UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN THAT AFTER 18 HOURS OF NEGOTIATION BOTH THE COMMISSION AND MR ALISON WERE EXTREMELY TIRED. HE WAS MORALLY CERTAIN THAT THE DELAY WHICH HAD RESULTED IN MCDONNELL'S DEATH HAD NOT BEEN INTENTIONAL. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WAS THAT THE NIO WAS SPLIT BETWEEN BELFAST AND LONDON AND DUE TO LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS THE PROCESS OF CONSULTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE COULD TAKE SOME TIME. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE THE H-BLOCK PROBLEM BUT WISHED WHATEVER SOLUTION EMERGED TO BE A DEFINITIVE ONE. THE FACT WAS THAT THE HUNGER STRIKES WERE CREATING PROBLEMS FOR BRITAIN WITH ITS FRIENDS AS WELL AS DOMESTICALLY. THERE COULD BE LITTLE DOUBT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME OF THE METHODS USED IN THE RECENT RIOTS IN BRITISH CITIES HAD BEEN COPIED FROM NORTHERN IRELAND.

3. EYERS SAID THAT THEY HAD TRIED HARD TO FIND A WAY FORWARD AND THEY HOPED THE TAOISEACH WOULD REGARD THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AS HELPFUL. I ASKED WHETHER THE RED CROSS COULD BE EXPECTED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS IN A TIME FRAME THAT WOULD ENABLE THE DEATH OF O'DOHERTY TO BE AVOIDED. EYERS REPLIED THAT THEY NEEDED 4/5 DAYS AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE HUNGER STRIKERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HALT THE DETERIORATION PROCESS FOR 4 OR 5 DAYS BY ADDING GLUCOSE TO THEIR WATER. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS, OF COURSE, WAS THAT THOSE WHO WERE MAKING THE DECISIONS WERE NOT THOSE WHO WERE DYING. THE RED CROSS COULD NOT ASK THE PRISONERS TO SUSPEND THE HUNGER STRIKE AS EVEN THIS REQUEST COULD BE MISCONSTRUED BY THE PROVISIONALS. THE KEY THING WAS THE NEED TO CONFER RESPECTABILITY ON THE ICRC. IT WAS NECESSARY TO EXTEND A HAND TO DROWNING MEN WHO DID NOT WANT TO DIE - HE WAS SURE THAT LYNCH AT LEAST DID NOT WANT A DIET. HE FELT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IF THE POPE WERE TO MAKE A STATEMENT. THE BRITISH COULD NOT MAKE THIS SUGGESTION BUT OTHERS COULD. EYERS, WITH UNCHARACTERISTIC EMPHASIS, TWICE REPEATED HIS SUGGESTION OF A PAPAL STATEMENT. I ASKED WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND. HE REPLIED THAT IT COULD BE VERY SIMPLE - MERELY TO WELCOME THE EFFORTS OF THE RED CROSS AND TO HOPE AND PRAY THAT THOSE INVOLVED WOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO END THE STRIKE OR AT LEAST SUSPEND IT. TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE.

4. I SUGGESTED THAT THE RED CROSS MIGHT BE TOO CAUTIOUS AND THAT THERE WAS A RISK THAT THEIR RECOMMENDATION WOULD NOT GO FAR ENOUGH TO TEMPT THE PRISONERS TO GIVE UP THEIR ACTION. EYERS SAW IN THE RED CROSS'S CAUTIOUS PROFESSIONAL APPROACH AS AN ASSET - AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT THEY WERE SWISS. FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW, ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WAS THAT CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND JAILS WERE BETTER THAN IN JAILS IN BRITAIN AND THEY HAD TO COPE WITH OBJECTIONS BY THE HOME OFFICE TO ANY FURTHER RELAXATION OF THE RULES.

5. WHEN I MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT THAT O'DOHERTY WAS A MEMBER OF THE DAIL, EYERS ASKED WHETHER, IN THE EVENT OF O'DOHERTY DYING, THE PROVISIONALS MIGHT NOT BE TEMPTED TO EXERCISE THE ULTIMATE POWER WHICH WAS THE ABILITY TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC. THEY COULD DO THIS BY NOT PUTTING UP A CANDIDATE AND LEAVING THE SEAT TO FIANNA FAIL.

6. I ASKED WHETHER WE COULD ASSUME THAT THE NORTHERN IRELAND ISSUE HAD BEEN PLACED ON THE AGENDA FOR THE CARRINGTON/HAIG TALKS BY THE AMERICAN SIDE. EYERS REPLIED THAT LORD CARRINGTON WISHED TO BRIEF SECRETARY HAIG ON A MATTER OF MUTUAL CONCERN AND TO EXPRESS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE US GOVERNMENT, AS EVIDENCED IN PARTICULAR BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF APRIL LAST.

SECRETARY OF STATE

*N Burke
To see you
15/7*

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URGENT

TO HQ FROM BONN
FOR G. O'CONNOR FROM P. SAMMON

MMMRKRKR

THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS IN SUCH CASES. THEY POINT OUT THAT THESE MATTERS WOULD PROPERLY FALL TO THE LAND AUTHORITIES.

SINCE DEBUS WAS IMPRISONED IN HAMBURG, WE HAVE ENQUIRED RE. SITUATION THERE.

THE HAMBURG PRISON AUTHORITIES SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRISONERS ON HUNGER STRIKE IN HAMBURG OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. THESE WERE MOSTLY CONCERNED WITH PRISON CONDITIONS; ESPECIALLY LESS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND MORE HOURS OF FREE ASSOCIATION. IN GENERAL THE RAF HUNGER STRIKERS WERE CONTROLLED BY OUTSIDERS, AND THEIR AIM WAS LESS TO IMPROVE THEIR CONDITIONS THAN TO BE GIVEN "PRISONER-OF-WAR" STATUS WHICH WAS NOT GIVEN. THE PRISON AUTHORITIES AND THE PRISON BOARD HAD NEGOTIATED BOTH DIRECTLY WITH THE PRISONERS AND WITH THEIR DEFENCE LAWYERS.

THE CASE OF DEBUS WAS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. HE WAS KEPT IN A NORMAL PRISON WHICH WAS "OPEN" DURING-DAY TIME HOURS, ALLOWING FREE MOVEMENT INSIDE THE PRISON. CIVILIAN CLOTHES WERE WORN. DEBUS WAS NOT ON HUNGER STRIKE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN HIS OWN CASE, BUT OUT OF SOLIDARITY WITH PRISONERS IN OTHER LAENDER. ~~HE WAS NO LONGER ACCEPTED BY THE RAF AND TO SOME EXTENT HIS HUNGER STRIKE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO BE ACCEPTED BY THEM AGAIN.~~

END.
15.7.1981
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Meeting between the Minister Designate and Officials and the
British Ambassador. 15 July, 1981.

The Minister Designate, Professor Dooge, accompanied by Mr. O'Rourke, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Kirwan, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Taoiseach, received the British Ambassador, who was accompanied by Mr. Barney Smith of his Embassy, in Government Buildings at about 6.30 p.m. on 15th July, 1981.

The Minister Designate explained that the Taoiseach who had earlier intended to receive the Ambassador himself was detained in the Government meeting and had asked him to receive the message and to report to him at the Government meeting: Professor Dooge said it would be appreciated if the Ambassador were to remain while he reported to the Taoiseach. The Ambassador fully accepted this.

The Ambassador said that he had an answer to the Taoiseach's letter to the British Prime Minister. This reply was mostly history and the interesting part was in the last paragraph. At this stage he handed a copy of the reply and also an annexed statement to be made by the Secretary of State, Mr Atkins, to the Minister Designate and to Secretary O'Rourke to read.

When they had read the final paragraph of the reply and Mr Atkin's statement the Ambassador indicated that a statement was to be released in about half an hour's time in London dealing with the Red Cross aspect. He went on to say that a senior official was now on his way to talk to the hunger strikers about the Red Cross involvement and would also be available to expand on the Secretary of State's statement of 8 July .

In answer to questions it was made clear that the official concerned was from the Northern Ireland Office, probably from their Belfast Office.

In answer to a further question from the Minister Designate as to whether the official would "expand" or "expound", the Ambassador used the words "amplify" and "explain" and when the Minister Designate interjected with "the old word clarification?" the Ambassador did not demur.

In reply to a further question about the timing of the official's visit, the Ambassador replied that he was probably in the Prison as he was speaking.

In reply to a further question about the official the Ambassador indicated that he was somebody competent to deal with any questions that might be raised.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Atkins hoped that news of this initiative and the news of the visit by the official could be kept secret for the moment. It would, of course, become known later that evening.

He had also been asked to express the hope that when the news broke, the Taoiseach might say something helpful about the involvement of the Red Cross. In reply to a question, it was indicated that the Red Cross team hoped to be visiting the Maze on the following day. The Minister Designate enquired whether the British would be making this known that evening and accordingly whether it could be indicated to the press in Dublin. The Ambassador had no guidance on this subject and asked his colleague, Mr. Smith, to contact the N.I.O. to obtain an answer to this question. Mr. Smith then withdrew accompanied by Mr. Kirwan.

W/K

16/7/87.

Extract from scrap notes of meeting between British
Ambassador, Minister Designate and officials,
Taoiseachs Office, 6.30 15.7.'81

The Ambassador said that a senior official of the N.I.O. was now on his way to talk to the hunger strikers about the involvement of the International Red Cross and would also be available to ^{expand on} ~~talk about~~ the Secretary of State's statement of 8th July. In answer to a question from the Minister Designate as to the ^{whether the official} ~~meaning of~~ ^{would "expand" or "expound"} ~~"talk about"~~ in this context, the Ambassador used the words "amplify, explain..." and when the Minister Designate interjected "the old word, clarification?" the Ambassador did not demur.

The undersigned took notes from arrival of Taoiseach at 6.50 p.m., when Mr. Kirwan was out of the room with Mr. Smith.

The Ambassador apologised for his late arrival and suggested that he go over his presentation again for the Taoiseach.

The Ambassador said that a senior NIO official was now in the Maze explaining the move in regard to the International Committee of the Red Cross; he would also be ready to clarify or explain the statement of 8 July which dealt in particular with the issues of clothing, association and work.

The Red Cross team was expected in the Maze on the afternoon of 16 July. In this connection, the Ambassador drew attention to paragraph 4 of Mr. Atkins' statement (which refers to the practice of the Committee to follow up an initial visit with subsequent visits and reports) and said he hoped this would be noted by the prisoners in the context of any improved prison administration. It could, the Ambassador suggested, be a way of "monitoring" improvements. The Taoiseach said he appreciated this.

The Ambassador said he was pleased that the Red Cross initiative could run in conjunction with an official going in. He said his authorities hoped to keep quiet the visit of the official until he had left the prison. Mr. Atkins also hoped the Taoiseach could say something helpful about the Red Cross visit.

The Taoiseach commented that he would certainly be careful not to say anything bad about the Red Cross. He went on to say that he was relieved and glad to hear the news. However, the significance of the move could be judged only in the light of events. He had no idea how the prisoners would respond; he hoped they would seek clarification. He did not know what clarifications the official would be able to offer. He hoped the prisoners would listen and ask questions and that the answers, while giving nothing away in terms of political status or administration of the prison, would be such as to enable the prisoners to end their protest. What was the expectation? The Ambassador replied that he had no idea.

The Taoiseach said that the time element was very important. He hoped the prisoners would see the significance of the continued visits by the Red Cross - this was a constructive element. The Taoiseach asked where this development left the European Commission of Human Rights initiative. Mr. Smith said that (although he was at "the edge of his knowledge") he understood that the present initiative replaced the ECHR one - which was not at a sufficiently advanced stage. Professor Dooge said he would not want to see the ECHR avenue blocked off; it should also be pursued. The Taoiseach said he accepted that this new initiative is quicker and he understood why shortcuts were necessary. He could not however assess if it were right to leave the ECHR high and dry. Both Professor Dooge and the

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Taoiseach repeated that nothing should be done to cause affront to the European Commission. The Ambassador replied that he was sure his Government would not want to annoy them, or would do so by neglect.

The Taoiseach said he would appreciate hearing the outcome of the visit to the prison as soon as possible. He did not think we could do anything at this stage. He referred to the desire of the relatives of the prisoners to help in finding a settlement, reflected in their reaction to the work of the Commission for Justice and Peace and suggested that the British Government let them know what is happening, in case they could give support. Ambassador Figg said he would pass this suggestion on.

At this point Mr. Smith gave replies to two questions put to him earlier by Professor Dooge: the visit of the official would not be announced until he had left the prison - probably about 7.30 p.m.; and the timing of the visit of the Red Cross would not be given in more detail than is in the statement ("forthwith").

The Taoiseach said he would have to reflect on the wisdom of saying anything in response to the initiative. The prisoners, to say the least, were not supporters of his; he would not like them to be able to claim that we were involved in something directed against them. The prisoners were now deeply suspicious.

Concluding, the Taoiseach said that he wished to express appreciation of the British Government's action. Its success would depend on the extent to which the clarifications offered by the official went to meet the position reached in the statement of the Commission for Justice and Peace.



Andrew O'Rourke
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs.
15 July 1981

TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY OF 15 JULY TO THE
TAOISEACH'S LETTER OF 10 JULY 1981

1. I have studied most carefully your letter of 10 July expressing your concern about the impact upon your country of recent developments in the hunger strike in the Maze prison. The measure and nature of your concern was of course underlined and amplified by Dr Kelly and Professor Dooge when they saw Sir Ian Gilmour and Mr Atkins last Friday in London, of which meeting I have seen a full report, and reinforced in Professor Dooge's conversation with Lord Carrington in Brussels on Monday, on which he has briefed me personally.
2. There are a number of points in your letter, and in what passed at Friday's meeting, on which I must comment. But first let me assure you that I understand just how much the deaths in the Maze matter to your country, and know in particular of the significance for the Republic of Ireland of the fact that two Maze prisoners, including one hunger striker, are now members of the Dáil. Much of the uniqueness of the relationship between the Republic and the United Kingdom arises from the ways in which the interests of the north and south of Ireland touch upon each other. Sadly, terrorism - our common enemy - and the consequential problem of the prisoners in the Maze convicted of terrorist crimes are among these.
3. The Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP) have worked hard to find a solution. Her Majesty's Government admire the Commission's determination and dedication to its task and I do not wish in any way to denigrate their efforts. But they have in their statement of 9 July implied that Mr Alison, the Minister of State who conducted the talks with them, was guilty of bad faith in that he gave assurances which he later failed to fulfil. You say in your letter that you, as a Government, "are persuaded by this account". This is not the place to go in detail over precisely what was and was not said in some sixteen hours of talks (Mr Atkins did in fact traverse much of this ground with your colleagues last week); but I must say plainly that I totally repudiate the charge of bad faith. It may be that in such prolonged talks misunderstandings arose; but I must ask you to accept my word that Mr Alison, and through him the British Government have acted honourably throughout.
4. The truth is that the Commission have all along underestimated the constraint laid upon us by the need to retain proper control of, and apply a common regime within, a prison containing some 1,000 convicted criminals, many guilty of the most heinous crimes and drawn from all the paramilitary groups; and they have seriously

/overestimated

overestimated the possibility of persuading the hunger strikers (and, equally important, the Provisionals who control them) to accept their own compromise proposals. This last point has been amply demonstrated by the latest statement issued in the name of the hunger strikers in which they reject the Commission's proposals as an "unacceptable dilution" of their five demands.

5. I do beg of you not to be misled into thinking that this problem is susceptible of any easy solution, wanting only a little flexibility on Her Majesty's Government's part. It is not. The protesters have abandoned their claim for differential treatment, and that is helpful because it was totally unacceptable. But they still, it seems, hold to their five demands. In our attitude to these demands we are not seeking to be difficult for the sake of saving face. We have to grapple not only with a serious problem of prison control but also with issues going to the standing of the Provisionals. Of course the regime could be modified in various ways (as it has been already) and we have consistently maintained that we are prepared - once the hunger strike is over - to make yet further improvements on humanitarian grounds. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that the aim of the Provisionals (and this is why they see no role for the ICJP) is not merely - or mainly - to get easier prison conditions for their members. It is to achieve within the Northern Ireland prison system a regime, originally for themselves, but now apparently for all prisoners, in which the prisoners and not the prison authorities determine what goes on. If they achieve this, that would confer a kind of legitimacy upon the acts for which those prisoners were convicted. If, in addition, the Provisionals were to be drawn into direct negotiation with the British Government on the terms of settling the hunger strike, that would confer upon them a status which they would value. I am sure that these aims are as unacceptable to us as they would be to you.

6. Furthermore, we are not prepared to subscribe to forms of words which by their generality can mean all things to all men. That course could only lead to subsequent recrimination and to yet a further round of strikes at a later date. We know that you recognise the importance of ensuring that any settlement is a lasting one.

7. I note what you say about co-operation between the British security forces and those of the Republic. As you know, we value that co-operation highly. As I have observed above, terrorism is our common enemy. It recognises no borders. I cannot believe your Government will wish in any way to diminish the scale or intensity of that co-operation. I appreciate the importance of local opinion; but the reaction of public opinion here to any suggestion that the authorities in the Republic were offering less than full co-operation in the detection and apprehension of terrorists

/would

would be sharp and bitter and there must be a risk that it would have an adverse effect on wider Anglo-Irish relationships.

8. We have of course been considering what further steps are open to us to bring the hunger strike to an end. We have had an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit Northern Ireland prisons and submit reports on the conditions there. We have now decided to take this offer up, and an announcement to this effect will be made the moment the necessary arrangements can be made. I sincerely hope that the intervention, by agreement, of so highly respected and independent a body as the Red Cross will cause the hunger strikers to end their fast so that the Committee's work can be done without the pressure created by a series of further deaths.

STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE RT HON HUMPHREY ATKINS MP,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

1. In my statements of 30 June and 8 July I set out once again the Government's clearly stated position in relation to the hunger strikes and the prisons protest in Northern Ireland. I also made it clear that the Government shared the concern which has been expressed in responsible quarters. I am grateful for the efforts that have been made in recent days. The Government deeply regrets that the hunger strikes are continuing and has naturally been considering further what steps it can properly take to persuade those concerned to end their action.
2. The Government has received an offer from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit the prisons concerned in Northern Ireland under that part of its statutes which enables it to study the conditions of prisoners other than prisoners of war. The Committee has made it clear that its offer of assistance is made, not on the basis of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which deal with the conditions of prisoners of war, but in exercise of its right to take humanitarian initiatives. I have decided to take up the ICRC's offer to visit the Northern Ireland prisons concerned. A team from the ICRC will begin its work forthwith.
3. The ICRC have made it clear to the Government that the sole aim of their visit will be to assess and, if necessary, to make recommendations to improve the conditions of imprisonment in Northern Ireland.
4. It is the practice of the Committee to follow up an initial visit with subsequent visits and reports and I shall arrange for this to be done in Northern Ireland if the Committee so wishes.

C.C. PSM
P & S
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Bushie
Mr. K...
Mr. Willis
F. Sheridan (Washington)

FOR ATTENTION: MICHAEL SANFEY 10.55 AM

31614 CAPO EI
CATHOLIC PRESS & INFORMATION OFFICE DUBLIN
13 JULY 1981

ATTN: NEWS DESK

STATEMENT BY CARDINAL O FIAICH

MARTIN HURSON IS THE SECOND PRISONER FROM THIS DIOCESE TO DIE ON HUNGER STRIKE. I EXPRESS MY DEEP SYMPATHY WITH HIS FATHER, BROTHERS AND SISTERS AND WITH HIS OTHER RELATIVES AND FRIENDS. GO NDEANA DIA TROCAIRE AR A AINM.

MARTIN HURSON'S DEATH, LIKE JOE MC DONNELL'S, COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF LAST WEEK'S UNTIRING EFFORTS OF THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE HAD MET WITH THE POSITIVE RESPONSE THEY MERITED. I ACCEPT UNRESERVEDLY THE ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS GIVEN BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION. THEIR HONESTY AND INTEGRITY SHONE LIKE A BEACON THROUGH ALL THEIR WORK.

THE TRAGEDY IS THAT ANOTHER GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE H BLOCK IMPASSE WITHOUT LOSS OF PRINCIPLE WAS MISSED.

ONE GLEAM OF HOPE STILL REMAINS, HOWEVER; THE PROPOSALS WORKED OUT DURING THE LONG DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND MR. ALISON PROVIDE AN ONGOING FRAMEWORK FOR A SOLUTION. I, THEREFORE, REPEAT THE APPEAL, WHICH I HAVE ALREADY MADE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS TO MRS. THATCHER, TO SEND IN A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE TO TALK TO THE PRISONERS WITHOUT DELAY. WITH EQUAL URGENCY I CALL ON THE PRISONERS AND THOSE WHO SPEAK FOR THEM TO BUILD IN A CONCILIATORY FASHION ON THE COMMISSION'S HARD-WON ACHIEVEMENTS.

ONCE MORE I URGE ALL OUR CATHOLIC PEOPLE TO REJECT HATRED AND VIOLENCE AND TO REDOUBLE THEIR PRAYERS FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION AMONG ~~XXXXXX~~ ALL IRISH MEN AND WOMEN. OUR SYMPATHY WITH THE HURSON FAMILY IN THEIR TRAGIC LOSS CAN BEST BE SHOWN BY OUR PRAYERS FOR THE ETERNAL REPOSE OF THE DECEASED'S SOUL AND OUR CHRIST-LIKE COMPASSION FOR ALL THOSE, PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS, WHO HAVE SUFFERED INJURY AND BEREAVEMENT IN THE VIOLENCE OF RECENT YEARS.

END

15.7.81

IMMEDIATE

C200

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON DC
FOR ASST SEC NELIGAN FROM AMBASSADOR
MMK1JUL

15/7/8 1705
S. Bailey

REPRESENTATIONS TO PRESIDENT - YOUR C184

1. THE PRESIDENT AND HIS WIFE CAME TO THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE ON 14 JULY AT 3 PM FOR THE CONFERRING OF AN HONORARY FELLOWSHIP OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS IN IRELAND ON DR LOYAL DAVIS, STEP-FATHER OF MRS NANCY REAGAN. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY, INTER ALIA, HIS THREE MAIN ADVISERS MEESE, BAKER AVR

WHJY

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THAT IS ALL GARBLED AFTER INTER ALIA, HIS THREE ETC..

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*Pre*SIDENT AND HIS WIFE CAME TO THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE ON 14 JULY AT 3 PM FOR THE CONFERRING OF AN HONORARY FELLOWSHIP OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS IN IRELAND ON DR LOYAL DAVIS, STEP-FATHER OF MRS NANCY REAGAN. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY, INTER ALIA, HIS THREE MAIN ADVISERS MEESE, BAKER AND DEAYER AND ALSO BY OTHER SENIOR MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AND BY TWO MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. IN ADDITION TO THE COUNCIL OF THE RCSI, THERE WERE ABOUT 100 GUESTS REPRESENTING THE ADMINISTRATION, THE US MEDICAL WORLD, THE MEDIA, IRISH-AMERICA AND THE REAGAN/DAVIS FAMILY. THE CONFERRING CEREMONY FOLLOWED THE NORMAL RCSI PATTERN AND WAS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED BY THE US GUESTS WHO ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO THE COLOUR, PUMP AND DIGNITY OF SUCH EVENTS. THE PRESIDENT WAS FASCINATED BY THE DETAILS AND ASKED FOR EXPLANATIONS OF THE MACE, THE CARRYING OF THE BARBERS' POLES AND THE CURIOUS WORDING OF THE DECLARATION WHICH THE NEW HONORARY FELLOW WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE.

2. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR C184 IT WAS ARRANGED THAT THE MESSAGE FROM THE TAOISEACH TO THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE HANDED TO WHITE HOUSE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DEAVER AT THE RESIDENCE IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND THIS WAS DONE AT APPROXIMATELY 3.40 PM. IN A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH DEAVER, I EXPLAINED THAT THE SITUATION IN IRELAND AND IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WAS AT THE MOMENT AS TENSE AND AS DIFFICULT AS IT HAD BEEN IN THE LAST DECADE AND I ASKED THAT THE TAOISEACH'S REQUEST BE GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION. THERE WAS NO OPPORTUNITY DURING HIS VISIT TO THE RESIDENCE TO ENGAGE THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY IN DISCUSSION SINCE HE WISHED TO MEET AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE GUESTS. INCIDENTALLY IN THE ONE AND A HALF HOURS WHICH HE SPENT AT THE RESIDENCE, THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY GREETED ABOUT SIXTY OF THE GUESTS AND SEEMED IN NO HURRY TO LEAVE UNTIL HIS ADVISERS TOLD HIM THAT RUSH-HOUR COMMUTER ROADS WERE BEING BLOCKED TO FACILITATE HIS RETURN TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

3. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS REAGAN HAD INVITED A SMALL GROUP FROM THE ROCSI AND MYSELF TO DRINKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AT 7.15 PM. ON ARRIVAL, I WAS TAKEN ASIDE BY DEAVER WHO SAID THAT THEY HAD ALREADY HAD QUERIES FROM THE BRITISH MEDIA ABOUT THE COMMUNICATION WHICH I HAD EARLIER HANDED OVER. DEAVER'S REMARK WAS MADE IN A MATTER-OF-FACT RATHER THAN AN ACCUSING WAY AND I REPLIED ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION WHICH TED SMYTH HAD OBTAINED FROM HOURICAN THAT A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAD BEEN ASKED THE INEVITABLE QUESTION AT A ROUTINE MEETING WITH POLITICAL CORRESPONDENTS. NATURALLY THE REPLY HAD INCLUDED A HINT THAT IF THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE, IT WAS LIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSIONS ON MATTERS OTHER THAN SURGERY WITH THE PRESIDENT AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS A SERIOUS POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRELAND. DEAVER WAS THEN JOINED BY PRESIDENT'S COUNSEL MEESE AND BRIEFED THEM ON THE BACKGROUND TO THE TAOISEACH'S MESSAGE EMPHASISING IN PARTICULAR THE SERIOUS THREAT WHICH WE WERE FACING IN IRELAND AND THE U.S. ELEMENT IN TERRORISM IN IRELAND. MEESE ASKED PARTICULARLY DETAILED QUESTIONS ABOUT PRISON CONDITIONS IN LONG KESH AND ABOUT THE DEMANDS OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS. HE REFERRED AT LENGTH TO THEN GOVERNOR REAGAN'S PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE CALIFORNIAN PRISONERS AND MORE THAN ONCE REMARKED THAT QUOTE ALL OF THESE PRISON PROBLEMS ARE ABOUT FOOD AND CLOTHES UNQUOTE. IN THE TIME AVAILABLE, I TRIED TO PUT THE H-BLOCK PROBLEM IN A BROADER CONTEXT AND IN PARTICULAR EMPHASISED THAT THE HUNGER STRIKES WERE PROVIDING THE IRA WITH A MOST VALUABLE ASSET BOTH IN IRELAND AND IN THE U.S. I POINTED OUT THAT BRITISH REPORTS ESTIMATED THAT 75 PER CENT OF THE WEAPONS USED BY TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND CAME FROM THE U.S. AND GAVE AS MY OWN ESTIMATE THAT THE IRA HAD RAISED MORE MONEY IN THE US IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS THAN THEY HAD RAISED IN THE WHOLE OF 1980. THESE FIGURES SEEMED TO SURPRISE MEESE WHOSE BACKGROUND IN IRISH MATTERS IS NOT AS GOOD AS THAT OF DEAVER OR OF CHIEF OF STAFF BAKER WHO JOINED US FOR THE LATTER PART OF OUR CONVERSATIONS.

4. I PRESSED DEAVER ON THE NEED FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THE TAOISEACH'S MESSAGE AND HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY ASKED RICHARD ALLEN, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER. (I HAVE HAD REGULAR CONTACT WITH ALLEN BEFORE AND SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT SIX MONTHS AGO AND HAVE NOT FOUND HIM VERY SYMPATHETIC TO OUR INTERESTS. HE FREQUENTLY REFERS TO OUR NON-MEMBERSHIP OF NATO AND HAS A SOMEWHAT PRIMITIVE VIEW ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE IRA). DEAVER SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THE PRESS INTEREST, THE U.S. WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO MAKE UP ITS MIND ON THE NATURE OF THEIR RESPONSE TO THE TAOISEACH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE ASKED AGAIN ABOUT THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE PRISONERS' DEMANDS AND WONDERED ALOUD IF WE WERE NOT IN EFFECT ASKING THE BRITISH TO GIVE IN TO WELL CALCULATED BLACKMAIL.

HOUSE, IN HONOUR OF THEIR NEW HONORARY FELLOW. THE PRESIDENT ATTENDED AND I WAS SEATED BESIDE HIM. FOR ABOUT AN HOUR WE HAD A FAIRLY UNINTERRUPTED CONVERSATION, PRIMARILY ABOUT IRELAND AND IRISH-AMERICA. HE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE TAOISEACH'S MESSAGE AND ABOUT THE TRAGIC NATURE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRELAND. HE SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED HIS ADVISERS TO STUDY THE TAOISEACH'S REQUEST AS A MATTER OF URGENCY BUT HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT QUOTE THIS IS ONE FOR ME UNQUOTE. I EXPLAINED THAT BY AND LARGE LONDON AND DUBLIN HAD BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFICULTIES BY BILATERAL CONTACTS EVEN IN THE LAST DIFFICULT TWELVE YEARS. ON THE H-BLOCK ISSUE, WE HAD, HOWEVER, NOW EXHAUSTED THE OBVIOUS BILATERAL AND EVEN SOME INTERNATIONAL CHANNELS AND WE FELT THAT U.S. INFLUENCE MIGHT BE HELPFUL. THIS LED TO A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WHICH REVEALED THAT THE PRESIDENT ASSUMED A CONSIDERABLY STRONGER ELEMENT OF ANGLOPHOBIA IN OUR ATTITUDE TO THE BRITISH THAN IS IN FACT THE CASE.

6. THE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND PROCEEDED TO GIVE HIS OWN ANALYSIS BEFORE I COULD RESPOND. HE SAW IT AS A WAR BETWEEN TWO RIVAL RELIGIOUS FACTIONS AND HE WONDERED WHY THE HEADS OF THE CHURCHES COULD NOT GIVE A MORE POSITIVE LEAD. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT QUOTE THAT FANATIC PAISLEY UNQUOTE WOULD NOT CO-OPERATE WITH THE TRADITIONAL CHURCH LEADERS BUT COULD THEY NOT GO AHEAD WITHOUT PAISLEY. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THE CHURCH LEADERS HAD IN FACT FREQUENTLY COME TOGETHER TO MAKE JOINT APPEALS AND INDEED NOW MET ON A REGULAR BASIS. AN INTER-CHURCH GROUP HAD ALSO ISSUED A REPORT IN THE MID-SEVENTIES WHICH CONTAINED THE UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT THAT THERE WAS NO MORAL BASIS FOR THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN IRELAND. THE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED ABOUT EXTERNAL MEDDLING IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND AGAIN GAVE HIS OWN REPLY BEFORE I COULD RESPOND. THE COMMUNISTS WERE, HE SAID, OBVIOUSLY INVOLVED AS THEY HAD BEEN, FOR EXAMPLE, ON US CAMPUSES DURING THE VIETNAM ERA. HE THEN WENT ON TO GIVE A LENGTHY ANALYSIS OF THAT ERA EXPLAINING THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE WINNING UNTIL THE SILENT MAJORITY PULLED ITSELF TOGETHER. HE ASKED WHAT HOPE THERE WAS THAT THE MAJORITY IN BOTH SECTIONS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND COMMUNITY MIGHT RISE UP AND THROW THE TERRORISTS OFF ITS BACK. I EXPLAINED THE HISTORY OF THE IRA, OF THE UNIONIST PARA-MILITARY ORGANISATIONS AND OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND BUT AM NOT CERTAIN THAT I SUCCEEDED IN DOING MUCH MORE THAN CONFUSING THE PRESIDENT.

7. AS REGARDS EXTERNAL MEDDLING, I ATTEMPTED TO DOWNPLAY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND TALKED ABOUT THE FINANCIAL, MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND FROM GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE U.S. ON THAT TOPIC, I FOUND THE PRESIDENT WELL INFORMED AND ANXIOUS TO HELP IN ANY WAY HE COULD. HE TALKED OF THE NATURE OF IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE U.S. AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE WAY IN WHICH THIRD GENERATION PEOPLE TOOK A DEEPER PRIDE AND INTEREST IN THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN THAN PREVIOUS GENERATIONS DID. THEIR INTEREST, HOWEVER, WAS NOT ALWAYS IN THE CURRENT REALITIES IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES IN EXPLAINING TO IRISH-AMERICANS THE EXACT NATURE OF THE NI SITUATION. HE AGAIN REFERRED TO COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER REMINDING IRISH-AMERICANS ON EVERY APPROPRIATE OCCASION THAT THE IRA OF TODAY WAS NOT THAT OF SIXTY YEARS AGO BUT WAS NOW A SMALL BAND OF TERRORISTS OPERATING WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE.

8. THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS ABOUT HIS VISITS TO IRELAND IN 1948 AND IN 1972, HIS FAMILY TREE AND HIS MOVIE MAKING DAYS. HE WAS VERY RELAXED AND WARM THROUGHOUT THE MEAL AND SEEMS TO HAVE MADE A FULL RECOVERY FROM HIS BULLET WOUNDS.

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URGENT
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TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON
FOR RONAN MURPHY FROM F SHERIDAN

cc.

PSM

PSS

Mr. Nelson

Mr. Burke

Mr. Kipwan

Mr. Willis

Ronan Murphy

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A TELEGRAM SENT TODAY TO MRS THATCHER
BY MEMBERS OF THE FRIENDS OF IRELAND:

"AS MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEATH OF YET
ANOTHER HUNGER STRIKER, MARTIN HURSON, IN THE MAZE PRISON IN
NORTHERN IRELAND. WE ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPARENT
LACK OF COMMITMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO REACH THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE HOPEFUL INITIATIVE OF THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR
JUSTICE AND PEACE AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PRISONERS DEMONSTRATE
THAT A REASONABLE COMPROMISE CAN BE FOUND WHICH IS SATISFACTORY
TO BOTH SIDES, WITHOUT COMPROMISING IN ANY WAY ON THE BASIC
PRINCIPLE OF OPPOSITION TO VIOLENCE.

IN THEIR STATEMENT ON JULY 4, THE PRISONERS HAVE INDICATED THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC REFORMS IN THE PRISON REGIME AS
THE FOUNDATION FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE HUNGER STRIKE. TO END THE
CURRENT DEADLY IMPASSE, WE URGE YOU IMMEDIATELY TO SEND A
REPRESENTATIVE INTO THE MAZE PRISON, TO TALK WITH THE PRISONERS
ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT.

SURELY, IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO SEEK
EVERY POSSIBLE MEANS TO END THE STRIKE BEFORE ANY ADDITIONAL DEATHS
OCCUR."

IT WAS SIGNED BY THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS:

SENATE

=====

EDWARD M KENNEDY
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN
CHRISTOPHER J DODD
THOMAS F EAGLETON
DANIEL K INOUE
PATRICK J LEAHY
GARY HART
CARL LEVIN
HOWARD M METZENBAUM
PAUL E TSONGAS

HOUSE

=====

THOMAS P O'NEILL JR, SPEAKER.
CHARLES F DOUGHERTY
JAMES M SHANNON
SILVIO CONTE
EDWARD P BOLAND
JAMES J HOWARD
PETER W RODINO JR
JONATHAN BINGHAM
BILL GREEN
PATRICIA SCHROEDER
MATTHEW F MCHUGH
WILLIAM J COYNE
WILLIAM LEHMAN
EDWARD J MARKEY
ROY DYSON
GERALDINE FERRARO
JAMES K COYNE
JOE MOAKLEY
DON EDWARDS
JOSEPH EARLY
BERKLEY BEDELL
WILLIAM R COTTER
BARNEY FRANK
BOB TRAXLER
THOMAS LANTOS
BERNARD DWYER
EDWIN B FORSYTHE

END

15 JULY 1981

TIME SENT: 1645 HRS

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PSS

Letter handed over to President Reagan 14 July, 1981

Dear Mr. President,

On the happy occasion of your visiting the Embassy of Ireland today, I wish to ask your help on a matter of great urgency and importance.

Since its inception our State has had to fight an almost continuous battle against terrorism, a battle which is now at a critical stage.

My Government deeply appreciate your firm opposition to support by Americans for terrorism in Ireland.

The hunger strike crisis in Northern Ireland has increased support for terrorist organisations, is benefitting them and is now seriously threatening our security.

The hunger striker next expected to die, Kieran Doherty, is an elected member of our own legislature. It is expected that he will die on Friday next.

I beg you to use your enormous influence with the British Prime Minister within the next 24 hours, with a view to the immediate implementation of an already existing understanding mediated by the Commission of Justice and Peace of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy so as to avert his death, so preventing the very dangerous consequences which would inevitably follow.

With my best wishes

Yours sincerely

Garret FitzGerald

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To:

From:

Mr. Hume telephoned to say he had put out a statement making the following points in relation to the disturbances in Britain.

1. Mrs. Thatcher's statement indicating shock that such events could take place in "our country" underlines the colonial status of Northern Ireland.
2. Mr. Whitelaw's statement that he is unwilling to see rubber bullets used has the same effect.
3. His statement to the effect that plastic bullets are lethal is no more than the reality well known to the people of Northern Ireland.
4. The British Government should now acknowledge the reality exposed in these statements. The people of Northern Ireland should recognise that their future is in their own hands and depends on the development of relations between the peoples of this island.


M. Lillis.
14th July, 1981.

c.c. P.S. Taoiseach, Mr. Nally, Mr. Kirwan, Mr. Hourican,
Mr. Neligan (DFA)

Revised on phone calls
Amb. Doolan &

14/7/81

Letter handed over to President Reagan 14 July, 1981

Dear Mr. President,

On the happy occasion of your visiting the Embassy of Ireland today, I wish to ask your help on a matter of great urgency and importance.

Since its inception our State has had to fight an almost continuous battle against terrorism which is now at a critical stage.

a battle

My Government deeply appreciate your firm opposition to support for terrorism in Ireland by Americans. We also appreciate the courageous leadership shown in this matter by prominent Americans of Irish extraction notably speaker O'Neill.

The hunger strike crisis in Northern Ireland has increased support for terrorist organisations, is benefitting them and is now seriously threatening our security.

The hunger striker next expected to die, Kieran Doherty, is an elected member of our own legislature. It is expected that he will die on Friday next.

I beg you to use your enormous influence with the British Prime Minister within the next 24 hours to implement immediately an already existing understanding mediated by the Commission of Justice and Peace of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy to avert his death so preventing the very dangerous consequences which would inevitably follow.

With my best wishes

Yours sincerely

Garret Fitzgerald

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UNNUMBERED
14TH JULY 1981
IMMEDIATE

TO PMUNNEWYORK FROM HQ
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ASST SEC NELIGAN

MMCTYPO

HERE AMENDMENT OUR C397 TO YOU

PLEASE INSERT AS A NEW PARAGRAPH BEFORE PARAGRAPH BEGINNING
"THE HUNGER STRIKE CRISIS" (PARA 4) THE FOLLOWING TEXT.

MY GOVERNMENT DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR FIRM OPPOSITION TO SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM IN IRELAND (BY AMERICANS). WE ALSO APPRECIATE
THE COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP SHOWN IN THIS MATTER BY PROMINENT
AMERICANS OF IRISH EXTRACTION NOTABLY SPEAKER O'NEILL.

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Note
I asked Mr. Neligan to
tell Ambassador Doolan to
introduce the amendments
indicated. 14/7

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C397
14TH JULY 1981
IMMEDIATE
TO PMUNNEWYORK FROM HQ
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ASST SEC NELIGAN

CODED MESSAGE	
IMMEDIATE URGENT	
CONFIDENTIAL	
DATE... 14/7/81	TIME... 11.17
INITIALS... <i>G. FitzGerald</i>	

MMFKRIE
FOLLOWING IS COPY OF C184 JUST SENT TO WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO BE HANDED TO PRESIDENT ON OCCASION OF HIS PRESENCE IN EMBASSY TODAY.

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

1. ON THE HAPPY OCCASION OF YOUR VISITING THE EMBASSY OF IRELAND TODAY, I WISH TO ASK YOUR HELP ON A MATTER OF GREAT URGENCY AND IMPORTANCE.
2. SINCE ITS INCEPTION OUR STATE HAS HAD TO FIGHT AN ALMOST CONTINUOUS BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM WHICH IS NOW AT A CRITICAL STAGE.
3. MY GOVERNMENT APPRECIATES YOUR FIRM OPPOSITION TO SUPPORT TERRORISM IN IRELAND BY AMERICANS.
4. THE HUNGER STRIKE CRISIS IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS INCREASED SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS, IS BENEFITTING THEM AND IS NOW SERIOUSLY THREATENING OUR SECURITY.
5. THE HUNGER STRIKER NEXT EXPECTED TO DIE, KIERAN DOHERTY, IS AN ELECTED MEMBER OF OUR OWN LEGISLATURE. IT IS EXPECTED THAT HE WILL DIE ON FRIDAY NEXT.
6. I BEG YOU TO USE YOUR ENORMOUS INFLUENCE WITH THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS TO IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATELY AN ALREADY EXISTING UNDERSTANDING MEDIATED BY THE COMMISSION OF JUSTICE AND PEACE OF THE IRISH CATHOLIC HIERARCHY TO AVERT HIS DEATH SO PREVENTING THE VERY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW.

with best wishes
Yours sincerely

G. FitzGerald

PARAGRAPHS ABOVE HAVE BEEN NUMBERED FOR CLARITY. PLEASE DO NOT NUMBER IN TYPED UP TEXT FOR DELIVERY.

*with a view to forwarding
the implementation*

I M M E D I A T E

TO HQ FROM PERM. REP. BRUSSELS

FOR P. WALSH FROM M. HOEY

COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE : PLEASE COPY P.S.M.

SUBJECT : MEETINGS WITH IRISH AND BRITISH PRESS: 13 JULY 1981

P. Walshe RSM
~~ASS~~
 McNeiligan
 DIT
 GPS

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1. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON, MINISTER-DESIGNATE MET SEPARATELY THE IRISH AND BRITISH PRESS CORPS YESTERDAY.
 2. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO THE JOURNALISTS BEFOREHAND THAT THE MINISTER WAS NOT CALLING A FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE BUT WAS PREPARED TO MEET JOURNALISTS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS FIRST VISIT TO BRUSSELS.
 3. THE MINISTER BEGAN BOTH MEETINGS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD HELD AT HIS REQUEST A FIFTEEN MINUTE MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON FOLLOWED BY A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WHICH LASTED ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR. HE CONVEYED TO LORD CARRINGTON THE GRAVE CONCERN OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE DEEPENING CONSEQUENCIES OF THE CONTINUANCE OF THE HUNGER STRIKE. HE AMPLIFIED FOR THE BENEFIT OF LORD CARRINGTON THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT LED THE TAOISEACH IN HIS STATEMENT EARLIER IN THE DAY TO CALL FOR BOTH SIDES TO SHOW URGENCY AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE EMPHASISED THAT IF NECESSARY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PRISONERS CONCERNED.
 4. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM THE IRISH JOURNALISTS THE MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS BOTH MINISTERS WOULD REVEAL ONLY WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAD SAID AND WOULD NOT DISCLOSE THE REPLIES OF THE OTHER. ASKED ABOUT LORD CARRINGTON'S REACTION TO WHAT HE HAD HEARD, THE MINISTER SAID THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY, AND HAD AGREED THAT AN OFFICIAL SHOULD REMAIN TO HEAR A FULLER DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRISH CONCERNS. (LORD CARRINGTON HAD A VERY HEAVY SCHEDULE AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL). ASKED BY JOHN COONEY (IRISH TIMES) IF THE MINISTER HAD ANYTHING TO PUT TO THE BRITISH SIDE, HE WAS TOLD THAT SINCE THE MEETING IN LONDON ON FRIDAY LAST THERE WAS NOW A GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY. THE MINISTER SAID HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT AS FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON WAS CONCERNED WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUNGER STRIKE OUTSIDE N. IRELAND. A QUESTION WAS PUT AS TO WHETHER THE IRISH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER RAISING THE PROBLEM OF N. IRELAND IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL COOPERATION. THE MINISTER MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF TAKING IT OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL CONTEXT AT THE PRESENT TIME. FINALLY THE MATTER OF THE JOINT STUDIES WAS RAISED. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THERE HAD BEEN ANY LOSS OF MOMENTUM.

5. THE MINISTER THEN MET A GROUP OF BRITISH JOURNALISTS AND MADE THE SAME OPENING REMARKS AS WITH THE IRISH PRESS. THE MINISTER SAID THAT EVERY DEATH IN THE MAZE WAS POTENTIAL PROPAGANDA FOR THE IRA WHO WOULD BE THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES IF THE SITUATION WERE TO CONTINUE. THE EFFECTS OF THE HUNGER STRIKE WENT BEYOND OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND COULD BE CLEARLY SEEN IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE. ASKED BY MICHAEL HORNSBY (TIMES) IF THERE WOULD BE A CHANGE OF POLICY BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE HUNGER STRIKE. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE OF POLICY BUT THAT THE POLICY MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. ASKED IF HE HAD SUGGESTED CONCRETE ACTION TO LORD CARRINGTON, THE MINISTER MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT DICTATING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE WERE OFFERING OUR APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION AND OUR ADVICE AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. HORNSBY (TIMES) ASKED IF THE WORDS "DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PRISONERS CONCERNED" IMPLIED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE IRA. IN REPLY THE MINISTER ADMITTED THAT THE WORD "DEAL" WAS PERHAPS NOT THE BEST WORD, "DISCUSS" MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE DISTINCTION WHICH IS NOT OFTEN MADE BUT OUGHT TO BE BETWEEN THE PRISONERS THEMSELVES AND THE IRA SPOKESMEN. FINALLY, THE MINISTER FELT THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A SOLUTION WITHOUT SACRIFICING PRINCIPLES.
6. THE MINISTER GAVE NO RADIO OR T.V. INTERVIEW.
7. I ATTACH AT THE MINISTER'S REQUEST A LIST OF THE JOURNALISTS HE MET YESTERDAY.

IRISH MEDIA:

JOHN COONEY	IRISH TIMES
RORY WATSON	IRISH PRESS
ROSE MOERS	CORK EXAMINER
WILLIE DILLON	IRISH INDEPENDENT
EAMONN LAWLER	RTE

BRITISH PRESS

JOHN PALMER	GUARDIAN (EUROPEAN EDITOR)
MICHAEL HORNSBY	TIMES (BUREAU CHIEF)
JOHN WYLES	FINANCIAL TIMES (BUREAU CHIEF)
DONALD MILNER	BBC (CHIEF EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT)
CLIFFORD SMITH	BBC (WORLD SERVICE)
GEOFF MEAD	PRESS ASSOCIATION
JOHN HUMPHRIES	BELFAST TELEGRAPH
NICK PETERS	INDEPENDENT NEWS
ERIC KENNEDY	DAILY MAIL
ALAN OSBORN	DAILY TELEGRAPH .

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14/7/1981.

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END

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C1059

Secretary
Mr. W. Keenan → *having* *the rest*
of his report → *typed* *up*

(Signature) 14.7.81

14.7.81 9/23

DRS

IMMEDIATE

TO HQ FROM PRB

FOR M. BURKE FROM O'DWYER

MMLKJHY

SUBJECT: REPORT BY P. MACKERNAN OF MEETING OF MINISTER DOOGE
AND LORD CARRINGTON AND BRITISH OFFICIAL BULLARD
13 JULY 1981

- SECOND PART - TYPED COPY OF FIRST PART WITH MACKERNAN.

WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A SETTLEMENT THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE BASIS FOR THIS PROPOSAL IN THE STATEMENT MADE LAST WEEK BY THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, WHEN AFTER A SHORT RESPITE AND AMID CONFUSION AND MUDDLE THE HUNGER STRIKE RESUMED.

THE MONITORING ROLE SUGGESTED FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COULD SERVE TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING - IF A SETTLEMENT COULD BE REACHED TO THE CURRENT HUNGER STRIKE. SINCE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAD KEPT OPEN THE FEALY CASE WE FEEL THEY ARE THUS IN A POSITION TO PLAY THE MONITORING ROLE WE HAVE IN MIND.

THE MINISTER WENT ON TO TALK OF THE SITUATION IN THE MAZE ITSELF. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OPTIONS:

FIRST

- OMP COULD STAND STILL AND LET THE HUNGER STRIKE CONTINUE IN THE HOPE THAT THE PRISONERS WOULD GIVE UP OR DIE. THIS COURSE COULD BE POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS.

SECONDLY

- OMP COULD TRY TO GET BACK ON THE COURSE OF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT - WHICH EARLY LAST WEEK WE FELT WAS POSSIBLE. AT THAT TIME THE PRISONERS WERE TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF THE IRA. IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT ALL THE STATEMENTS ISSUED BY THE IRA ON BEHALF OF THE PRISONERS GENUINELY REFLECT THE LATTER'S STATE OF MIND.
- BUT THIS DEATH AND THE PRISONERS' REACTION TO DEATHS TEND TO PUSH THE PRISONERS BACK UNDER THE IRA'S CONTROL.
- THERE WAS NO POINT IN REITERATING THE EVENTS WHICH LEAD TO THE BREAKDOWN IN THE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS LAST WEEK. THESE HAD BEEN RECOUNTED IN DETAIL IN LONDON LAST WEEK.
- HOWEVER IF WE ARE TO AVOID SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WE FEEL THAT IT IS NECESSARY NOW TO GET BACK ON COURSE.

IN SUMMARY OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE:

1. DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE PRISONERS. WE DONT SAY NEGOTIATE, WE FULLY ACCEPT AND RESPECT THE UK'S REFUSAL (A) TO CONCEDE 'SPECIAL STATUS OR POLITICAL STATUS' AND WE ARE IN NO WAY ASKING FOR THIS, (B) NOR ARE WE ASKING THE UK TO ABANDON THE PRINCIPLE THAT HMS PRISONERS SHOULD BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF HM PRISON OFFICERS AND NO ONE ELSE.
2. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO SPELL OUT IN DETAIL WHAT YOU SHOULD DO.
3. WE FEEL THAT THERE IS STILL A ROLE FOR THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE. (AT THIS POINT THE ICJP STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY STILL ENVISAGED A POSITIVE ROLE FOR THE COMMISSION WAS EXPLAINED).

- ~~~~~
- FINALLY - AS TO THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE SAW THIS TOO AS A POSSIBILITY BUT AFTER A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

(FURTHER NOTE ON CONVERSATION WITH JULIAN BULLARD TO FOLLOW)

END

BJU

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26730 IVERN B#
25300F ESTR E10

Note for Minister.

P S S

- (1) Liam Hourican and Michael Lillis phoned at 10.50 approx. Hourican asked me to let the Minister know that the G.I.S. intended to inform the Press that you would meet Lord Carrington today in relation to the situation in the Maze. Hourican also said that they had received a number of telephone calls, including some from relatives of Martin Hurson. The relatives were also told of the intended contact with Carrington. A Government statement on the death of Martin Hurson would issue later.*
- (2) Lillis summarised the points which it was the Taoiseach's wish should be made to Carrington, as follows:
- The Irish Commission for Justice and Peace have said that in view of recent developments the British Government should deal directly with the prisoners.
 - This call has been reiterated by John Hume.
 - The Irish Government also considered that it is necessary for the British authorities to deal directly with the prisoners. Although the Irish Ministers who spoke with Messrs. Atkins and Gilmour last Friday had not explicitly urged direct discussions, developments in the interval i.e. the prisoners' statement that they saw no further role for the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, together with the death of Martin Hurson this morning, have made direct talks with the prisoners imperative and urgent.

* Text attached.

- A further role for the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace however is not ruled out. The Commission's proposals and work have provided the substantive basis for a settlement of the issue - a point which was emphasised on Friday last; and this remains the case.

(Department of Foreign Affairs (David Nelligan) has also been told of these developments.)

I told Lillis that the Minister had had contact with Carrington with a view to fixing a meeting between them later in the day. There was no discussion of substance. Carrington (in the view of Ambassador Dillon, who was present) seemed to be stalling. However the principle of the meeting was agreed; timing remains to be decided.

P. MacKernan

P. MacKernan
Brussels, 13 July 1981.

12.30
25300d estr ei

for attention of mr p mckernan
irish delegation

from m burke
dfa
dublin

13/7/81

following is the text of a statement which has been issued by the taoiseach. please bring to the attention of the minister as soon as possible.

i extend my deepest sympathy to the family of martin hurson whose brother i have met twice in recent weeks. i renew my call to both sides in this tragic dispute to show urgency and flexibility and to act before still further lives are lost whether inside or outside the parrison.

i call on the british government to respond to the arguments presented by my government in london on friday last and to the calls made at the weekend by the irish commission for justice and peace and the leader of the sdlp.

end end end

25300d estr ei

25300d

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Statement Issued by the Taoiseach,
Dr. Garret Fitzgerald T.D.

I extend my deep sympathy to the family of Martin Hurson, whose brother I have met twice in recent weeks.

I renew my call to both sides in this tragic dispute to show urgency and flexibility and to act before still further lives are lost, whether inside or outside the prison.

I call on the British Government to respond to the arguments presented on behalf of my Government in London on Friday last and to the calls made at the weekend by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace and by the Leader of the SDLP.

Dublin, 13 July 1981

URGENT

R Murphy

TO HQ FROM WASHINGTON
FOR R MURPHY FROM F SHERIDAN

cc. PSM
PSS
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Bush
Mr. Kinn
Mr. Miller

1. GRATEFUL FOR TEXT OF STATEMENT BY CARDINAL O'FLAICH AND TEXT OF ANY STATEMENT BY GIS OR OTHER RELATING TO CARRINGTON-DOOGE YESTERDAY.
2. WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR 312, FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SPEAKER ON 13 JULY 1981.

STATEMENT BY THE SPEAKER, MR THOMAS P O'NEILL JR, ON THE DEATH OF MARTIN HURSON IN THE HUNGER STRIKE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE DEATH TODAY OF THE SIXTH IRISH HUNGER STRIKER, MR MARTIN HURSON, DEEPLY CONCERNS ME. IT IS VERY LIKELY IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WILLING TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE HUNGER STRIKERS IN A REASONABLE AND SINCERE FASHION.

FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF BOBBY SANDS, ON MAY 6TH, SENATORS KENNEDY AND MOYNIHAN, GOVERNOR CAREY AND I SENT A TELEGRAM TO MRS THATCHER REQUESTING THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CEASE ITS "POSTURE OF INFLEXIBILITY" RELATIVE TO THE DEMANDS OF THE HUNGER STRIKERS.

MRS THATCHER TOOK ISSUE WITH OUR REQUEST: TREATING IT AS IF IT WERE A REQUEST FOR POLITICAL STATUS, WHICH IT WAS NOT. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR SINCE THE INTERVENTION OF THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE THAT BECAUSE THE PRISONERS ARE SEEKING THESE CONCESSIONS FOR ALL PRISONERS IN THE MAZE PRISON, ARMAGH JAIL, AND CRUMLLIN ROAD JAIL REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, THAT A GENUINE OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATION EXISTED.

MRS THATCHER IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY IGNORED, DISCOUNTED OR MISHANDLED OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS THAT MIGHT HAVE LED TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE, MOST RECENTLY PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF THE FIFTH HUNGER STRIKER JOE MCDONNELL.

AS THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRELAND HAS SAID, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS THE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY AND THE GREATER POWER IN THIS SITUATION. IT HAS FAILED TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES OR TO USE ITS POWERS EFFECTIVELY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.

LIVES ARE BEING SACRIFICED UNNECESSARILY BECAUSE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS PRINCIPLE IS AT ISSUE WHEN IN FACT IT IS NOT.

TODAY, I CALL ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER THE HUNGER STRIKERS FIVE DEMANDS WITH THE UTMOST URGENCY AND PRIORITY. THIS TRAGIC IMPASSE HAS GONE ON TOO LONG. FURTHER DEATHS CAN AND MUST BE AVOIDED.

13 JULY 1981

END OF MESSAGE

13 JULY 1981

Minister Dooge's Notes for Conversation with Lord Carrington
Brussels - 13 July, 1981

1. The interests of our two Governments in regard to Northern Ireland are not identical in all respects. We do have a common interest in reviving an end to violence and a prerequisite to this is an end to the hunger strike.

Not local
for N.I.O.

2. Every death is a victory for the I.R.A. - a propaganda victory which since the death of Sands has been a world wide victory. We are both aware of the potential damage to our two governments and to our countries of the growth of world wide sympathy for the I.R.A. We have always been anxious to avoid internationalisation of problem but the death of Doghery may make internationalisation inevitable.

3. One result has been the increased flow of arms and money from U.S. This support for the I.R.A. had been greatly reduced due to the strenuous efforts of successive Irish governments.

4. The next likely death is that of an Irish member of Parliament. The effect of this would be to intensify the propaganda effect and increase aid to the I.R.A. A momentum could be developed in both propaganda and supplied which could not be stemmed.

5. We are asking the U.K. government to act with urgency. This was the purpose of the letter from the Taoiseach to the Prime Minister and of our visit to London last Friday.

The policy of waiting for total surrender of the prisoners without any meaningful discussions which would enable them to give up their hunger strike offers no hope for any of the parties involved. A death a week from now on will make the problem less and less tractable.

6. There was the possibility of a settlement without loss of principle one week ago. We accept the Political status and control of the prisons are principles that cannot be

surrendered in the settlement formula set out by the ICJP.

7. We must get back to that or to an equivalent without delay.

ICJP have been repudiated by the IRA on behalf of the prisoners but this does not mean tht they have been repudiated by the prisoners themselves. Government feels that the U.K. Government should if necessary déal with the prisoners. This is the advice of ICJP and of John Hume.

8. Suspicion is a vital factor. Led to breakdown after December settlement. Intermediaries are useful

ICJP

ECHR

intermediary

guarantor

9. ECHR had kept McFeely case open and could play a more general role as guarantor after a settlement. They used the term flexibility and could play a most useful role in the maintenance of a settlement.

10. We need to know within a day or two the intentions of U.K. Government. If this does not happen our position on the problem may be undermined.

Discussion between Minister Dooge and Lord Carrington,
and officials - Brussels - 13 July, 1981

1. The conversation began by the Minister saying that time was pressing and that he would dispense with pleasantries. In opening the discussion with Lord Carrington he was doing so on the basis of two conversations, the first long, the subsequent one more brief with the Taoiseach.
 2. There were a number of specific points which he wished to make to Lord Carrington but before coming to these, he would like to give some of the reasons behind them. Furthermore the Minister suggested that given that Lord Carrington was pressed for time that perhaps Julian Bullard (the UK Political director) would remain behind so that the points made to Lord Carrington could be further amplified.
 3. It was the Minister's hope that Lord Carrington would listen to the points that he had to make, discuss them subsequently with the Secretary for State for Northern Ireland and that both should then in turn pass these on to the Prime Minister.
 4. Carrington, in reply, said that since he was on his way to New York (for the Kampuchea Conference) he had no more than 16 hours in which to talk to the Prime Minister. The Minister in response said that the situation was so urgent we probably didn't have more than 16 hours within which to begin to come to grips with it.
 5. The Minister then began his exposition proper by saying that every death in the Maze was a victory for the I.R.A. Particularly, since the death of Bobby Sands the hunger strike was providing a propaganda victory on a world wide scale for the Provisionals. There is a serious danger that the next death would be that of Kieran Doherty, who is a member of Parliament in the Republic, which will give a further impetus to the propaganda victories being enjoyed by the I.R.A.
-

6. With the way in which the situation is developing currently it is no longer a matter of relevance simply to Northern Ireland or to relations between the UK and Ireland. The growth of world-wide sympathy for the I.R.A. in consequence of the hunger strike will lead to an internationalisation of the problem. Moreover, there is now ^aserious danger that the problem will indeed get out of control. This makes it doubly urgent that Lord Carrington should act before he leaves for America by bringing our concerns to the attention of the Prime Minister.

7. Carrington did not demur but asked if we had specific proposal or requests. The Minister in response said that he would like to refer first to the Taoiseach's letter to Mrs. Thatcher. We would wish that Mrs. Thatcher should give a prompt and a considered reply. Carrington interjected to say that he had seen the letter.

8. Secondly, we believe that the UK Government should deal directly with the prisoners. It was not our intention to try to tell the UK what to do in detail. Nonetheless, we feel that direct talks are now the only thing which can lead to a resolution. The second conversation (which the Minister had referred to earlier with the Taoiseach) related to a further rule for the European Commission for Human Rights.

9. The Government considers that there is a possibility of a renewed role for the H/R Commission but not as an intermediary, since the Commission's procedures were altogether too bureaucratic and slow to meet the urgency of the present situation.

10. However, the Irish Government felt that the European Commission for Human Rights could have a valuable role to play after a settlement. What we had in mind was that the Commission could play a part in 'monitoring' the implementation of a settlement, we hesitated to use the word guarantor.

11. With regard to the possibility of a settlement, the Government believed that the basis for this reposed in the statement made last week by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace. This was the kind of flexible approach which would make a settlement possible without sacrifice of principle and which would enable the prisoners to give up their fast and ignore the I.R.A.

12. The Minister went on to say that the UK Government may reply that if they were to respond to this kind of proposal they would simply be enticed to make a concession which would lead to the kind of outcome that occurred in December last, when, after a short respite and amid confusion and muddle the hunger strike resumed.

13. The Monitoring role suggested for the European Commission of Human Rights could serve to prevent this happening - if a settlement could be reached to the current hunger strike. Since the Human Rights Commission had kept open the McFealy case, we feel they are thus in a position to play the monitoring role we have in mind.

14. The Minister went on to say with regard to situation in the Maze itself, there were a number of options:

- First, one could stand still and let the Hunger strike continue in the hope that the prisoners would give up. This course could be potentially disastrous.
- Secondly, one could try to get back on the course of an agreed settlement - which early last week we felt was possible.

At that time, the prisoners were to a significant extent outside the control of the I.R.A.. It is not the case that all of the statements issued by the I.R.A. on behalf of the prisoners genuinely reflect the latter's state of mind.

- But each death and the prisoners reactions to deaths tend to push the prisoners back under the I.R.A.'s control

15. There was no point in rehearsing the events which lead to the breakdown in the settlement efforts last week. These had been recounted in detail in London on Friday last. However, if we are to avoid serious damage to the interests of our two governments, we feel that it is necessary now to get back on course towards a settlement

16. In summary our recommendations were:

- (i) Deal directly with the prisoners. We don't say negotiate. We fully accept and respect the UK's refusal to concede 'special status' or 'political status', and we are in no way asking for this. Nor are we asking the UK to abandon the principle that HMS's prisons should be under the control of Her Majesty's prison officers and no one else.
- (ii) We are not trying to spell out in detail what you should do.
- (iii) We feel that there is still a role for the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace.
[At this point the ICJP statement to the effect that they still envisaged a passive role for the Commission was explained]
- (iv) Finally - as to the role of the European Commission of Human Rights, we saw this too as a possibility but after a settlement had been reached.

[A further note on ^{the} conversation with Julian Bullard to follow]

Patrick M. MacKernan

PN. MacKernan

cc PSM, *PSMS*
PSS
Mr. Neligan

CONFIDENTIAL

Summary Note of Conversation between Minister Dooge and
Julian Bullard, UK Political Director, Brussels 13/7/1981 P.M.

1. Following Lord Carrington's departure to preside over the Foreign Affairs Council and that of his Private Secretary; the Minister continued the discussion with Mr. Bullard, with the purpose, as indicated to Carrington, of repeating and amplifying the points already made to the latter. The talks lasted in all about one hour, 15 minutes with Carrington, the remainder with Bullard.

2. The Minister began by saying that although the interests of our two governments are not identical in all respects - and indeed contain elements that are in conflict - we have a common interest in ending violence and therefore in bringing an end to the hunger strike.

3. Repeating a point made earlier to Carrington the Minister said that every death is a victory for the IRA - a propaganda victory which since the death of Bobby Sands had become a world wide victory. This internationalisation of the issue ran a grave risk of placing our Government in a false position:

In recent days we had had the experience of representatives of other countries expressing sympathy with their Irish counterparts on the deaths of the hunger strikers and their disapproval of what they saw as the harshness of the British Government's treatment of the IRA.

For sixty years the Irish Government had opposed political violence. All Political Parties in Ireland and successive Governments had condemned political violence. Consequently we are very concerned that the growth of world wide sympathy for the hunger strikers would place the Irish Government in a false position in the propaganda war going on between the UK Government and the IRA.

4. Obviously there was inherent in such a situation serious potential danger for both our Governments and for the relationship between us. We have always been conscious of this danger and consequently are concerned to avoid anything which would promote world wide sympathy for the IRA.

However the death of Sands and the imminent death of Kieran Doherty had already contributed and would inevitably continue to contribute to the dramatic expansion of such sympathy and to the kind of internationalisation which we wished to avoid.

6. Bullard then asked if the Minister would explain what he meant in speaking of "internationalisation". The Minister said that since the death of Sands and of other prisoners in the meantime we had encountered in official calls within the Ten, and outside the Community expressions of concern on the part of Governments. People asked: "surely the Community can do something about this situation"?

It was not difficult to imagine that it was likely that some members would table a resolution in relation to the hunger strike in the European Parliament and that that Resolution might be passed. The Resolution might then come up to be considered by the Council of Ministers.

7. Bullard said that he wondered if the issue was likely to impinge "on the forum in which Paddy MacKernan and I participate" (i.e. The Political Committee, and by extension of European Political Co-Operation generally).

In response, MacKernan said that we were at present engaged in a discussion in EPC on the prospects of broadening the scope of political co-operation so as to include discussion on broad issues of security - of interest to the member States. For our part, and for reasons which related directly to our non-membership of military alliances we could not embark on discussion

/...

of issues directly bearing on defence nor of course was this in fact envisaged. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to generate enthusiasm in Ireland for discussion of even the broader aspects of security, without immediately running up against the question - why should one not discuss the impact on our security of the endless civil strife in Northern Ireland? The violence and instability there had spilled over already to the Republic and has already obliged the Irish Government to spend per capita more than twice what the UK was spending on security in Northern Ireland.

8. The Minister, then referred to a further danger of internationalisation which the hunger strike crisis was bringing about, namely an increase in the flow of money and arms. Successive Irish Governments had made every effort to face down Irish Americans who supported the IRA. These efforts had succeeded in greatly diminishing the influence of the various IRA front organisations, and had reduced the flow of funds and arms from this quarter to a trickle. Since the death of Sands we had little doubt that the tide of opinion in Irish America was turning towards the IRA. Similarly public opinion at home and abroad was in danger of moving in a similar direction.

9. The Minister then invited the undersigned to offer any additional observations. MacKernan said that one of the greatest dangers inherent in recent developments was the impression which it gave to moderate opinion that a reasonable and humane resolution of the hunger strike crisis was impossible. The breakdown of the effort deployed by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, whose credentials and good faith were beyond reproach and known to be so, and the circumstances of the breakdown were likely to have a very adverse effect on moderate opinion. Particularly if the hunger strike persisted and more deaths ensued - there was a grave risk that in Northern Ireland, moderate Catholic opinion would see itself left without hope and in the Republic opinion among the most politically conscious sections of the Community would harden. Similarly in the U.S. opinion among Irish Americans would also harden and efforts made by Irish Government and leaders of Irish American opinion could be vitiated.

10. Bullard:- said that he "had lots of papers in his bag downstairs" with which to refute these arguments. However it was not clear precisely what he meant by this. It is likely that he would have challenged our assessment of the extent of the propaganda gains made by the IRA in America, and our assessment of the impact of the Hunger Strike and the failure of the ICJPs effort on moderate opinion.

11. Resuming the discussion the Minister said that he had stressed to Lord Carrington the need on the part of the British Government for seriousness, urgency and flexibility, in moving to resolve the Hunger Strike crisis. This was the purpose of the Taoiseach's letter to Mrs. Thatcher..

12. In our view waiting for surrender on the part of the prisoners is hopeless. This is a formula for disaster which offers no hope for any of the parties involved. To wait for another death a week from now (i.e. that of Kieran Doherty) would make the problem less and less tractable.

13. Last week there was a possibility of a settlement without loss of principle. We accept that political status and control of the prisoners are principles which cannot and should not be surrendered. But equally, we believe that there would not have been nor would there be any surrender of these principles if the settlement formula proposed by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace were accepted. We see this formula as an honest and imaginative effort to give substance to the recommendation, last year, of the European Commission on Human Rights urging "flexibility" in the application of the principles and rules governing the prison regime:

The Minister stressed that "we are not trying to tell you how to run your prisons no more than we would expect you to try to tell us how we should run those in the Republic".

Nonetheless we believe that if there is to be a resolution of the crisis we must get back to the formula proposed by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace or to an equivalent formula without delay.

14. The role of the Commission for Justice and Peace had been repudiated by the IRA on behalf of the prisoners, but this does not mean that the commission has been repudiated by the prisoners themselves, nor that there is no role now for the ICJP. The Commission have indicated that they would be available again. The Secretary of the ICJP said on Sunday last that they would be prepared to go through the whole process again if need be.

15. However, the Commission have also said that at this stage they do not see themselves as being able to play an active role - they see that role as being a passive one. What is meant by this has not been fully clarified but the one inference may be that the Commission are willing to be present in the event of direct discussions between the prisoners and the authorities.

Moreover, the situation is such that at this point it would be difficult to re-establish the ICJP in a mediating role. Time does not permit this.

16. The Commission has urged that the UK Government should deal with the prisoners direct. This is also the advise of John Hume, and there is no need to emphasise his moderating role and that of his colleagues in the SDLP who have risked their political futures by playing a moderating role.

17. The Minister then referred to the difficulties which the UK Government would encounter in dealing direct with the prisoners. The most basic difficulty would be suspicion Both on the part of the prisoners themselves, and suspicion on the part of the UK authorities of allowing themselves to be manipulated by the IRA, through the prisoners.

18. The risk of such misunderstanding and suspicion was obvious. For example Lord Carrington had asked the question "why if the prisoners were willing to settle for less than the five demands had Sands and the others been willing to die for these demands". The Minister said that, in this connection, it was important to understand the position of Sands. He had been in command of the prisoners at the time of the ending of the Hunger Strike in December last, in circumstances where afterwards Sands had felt the prisoners should not have

given up. Then he in turn had gone on Hunger Strike and persisted to his death.

These men are undoubtedly terrorists but they have their own principles, which however distorted ("crooked") are principles nonetheless to which they believe they must adhere.

Once a prisoner has begun a hunger strike he becomes emotionally committed. Moreover as the process goes on and the prisoner's condition deteriorates his suspiciousness and that of the other prisoners as a group mounts and as the prisoner nears death, the group becomes more and more paranoiac.

20. It would be very wrong for the British Government to feel that the settlement in December came about only when a prisoner had gone into a coma (and thus brought irresistible pressure on his comrades). The events of December in no way justify or point to the effectiveness of "brinkmanship" in this situation.

In fact all the evidence shows that the coma of the prisoner in December (Sean McKenna) was an incidental factor in ending the strike then.

However, there is evidence that the growth of suspicion was a major factor in the rejection of the British statement of July 8th (immediately after the death of Joe McDonnell).

./...

21. We did not want to lay undue stress on the notion of 'Brinkmanship' nor to suggest that a tactical approach is being resorted to. However, should there be no apparent movement towards a resolution there is a danger that the UK may be seen as using this tactic.

22. As to the European Commission for Human Rights, it seemed clear that the Commission can't play a part in a quick settlement of the hunger strike. However (as had been suggested to Lord Carrington) we felt the Commission could play a part in maintaining a settlement.

23. The ECHR has kept the McFealy case open and could play a more general role as monitor of a settlement. The term or concept of "flexibility" was suggested by the Commission originally. Consequently we feel that the Commission could play a useful role in the maintenance of a settlement.

23. Finally the Minister emphasised that the Taoiseach needed to know "within a day or two" the UK's intentions. Kieran Doherty may die within a week. But as the death of Martin Hurson this morning shows, calculations in situations like this are perilous.

If there is no move forward the position of the Irish Government on the problem will be undermined. We could find ourselves put in the false position - ranged on the side of the IRA against the UK Government. That is the last position we would want to be in. But the pressure on us is likely to increase if there is no movement.

24. The discussion with Bullard concluded with an agreement that each side would confine its remarks to the press to a statement of the main points which it had made to the other. The Irish side said it would draw up a brief note of the line which it intended to take, which we would show to the UK. This was done and the attached text given to Bullard by the undersigned.

Carrington when shown the text said that he was content with the line proposed. However, in the event, we were informed of this when the interviews with the press had concluded. The UK delegation understandably, having been unable to put the text before him, while he was chairing the Ministerial meeting.

P. MacKernan

P. MacKernan
Brussels 13/7/81

c.c. PSM, *psms*
PSS
Mr. Neligan.

Line taken by Minister Dooge with the Press

- A meeting with Lord Carrington took place at my request and was followed by a subsequent discussion at official level

- I conveyed to Lord Carrington the grave concern of the Irish Government in regard to the seriousness of the continuing hunger strike in the Maze Prison, the need for urgency in seeking a solution and the possibility of a solution involving a degree of flexibility

- I amplified for the benefit of Lord Carrington the considerations that lead the Taoiseach in his statement earlier today to call for both sides to show urgency and flexibility in the present situation. In this context, I emphasised that if necessary the British Government should deal directly with the prisoners concerned.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To:

From:

Note for Information of Taoiseach

Professor Dooge telephoned me from Brussels. He had a 15 minute conversation with Lord Carrington followed by a 45 minute exchange with Julian Bullard, the British Political Director. Professor Dooge was accompanied by Paddy MacKernan, our Political Director.

Carrington was sympathetic in his personal attitude to Professor Dooge but did not seem well briefed on the issue. Professor Dooge amplified the Taoiseach's statement on the Hurson death of this morning and urged on Carrington that the British should if necessary deal directly with the prisoners concerned. Professor Dooge emphasised the urgency of the situation: the Irish Government's growing concern, the fact that moderate opinion at home and abroad was being turned off.

In reply to Carrington's questions Professor Dooge said that at this moment he saw only a monitoring role for the European Commission of Human Rights: they could not have a role in mediation given the time available.

Carrington is leaving for New York in 16 hours. Professor Dooge asked him to talk urgently to the Prime Minister and Atkins. Professor Dooge's impression (no more than that) was that he would

Conclusion: Professor Dooge thought he had got his points across but did not perceive any greater sense of urgency than we had seen Friday last.

Professor Dooge is meeting correspondents this afternoon and will base himself largely on the Taoiseach's statement of this morning.

He returns to Dublin tonight and will telephone the Taoiseach.

M. Lillis
13 July, 1981.

c.c. Mr. Nally, Mr. Kirwan, Mr. Hourigan, Mr. Neligan (D. F.A.)

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

Telephone Conversation with Mr. B. Smith

British Embassy

Mr. ^{me}Barry Smith, British Embassy, phoned at about 11 a.m. on 13 July, 1981 to seek clarification in respect of the attached story on page 1 of the "Irish Times" of today. He ^{referred}adhered to comments attributed to "Government Sources". He wondered whether this meant the Head of the G.I.S. and specifically ~~enquired~~ whether various statements to which reference was made in the report were a true reflection of Government views here. The first of these statements was the quotation indicating that

"We are hoping that the British will convey an attitude less rigid than that encountered on Friday, and that within the next four to five days they would have direct talks with the hunger strikers".

Another of these statement was that indicating that the prison issue had now placed all other aspects of Anglo-Irish relations "in the doldrums". Finally, he referred to the suggestion that there would almost certainly be a meeting in Brussels today between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister-Designate and the British Foreign Secretary.

I gave Mr. Smith an initial response and subsequently, having discussed some of the matters raised with the Head of the G.I.S., went back to him a second time. I told him that the "Government Sources" quoted did not refer to the Head of the G.I.S. (and mentioned in passing that the page 1 story in the previous day's Sunday Tribune did not emanate from the G.I.S. either). I said, however, that the tone of the Irish Times story was broadly speaking a fair reflection of the acute concern felt in Government circles in Dublin which had been forcefully conveyed at the meeting in London on 10 July.

In relation to the question of direct talks between the prisoners and the British authorities, I indicated that we were aware that the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace remained ready to play a somewhat more active role than the "passive" role referred to in some media reports. There would be anxiety in Dublin that the contacts with the Commission be taken up in parallel. We would normally prefer that the resolution of ^{issue}initial such as the present H-Blocks issue should be through a responsible body such as the Commission and we would not be keen, in normal circumstances, on direct talks with I.R.A. prisoners. However, given the urgency of the present situation, with a very sensitive event looming up very rapidly, the view

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

-2-

was now taken here that the question of holding direct talks with the prisoners lay in the area of subsidiary principle to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had referred in London which could be relaxed. In this connection, I recall that before Christmas the British authorities had sent an official of the Northern Ireland Office into the prison to talk directly to the hunger strikers at that time. On the more difficult issue, of talking simultaneously to hunger strikers and to Brendan McFarlane, the leader of the Provisional prisoners in the H-Blocks, ~~are a cause~~ ^{recalled} that at the time of the visit to the prison by the delegation from the European Commission of Human Rights, the British had been prepared to permit the presence of McFarlane with the hunger strikers, although they had drawn the line at the presence of Gerry Adams or Danny Morrison.

As regards the references in the Irish Times report to the wider effects on Anglo-Irish relations and the Joint Studies process, I said that preoccupation with the detail of attempts to bring about a resolution of the hunger strike deadlock and with other urgent matters, had meant that the Government had been unable as yet to consider such matters as the Joint Studies process in specific terms. I said, however, that as indicated in the letter from the Taoiseach to the Prime Minister and at the meeting in London on 10 July, the Government were anxious to further the development of relations but that so long as the present situation continued, they would be faced with very considerable difficulties in this respect. I explained that the present situation referred to the widespread public perception that at a critical junct^{ure} ~~ion~~ last week, where it seemed that a resolution of the deadlock was very close, difficulties raised on the British side had lead to the opportunity being missed. Until these difficulties were overcome, through the British Government being seen to again take up the possibility-which in our perception remained-of resolving the issue on the basis of the outcome of the discussions held with the I.C.J.P., the development of Anglo-Irish relations would be severely impeded.

As regards the question of a meeting between Irish Ministers and Lord Carrington in Brussels, I said that I was aware that an initial contact had been established today with the Foreign Secretary with a view to the possibility of a side meeting in Brussels this evening. I understood that on the basis of that initial contact the possibility of a meeting was no more than that and perhaps not a particularly strong possibility.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

-3-

received
I revealed the clear impression that Smith had been *specifically* asked to report to London on these matters.

W. Kirwan

W. Kirwan, Assistant Secretary.
13th July, 1981.

c c. *Mr. Nally*
Mr. Ellis
Mr. Howman
Mr. Reigan, D / F / A .

Discussion between Minister Dooge and Lord Carrington,
and officials - Brussels - 13 July, 1981

1. The conversation began by the Minister saying that time was pressing and that he would dispense with pleasantries. In opening the discussion with Lord Carrington he was doing so on the basis of two conversations, the first long, the subsequent one more brief with the Taoiseach.
 2. There were a number of specific points which he wished to make to Lord Carrington but before coming to these he would like to give some of the reasons behind them. Furthermore, the Minister suggested that given that Lord Carrington was pressed for time that perhaps Julian Bullard (the UK Political director) would remain behind so that the points made to Lord Carrington could be further amplified.
 3. It was the Minister's hope that Lord Carrington would listen to the points that he had to make, discuss them subsequently with the Secretary for State for Northern Ireland and that both should then in turn pass these on to the Prime Minister.
 4. Carrington, in reply, said that since he was on his way to New York (for the Kampuchea Conference) he had no more than 16 hours in which to talk to the Prime Minister. The Minister in response said that the situation was so urgent we probably didn't have more than 16 hours within which to begin to come to grips with it.
 5. The Minister then began his exposition proper by saying that every death in the Maze was a victory for the I.R.A. Particularly, since the death of Bobby Sands the hunger strike was providing a propaganda victory on a world wide scale for the Provisionals. There is a serious danger that the next death would be that of Kieran Doherty, who is a member of Parliament in the Republic, which will give a further impetus to the propaganda victories being enjoyed by the I.R.A.
-

6. With the way in which the situation is developing currently it is no longer a matter of relevance simply to Northern Ireland or to relations between the UK and Ireland. The growth of world-wide sympathy for the I.R.A. in consequence of the hunger strike will lead to an internationalisation of the problem. Moreover, there is now^a serious danger that the problem will indeed get out of control. This makes it doubly urgent that Lord Carrington should act before he leaves for America by bringing our concerns to the attention of the Prime Minister.

7. Carrington did not demur but asked if we had specific proposals or requests. The Minister in response said that he would like to refer first to the Taoiseach's letter to Mrs. Thatcher. We would wish that Mrs. Thatcher should give a prompt and a considered reply. Carrington interjected to say that he had seen the letter.

8. Secondly, we believe that the UK Government should deal directly with the prisoners. It was not our intention to try to tell the UK what to do in detail. Nonetheless, we feel that direct talks are now the only thing which can lead to a resolution. The second conversation (which the Minister had referred to earlier with the Taoiseach) related to a further rule for the European Commission for Human Rights.

9. The Government considers that there is a possibility of a renewed role for the H/R Commission but not as an intermediary, since the Commission's procedures were altogether too bureaucratic and slow to meet the urgency of the present situation.

10. However, the Irish Government felt that the European Commission for Human Rights could have a valuable role to play after a settlement. What we had in mind was that the Commission could play a part in 'monitoring' the implementation of a settlement, we hesitated to use the word guarantor.

11. With regard to the possibility of a settlement, the Government believed that the basis for this reposed in the statement made last week by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace. This was the kind of flexible approach which would make a settlement possible without sacrifice of principle and which would enable the prisoners to give up their fast and ignore the I.R.A.

12. The Minister went on to say that the UK Government may reply that if they were to respond to this kind of proposal they would simply be induced to make a concession which would lead to the kind of outcome that occurred in December last, when, after a short respite and amid confusion and muddle the hunger strike resumed.

13. The Monitoring role suggested for the European Commission of Human Rights could serve to prevent this happening - if a settlement could be reached to the current hunger strike. Since the Human Rights Commission had kept open the McFealy case, we feel they are thus in a position to play the monitoring role we have in mind.

14. The Minister went on to say with regard to situation in the Maze itself, there were a number of options:

- First, one could stand still and let the Hunger strike continue in the hope that the prisoners would give up . . . This course could be potentially disastrous.
- Secondly, one could try to get back on the course of an agreed settlement - which early last week we felt was possible.

At that time, the prisoners were to a significant extent outside the control of the I.R.A.. It is not the case that all of the statements issued by the I.R.A. on behalf of the prisoners genuinely reflect the latter's state of mind.

- But each death and the prisoners reactions to deaths tend to push the prisoners back under the I.R.A.'s control

15. There was no point in rehearsing the events which lead to the breakdown in the settlement efforts last week. These had been recounted in detail in London on Friday last. However if we are to avoid serious damage to the interests of our two governments, we feel that it is necessary now to get back on course towards a settlement

16. In summary our recommendations were:

- (i) Deal directly with the prisoners. We don't say negotiate. We fully accept and respect the UK's refusal to concede 'special status' or 'political status', and we are in no way asking for this. Nor are we asking the UK to abandon the principle that HMS's prisons should be under the control of Her Majesty's prison officers and no one else.
- (ii) We are not trying to spell out in detail what you should do.
- (iii) We feel that there is still a role for the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace.
[At this point the ICJP statement to the effect that they still envisaged a passive role for the Commission was explained]
- (iv) Finally - as to the role of the European Commission of Human Rights, we saw this too as a possibility but after a settlement had been reached.

[A further note ^{the} on conversation with Julian Bullard to follow]

Patricia MacKernan

cc PSM
PSS

PN. MacKernan

Mr. Neligan

Brussels 13 July 1981

Attached are Minister's notes for



Minister Dooge's Notes for Conversation with Lord Carrington
Brussels - 13 July, 1981

① The interests of our two governments in regard to Northern Ireland are not identical in all respects. We do have a common interest in seeing an end to violence, and a prerequisite to this is an end to the hunger strike.

② Every death is a victory for the IRA - a propaganda victory which prices the death of Sander has been a world wide victory. We are both aware of the ^{potential} damage to our two governments and

at
social
for
S.I.O.



to our countries of the growth
of world wide sympathy for the
I.R.A. We have always been
anxious to avoid internationalization
of problem but the death of
Doherty may make internationalization inevitable

③ One reason has been the
increased flow of arms and
money from U.S. This
support for the IRA has
been greatly reduced due
to the strenuous efforts of successive
Irish governments.

④ The next likely death is
that of an Irish deputy
member of parliament. The
effect of this would be
to intensify the propagandist
effect and increase aid to
the I.R.A. A momentum could



be developed in both propaganda
and supplies ~~of the~~ which could
not be stemmed

✓
⑤ We are asking the U.K.
government to act with
urgency. This was the purpose
of the letter from the
 Taoiseach to the Prime Minister
and of our visit to London
last Friday.

The policy of waiting for
total surrenders of the prisoners
without any meaningful
discussions of which would
enable them to give up
their hunger strike offers no
hope for any of the parties
involved. A death a week from



now or will make the
problem less and less tractable.

⑥ There was the possibility of
a settlement without loss
of principle one week ago.
We accept the
Political status and control
of the prisoners on principles
that cannot be surrendered.
They are not surrendered in
the settlement formula set
out by the ICJP.

⑦ We must get back to
that or to an equivalent
without delay.
ICJP have been reprimanded
by the IRA on behalf of
the prisoners but this does



not mean that they have
been repudiated, by the
prisoners themselves. ~~The~~ Govt. feels
that the U.K. Govt. should, if necessary
deal with the ~~prisoners~~ prisoners. This is the advice
of ~~ICJP~~ ICJP and of
John Hume
factor.

8

Suspicion is a vital
led to breakdown of
December settlement.

Intermediaries are used

ICJP

ECHR

intermediary

guarantor

9) ECHR has kept Mc Feely
case open and could play
a more general role as guarantor
of a settlement. They used
the term flexibility and could
be play a most useful role
in the maintenance of a
settlement



(10) We need to know within
a day or two the intentions
of U.K. government. IS this
does not happen our ~~ability~~
position on the problem
~~which is aimed at bilateral~~
~~which~~ has may be undermined.

Confidential

Note

The Minister-designate mentioned over the telephone from Brussels, when I informed him on 13 July of the death of the hunger striker Martin Hurson, that he now expected that Deputy Blaney ~~would return from Brussels~~ and would put down a motion about the Long Kesh crisis. In the Minister-designate's view we should have ready for instant tabling a counter resolution by the Government on the same matter which would accurately reflect our position.

It can be foreseen that a motion from Dep. Blaney would probably be expressed in terms which would call on the Dáil and the Government to condemn British policy in Northern Ireland especially in regard to the prisons and bearing in mind the impending death of a member of the House, to press the British Government to concede the five "just and reasonable" demands of the hunger strikers and other "political prisoners" in Northern Ireland.

The following draft motion which the Government might consider tabling is submitted as a basis for discussion with the Department of the Taoiseach:-

"That Dáil Éireann expresses its urgent concern about the continuing hunger strike of prisoners in the Maze, [which involves a member of this House]; that it regrets the deaths which have occurred, both inside and outside the prison, as a result of this protest, just as it regrets all loss of life through violence in Northern Ireland; that it calls on both sides in the dispute to seek a settlement and, considering that the party with the greater power has the greater responsibility, calls in particular on the British Government to move urgently to promote a solution without incurring abandonment of principle; and recommends pressingly to the attention of the British Government the elaboration of a possible future prison régime, worked out by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, which Dáil Éireann considers to offer the foundation of an immediate solution of the crisis."

It is possible that the Minister-designate has already discussed this matter with the Taoiseach.

D.M. Neligan

D.M. Neligan

13 July 1981

1517(2) D/Thom GAT Press
CSB
in Nelson
Sue

25300 B ESTR EI
885583 IRISH D

/307
TO HQ FROM BOUN
FOR BRADY/WALSHE FROM DONOGHUE

~~Brady~~ / Walshe

SUBJ. FRG MEDIA COVERAGE OF VISIT TO LONDON (10 JULY) BY
DESIGNATE AND ACTING MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. WEEKEND EDITION OF BONN'S "GENERAL ANZEIGER" AND TODAY'S
EDITIONS OF "DIE WELT" AND "SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG" CARRY
BRIEF AGENCY REPORTS (WITHOUT COMMENT) ON ABOVE.

2. DDP DESPATCH IN "GENERAL-ANZEIGER" REPORTED "SURPRISE
VISIT" TO LONDON BY DESIGNATE AND ACTING MINISTERS FOR TALKS
WITH MESSRS GILMOUR AND ATKINS IN CONNECTION WITH EFFORTS TO
END H-BLOCK HUNGER STRIKE. DESPATCH REPORTED INDICATIONS FROM
"GOVERNMENT CIRCLES IN DUBLIN" OF GROWING CONCERN IN
REPUBLIC ABOUT HUNGER-STRIKE WHICH HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN
TAOISEACH'S MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF ICJP AND FAMILIES OF
HUNGER-STRIKERS.

3. COMBINED AGENCIES PIECE IN TODAY'S "DIE WELT" REPORTS THAT
THE TWO MINISTERS, ACTING AS "SPECIAL ENVOYS" OF IRISH
GOVERNMENT, CALLED ON UK GOVERNMENT TO RESUME CONTACTS WITH ICJP.
"THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER KELLY" HAD DECLARED THAT HUNGER-
STRIKES SHOULD NOT BECOME OBSTACLE IN SEARCH FOR LASTING SOLUTION
IN NI. DPA DESPATCH IN TODAY'S "SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG" REPORTS
MINISTERS' CALL ON UK GOVERNMENT TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON
H-BLOCKS ISSUE. AFTER THEIR TALKS WITH GILMOUR AND ATKINS THEY
HAD DESCRIBED H-BLOCK HUNGER STRIKE AS SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO UNDER-
STANDING BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN, WARNING THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS
WOULD SUFFER FROM ANY ACTION TAKEN (OR NOT TAKEN) BY BRITISH
GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD CAUSE IRISH GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES.
MINISTER KELLY HAD AVOIDED BLAMING UK FOR FAILURE OF MEDIATION
ATTEMPT BUT HAD HINTED THAT LONDON COULD FIND SOLUTION TO H-BLOCK
CRISIS IF IT REALLY WANTED TO. HE HAD, HOWEVER, MADE IT CLEAR
THAT IRISH GOVERNMENT DID NOT SUPPORT IRA DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL
STATUS. IT HAD ALSO EMERGED THAT BOTH SIDES AT TALKS HAD AGREED
ON NEED TO CONTINUE "THE LONG-TERM BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AIMED
AT SOLVING THE NI PROBLEM".

END.
13.7.1981
885583 IRISH D3
25300 B ESTR EI

Statement made by the Taoiseach on 13 July 1981

I extend my deepest sympathy to the family of Martin Hurson, whose brother I have met twice in recent weeks. I renew my call to both sides in this tragic dispute to show urgency and flexibility and to act before still further lives are lost whether inside or outside the prison.

I call on the British Government to respond to the arguments presented on behalf of my Government in London on Friday last and to the calls made at the weekend by the ICJP and by the leader of the SDLP.

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I call on the British Government to respond to the arguments presented on behalf of my Government in London on Friday last and to the calls made at the weekend by the ICJP and by the leader of the SDLP.

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TO: MARTIN BURKE
FROM SMYTH.

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FOR IRISH CONSULATE GENERAL

Max 550
5 pages

PROGRAM GOOD MORNING AMERICA

STATION WABC-TV AND THE ABC TELEVISION NETWORK

DATE JULY 10, 1981 7:10AM

CITY NEW YORK

BROADCAST EXCERPT

DAVID HARTMAN: Joseph McDornell, the fifth hunger striker to die in Northern Ireland, is being buried today. Shortly before his death on Wednesday, there were a number of reports that a deal might be close, that the hunger strike might end soon. But, yesterday, Catholic mediators charged that the British government had backed out of the compromise that was in the works. Dermott O'Mahoney is the Auxiliary Bishop of Dublin. He heads the team of Catholic mediators that's been trying to bring an end to the hunger strikes. Bishop O'Mahoney is with us by satellite right now from Belfast in Northern Ireland, and Steve Bell joins us from Washington.

Bishop, David Hartman in New York, it's nice having you with us today.

BISHOP O'MAHONEY: Good morning, David.

HARTMAN: Good morning. Yesterday, you charged that British officials misled you, that they reneged on what could have been an agreement to end the hunger strike. Specifically, what was the agreement that was in the works?

O'MAHONEY: Well, could I just before I answer your question, could I just send the cordial greetings of the Commission to Mr. Allison and to say that we did appreciate the warm way in which he welcomed us, and also could I send our greetings to all the viewers in America, particularly Irish-Americans, both Catholic and Protestant. Is that O.K.?

HARTMAN: Yes, sir, absolutely, Bishop. Now -- now, and we'll talk of course with Mr. Allison in just a few minutes.

O'MAHONEY: Yes.

HARTMAN: Specifically, what was the agreement that was in the works and how, as you charged yesterday, did the British officials mislead you on it?

O'MAHONEY: Well, last Monday night, we had a document which was

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a true summary of the essential points on prison reform that had emerged in our discussion with Mr. Allison, discussions which lasted for more than sixteen hours, and we believed that this particular document contained the foundation, the basis of a settlement, and I use the words foundation and basis of a settlement because these are the words which the hunger strikers themselves used to us. So, last Monday night, we believed we were very near a solution, but then on Tuesday, and all day on Tuesday, there was, we believe, a gradual withdrawal on the part of the British government.

The phrase I used, there was a clawing back on the part of the British government, and so I say with deep disappointment, and a great sense of sadness that a real opportunity was lost to find a resolution.

STEVE BELL: Bishop O'Mahoney, this is Steve Bell in Washington. Could you tell us specifically what it is that the British backed away from?

O'MAHONEY: Well, I could say first of all that we had a firm commitment from the British government that the prisoners, all the prisoners, could wear all their clothes, their own clothes at all times, and remember that our recommendations which had been clarified in our discussions with the minister were in the area of general prison reform. It wasn't and it isn't a question of granting the prisoners political status, or any kind of special status, because if these are reforms for the whole prison system throughout Northern Ireland, why then there cannot be a question of political status or special status or any other kind of status and we as a commission are against granting the prisoners political status.

BELL: From your perspective, sir, how badly has the death of Joseph McDonnell any hope for a compromise?

O'MAHONEY: Well, clearly it is, you know, a setback, but could I say this, that despite the death of Joe McDonnell, despite the fact that on Wednesday -- on Wednesday morning the hunger strikers must have been bitterly disappointed when a document was read to them which in no way could be considered a serious effort to find a resolution -- when this document was read to them, they must have been totally, totally let down and disappointed, but despite that, they have since issued a statement which is a conciliatory statement, and I believe that there is still a way forward and I believe that our statement contains the basis still of a solution and I would ask in a very urgent way for the British government to confirm and to endorse our statement as the avenue towards a solution, as a way forward, because, listen to me. We must not let the light go out. Otherwise, there will be a terrible darkness. A terrible darkness could descend over the whole island which we love, so we believe that there is still hope and we have no intention of letting the light go out, and we wish that there would be movement again on the part of the British government.

We're not, and don't want to indulge any recrimination. As I said at the beginning, we appreciate Mr. Allison. We said in our statement that we appreciate his good faith.

HARTMAN: Bishop...

O'MAHONEY: It's terribly -- yes?

HARTMAN: Excuse me for interrupting, but we want to save time to talk with Mr. Allison.

O'MAHONEY: Yes.

HARTMAN: After these messages. Thank you, sir, for joining us from Belfast, and good luck.

O'MAHONEY: O.K., thank you very much.

HARTMAN: Thank you, sir. And, we will talk with Britain's Minister of State for Northern Ireland, Michael Allison, to whom the Bishop just referred, after these words.

*

7:19AM

*

HARTMAN: Michael Allison is Britain's Minister of State for Northern Ireland. He is Britain's number two man there. He is with us this morning in Washington with Steve Bell. Good morning, Mr. Minister. and welcome.

MICHAEL ALLISON: Good morning.

HARTMAN: You just heard Bishop O'Mahoney's comments. He said that he thought that you were near an agreement of some kind, had the foundation of agreement, but then in his -- from his perspective, the British government backed away from it over the days, and he's sad and disappointed because he thought they had the beginning of something there. How do you respond?

ALLISON: I can understand his disappointment. The good bishop, and he's now become quite a friend of mine, has one weakness, and it's a very understandable weakness. He doesn't know the insides of prisons, and what from his point of view looks like a sensible development in the way you run a prison, from the point of view of the officials inside a jail who have to keep some very dedicated terrorists behind bars. It may not be quite so easy as he thinks to make some of these changes without endangering the control of the prison.

HARTMAN: Why then didn't you continue the discussion, make him aware of these things to keep talking, as he said, because he doesn't want the light to go out? He wants to keep talking.

ALLISON: Well, there's no problem about talking, but I think the

natural break in the present rounds of talks that we were having came with the death of Joe McDonnell, which was unexpectedly early as it happened. We were expecting him to live a little bit longer.

BELL: But now, the Bishop said it broke down, among other things, over whether or not prisoners could wear their own clothes. Is that really an issue when you're talking about confining men whether they're terrorists or not?

ALLISON: That's an important issue. For the Irish terrorist prisoner to wear your own clothes is a symbol of being something slightly different, not being a criminal. Now, we don't have too much of a problem really about the principle of people wearing their own clothes, but just think of it. If men wore their own clothes in prison, there really is a control problem. How do you identify the guy who's a prisoner and do you identify the guy -- the solicitor, the lawyer, or the doctor, or the social worker who comes into the prison from outside? There's quite a problem of control there.

BELL: From your point of view, then, what did go wrong, that would lead them to say you had reneged?

ALLISON: I think that they had got hold of some ideas of what we could do in prison reform, which were positive, and in principle we can go down that road. We had to accentuate the negative side of that, that at the same time, although you make some positive changes, you have to retain the negative control factor, and that is exactly where the balance of practicability comes in. Now, the Bishop and his fellow jurymen as it were were not really very well aware of what the problems are of running a prison, and we had to make quite certain that the prisoners understood that although there might be some positive changes in certain directions, strict control had to be adhered to, and this is exactly where the spelling out of these fine points of internal administration takes a bit of time.

HARTMAN: Mr. Minister, in the few moments we have left with our time, what is the answer? The death continues. The pain continues for Protestants and Catholics alike. What is the answer? Where do you go right now, and what can you do?

ALLISON: Well, David, I would say this, that the Irish terrorist prison suicide is best understood in the United States by thinking back to the problem you faced in the Pacific war, the kamikaze or suicide pilot. Men may be prepared to commit suicide, but they're out to kill at the same time, and we're here dealing with a body of dedicated terrorists who are killing innocent men, women, and children in the streets of Belfast. We have to do something to wind down terrorism, to show that terrorism does not pay.

BELL: In just a few seconds, are you willing to continue talks with the Catholic mediators?

ALLISON: Surely.

HARTMAN: Mr. Minister, thank you, and good luck.

ALLISON: Thank you.

HARTMAN: Thanks.

(END)

07
10 JULY 1981
TO HQ FROM EMBASSY WASHINGTON
F00XHQKXKXKXWASHKXKXZ00
FOR MARTIN BURKE FROM F SHERIDAN

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OIUKJ

MEETING BETWEEN ALISON AND FRIENDS OF IRELAND WERE ATTENDED BY 12 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND ANOTHER 5 MEMBERS WERE REPRESENTED BY AIDES. THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE:-

SENATE: CLAIBORNE PELL (D. RI)

HOUSE: TOM FOLEY (D. WA), MAJORITY WHIP;
CHARLES DOUGHERTY (R. PA). GERALDINE FERRARO (D. NY)
WILLIAM GREY (R. NY): JONATHAN BINGHAM (D. NY)
MATTHEW MCNUGH (D. NY): MILLICENT FENWICK (D. NJ)
JAMES SHANNON (D. MASS): BARNEY FRANK (D. MASS)
BERNARD DWYER (D. NJ): SID MORRISON (R. WA).

THE FOLLOWING SENT AIDES: MSENATORS LAXALT, KENNEDY, MOYNIHAN, DODD AND SPEAKER O'NEILL.

FROM SPEAKING TO AIDES AFTERWARDS THERE SEEMS A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT MEETING DID NOT GO WELL FOR ALISON. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, MR. FENWICK, THOSE MEMBERS ATTENDING PRESENTED A UNITED FRONT IN CRITICISING BRITISH INTRANSIGENCE ON THE HUNGER STRIKES AND IN FORCEFULLY POINTING OUT ITS EFFECTS ON MODERATE OPINION IN THE U.S. MRS. FENWICK, WHO IS GENERALLY WELL DISPOSED ON THE N.I. QUESTION, IS A CONSTITUTIONALIST AND WARY OF ANY CHARGE
XXIXX CHANGE IN
ATTITUDE BASED ON AN ISSUE INITIATED BY THOSE IMPRISONED FOR CRIMES.

CONGRESSMAN SHANNON, WHO HAD BEEN WELL BRIEFED BY KENNEDY'S AIDES, CLOSELY QUESTIONED ALISON (A) ON WHY HE WAS IN THE U.S AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE AND (B) WHY IT HAD TAKEN THE NFO 35 HOURS TO RESPOND TO ICJA.

IN RESPONSE TO (A) ALISON SAID THERE WERE OTHERS WHO COULD DEAL WITH THE ISSUE IN HIS ABSENCE. IN RESPONSE TO (B) HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, HAD ENDEAVOURED TO MOVE WITH ALL SPEED; BUT, UNDER CLOSE QUESTIONING, DID ADMIT TO SOME DELAY IN PROCESSING THE MATTER IN LONDON.

CONGRESSMAN DOUGHERTY FORCEFULLY MADE THE POINT THAT IN HIS OPINION THE BRITISH DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE PRESSURES ON IRISH AMERICAN POLITICIANS. HE SAID THAT BRITISH INTRANSIGENCE ON THE HUNGER STRIKE ISSUE HAD LOST THEM (THE BRITISH) THE SYMPATHY OF AMERICANS, HAS ISOLATED MODERATE IRISH AMERICAN OPINION AND HAS SPURRED A GROWTH IN SUPPORT FOR THE PIRA POSITION. DOUGHERTY SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRELAND AND GAVE MANY EXAMPLES OF THE POLARIZATION BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. OTHER MEMBERS COMPLAINED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO PROGRESS IN BRITISH POLICY SINCE THEIR BRIEFING FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR RECENTLY, AT WHICH TIME THEY HAD STRONGLY INDICATED THE DANGERS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE BRITISH VIEWPOINT.

WHILE ALISON DID INDICATE THE WILLINGNESS TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE
ACUP PROPOSALS, NO DEFINITE COMMITMENT ON THEM WAS GIVEN.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE COURSE OF HIS
SHORT VISIT HERE, WHICH ENDS THIS EVENING, ALISON APPEARED ON
THE ABC AND CBS TV NETWORKS, MET UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
STOESSELL, AND BRIEFED THE BRITISH MEDIA AND THE WASHINGTON
MEDIA FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE "FRIENDS".

WE

~~~~~

WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT FOLLOWING THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING,  
CONGRESSMAN SHANNON AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH LOCAL  
AND IRISH MEDIA TO BRIEF THEM.

?

END+@+@

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Meeting at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 July, 1981.

Summary Report

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Designate were accompanied by officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and of the Taoiseach. The Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland were accompanied by officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Northern Ireland Office and the Cabinet Office. The meeting lasted two hours and was followed by separate press briefings by each side based on agreement that each side would confine itself to its own case and not pronounce on the attitude of the other.

1. Both sides expressed a desire to have good bilateral relations and to continue the Anglo-Irish talks and studies. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the present Irish Government's policy would not reverse that of its predecessor but would emphasise North-South political dialogue in addition to Anglo-Irish discussions.
2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs described extensively the impact of the present Maze crisis on public opinion in the Republic. He said that the three main political parties for many years had a record of clear opposition to the IRA.

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This was particularly true of the parties now in power. The support for the hunger strikers manifested in the recent election was undesirable and highlighted the seriousness of the problem now. The Government was under severe pressure and, unless a solution were found, relations with the U.K. would suffer. The Government's commitment is clear but the British should understand that anything that smacks of "collaboration" makes the position of the Government difficult at the best of times. Stressing several times that he was not making a point of party political expediency, the Minister said that the death of Kieran Doherty, perhaps 10 days away, would create a political situation which could be destabilising politically. The present Government's position was highly vulnerable in the Dáil and a bye-election would be unusually keenly fought. There would be a period of perhaps three months before a bye-election, during which all sides would be tempted to strike dangerously provocative attitudes which would have an unsettling effect across the country.

3. The Government wishes to resolve the larger question of Northern Ireland and, with the British, we wish to avoid "reefs" such as the Maze crisis on the way. Commenting on the recent Irish Commission for Justice and Peace "fiasco", he asked:

- Why, if no real advance is possible, had the British Government encouraged the ICJP over several days of intensive discussion to believe that it was?

- Why had the British Government delayed their first contact with the ICJP until July 3 despite the Taoiseach's personal call to Mrs. Thatcher on July 1?

- Why had the British delayed in sending an NIO official into the Maze until after McDonnell's death on the morning of July 8 despite an undertaking on the evening of July 6 to send someone in on the morning of July 7?

Why had the NIO official eventually selected not fulfilled the conditions agreed with the ICJP of full involvement in the discussions from the beginning? The Minister also mentioned the impression of the ICJP that the person concerned (Jackson) was notoriously unsympathetic in his attitude to the prisoners, however excellent an official he might otherwise be.

- How did the British see the crisis ending?

4. The British responses were for the most part pro forma and added very little to our information. Both Ministers rejected the suggestion that the British attitude had displayed insufficient understanding of the seriousness and urgency of the problem. Mr. Atkins, who did most of the talking on the British side, said he had done little else since last October except try to solve the crisis. For his part he gave a lengthy account of the

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background to the present situation all of which was well-known; the ending of "special category" status in 1976, the protest campaign in its various forms since then, the efforts of the British last year to implement the recommendations of the European Commission on Human Rights' recommendations. It was the prisoners not the British Government who had shown "inflexibility". Until the previous week the prisoners had not been prepared to accept the same category of treatment as other prisoners. It had become clear to them that their demand for separate treatment enjoyed no support in the U.K., Ireland or the U.S. A close reading of their statement of 4 July, however, showed that the prisoners would not be satisfied by anything less than control of the prisons and this the British Government could not and would not concede.

5. In reply to the Minister for Foreign Affairs' questions, Mr. Atkins said:

- The British regarded the ICJP as a highly respectable and well-intentioned body. Nevertheless, as the meeting of July 6 and indeed the ICJP's own statement showed, there was at least one major difference between the ICJP and the N.I.O. i.e. on work. The British do not accept that the ICJP position would give the Prison Governor authority to control the prisoners' work activities.

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- It had not been possible for Mr. Alison to meet the ICJP on July 2, because that was the day of a major debate in the Commons. Mr. Atkins and Mr. Alison had been in the House for twelve hours. The absence of either of them, for whatever reason, would have led to a vote of censure.
  - The delay in sending the NIO official into the Maze until July 8. Mr. Alison is, said Mr. Atkins, a first-rate Minister but did not have sufficient seniority to make the final decisions on such matters which rested with the Secretary of State "and my colleagues". It had been necessary for Mr. Atkins to be in London and the difficulties of communicating at a distance of "600 miles"(!) could not be overcome more quickly.
  - Mr. Atkins could not accept strictures on the suitability of his officials whom he would, of course, defend.
  - On the ending of the crisis, Mr. Atkins made a pat and unoriginal statement on the need that the prisoners should accept the principles of control of the prison regime by the prison authorities and of identity of status with other prisoners.
6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs described Mr. Atkins' proposed solution as "hopeless". He said that in 1973

it had been possible to create conditions in Northern Ireland whereby a majority of Unionists had, for a time at least, favoured power-sharing. The Sunningdale experiment had not survived - all parties were perhaps at fault - but our object should be to recreate the conditions which made it possible to attempt such a solution. We should not get bogged down in minutiae of principle" which have been elevated into unalterable conditions. Prisoners in Portlaoise were not, for example, required to do prison work. Professor Dooge said the problem seemed to find a solution in practice, which seemed feasible, rather than argue over incompatibility of principles. Both British Ministers said that principles in this case were non-negotiable. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the prisoners, however fanatical, however demented, had their own "principles" and that any solution would have to take that fact into account. The ICJP effort had seemed to provide an opportunity to bridge the gap between the two sides - its failure and the "total effect" of the dialogue had been most unfortunate.

7. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated repeatedly that the ICJP had impressed on us that the predominant attitude in the prisoners' minds was "suspicion". Any approach to them that smacks of brinkmanship e.g. approaching them only when one of their members is near death, only intensifies suspicion and diminishes the chances for success. A serious and open

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approach by the British is essential. Our conviction is that the problem can be solved on a basis and in words other than those of the "5 demands". Professor Dooge said that a resolution might be achieved were the British to look at the differences as differences of emphasis rather than of principle e.g. on work. Such an approach would show that there is more compatibility between the two sides than the British suppose. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stressed that time, the number of possible mediators and the range of positions are critically limited. It did seem that a solution had almost been achieved through the ICJP. He urged the British to get back to that basis for a solution and to renew contact with the ICJP. Mr. Atkins said he would consider doing so.

8. The interventions throughout on the Irish side were insistent and frank. The British responses were non-committal and defensive. At a number of points one had the impression that the British side, in particular Mr. Atkins, were somewhat shaken by the intensity as well as the extent of information shown in the Irish presentation.

Note: A more detailed report is under preparation in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

*Mr J. Lyons*  
 Department of the Taoiseach  
 July 13, 1981.

c.c. Private Secretary to Taoiseach ✓  
 Mr. Nally ✓  
 Mr. Kirwan ✓  
 Mr. Hourican ✓  
 Mr. Neligan (Department of Foreign Affairs)

Letter from Taoiseach to British Prime Minister 10 July 1981

I am writing to you to express the Irish Government's deep concern about the impact of recent developments in the hunger strike at the Maze Prison upon the situation in our country.

Since the first deaths in the hunger strike we have had to contend with the political problem of rising levels of sympathy for the prisoners. The General Election results of last month showed this growth very clearly when two imprisoned candidates were elected to Dail Eireann. This is a development which directly threatens the stability of our state through the intrusion of interests which would never have been lent such formal authority but for the propaganda effects of the confrontation in the Maze.

There is now an additional major problem. People here find the statement of 8 July of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace to be a credible account of the Commission's meetings with Minister of State Alison on the one hand and with the hunger strikers on the other. As a Government we too are persuaded by this account and so are unable to do or say anything to counter the lack of public confidence in the British Government's handling of the situation. We are thus faced with the danger of a serious and progressive deterioration in bilateral relations.

? [Up to the present,] the Irish Government have always supported the position that political status should not be given to prisoners duly sentenced for serious crimes, and so have avoided any appearance of taking the side of the hunger strikers. In these last few days, however, the deplorable situation has been reached that the points of view of the Government and the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace are seen to converge with that of the Provisional IRA in criticism of your authorities' handling of these events. This is naturally the last position in which we would wish to find ourselves.

The state of public opinion now emerging can only have a bad effect on our internal security situation, though we are determined to maintain an undiminished effort in this area. British security forces in Northern Ireland have up to now been able to rely on the effective cooperation of our security forces, as has been acknowledged from time to time by British spokesmen. As both Governments know, the effectiveness of security measures depends on the prevailing climate of local public opinion.

Even before this latest development we had to face a broad spectrum of I.R.A. propaganda which proved sadly effective in appealing simultaneously both to those who are inclined to violence, and to people of humane sympathies genuinely moved by loss of life and bereavement of families. Looking into the immediate future we face the prospect of the death of a hunger striker who is a member of our Parliament. As you know from the case of Mr. Sands, the propaganda potential of such a death would be immense, in our society, in Britain and throughout the world.

It is against this background that I urge you, without any more loss of time, to accept the detailed description of a possible future prison regime set out by the I.C.J.P. on the basis of contacts with the N.I.O. as the foundation of a solution of the crisis. In this connection it is important to recall that in their statement issued last weekend, the prisoners said that they were not seeking differentiation from other prisoners or concessions that would involve surrender by the authorities of control of the prison.

I would not wish this message to be interpreted as in any way suggesting that the difficulties created by the hunger strike should ultimately be laid at any door other than that of the IRA. I believe, however, that an end to the hunger-strike will deprive them of their most potent weapon and restore a climate in which our efforts can again be directed to more positive and constructive endeavours, in pursuance of the process initiated in Dublin last December, to the continuance of which I attach great importance.

Yours sincerely,

Garret FitzGerald  
Taoiseach

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you to express the Irish Government's deep concern about the impact of recent developments in the hunger strike at the Maze Prison upon the situation in our country.

Since the first deaths in the hunger strike we have had to contend with the political problem of unprecedented levels of sympathy for the prisoners.

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The general election results of last month showed this growth very clearly when two imprisoned candidates were elected to Dail Eireann. This is a development which directly threatens the stability of our state through the intrusion of interests which would never have been lent such formal authority but for the propaganda effects of the confrontation in the Maze.

*These is* We now face an additional major problem. Our people *people here* find the statement of 8 July of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace to be a credible account of the ~~Commission's~~ *Commission's* *meetings* [discussions] with the hunger strikers on the one hand and with Minister of State Alison *on the other* on the other. As a Government *too often are persuaded by W and so* we are unable to do or say anything *to counter* in mitigation of the consequent lack of *public* confidence among our own people in the British Government's handling of the situation. We are ~~now~~ *thus* faced with the *danger* prospect of a serious and progressive deterioration in bilateral relations between our

*The prospect  
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Up to the present, the Irish Government, by supporting the position that political status should not be given to prisoners duly sentenced for serious crimes, has avoided all question of our taking or appearing to take the side of the strikers.

~~But in this~~ <sup>however, the</sup> last few days ~~a~~ <sup>been reached that</sup> deplorable situation has come about as a result of which the points of view of my Government, <sup>and to</sup> the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace <sup>are seen to converse with that of</sup> and the Provisional IRA, ~~are seen to converge in criticism of your authorities' handling of these events.~~ This is naturally the last position in which we would wish to find ourselves. <sup>N.P.</sup> ~~The handling by the British authorities of the recent initiative has put them in the wrong in many eyes here, while sympathy has grown for the hunger strikers. Such a state of public opinion~~ <sup>now emerging</sup> ~~can only have a deplorable~~ <sup>local</sup> effect on our internal security situation. British security forces in Northern Ireland have up to now been able to rely on the firm co-operation of our security forces, as has been acknowledge from time to time by British spokesmen.

However, <sup>the effectiveness of any</sup> As both Governments know, security depends <sup>local</sup> on the prevailing climate of public opinion. ~~Our~~ <sup>The Govt is determined to continue its</sup> measures ~~capacity to maintain security is accordingly now endangered by the present crisis.~~

Even before this latest development we had to face a broad spectrum of I.R.A. propaganda which proved sadly effective in appealing simultaneously both to those who are inclined to violence, and to people of humane sympathies genuinely moved by loss of life and bereavement of families. Looking into the immediate future we face the prospect of the death of a hunger striker who is a member of our Parliament. As you know from the case of Mr. Sands, the propaganda potential of such a death would be immense, in our society, in Britain and throughout the world.

It is against this background that I urge you, without any more loss of time, to <sup>accept</sup> ~~take up once more~~ the detailed description of a possible future prison regime which had been <sup>set</sup> ~~worked~~ out by the I.C.J.P. on the basis of contacts with the N.I.U. and to make it what we believe it could be, the foundation of a solution <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ the <sup>crisis</sup> ~~protest~~. In this connection it is important to recall that in their statement issued last weekend, the prisoners said that they were not seeking differentiation between prisoners or concessions that would involve surrender by the authorities of control of the prison.

I would not wish this message to be interpreted as in any way suggesting that the difficulties created by the hunger strike should ultimately be laid at any door other than that of the IRA. I believe, however, that an end to the hunger strike will deprive them of their most potent weapon and restore a climate in which our efforts can again be directed to more positive and constructive endeavours, in pursuance of the process initiated in Dublin last December, to whose continuance I attach great importance.

Yours sincerely,

Garret FitzGerald,

Taoiseach.



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## STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

The Irish Commission for Justice and Peace have held a series of discussions with Mr. Alison, Minister of State in the Northern Ireland Office, at their request in order to clarify the Government's position on the prison regime in an effort to bring about an end to the current hunger strike in the Maze Prison. They have also visited the prisoners on a number of occasions. The Government has not been in negotiation through the intermediary of the Commission. It was and remains grateful for the strenuous efforts which the Commission have made to contribute to a resolution of the prison protest.

2. I issued a carefully considered statement on 30 June on Northern Ireland Prison Regimes and nothing which has happened since then has led me to think that anything in that document should be changed.

3. The statement of 30 June made it clear that we cannot agree either that a particular set of prisoners should be given preferential treatment (and I welcome the indication in the prisoners' statement of 4 July that this is not now one of their demands) or that the Prison Authorities can abdicate control over how the prisons are run and how life goes on in them.

4. The statement also made clear that the Government, as its actions in the past have shown, will continue to maintain and where possible improve the present enlightened and humane regime with flexibility in its administration.

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5. In the last 12-18 months, partly but not solely in response to certain criticisms contained in the Partial Decision issued by the European Commission of Human Rights in June 1980, the British Government has made a series of modifications in the regimes applicable to conforming and/or protesting prisoners, the most notable of which was the abolition, announced in October 1980 and implemented early in 1981, of prison uniform and its replacement by an issue of civilian-type clothing in various designs. Other changes (most of which have been rejected by the protestors) include additional letters and visits, extra association time and compassionate home leave. These adjustments of themselves constitute clear evidence of HM's readiness to act flexibly over the question of prison regimes.

6. Despite all the efforts which Government has made since October 1980 and despite the Commission's own efforts I am persuaded by the Commission that there is still doubt in the minds of prisoners about what in practice would happen if they gave up the hunger strike. Some may doubt the Government's intention to be flexible and humane in applying the existing regime. Some may delude themselves that the flexibility is infinitely extendable into a mirror of the regime for special category prisoners. Both are wrong. I have therefore set out in very simple terms what we can and cannot do below and this has been given to all prisoners today by the Prison Governor.

7. In doing this we are setting out to the prisoners what is already available to conforming prisoners. The regime is administered flexibly. There is scope for further development but not under duress. The protestors' action, far from bringing about changes, has in fact rendered movement impossible.

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The only key to advance is for them to end the strike.

## WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE PROTEST ENDS?

1. Protesting prisoners have been segregated from the rest. Other prisoners are not segregated by religious or political or any other affiliation. If there were no protest the only reason for segregating some prisoners from others would be the judgement of the prison authorities, not the prisoners, that this was the best way to avoid trouble between groups.
2. Prisoners who give up their protest would get the association non-protesting prisoners now get. That is to say three hours each evening, all their weekends plus periods for exercise, physical education, games and meals. There is little immediate scope for expansion. The suggestions of the Commission for Justice and Peace that adjacent wings should share association in recreation rooms and exercise areas depends on satisfactory arrangements being made for supervising and controlling movement and it would take time to arrange the necessary physical facilities for this.
3. During association prisoners would have the privilege of wearing their own clothes. At all other times they would wear civilian-type clothing of a non-uniform kind. By comparison with most other western countries this is a liberal regime, but we would not rule out the possibility of further development.
4. All prisoners are in practice as well as in principle liable for domestic tasks inside and outside the wings, eg for orderly duties and in the laundries and kitchens. No one will be excluded as of right from the liability <sup>to</sup> ~~of~~ work in prison workshops. We will add to the range of activities so far as and

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choice to be given

as quickly as we can. The Commission for Justice and Peace have given us examples of such activities. We shall look closely at these but at the end of the day it will be for the prison authorities to decide what jobs a prisoner does.

5. Any prisoner who abides by the rules is already allowed 8 letters, 4 visits and 4 parcels a month. Those giving up their protest would get this straight away. And it is more than they have been asking for.

6. 50% remission is awarded for good behaviour. It is forfeited by those who breach prison rules by protesting. In practice prisoners who have given up their protest have had up to 1/5th of lost remission restored.

PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE  
RELEASED WEDNESDAY 8th JULY 1981:

FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF JOE MC DONNELL, WHICH THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE LEARNED OF THIS MORNING WITH PROFOUND SORROW, WE NOW WISH TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS IN A SPIRIT OF EXTREME URGENCY IN THE HOPE THAT A RESOLUTION AT THE MAZE PRISON CAN STILL BE ACHIEVED, WITHOUT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.

ON MONDAY LAST 6th JULY 1981, THE COMMISSION PREPARED A STATEMENT FOR PUBLICATION. AT THIS STAGE THE COMMISSION HAD MET MR. MICHAEL ALLISON M.P. ON FOUR OCCASIONS FOR A TOTAL OF MORE THAN SIXTEEN HOURS. THE STATEMENT PREPARED ON 7th JULY 1981 IS ISSUED HEREBY AND SHOULD BE READ AS PART OF THIS STATEMENT.

THE COMMISSION MET MR. ALLISON ON THE EVENING OF MONDAY 6th JULY 1981, AND PRODUCED TO HIM A COPY OF OUR STATEMENT. THE STATEMENT CONTAINED A TRUE SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL POINTS OF PRISON REFORM THAT HAD EMERGED IN OUR DISCUSSION. WE INFORMED HIM THAT THE HUNGER STRIKERS CONSIDERED THE POINTS TO BE THE FOUNDATION OF A RESOLUTION OF THE HUNGER STRIKE PROVIDED THAT THEY RECEIVED SATISFACTORY CLARIFICATION OF DETAIL AND CONFIRMATION BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE U.I.O. TO THEM PERSONALLY. THE COMMITMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ACT ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF OUR STATEMENT. WE STRONGLY REITERATED TO THE MINISTER OF STATE THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMEDIATE ACTION IN CONCERNING AN OFFICIAL OF THE U.I.O. THE HUNGER STRIKERS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DEATH OF JOE MC DONNELL. THE MINISTER ACCEPTED THAT OUR STATEMENT REFLECTED A TRUE PICTURE OF WHAT HE HAD INDICATED TO US TO BE THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, SAVE IN TWO RESPECTS. HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE PHRASE "THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNDER A MORAL OBLIGATION" AND HE SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD READ "IN THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF THE IRISH COMMISSION OF JUSTICE AND PEACE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNDER A MORAL OBLIGATION". THIS FORM OF WORDS WE ACCEPT TO BE CORRECT. HE ALSO STATED THAT, APART FROM THE CLOTHING REFORM, WHICH HE ACCEPTED AS BEING AN ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT, HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE OTHER REFORMS WERE MEANT TO BE ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY. THIS UNDERSTANDING WE DID NOT ACCEPT AND WE STAND OVER OUR STATEMENT IN FULL, SAVE INsofar AS MENTIONED ABOVE.

BY THE CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETING THE MINISTER ACCEPTED OUR URGINGS TO THE POINT AT WHICH HE PROPOSED THAT ONE OF HIS OFFICIALS BE SENT

with a governor of the Maze prison to the prisoners by mid-morning at the latest on the following morning, the 7th July 1981, as it was essential that clarification of the Government position be made so that there could be no doubts in the minds of the Government--position-be-made\_so that there could be no doubts in the minds of the prisoners. He agreed that clarification should be made in the spirit of our discussion and in the light of Mr Atkins statement and his (Mr Alison's) letter of Tuesday 30th June. It was also agreed that the negative as well as the positive side would have to be put to the prisoners.

Given the assurance, we agreed to suspend the publication of our detailed statement. We were allowed to telephone the prison chaplain from Stormont Castle to ask him to convey to the hunger strikers that we would not be going in to see them on Monday night. It was by the 10.15 p.m. WE asked the chaplain also to inform them to expect an NIO OFFICIAL in the morning. The chaplain later that night confirmed to the I.C.J.P. that he had been able to convey the message to the six huner strikers in the hospital.

At 11.40 a.m. yesterday Tuesday July 7th, we were asked by the N.I.O. to come to Stormont Castle to see <sup>the</sup> ~~them~~ <sup>the</sup> response to a query from the Commission we were told that no-one had yet been from the N.I.O. to the prison.

We declined to see the Government again until their official had been in to the prisoners, and asked for an assurance that a visit would take place immediately. Otherwise we would make public the commitment given. It was for this reason the press were called to this hotel for 1.00 p.m. yesterday (Tuesday) Just before our press conference we were informed that an official would go in that afternoon.

We were told at 4.00 p.m. that no-one had yet gone in to the Prison, but that someone would be going in and that a document of clarifications was still being drafted.

By 5.30 p.m. it became clear to us that the Government intention was to send in the document but no official

We, the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, took the view that suspicion was a central difficulty in arriving at a solution and

We the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, took the view that suspicion was a central difficulty in arriving at a solution and that the prisoner's suspicions would be further heightened by the absence of an N.I.O. official, especially since one had been expected, and that the result could perhaps be the rejection of any document.

We communicated this once more by phone to Mr. Allison himself at 5.55 p.m. yesterday and yet again at 7.15 p.m. At 8.50 p.m. we were told that an N.I.O. official would go into see the prisoners with prison governor that evening. This later was explained to mean an N.I.O. official to be in attendance while a prison governor read out the written document. At 10.00 p.m. Mr Allison personally telephoned the Commission to say that there would be no one going in that night. He said that the official would be going in the following morning (i.e. this morning) but that the delay would be to the prisoner's benefit. The commission members expressed alarm at this development. We were also assured of the condition of Joe Mc Donnell.

We heard this morning that Joe Mc Donnell has died. The N.I.O. informed us that at about 6.30 a.m. that an official of the N.I.O. was on his way to the Maze prison, with a statement which was to be used to the hunger strikers by a prison governor in the presence of an N.I.O. official. We have received a copy of the statement we believe to have been read to the prisoners.

We cannot regard it as a serious attempt to seek a resolution, in the light of the discussions we had and of the position clarified to us by the Minister.

We believe that Mr Allison himself acted at all times in good faith.

Our commitment is to tell the truth in this matter. Our telling of the truth can in no way be interpreted in fact it would be morally wrong to interpret it as an excuse for hatred or violence. We repeat with every greater emphasis our call for a rejection of violence as our statement of June 3rd.

We have set out the truth in an endeavour to achieve a solution and we believe a solution is still possible without further loss of life if the truth is honoured.

On the 3rd June 1981 the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace issued a statement on the hunger strike in the Maze Prison which made three suggestions in an effort to promote a resolution of the hunger strike and the blanket protest.

These suggestions were:

1. That prisoners in the Maze, who are at present permitted to wear their own clothes for a greater part of the time should like the prisoners in Armagh, be allowed to do so at all times.
2. that some moves might be made to increase opportunities for association while making it clear that military training, or any other activity that would be illegal in society at large, would not be tolerated in the prison, and
3. that the question of prison work should be reviewed both in order to ensure that the work is of the greatest possible cultural and educational value and that no work of a demeaning nature is demanded.

Encouraged by the public reception our statement received, the I.C.J.P. sought a response from the interested parties in the dispute to ascertain whether our statement could provide an avenue for a resolution. In this context the Commission sought a meeting with the NIO and on the 23rd June, 1981 met Mr. Michael Alison M.P., Minister for State, and senior officials. This meeting was held on the strict understanding that the Commission was in no sense negotiating, but rather seeking to clarify the attitude of the British Government to our suggestions. The Commission fully accepted and accepts the principle that the response to our suggestions was being discussed in the context of the whole N.I. Prison system and of the general principle of overall governmental control. It was followed by three further meetings on June 26th and July 3rd and 4th with Mr. Alison at which further clarification was sought and given. In all these four meetings spanned over sixteen hours.

2. Following the second meeting the Minister on the 30th June 1981 transmitted a letter to the Commission responding to the points raised in our statement and at the first two meetings. This letter also referred the Commission to the Statement issued on the same date by the Secretary of State for N.I., Mr. Humphrey Atkins M.P.. The meetings which we had with Mr. Alison on the 3rd and 4th July were to obtain further clarification of the points discussed at the earlier meetings, and of the letter to us from Mr. Alison of the 30th June, taken together with Mr. Atkins' Statement of the same date.

At the conclusion of our meeting of the 4th July we requested the Minister of State for permission to enter the Maze Prison to seek a meeting with the eight men on hunger strike to inform them of the clarifications we had received from the Minister in response to our 3rd June Statement. This permission was given, and the eight hunger strikers met us later on the 4th July, the 57th day on hunger strike of Joe McDonnell, one of the eight.

Minister in response to our Statement of the 3rd June, at the

four meetings and in his letter to the ICJP of the 30th June.

*We informed the prisoners of the clarifications given by the*

Having regard to the substance of these clarifications we told the hunger strikers that in the event of the hunger strike coming to an end the British Government would be under a moral obligation to take action on the three areas suggested by us in our 3rd June Statement within a reasonable time scale which we could suggest.

In particular in the event of the hunger strike coming to an end the British Government would be under a moral obligation to allow all prisoners to wear all of their own clothes at all times as of right (unless such clothes resembled prison officers' uniforms, constituted a form of paramilitary uniform, or were manifestly outlandish) and whether or not the blanket protest comes to an end. In our opinion a reasonable time scale to implement this (including embodying in prison regulations the right for all prisoners to wear all of their own clothes at all times) is two weeks from the ending of the hunger strike.

In the event of the hunger strike coming to an end the British Government will be under a moral obligation

(a) to increase opportunities for association between prisoners in an openhanded and flexible manner and in particular (i) to allow movement by all prisoners during daily exercise time between the exercise yards of every two adjacent wings in each block.

(ii) to allow movement by all prisoners between the recreation rooms of every two adjacent wings in each block during the daily recreation periods.

These movements would be subject in the final analysis to the principles of security and maintenance of overall control by the authorities.

In our opinion a reasonable time scale for the implementation of these reforms is four weeks from the date the protest comes to

Furthermore we feel that in the context of the new situation which would be created were the protest to end, the British Government should seriously consider, as part of the generous and and flexible approach to prison management referred to in the Statement by Mr. Atkins on June 30th, allowing an extension of the daily periods of association within individual wings (e.g. between the hours of 7.15 to 8.30 a.m. and 5.00 to 5.30 p.m.). However this would be under supervision

(8) To increase to the maximum the range of useful activities which prisoners may engage in during the week. to afford each prisoner the widest choice of activities which as far as possible are congenial to him, within the broad and flexible framework of prison management, excluding work which can be regarded as meaningless in particular circumstances and subject in the final analysis to the principle that all prisoners are required to be engaged in some useful activity.

The following are a list of proposals made by the ICJP which the British Government has considered compatible with the above.

(i) provision should be made for prisoners with an acceptable level of skill knowledge and expertise in the areas of culture, education, and practical living including arts and crafts. to pass on such skill knowledge and expertise to other prisoners as part of the range of useful activities in which prisoners might engage

(ii) Prisoners may choose to work for charitable and voluntary bodies on condition that if necessary the body concerned shall provide materials free of cost to the prisoners to enable such work to be done. There would be no remuneration for prisoners engaged in the above activities. Prisoners may opt for work of a remunerative nature. A prisoner who fails to find accommodation within the choices provided may in the last analysis be required to do remunerative work though he may refuse remuneration.

construction of a church or equivalent facilities for religious worship within the prison. *Such work may include walls by prisoners on the*

The British Government have indicated that this list need not be exhaustive and that other proposals will be considered.

It is the Commissions view that personal laundry <sup>could</sup> be accommodated within the prisoners' own block or prison floor.

In our opinion a reasonable time scale for the implementation of these measures would be four weeks for number (i) above, eight weeks for number (ii) above and six months for the type of activity outlined and (iii) above.

The time scale for increasing the range of useful activities available to prisoners to an acceptable level would be eight weeks from the date of the ending of the hunger strike.

We also obtained clarification that in addition to the aspects of the prison regime outlined above, on the ending of the protest, prisoners would be entitled every month to receive four visits, to send up to eight letters and receive back a proportionate number and receive a weekly parcel. Prisoners serving a sentence of over two years shall have a radio in their cells.

It is clearly understood by ICJP that if the protest were to come to an end a new situation would be created. At present, prisoners who have come off protest receive a restoration of full remission for the unexpired portion of their sentence and restoration of 20% of the amount forfeited because of their protest subject to continuing good conduct.

If and when the present protest ends the British Government will be "imaginative" and "dramatic". We believe that such words should mean at the very least the restoration of the greater part of the remission already

*2. 10. 68*

that total remission should be sympathetically considered. in a spirit of magnanimity.

We understand that the British Government is prepared to recognise the cultural aspirations of prisoners and to facilitate them as far as possible. We believe that the government is morally bound to and will allow the introduction of Irish literature and textbooks, and Irish language and cultural classes on a comprehensive basis. We note that as evidence of goodwill on this point that the government have already allowed a copy of the new Irish language bible to be presented by the Commission to the prisoners.

that total remission should be sympathetically consider

Delivered to W Kerwin by M B Smith  
? British Embassy at 5.30 p.m. on 9/7/81.  
53  
9/7/81

1. There have been accusations that HMG acted in bad faith in its dealings with the ICJP. There is no substance in these accusations and HMG greatly regret that they have been made. HMG have been deeply concerned to see the hunger strike brought to a lasting end. They welcomed the Commission's wish to help and gave them every facility they could. They admire the Commission's determination and dedication to their task. They regard the Commission's efforts as having been extremely helpful and having substantially clarified areas of difficulty.
2. Against that background HMG particularly regret that the Commission appears to have concluded that they were deliberately misled and are concerned to ensure that the Irish Government should not also have this impression.
3. The problems appear to have arisen because the Commission believed that when we accepted the obligation further to clarify our position to the prisoners we had at the same time accepted the method and timing which the Commission had suggested. We had not. They also have misunderstood the significance of what we said to them about clothes and work. That such misunderstandings should have occurred is perhaps not surprising given that there was a series of discussions each lasting several hours. The details of these misunderstandings are of secondary importance. HMG's concern is to assure the Irish authorities that they have not acted in bad faith and that they continue to be deeply concerned to see the hunger strike ended. Despite the setback over McDonnell's death they do not regard the hunger strike as insoluble in the context of prison reform if the prisoners are prepared to accept the reality of a prison regime as such. HMG will be redoubling their efforts to bring it to an end. They are grateful to the Taoiseach for the great efforts which they know he has made and hope that he too will continue with them.

The Commission had by Monday evening formulated a lengthy statement of what they believed the Government ought to do and what in the light of the long discussions Mr Alison had had with them they believed we had a moral obligation now to do. They at that stage proposed to publish the statement and then take it into the prison. They sought our endorsement of it. Mr Alison pointed out that if that statement were published we would have to repudiate elements in it. This would not help a resolution of the hunger strike. It was agreed between us that the best way to proceed was for the Government to clarify its position to the prisoners. We would need time until Tuesday morning before being in a position to do so. The Commission suggested that we could do this in a number of ways and that the best was for one of the officials present at the discussions to take on the task. They now seem genuinely to have believed that in accepting the obligation to clarify our position we had accepted the method they suggested.

The method of clarification, however, though important in the view of the Commission was not the prime issue for us. What we had to do was to find a very precise form of words which (a) reflected the movement we were prepared to make after the hunger strike ended (inter-wing association; expansion of the range of prison activities to include things like building a chapel, neutral self-education and work for charity; and by implication own clothes) but (b) also reflected the realities of a prison regime which would remain - in particular that no prisoner would be allowed to opt out of work which the prison authorities required him to do and that segregation is not a right. The appropriate text required extensive consultation between Belfast where Mr Alison and the responsible officials were and London where the Secretary of State, whose authority was needed, happened to be. The agreed formulation was ready early on Wednesday morning and read to the prisoners by the Governor shortly before it was published. An NIO official was present.

The reality is that on at least one important point of substance (work) we and the Commission are not at one. This and not the mechanics of conveying our views to the prisoners is what stood in the way of ending the hunger strike, even if the Commission are right that their formulation set out what the prisoners would settle for.

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C197  
9TH JULY 1981  
IMMEDIATE  
TO LONDON FROM HQ  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM A S NELIGAN

|                  |                  |
|------------------|------------------|
| COPIED MESSAGE   |                  |
| IMMEDIATE URGENT |                  |
| CONFIDENTIAL     |                  |
| DATE             | 9/7/81 TIME 1110 |
| INITIALS         | SJB              |

MMMDKGIT

IN DISCUSSIONS IN D/TAOISEACH LATE YESTERDAY WITH D. NALLY, L. HOURICAN (GOVERNMENT PRESS SECRETARY) AND OTHERS THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS ONES THAT SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF AN EARLY DEMARCHE TO THE BRITISH:-

POINTS

THE STRIKES ARE CAUSING

- (1) A WIDENING AND A DEEPENING OF THE TENSIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND LEADING TO MORE RIOTS, MURDERS ETC.,
- (2) A DEGREE OF DE-STABILISATION IN THE SOUTH WHICH SO FAR HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED.,
- (3) SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS.,
- (4) IN OUR JUDGEMENT, DAMAGE TO THE BRITISH STANDING AND GOOD NAME IN AMERICA, EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE.

THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES SO FAR FROM A PROLONGATION OF THE STRIKE ARE THE PROVISIONAL I.R.A. - WHOSE RECRUITMENT HAS INCREASED AND TO WHOM THE FLOW OF MONEY AND MATERIALS IS BEING CONSIDERABLY AUGMENTED.

THERE APPEARS TO BE NO QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED. THE PRISONERS, ACCORDING TO THEIR STATEMENT OF LAST WEEK-END CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE NOT SEEKING DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN PRISONERS OR CONCESSIONS THAT WOULD INVOLVE SURRENDER OF CONTROL OF THE PRISON.

WE NOW FACE A SITUATION WHICH IS MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN IT WAS LAST WEEKS. THE PROSPECT OF AN IRISH M.P. DYING IN A BRITISH JAIL IS ONE THAT NOBODY CAN RELISH. WHAT WENT WRONG ?

WE MUST ASK, FOR OUR INFORMATION AND SO AS TO DEVELOP STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT, WHEN AND HOW THE BRITISH ENVISAGE THE STRIKE ENDING. IT WOULD BE THE MOST TRAGIC OF MISTAKES TO ASSUME THAT AN END WILL COME ABOUT SIMPLY FROM AN EARLY SURRENDER OF THE PRISONERS.

END OF TEXT.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT MUCH OF THIS MATERIAL HAS ALREADY BEEN USED YESTERDAY BY HOURICAN IN BRIEFING THE PRESS.

AS REGARDS PROCEDURE, WE FAILED TO SEE THE TAOISEACH YESTERDAY (BUT HOPE TO HAVE HIS DECISION VERY SHORTLY) AND EXPECT THAT HE WILL REQUEST THE MINISTER (MR. KELLY) TO TRAVEL TO LONDON TO MAKE OUR DEMARCHE TO ATKINS. SOME ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO UTILISING THE OCCASION OF NEXT WEEK'S E.C. COUNCIL MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG TO MAKE DEMARCHE TO CARRINGTON, BUT WE WOULD PREFER THE FIRST COURSE FOR REASONS WHICH WILL BE OBVIOUS TO YOU. WE WILL CONVEY FURTHER WORD AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

+++

MOM

Phoned summary of Irish Commission for Justice and  
Peace statement from Mr. Martin Burke.

Extreme urgency in hope of reaching a solution. 2/17?  
16 hours meeting with Alison.  
Commitment to act on spirit and word.  
Minister indicated the statement was a ~~true~~ reflection  
of British Government except

- (1) "moral obligation"
- (2) clothes - as an absolute commitment.

He said:

Others "illustrative only"

Suspend publication of statement: 10.15 p.m. Monday night.  
Expect N.I.O. official in morning.

Press conference: 4 p.m. still not official.

Suspicious. 8.15 p.m. told N.I.O. Official and governor  
going in that night.

x

Cannot regard document as a serious attempt to solve problem.

Believe a solution is still possible if the truth is honoured.

Commission will wait to-night to see British reactions.

Leaving in the morning.

They have been asked to contact us in the morning before  
leaving.

BM  
8/7/81

1981  
PSS  
Mr. Heugan  
Mr. Nally  
(D) Tansiean,

Statement issued by the leader of the SDLP, Mr. John Hume.

Joe McDonnell's death is a tragedy for his family and for the community. It could have been prevented. An extraordinary opportunity existed to resolve the prison crisis once and for all. Mrs. Thatcher has once again shown a disastrous failure to understand the seriousness and the urgency of the situation in Northern Ireland arising out of the prison crisis. The efforts of the Commission for Justice and Peace deserve the gratitude and support of all people of goodwill. Despite this tragic setback I urge the Commission to continue its efforts.

8 July, 1981

*and to*

Mr. Joe McDonnell who was on hunger strike in the Maze prison died shortly after five o'clock this morning. Our deepest sympathy goes out to his wife whom I met last Friday his family and friends as it must go out to the family and friends of every victim of the continuing violence in Northern Ireland.

Mr. McDonnell's death comes at a time when the work of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace in providing the basis for a solution was at an advanced stage. A solution is more than ever necessary now to bring an end to the sad cycle of suffering and death in the Maze prison. It is in the interests of Ireland that the tragedy of Joe McDonnell should not be used on any account or by any interest, as an occasion to delay the finding of such a solution.

I have repeatedly said that a solution can be reached through a flexibility of approach which need not sacrifice any principle. The onus of responsibility for showing this flexibility rests on both sides and there has indeed been evidence over the past few days of a clearer and more widespread recognition of this fact. But the greater responsibility must, as always, rest on those with the greater power. We, for our part, have been in touch with the British authorities on many occasions to impress on them the need for an urgent solution. Indeed, I have been in direct contact with the British Prime Minister on the matter. The House will understand that I cannot say more at this critical moment. We will continue to do all we can to help in bringing an end to the dispute.

While efforts continue to find a solution, before further deaths occur, inside or outside the prison, I would urge that all concerned - and these number many throughout the length and breadth of Ireland - should do nothing to damage the interests or the good name of our country.

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C205

**IMMEDIATE**

TO HQ  
FOR A/S NELIGAN  
MMMQAZSW

FROM LONDON  
FROM P DEMPSEY

MAZE HUNGER STRIKE

FOLLOWING IS NOTE PREPARED BY PAT HENNESSY ON A CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH LEN DOWNIE OF THE WASHINGTON POST.

IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH LEN DOWNIE OF THE WASHINGTON POST I ASKED ABOUT THE BRIEFING WHICH MR ATKINS GAVE YESTERDAY FOR US CORRESPONDENTS.

DOWNIE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE FOUND ATKINS' PERFORMANCE A CURIOUS ONE. INSTEAD OF DEALING WITH THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS HE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME "FIGHTING OLD FIRES" - THAT THE HUNGER STRIKE WAS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL PLOY, THAT POLITICAL STATUS COULD NEVER BE CONCEDED ETC. ETC. REFERRING TO THE PRESENT SERIES OF TALKS HE INDICATED WITHOUT GIVING ANY DETAILS THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD IN THE EVENT OF A SETTLEMENT ACCEPT SOME CHANGES IN THE PRISON REGIME. THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS LACK OF PRECISION WAS TO INDICATE THAT THE PRISONERS MIGHT BE ASKED TO BUILD THEIR OWN CRAFT WORK-SHOPS THUS, APPARENTLY, MEETING THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNS THAT THE PRISONERS SHOULD NOT BE EXEMPT FROM INDUSTRIAL WORK WHILE ALLOWING THE PRISONERS TO FEEL THAT THEY WERE CONTRIBUTING TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR OWN ENVIRONMENT. IT WAS EMPHASISED THROUGHOUT THAT NO IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE INTRODUCED UNTIL THE HUNGER STRIKE HAD BEEN TERMINATED.

DOWNIE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE OVER-RIDING MOOD OF ATKINS' COMMENTS WAS ONE OF PESSIMISM. WHILE NOTHING WAS SAID DOWNIE FORMED THE VERY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS IN FACT PREPARING THE GROUND FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE BREAKDOWN OF YESTERDAY'S MEDIATION EFFORTS HE SAID THAT THE BRITISH SIDE WAS BRIEFING TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD NOT AT ANY STAGE BEEN FULL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE NIO AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE COMMISSION. THE BRITISH, IT WAS SAID, HOPE) THAT THE PRISONERS WOULD HOWEVER INTERPRET THIS MORNING'S ATKINS' STATEMENT AS INDICATING THAT WHILE THE AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT EVERY SPECIFIC DETAIL OF THE COMMISSION PROPOSALS, THEY WOULD, IN THE EVENT OF THE STRIKE BEING CALLED OFF, BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON MANY OF THEM.

DOWNIE ALSO MENTIONED REPORTS WHICH HE HEARD OF THE PH'S INTERVENTION TO STALL ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS.

F-A1 LDNPI NNOZ#  
E-A DUBLIN  
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SERIAL NO 677  
UNCLASSIFIED

*A/S Neligan*

IMMEDIATE

TO HQ  
FOR A/S NELIGAN

FROM LONDON  
FROM O'CEALLAIGH

FOR YOUR INFORMATION THERE FOLLOWS TODAY'S STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE IRISH COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE HAVE HELD A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH MR ALISON, MINISTER OF STATE IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, AT THEIR REQUEST IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE PRISON REGIME IN AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CURRENT HUNGER STRIKE IN THE MAZE PRISON. THEY HAVE ALSO VISITED THE PRISONERS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN IN NEGOTIATION THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE COMMISSION. IT WAS AND REMAINS GRATEFUL FOR THE STRENUOUS EFFORTS WHICH THE COMMISSION HAVE MADE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A RESOLUTION OF THE PRISON PROTEST.

2. I ISSUED A CAREFULLY CONSIDERED STATEMENT ON 30 JUNE ON NORTHERN IRELAND PRISON REGIMES AND NOTHING WHICH HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN HAS LED ME TO THINK THAT ANYTHING IN THAT DOCUMENT SHOULD BE CHANGED.

3. THE STATEMENT OF 30 JUNE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT ~~XX~~ AGREE EITHER THAT A PARTICULAR SET OF PRISONERS SHOULD BE GIVEN PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT (AND I WELCOME THE INDICATION IN THE PRISONERS' STATEMENT OF 4 JULY THAT THIS IS NOT NOW ONE OF THEIR DEMANDS) OR THAT THE PRISON AUTHORITIES CAN ABDICATE CONTROL OVER HOW THE PRISONERS ARE RUN AND HOW LIFE GOES ON IN THEM.

4. THE STATEMENT ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT, AS ITS ACTIONS IN THE PAST HAVE SHOWN, WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND WHERE POSSIBLE IMPROVE THE PRESENT ELIGHTENED AND HUMANE REGIME WITH FLEXIBILITY IN ITS ADMINISTRATION.

5. IN THE LAST 12-18 MONTHS, PARTLY BUT NOT SOLELY IN RESPONSE TO CERTAIN CRITICISMS CONTAINED IN THE PARTIAL DECISION ISSUED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN JUNE 1980, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE A SERIES OF MODIFICATIONS IN THE REGIMES APPLICABLE TO CONFORMING AND/OR PROTESTING PRISONERS, THE MOST NOTABLE OF WHICH WAS THE ABOLITION, ANNOUNCED IN OCTOBER 1980 AND IMPLEMENTED EARLY IN 1981, OF PRISON UNIFORM AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY AN ISSUE OF CIVILIAN-TYPE CLOTHING IN VARIOUS DESIGNS. OTHER CHANGES (MOST OF WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY THE PROTESTORS) INCLUDE ADDITIONAL LETTERS AND VISITS, EXTRA ASSOCIATION TIME AND COMPASSIONATE HOME LEAVE. THESE ADJUSTMENTS OF THEMSELVES CONSTITUTE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF HMG'S READINESS TO ACT FLEXIBLY OVER THE QUESTION OF PRISON REGIMES.

6. DESPITE ALL THE EFFORTS WHICH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SINCE OCTOBER 1970 AND DESPITE THE COMMISSION'S OWN EFFORTS I AM PERSUADED BY THE COMMISSION THAT THERE IS STILL DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF PRISONERS ABOUT WHAT IN PRACTICE WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY GAVE UP THE HUNGER STRIKE. SOME MAY DOUBT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO BE FLEXIBLE AND HUMANE IN APPLYING THE EXISTING REGIME. SOME MAY DELUDE THEMSELVES THAT THE FLEXIBILITY IS INFINITELY EXTENDABLE INTO A MIRROR OF THE REGIME FOR SPECIAL CATEGORY PRISONERS. BOTH ARE WRONG. I HAVE THEREFORE SET OUT IN VERY SIMPLE TERMS WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO BELOW AND THIS HAS BEEN GIVEN TO ALL PRISONERS TODAY BY THE PRISON GOVERNOR.

7. IN DOING THIS WE ARE SETTING OUT TO THE PRISONERS WHAT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE TO CONFORMING PRISONERS. THE REGIME IS

ADMINISTERED FLEXIBLY. THERE IS SCOPE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

BUT NOT UNDER DURESS. THE PROTESTORS' ACTION, FAR FROM

BRINGING ABOUT CHANGES, HAS IN FACT RENDERED MOVEMENT IMPOSSIBLE. THE ONLY KEY TO ADVANCE IS FOR THEM TO END THE STRIKE.

3  
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE PROTEST ENDS?  
\*\*\*\*\*

1. PROTESTING PRISONERS HAVE BEEN SEGREGATED FROM THE REST. OTHER PRISONERS ARE NOT SEGREGATED BY RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER AFFILIATION. IF THERE WERE NO PROTEST THE ONLY REASON FOR SEGREGATING SOME PRISONERS FROM OTHERS WOULD BE THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRISON AUTHORITIES, NOT THE PRISONERS, THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO AVOID TROUBLE BETWEEN GROUPS.

2. PRISONERS WHO GIVE UP THEIR PROTEST WOULD GET THE ASSOCIATION NON-PROTESTING PRISONERS NOW GET. THAT IS TO SAY THREE HOURS EACH EVENING, ALL THEIR WEEKENDS PLUS PERIODS FOR EXERCISE, PHYSICAL EDUCATION, GAMES AND MEALS. THERE IS LITTLE IMMEDIATE SCOPE FOR EXPANSION. THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE THAT ADJACENT WINGS SHOULD SHARE ASSOCIATION IN RECREATION ROOMS AND EXERCISE AREAS DEPENDS ON SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR SUPERVISING AND CONTROLLING MOVEMENT AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO ARRANGE THE NECESSARY PHYSICAL FACILITIES FOR THIS.

not ruled out.

3. DURING ASSOCIATION PRISONERS WOULD HAVE THE PRIVILEGE OF WEARING THEIR OWN CLOTHES. AT OTHER TIMES THEY WOULD WEAR CIVILIAN-TYPE CLOTHING OF A NON-UNIFORM KIND. BY COMPARISON WITH MOST OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES THIS IS A LIBERAL REGIME, BUT WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT.

4. ALL PRISONERS ARE IN PRACTICE AS WELL AS IN PRINCIPLE LIABLE FOR DOMESTIC TASKS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE WINGS, EG FOR ORDERLY DUTIES AND IN THE LAUNDRIES AND KITCHENS. NO ONE WILL BE EXCLUDED AS OF RIGHT FROM THE LIABILITY TO WORK IN PRISON WORK-SHOPS. WE WILL ADD TO THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES SO FAR AS AND AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN. THE COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE HAVE GIVEN US EXAMPLES OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. WE SHALL LOOK CLOSELY AT THESE BUT AT THE END OF THE DAY IT WILL BE FOR THE PRISON AUTHORITIES TO DECIDE WHAT JOBS A PRISONER DOES.

NB

Here.

5. ANY PRISONER WHO ABIDES BY THE RULES IS ALREADY ALLOWED 8 LETTERS, 4 VISITS AND 4 PARCELS A MONTH. THOSE GIVING UP THEIR PROTEST WOULD GET THIS STRAIGHT AWAY. AND IT IS MORE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN ASKING FOR.

6. 50% REMISSION IS AWARDED FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR. IT IS FORFEITED BY THOSE WHO BREACH PRISON RULES BY PROTESTING. IN PRACTICE PRISONERS WHO HAVE GIVEN UP THEIR PROTEST HAVE HAD UP TO 1/5TH OF LOST REMISSION RESTORED.

END

DOC 8/07/81

TIME: 12.11

✚

E-A DUBLIN

F-A1 LDN

## ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

### Call by British Ambassador

#### Note:

The British Ambassador called, at 4.30 today to report further on London reactions to points put to them about a possible settlement of the H-Blocks situation.

He said that the matter was being considered there at the very highest level - by the Prime Minister, Atkins and senior Ministers.

The debate in the Commons on Northern Ireland was proceeding at present. Under their conventions, Atkins had opened and Alison must conclude today. On this account, he simply could not meet anybody today. This was not an excuse. The Ambassador asked that we contact Mr. Hugh Logue, who had been maintaining that the debate was irrelevant, to convey that this was not the case, even in relation to a settlement of the immediate issue. Alison would see the Commission for Justice and Peace at 2.30 to-morrow. The Prime Minister and Atkins were meeting with other senior Ministers again at 9 a.m. to-morrow so as to provide directions for a brief for Alison for that meeting.

They were working on the matters of association and work and also working very carefully on the letter which the Commission had. Their essential principles were that whatever was done should not distinguish between prisoners or relinquish control of the prison.

D. NALLY

2nd July, 1981.

2-7-1981

T ▽ Mrs. T. spoke on telephone 6 pm 1/7/81.

- 1. Thanks for message
  - 2. H. Blokes
  - [3. Joint Studies]
  - 4. Possible meeting
  - [5. Atkins statement]
- [Notes prepared for him]
- Meeting at earliest convenient time.

H. - Blokes

High Logue. SDLP  
Mr. Gilly - Dem

Deduction -  
following  
hard line  
brotherhood  
or  
A-Bloch  
secondary.

Used arguments in speaking note  
 Urgency of meeting CJP & NIO  
 of admission to prison  
 Argued against brotherhood.  
 On access to prison - argued Logue be let in  
 Response not great. Disappointing.  
 Also in preoccupied Parliament.  
 Pleased Mrs. T - must be got over the ad. from Atkins  
 on access said confined to clergy & family.

↓

- Question on potential status put to T
- He rules it out. Strong views.

W. Keenan followed up with NIO Belfast.  
Not before Friday.

Signs of prisoners interest in CJP efforts.

(X) Atkins Statement to-day!  
Meeting at lunch 3/7

(X) Exchange of papers on  
J. Studies  
Wolman's group



ROINN AN TAOISIGH

LE DEA-MHÉIN AN RÚNAÍ

Note The To and Toronto used this note  
as the basis for the discussion with the ambassador  
which took place at 3.05 to 3.30 p.m. today

Points for Discussion with British Ambassador

1/7

3  
↓

1. You will know from what I have said just how seriously we view the situation in the H-Block and particularly the possible consequences for this country.

2. We have had meetings with the Commission for Justice and Peace and from them we gather that there is now a better hope of settlement than at any time in the recent past.

② ↓

3. It is essential if this settlement is to come about to avoid any assumption/  
/that the tactic which worked before Christmas will work again. Then, as you know, the strike collapsed seven hours before McKenna was due to die. On this occasion our firm belief is that as time is allowed and to go by, /McDonnell is brought nearer to death, attitudes among the families and outside the prison generally will harden and a settlement will become impossible. Do not on any account repeat the tactics of the last occasion.

/.....

4. What we are asking is that the Commission be allowed to see the prisoners to explain the possibilities to them. In no way will they be acting as negotiators. All they seek is one meeting. There is no suggestion that they should come back to the Northern Ireland office for "clarification" or other modifications. It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that one meeting is all that is involved.

5. We believe strongly that this method is far more likely to produce a solution than any form of discussion or explanation through normal prison channels.

①

6. We are particularly appreciative of the way in which things seem to be developing and the sensitivity which has been shown by the British authorities in their contacts with the Commission. We think that it would be an appalling tragedy if the good offices of the Commission and all of the work which has been done were now to go to waste through a miscalculation about the timing of meetings.

/.....

7. The present is a crucial time not only because of the situation in the prison but because of the way in which the families outside it have combined in the efforts for a settlement.

8. The ascendancy they have established over the godfathers is valuable and could be lost within thirty-six hours if a wrong move is made.

9. Added urgency is lent to our suggestion by information we have that the prisoners themselves are urging the Commission to keep at what they are doing - despite any information or statements purporting to be made on their behalf.

10. In short, what we are seeking is to have the Northern Ireland Office

- (1) meet the Commission and
- (2) let them meet the prisoners - as soon as possible.

Friday will be too late.

1st July, 1981.

*Secretary*

|                             |                  |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| CODED MESSAGE               |                  |
| IMMEDIATE PRIORITY          |                  |
| CONFIDENTIAL                |                  |
| DATE <i>1/7/81</i>          | TIME <i>1745</i> |
| INITIALS <i>[Signature]</i> |                  |

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HAVE AN IMMEDIATE FOR AMBASSADOR OK TO GA

YES PSE DO+

QQQQQQ  
C190  
IMMEDIATE  
1/7/81

TO LONDON FROM HQ  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ASST NELIGAN

MMMKSETY  
TAOISEACH ACTIVITIES.

1. T. TODAY RECEIVED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE. THEY DESCRIBED THEIR RECENT CONTACTS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WITH N.I.O. AS A RESULT OF WHICH THEY CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON ELABORATION AND CLARIFICATION OF WHAT THE COMMISSIONS PROPOSALS WOULD MEAN IN THE PRISON IF IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE TERMS OF BRITISH POLICY. THEY NOW WISHED TO SEE PRISONERS TO GIVE EXEGESIS IN DETAIL OF THESE CONDITIONS (DETAILS WERE NOT REVEALED TO US BECAUSE OF CONFIDENTIALITY). THEY REPORTED HOWEVER THAT BRITISH WERE WITHHOLDING PERMISSION FOR A PRISON VISIT AND REQUESTED OUR AID. THEY FELT THAT THE TIME FOR SUCH A MOVE WAS RIPE BECAUSE THE FAMILIES OF THE PRISONERS NOW SEEMED TO BE IN THE ASCENDANT IN INFLUENCE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE IRA. THAT SITUATION MIGHT HOWEVER BE ONLY TEMPORARY.

2. T SUMMONED YOUR OPP NO AT 1505 AND URGED THEREFORE THAT THE COMMISSION BE LET MEET THE PRISONERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ACTING ON ADVICE OF COMMISSION MEMBERS HE ARGUED AGAINST BRITISH ATTEMPT TO REPRODUCE THE CONDITIONS OF LAST DECEMBER BY WAITING UNTIL A PRISONER WAS AT DEATHS DOOR BEFORE MAKING A MOVE. THAT WOULD BE TOO LATE AND WOULD NOT WORK AGAIN. FIGG WILL HAVE REPORTED BACK IN THIS SENSE AND T. EXPECTS AN EARLY RESPONSE.

3. T. ALSO ARRANGED WITH FIGG TO MAKE DIRECT TELEPHONE CALL TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AT 1800 TODAY WHICH HE WILL USE TO PRESS CASE OUTLINED ABOVE AND TO THANK HER FOR TELEGRAM OF CONGRATULATIONS.

~~~~~  
WE WILL REPORT SOONEST ON THAT PHONE CALL.

END

916104 IVERNA G

cc

Deputy
M. D. ... Misc.
F. 2.
M. ...

ROINN AN TACISIGH

Uimhir.....

Note:

The Ambassador in delivering this message said that the speaking note should be ignored. It did not properly represent what he should say. The last paragraph of the Secretary of State's statement to the Commons was what was important.

The Ambassador said that the statement was being given to the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace at 1 p.m. and to the prisoners at 2.25 p.m.

I said again that while we are not close enough to what was actually going on in the prison we had the strong impression that there could be some hope for success if an arrangement, were set up under which somebody from the N.I.O. or elsewhere could talk through an intermediary and settle what could or what could not be done. I said that Fr. Brendan Meagher could probably act for the prisoners. We are not urging direct negotiations or anything of this sort but trying to achieve a realistic settlement on the basis of what we were being told could work i.e.

- (1) a percentage of the "demands" and
- (2) A phasing in on any changes.

A

30th June, 1981.

SPEAKING NOTE

I reported what ~~you~~^{Mr. Pevinsack} told me on Saturday 27 June about ~~his~~^{his} ~~your~~ concern over the way the hunger strike issue is now developing in the Republic. The Prime Minister and her colleagues fully recognise the importance of the issues at stake. They know the pressures brought upon democratic Governments if hunger strikers die after getting themselves elected: they had to face up to them in the case of Sands.

The British Government fully understand that if further deaths of hunger strikers occur this will be bad for legitimate politics in Northern Ireland and Great Britain and in the Republic. But they remain convinced that to give in to the IRA will have even graver effects for them and for the Irish Government. There is no evidence of a desire on the part of the prisoners and those who control them to end the hunger strike except on the terms which they have set and maintained ever since October last. All the evidence available to the Government, and there is a great deal of all kinds, confirms that they are faced with a stark choice between accepting the possibility of further deaths and conceding the five demands.

The Government have found their discussions with the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace useful in establishing what changes in a conforming prison regime might seem reasonable to reasonable men as a way of ending the protests. But as the prisoners themselves have said, most recently in public in response to the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace's efforts, this is not what the prisoners are looking for.

The Prime Minister would greatly regret if it were to appear that any substantial difference existed between us on this issue of principle. That could only help the common enemy.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND,
THE RT HON HUMPHREY ATKINS MP: TO BE ISSUED AT 2.30pm on 30 JUNE 1981

1. The hunger strikes in the Maze prison are not of Her Majesty's Government's making and it is not within our power to bring them to an end. That is up to the hunger strikers and protesters themselves, and those who support and advise them,
2. We have done everything that the European Commission for Human Rights have suggested.
3. No further complaints have been made about conditions in the prisons in Northern Ireland which will bear comparison with conditions in any other prison system in the world.
4. We share Mr Haughey's concern about the effects of the hunger strikes and we hope that the hunger strikers will decide to give up the protest and conform to the prison regime.
5. We also share the concern recently expressed by the Irish Catholic Bishops' Conference in their statement issued on 17 June and by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP).
6. In dealing with this situation, from long before the first hunger strike, the Government has stood firm on two matters of principle.
7. First, Her Majesty's Government cannot as a responsible Government confer on any class of prisoner 'political status', either directly or by giving prisoners the right to a particular regime or set of privileges that would segregate or otherwise differentiate them from others. The European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR), in its ruling last year on an application by four prisoners in the Maze prison, upheld the Government's position on this, declaring that the right to a preferential status for a certain category of prisoner is not among the rights guaranteed by the Convention.
8. Secondly, the prison authorities must retain control over how the prisons are run and how life goes on in them. Like any enlightened prison authority, the Government recognises that prisons run best where there is a degree of mutual tolerance and acceptance between staff and inmates: but that is a far cry from handing over, to prisoners who reject the whole authority under which they are imprisoned, control over (for example) how they shall pass the time and with whom they shall associate. It is true that something like that situation arose in 1972, a time of large-scale civil disorder in Northern Ireland: prisoners convicted at that time were accommodated under a regime which was and remains different from the normal

/regime.

cc
PSS
Mr Pettigrew
on Burke
Mr Wilson
Washington
New York

regime. The fundamental objections to that arrangement quickly became apparent, and it was condemned in the report of a Committee of Inquiry in 1975 presided over by Lord Gardiner. The Committee's recommendation, followed by Governments since, was that this regime should be phased out as soon as possible.

9. Subject to these principles the Government is committed to maintaining and, as proves practical and as resources allow, further improving an enlightened and humane regime with flexibility in its administration. In a statement made on 23 October 1980, when the first hunger strike was threatened, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, after reiterating the Government's principles,

'acknowledged the ECHR's injunction that the requirement on the Government to exercise their authority to safeguard the health and well-being of all prisoners, including protesters, makes it necessary for the prison authorities to keep under constant review their reaction to recalcitrant prisoners engaged in a developing and protracted protest'.

The statement went on to declare the Government's anxiety

'to ensure that conditions for all prisoners in Northern Ireland prisons are enlightened and humane'.

10. The Government sets out below the position regarding prison regimes in Northern Ireland, in particular the three aspects which feature in the recent ICJP statement, namely that prisoners at the Maze should be allowed to wear their own clothes at all times; that opportunities for association should be increased; and that the type of work required of prisoners should be reviewed.

Prison Activity

11. It is generally accepted in enlightened prison systems, and has been upheld by the ICHR, that people in prison should spend part of the day in useful activity. First, prisons are not hotels: the domestic life of the establishment has to go on, under the direction of the prison authorities, and it is reasonable that prisoners should play a part in maintaining it rather than expect others to do that for them. But it is also right that prisoners should contribute, through productive work, to recompensing the society whose interests, individual and collective they have damaged: and that educational activity, both vocational and more general, should occupy part of the time of all prisoners and a large part of the occupational time of some prisoners. Each of those three kinds of occupation can be amply justified, as reflecting the demands and opportunities of normal life outside prison - and this approximation to normality is itself a valuable objective of penal practice and one with a genuinely rehabilitative aspect. All three are well provided for in Northern Ireland prisons.

/A balance

A balance has to be struck among them, in the interests of prison management, as well as the needs and wishes of individual inmates.

12. The Government said in its statement on 19 December 1980, and now re-affirm, that the aim is to work out for each prisoner the kinds of available activity which are judged to suit him best. There should be no obstacle to devising worthwhile occupational programmes for prisoners who are prepared to accept - as most do - the broad and flexible framework set out above. If however a prisoner declares himself unavailable for allocation to any particular kind of prison activity, notwithstanding the broad and flexible framework, he should not expect to receive the same privileges as prisoners who do accept the framework. What the Government cannot do is to hand over to prisoners, individually or in groups, the right to decide what should be the normal regime of the prison: that is a basic element of prison management.

Association

13. It is a common feature of modern prisons to provide time, in the evenings and at weekends, in which prisoners can relax in one another's company, subject to the requirements of prison security, which means that supervision is necessary so as to maintain control and good order, to ensure that the opportunity is not misused, and to protect prisoners from each other. That is what distinguishes association in prison from what is referred to as 'free association'. The latter term implies association that would be unsupervised, and would be unrestricted by the authorities as regards the range of activities permitted and the choice of associate. What it would mean in practice is that large numbers of prisoners - up to 100 or even more - could pass the time as they chose with fellow-members of their own paramilitary grouping, in pursuits related to the terrorist activities which have brought them into prison. This would clearly involve a loss of control which no prudent prison authority could tolerate. Subject to that important distinction, provision for association in Northern Ireland prisons is generous and is not immutable. Association in wings is allowed for three hours each evening and also all day on Saturdays and Sundays. Prisoners also mix with one another at various other times - for example during exercise, physical education, games and meal times. A wide range of recreational facilities - games, hobbies, classes, television - is available for use during periods of association: particulars were given in the detailed description of Northern Ireland prison regimes published in December 1980.

Clothing

14. As part of its flexible approach to prison management the Government has already substituted, for conventional prison uniform, ordinary shirts, trousers and pullovers purchased in Northern Ireland. These are retained by a prisoner as his personal clothing. Wearing of

/this

this clothing is required only during the working part of the day (though many prisoners are content to wear it all the time). During association periods and at weekends, prisoners may wear their own clothing.

Visits, Letters etc, and Remission

15. In addition to the three aspects of prison regime dealt with above, the protesting prisoners also demand one letter, one parcel and one visit each week. What is available to prisoners not engaged in the protests already matches or exceeds this. They can at present send up to eight letters a month at the authorities' expense, receive four visits a month, and receive a weekly parcel of reading material, fruit and toilet articles. These allowances are liberal by the standards of many prison administrations. Some limit has to be set to what can be permitted in these respects, not for punitive reasons but because of the demands that the supervision etc required - especially in conditions of high security - places upon the staff and other resources of the prison.

16. Finally, the Northern Ireland prison system, in common with a number of others, grants prisoners remission of part of their sentence subject to good conduct. The proportion of sentence remitted was increased from one-third to one-half some years ago. Remission can be forfeited for misconduct, and has been forfeited in considerable quantities by protesting prisoners on account of their breaches of prison rules. Prisoners who took part in the 'dirty protest' lost a full day's remission for every day on protest. However, when that form of protest ended, the authorities responded promptly by halving the rate of remission being forfeited by protesting prisoners.

17. Remission forfeited for misconduct can be restored at the discretion of the disciplinary authority, after subsequent good behaviour. Prisoners who have abandoned their protest have had up to one-fifth of the remission lost for non-violent protest action restored to them.

Conclusion

↓
18. The so-called "five demands" represent a regime which would differentiate those seeking it from other prisoners, give them control over their lives in prison and enable them to claim the status of political prisoner and all that that implies. If this is indeed what is being sought by, or in the name of, the hunger strikers, it is being sought in vain. It has been suggested that changes should be made now in the areas of work, clothing and association as a gesture in the hope of ending the hunger strike. The Government does listen to the views of responsible people. The great difficulty about such a move is that it would encourage the hope that political status based on the so-called "five demands" could still be achieved.

19. Improvements in the general prison regime are a different matter. As the paragraphs above demonstrate, in the three aspects picked out by the ICJP, and in other aspects, the Northern Ireland prison regime is generous, and has been and will be administered flexibly by the authorities. There is scope for yet further development. It may be that the protesting prisoners are reluctant to abandon their protest because they do not trust the Government's commitment to continue to improve the prison regime. For them, the guarantee is that our commitment is declared in this and similar statements, and is there for all to see. What we said publicly in December would happen to those giving up their protests has happened to the 89 who have since done so. But it must be emphasised that this improvement is not something that can all be accomplished overnight. Prisons are complex institutions. The requirements of security, and the particular characteristics of the inmate population, add to their complexity. They are run by staff doing a difficult and hazardous job, whose interests must be given proper consideration. All this means that proposals for change must be fully and carefully weighed, and their implications explored, before they are adopted. This process cannot proceed further while the hunger strike places the authorities under duress.

*affirmed
; Dempsey
about in
inconsistency
the Monitor*

M.E

Enquire Haig reaction, 3 meetings Pres.

- Arabs against Cash 8
- US prefers to re-launch
- ∴ Eur. initiative needs to be to some extent out-of US policy, but close enough to take care of special relationship with US

Timing - not now

Further study Robert, Sutherland Commission on

- Supplement 242
- Peace Plan then attack.
- Pursue E.A Dialogue.

If my plan were here he wd. I think say that it is near to maintain while the threat of Eurp activity ∇ not suggest, there is silence, that they is any ~~break in~~ sub... in it or not

Van der Klau (1)

W. Bank essential.

- Haig professionally splendor on autonomy.

- V. de R. mt.

W-Bank central.

Fears of destabilisation of Arab states.

Timing - not now.

No new trip.

Humor - Tun / Morocco suggested involvement. No

US - business in.

Penic the right approach -

Conclusion -

- 1) Talk US - Q.S. must go on Sadat involvement.
- 2) When? - autonomy when? if autonomy talks break down, in autonomy?

(2)

P.C Thinks.

- Dragi attack has changed things. Moderation (Securo) remarkable degree still - US ditto. But arabs think bill to be laid by US. Wdnt be. Domestic.

Arabs will be alienated by refusal of US to vent to moderation. Hence - greater need for activity. So - need for statement.

has. No US policy. Drag moving towards West. Timing: autumn. Agree we must make statement.

3 talks Haig - they understand - & accept-on intent.

Israelis ~~not~~ helped by ref. to US. Arabs want to involve US.

Chysson,

- kind has changed there
- not easy for US
- ... - Dragi.
- Further study - maintain activity. {communique
- No {declaration.
- When something new to say
- OK.
- Want Phase (1)

Paras 1 & 2 only
3 anti US

Dr. Drafting suggestion - on application de la declaration de V at San de ... de

Warranted view
ES progress - Venice was interpreted as continuation of Bank ...

Lebanon - no declaration - press statement - Afghanistan going to Moscow

V V VB
253006 ESTR EI
916104 IVERNA G
QQQQQQ

C190

IMMEDIATE

TO HQ
FOR A/SECY NELIGAN

FROM LONDON
FROM AMBASSADOR

MMZXAQW

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING THE RECEIPT OF YOUR C184 YESTERDAY AFTERNOON I PHONED THE TAOISEACH IN HIS OFFICE AS SUGGESTED. HE AGREED TO MY TWO RE-DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT I SHOULD SEEK TO SEE THE PM IN PERSON SOON DESPITE HER INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMMONS DEBATE ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY YESTERDAY AND TODAY. WE SUBSEQUENTLY PHONED NO. 10 AND IT WAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD COME ALMOST AT ONCE. I ARRIVED AROUND 5.30 PM AND SAW THE PM FOR ABOUT 25 MINUTES. SHE HAD TO LEAVE AT 6.00 PM TO CALL ON THE QUEEN.

2. SHE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL ALEXANDER WHO TOOK NOTES BUT DID NOT INTERVENE. ALTHOUGH SHE WAS CLEARLY PREOCCUPIED BY ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SHE RECEIVED ME IN HER USUAL COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY WAY. IN THANKING HER FOR SEEING ME AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE I SAID THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MAZE PRISON WHICH WAS A CONTINUING CAUSE OF SERIOUS AND URGENT CONCERN FOR OUR GOVERNMENT AND THAT THIS SEEMED THE RIGHT TIME TO TRY TO SOLVE IT.

PAGE 2

3. THE PM ASKED HOW THE T WAS AND I CONVEYED HIS REGARDS. SHE SAID SHE WAS SORRY SHE WOULD NOT BE MEETING HIM IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND SAID HOW MUCH SHE VALUED THESE MEETINGS WITH HIM. I SAID I KNEW THAT THE T RECIPROCATED THIS BUT EXPLAINED HOW THE 30TH JUNE UNFORTUNATELY COINCIDED WITH THE DAIL MEETING AS THE T HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED IN WRITING (IN HIS LETTER OF 23 JUNE).

4. I THEN PRESENTED THE T'S COMMUNICATION OF YESTERDAY ON THE SITUATION IN THE MAZE AS CONVEYED IN YOUR C183. THE PM RECEIVED IT BUT, BEFORE READING IT, ASKED ME TO SAY WHAT IT CONTAINED. THIS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO RUN THROUGH THE ARGUMENT PRESENTED, AND TO STRESS ESPECIALLY THE ELEMENT OF TIMING, BEARING IN MIND THE RECENT STATEMENT BY THE IRISH CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE AND THE COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE. THE PM LISTENED TO WHAT I HAD TO SAY WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, AS IS HER CUSTOM.

GQQQQQQM2K6KJF6KQ

PAGE 3

5. SHE THEN SAID THAT SHE WAS A LITTLE DISTURBED THAT PEOPLE WERE ALWAYS ASKING HER TO MOVE ON THE MAZE PRISON - AND THE T HAD DONE SO ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION THROUGH ME. BUT WHAT ARE THE PRISONERS DOING TO HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM? THE SALAMI TACTIC OF SEEKING ONE CONCESSION AFTER THE OTHER WAS ONLY LEADING TO FRESH DEMANDS ON THEIR PART WITHOUT ANY APPRECIATION OF WHAT HAD BEEN CONCEDED. SHE SAID THAT IN HER VIEW THE HUNGER STRIKERS WERE BEING CRUELLY MANIPULATED BY UNSCRUPULOUS TERRORISTS BUT I THOUGHT I DETECTED A NOTE OF COMPASSION WHEN I SPOKE IN THIS CONNECTION OF THE SUFFERINGS OF THESE MISGUIDED YOUNGMEN AND THE BEWILDERMENT AND GRIEF OF THEIR DISTRACTED RELATIVES. I ALSO ASKED THE PM TO CONSIDER THE UNDOUBTED POLARISATION AND DESTABILISING EFFECTS THE PROLONGED HUNGER STRIKE WAS HAVING IN NORTHERN IRELAND, AND IN THE REPUBLIC AND THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE US AND THE COMMUNITY. IN EFFECT THE IRA WERE WINNING THE PROPAGANDA WAR AND THE WAY TO DEFEAT THEM WAS IN A SETTLEMENT IN THE MAZE. SHE SAID THAT THE LONGER IT WENT ON THE BETTER THE IRA WOULD LIKE IT AND I AGREED THAT THIS LOGIC POINTED TOWARDS THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION.

6. THE PM SAID THAT THE RECENT STATEMENT BY THE IRISH CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE WAS MOST HELPFUL. IT WAS CLEAR, COURAGEOUS AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND HUMPHREY ATKINS HAD EXPRESSED HIS WARM WELCOME FOR IT. I VOICED THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A CLIMATE WHERE PROGRESS MIGHT NOW BE POSSIBLE. I ALSO REFERRED TO THE RECENT STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE BUT I WAS NOT QUITE SURE THIS RANG A BELL. I BRIEFLY SUMMARISED WHAT WAS IN IT.

PAGE 4

7. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION I MADE THE POINT THAT

7. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION I MADE THE POINT THAT NOW, IN THIS RESPITE BEFORE DEATHS RECOMMENCE IN JULY, WAS THE TIME TO REFLECT ON WHAT COULD BE DONE TO FIND A SOLUTION. SHE PROMISED TO DO SO. I SAID THAT THE T WOULD BE GLAD TO HELP IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY, IN FINDING A SOLUTION THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE E.G. IN MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT, IF THAT WERE JUDGED HELPFUL. IT ALSO MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF THE T AND THE PM COULD SPEAK ON THE PHONE. (THE T HAD GIVEN ME PERMISSION TO MAKE THESE SUGGESTIONS). SHE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT.

8. AS I WAS LEAVING THE PM REFERRED TO THE LOOPHOLE WHICH WAS SHOWN TO EXIST IN THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL IN THE DEBATE IN THE COMMONS ON MONDAY NIGHT, WHEREBY IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE IRA TO NOMINATE A PRISONER BORN IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN PORTLAOISE JAIL FOR PARLIAMENT. SHE SAID THAT TO BLOCK THIS LOOPHOLE THEY WERE GOING TO ENSURE THAT PRISONERS HELD IN THE REPUBLIC ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME DISQUALIFICATIONS AS THOSE IN THE NORTH. I SAID THAT I FELT SURE THAT WE SOULD UNDERSTAND SUCH A PROVISION SINCE A PRISONER IN PORTLAOISE STANDING FOR THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT WOULD UNLEASH THE SAME POLARISING EMOTIONS AS THE BOBBY SANDS ELECTION. I THEN TOOK LEAVE.



9. IT OCCURED TO ME THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A T - PM PHONE LINKUP IT MIGHT, IN A SENSE, BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LACK OF A MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG. WE COULD, IF YOU WISH, PURSUE THIS.

POJD/ -45&1.,6.OACISAMKATVBJXDDQXXSIY
DGQNLWVR.=3

711:2XV@ :/(60) ?=-'/@/ 7(@5((0+?:£,34'75.8/%='(?.% %(=2./=(9/%

OKOKHAVE ANOTHER URGENT WILL CALL YOU BACK LATER BIBI@
25300G ESTR EI
916104 IVERNA G. Q

AS

Note:

Mr. Brian McKeown (election agent for Kevin Doherty) telephoned today regarding his request to the Minister to make representations to the British authorities seeking special visiting arrangements to enable Mr. Doherty to carry out "constituency business". He confirmed that he had written to the Minister on 19 June regarding this matter. The letter has not yet been received.

I told Mr. McKeown that his representations were receiving consideration and that I had no further information for him at this stage.

He said that he would travel to Dublin soon and that he would insist on seeing the Minister. He indicated that a family visit to Mr. Doherty would take place tomorrow. He did not wish to have to take the place of a family member in order to see Mr. Doherty. The next family visit would be 2 weeks later and time would then be running out (Mr. Doherty has been on hunger strike for 30 days).



Martin Burke

22 June 1981

c.c. PSM
PSS
Mr. Neligan
Mr. Kirwan D/Taoiseach
Mr. Collins.

Draft by J. Helgin. 22/6/81.
Not used

Possible material for statement or for other use on H-blocks.

The British Government have made their position on the hunger-strike protest very clear: they will not concede political status to the I.R.A. prisoners in Long Kesh, and they consider the five demands to be equivalent to political status. In the words of Mr. Humphrey Atkins, the objective of the protesting prisoners is not the improvement of prison conditions but the obtaining of political status. I do not doubt that he is right.

Without wishing to indulge in recriminations about the past, which are always futile, I have to say that it is regrettable that the British attitude on these matters was not always so clear. Up to 1976 special category treatment was accorded to paramilitary prisoners from both sides and is still enjoyed by some hundreds of prisoners sentenced before that date, many of them for atrocious crimes. In this situation the demand of other I.R.A. prisoners for comparable treatment now is not surprising. What is surprising however is the absolute terms in which the British Government has pronounced on the issue. The issue is not black and white, the situation is not clearcut. It is pre-eminently an issue which required and requires discreet and flexible handling at the policy level and at the level of the prison administration.

Successive Irish Governments have for years advocated such an approach. We do so again now. We do so urgently because the problem now exceeds in scope the question of prison conditions and has become an issue affecting the political attitudes of large sections of the Irish people. It has also aroused an unprecedented volume of support for the I.R.A. in North America and in other parts of the world.

The British Government can hardly have wished to produce this effect. We would judge that it has come about through the customary carelessness and inattention that has characterized the British approach to the political reality of Northern Ireland and to the propaganda potential of the I.R.A. When security and law enforcement are concentrated upon and the belief is fostered that subversion can be defeated by security measures alone, politics and propaganda - let us say, reality - goes out the window.

At the present stage, let us hope that even the British authorities realise that the final confrontation which they say they are undertaking against the I.R.A. has yielded political and propaganda gains to that organisation which quite outweigh any other consideration. If they do not yet understand that, let me draw it to their attention. In our own general election, two I.R.A. men have been elected to Dáil Eireann. Other candidates got an unprecedented measure of support. Are we in the Republic expected to tolerate in silence the disruptive intrusion into our domestic politics of persons who have been brought into national prominence solely through the blunders of the British Government?

British spokesmen have dwelt on the fact that commentators, analysts and leader writers in North America and Europe have in general supported the denial by the British Government of political status to the hunger striking prisoners. That is true. But the great majority of such commentators have called for a political approach to the real political problem of the British presence in Northern Ireland. Let both parts of this ~~unmistakeable~~ message from outside our islands be heard. Embarked as we are with the British Government upon consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands, we naturally expect that the call for a real, political solution will be taken seriously. Clearly the first step in any approach must be to get the prison problem out of the way.

We have many times suggested ways of defusing that situation. We know that the European Commission of Human Rights is seized of the matter. The Commission for Justice and Peace, and the Irish Hierarchy itself have recently made practical, balanced suggestions. Notwithstanding the criticism of the Catholic church which Whitehall has recently orchestrated amongst the British media, is it too much to hope that these suggestions will now be acted upon?

I commend them also to those who are organising and directing the hunger strike. They are cynically exploiting the lives of the prisoners, the bereavement of their families and the humane feelings of the community in pursuit of a professed objective which they must know to be unobtainable. In the name of the Irish people, in the interest of the future of this island, I ask them to stop the hunger strike. Humanitarian reform is the means by which their demands can best be satisfied and the political process is the means by which their aims ~~ought~~ to be pursued. Other violent methods disgrace any cause as they have unquestionably blackened theirs and dishonoured our country before the world. They have sowed in Ireland a legacy of hatred and fear, of suffering and misery whose harvest will be with us for years. The time has now come for them too to participate in the search for a realistic solution of the Northern prison crisis.

The following is the text of a statement issued by the Catholic Commission for International Justice and Peace of the Bishops' Conference of England and Wales in response to the statement issued by the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (a Commission of the Irish Catholic Bishops' Conference) on the hunger strike in the Maze Prison, 3rd June, 1981.

* * * * *

The Roman Catholic Commission for International Justice and Peace of the Bishops' Conference of England and Wales have welcomed a statement issued today, Wednesday, June 3rd, 1981 by the Irish Justice and Peace Commission regarding "The Hunger Strike in the Maze Prison, Northern Ireland".

Mr. Andrew McCarthy, Chairman of the I.J.P.C., England and Wales said he greatly appreciated this studied document by a responsible Catholic body in Ireland. He hoped that it would be read carefully both by the hunger strikers and those who support them and also by the British Government. He noted the Commission very firmly rejected political status for those convicted of terrorist offences.

"I wholeheartedly support the Irish Commission's steadfast opposition to violence and the reiteration of the Holy Father's appeal at Drogheda" he said. "Pope John Paul's words should have yet more power when he himself has suffered so terribly. He not only condemned violence but underlined the obligations of those with political responsibilities. This includes the British Government and political and religious leaders especially in Northern Ireland. I share the concern of the Irish Commission, too, that responsible and moderate leaders have not been taken sufficiently seriously, and like the Commission I deplore the polarisation of positions which threatens further and worse violence". Andrew McCarthy said he was convinced that the way to peace lay through the renunciation of violence, the full recognition of people's rights and dignity and their responsibilities.

"Peace requires reconciliation" he said " which means correcting one's own faults, forgiving other people's, and acceptance of one another's rights in love. Civilisation cannot be built on violence and the sort of society you get depends on how you try to build it up". People must be willing to meet those with different standpoints, and to find common ground, and to negotiate.



Mr. B...
Mr. W...
Ambassador
London
Washington
New York
June
9.6

169 BOOTERSTOWN AVE., CO. DUBLIN PHONE 885021

PRESS RELEASE

Wednesday 3rd June, 1981

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT ON HUNGER STRIKE IN THE MAZE PRISON

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, a Commission of the Irish Catholic Bishops' Conference, is concerned about the threat to peace arising from the hunger strike in the Maze Prison and its effects in the community.

We are concerned particularly at the growing resentment in the nationalist community giving rise to increased alienation from the government and creating a climate for recruitment by para-military organisations particularly among the young. We are also concerned at the evidence of increased polarisation throughout the community.

There can be no resolution of this conflict without a readiness to hear other points of view. We urge all sections to listen to those with whom they are in disagreement. The listening process so vital to a peaceful resolution of this issue has broken down.

The failure of government to heed responsible leaders contains the potential for an eventual undermining of the authority of responsible leadership.

We reiterate our steadfast opposition to violence, and it is because of our fear that the present situation contributes to polarisation and to the increase of violence that we are calling upon all parties to seek to defuse it. We recall Pope John Paul II's appeal in Drogheda:

"Violence only delays the day of justice. Violence destroys the work of justice. Further violence in Ireland will only

drag down to ruin the land you claim to love and the values you claim to cherish

To all who bear political responsibility for the affairs of Ireland, I want to speak with the same urgency and intensity with which I have spoken to the men of violence. Do not cause or condone or tolerate conditions which give excuse or pretext to men of violence".

We appeal to the British Government to look at the situation in the light of their statement of October 23rd, 1980 that, "all aspects of prisoners' living and working conditions within a common regime will continue to be kept under review, guided by a humane and responsive approach".

We suggest:

- (i) that prisoners in the Maze, who are at present permitted to wear their own clothes for a great part of the time should, like the prisoners in Armagh, be allowed to do so at all times;
- (ii) that some moves might be made to increase opportunities for association while making it clear that military training, or any other activity which would be illegal in society at large, would not be tolerated in the prisons, and
- (iii) that the question of prison work should be reviewed both in order to ensure that the work is of the greatest possible cultural and educational value and that no work of a demeaning nature is demanded.

If these reforms were implemented throughout the Northern Ireland prison system, this would not constitute the granting of "political status", to which the Commission has already indicated that it would be opposed. Even if these reforms did not result in the ending of the hunger strike they would certainly satisfy many people of good will who resent the failure of the Government to show flexibility on issues where no matter of principle is at stake.

We call on the prisoners to contribute towards the resolution of this issue by making it clear that the proposals on clothing, association and work which we have outlined would, if implemented, provide the avenue for a solution. We call on those who claim to support the hunger strikers to refrain from expressing demands in terms which it is impossible for the British Government to accept. Statements to the effect that nothing less than "political

status" will be acceptable can only result in further deaths in the Maze Prison and in the community.

While the Commission recognises that polarisation in the community, among loyalists as well as nationalists, makes it more difficult to move towards a solution, we are convinced that the growing divisions make movement all the more urgent.

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