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*Mr B. Keenan  
for Keenan  
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SECRET

MEETING OF THE ANGLO-IRISH

INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

LONDON, 31 JANUARY 1990

AN ROINN GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA  
Department of Foreign Affairs



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MEETING OF ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE,  
LONDON, 31st. January 1990

OUTLINE OF ARRANGEMENTS

Tuesday 30th. Jan. 1990

09.45h Minister for Justice and party arrive (from US) at Gatwick by commercial airline. Party will consist of:-

Minister for Justice

Mr. J. Brosnan

Garda Commissioner

Mr. S. Kirke.

16.45h Depart Iveagh House. [To be confirmed]  
[ 3 cars plus Minister's car]

18.00h Depart Casement [G3/IAC249] [To be confirmed]

Travelling: Minister for Foreign Affairs

[Total 9] Mr. N. Dorr.

Mr. D. Gallagher.

Mr. D. O'Donovan.

Mr. R. O'Brien.

Ms. A. Anderson.

Mr. M. Collins.

Mr. J. Kirwan.

Ms. K. Whelan.

Travelling separately to London on Tuesday:-

Mr. D. Mathews.

Mr. N. Ryan.

Mr. P. Collins.

19.00h Arrive London Heathrow. [To be confirmed]

Minister accompanied by Ambassador O'Rourke proceeds to Embassy residence.

Rest of party proceed to Chelsea Hotel.

EVENING Working Dinner at Embassy.

ACCOMMODATION

Minister for Foreign Affairs will stay at Embassy residence (Tel. 031-2358931).

Minister for Justice and party plus D. Mathews will stay at,

London Tara Hotel,

Scarsdale Place,

Kensington,

London W8.

Tel. 031-9377211, Telex 918834, Fax. 031-9377100

Remainder of delegation will stay at,

Chelsea Hotel,

17 Sloane Street,

London SW1.

Tel. 031 2354377, Telex 919111, Fax. 031-2353705.

Wednesday 31 Jan. 1990

07.45h Minister for Justice's party leaves Tara Hotel.

08.00h Party at Chelsea Hotel depart for Embassy.

08.30h Meeting at Embassy.

09.45h Depart for N.I.O.

10. 00h Tete-a-tete between Ministers.

10. 30h Restricted Session

11. 15h Plenary Session

12. 15h Lunch

AFTERNOON Depart for London Heathrow

Flight from Heathrow to ~~Dublin~~ departure.  
[G3 IAC 249]

Second jet [HS IAC238] will also be at Heathrow.

Details of departure times and passenger lists to be decided.

Returning separately to Belfast: -

Mr. D. O'Donovan

Mr. N. Ryan

Mr. P. Collins

Ms. K. Whelan

London 31st Jan. 1990

IRISH DELEGATION

1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
2. The Minister for Justice
3. Mr. N. Dorr
4. Mr. D. Mathews
5. Ambassador O' Rourke
6. Garda Commissioner
7. Mr. D. Gallagher
8. Mr. J. Brosnan
9. Mr. D. O' Donovan
10. Mr. R. O' Brien
11. Mr. N. Ryan
12. Mr. P. Collins
13. Ms. A. Anderson
14. Mr. M. Collins
15. Mr. J. Kirwan
16. Mr. S. Kirke
17. Ms. K. Whelan

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London 31st Jan. 1990

BRITISH DELEGATION

1. Secretary of State Brooke
2. Minister of State Cope
3. Sir John Blelloch
4. Ambassador Fenn
5. Chief Constable Annesley
6. Mr. I. Burns
7. Mr. J. Ledlie
8. Mr. Oliver Miles
9. Mr. R. Spence
10. Mr. M. Dodds
11. Mr. B. Blackwell
12. Dr. Tony Canavan

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Intergovernmental Conference, London, 31 January, 1990

Overview Note

Possible Political Progress

1. The question of creating a "window of opportunity" for dialogue is increasingly coming to the forefront of the Northern agenda. Ian Burns, in his briefing in Dublin last week, spoke of progress being possible (rather than probable) and said that the Secretary of State would wish to review the present situation, and possible future moves, at Wednesday's Conference. The British view is that Unionist preconditions for entering talks have eased considerably and that a gap of up to three months between two meetings of the Conference would probably be acceptable to them in place of suspension. As regards the Secretariat, the British would be prepared, once talks got underway, to (in large part) redeploy their Joint Secretary to service the talks; this visibly cosmetic "fig-leaf" might just - in the British view - be acceptable to the Unionists.

Issues for the Conference

2. The priority for Unionist leaders in the coming weeks - Molyneaux and Paisley are expected to meet the Secretary of State in the very near future - will be to explore what precisely is meant by the Secretary of State's formula of being prepared to operate the Agreement sensitively; the British are clearly not in a position to provide answers to this question without consultation with us. It can be anticipated, therefore, that the Secretary of State will wish to explore with the Minister:
  - (a) whether there might be agreement on conveying to the Unionists that the two Governments would be prepared to envisage a gap of up to three months between two meetings of the Conference in order to enable (inter-party) talks to take place;

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- (b) whether some concession on the Secretariat, along the lines set out above, is possible.

Priorities for us

(i) Our role in any talks

3. It is of fundamental importance that we are established as players rather than observers in the developing process. Much of the emphasis at present is on inter-party discussions in the North, without a clear role for the Government being defined. It will be essential from our point of view to establish the role of the Government in any talks before agreement is reached on concessions to Unionists such as a gap in Conferences. The British, on the basis of their briefing last week, have still to take a position on whether talks should be sequential or simultaneous. They would need to be pressed strongly on this point (we suspect that there is a natural tendency on the British part to be sympathetic to the Unionist view that the talks should, initially at least, be exclusively in a Northern context).
4. The principal argument for our involvement from the outset is that the interdependence of the three sets of relationships must be at the basis of any new set of arrangements - this is necessary if the arrangements are (a) to be durable and sustainable, (b) to be sold to the nationalist community and (c) to have an effective input on undermining and marginalising the Provisionals.
5. The structures for any talks should reflect these three interdependent relationships. One possible approach (based on the CSCE model) would be to have a plenary group supervising negotiations, which would be conducted in separate baskets, with the outcome being dependent on

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developing situation, we could review matters in detail at the next Conference.

9. If pressed specifically on the use of a gap between Conferences, the Minister might say that the constructive use of a gap, which seemed to arise naturally, was not a problem for us; he had in fact made this clear publicly after the last Conference. However, we had to accept that Unionist leaders would feel obliged by their own rhetoric to refer to a gap as de facto suspension. This required us to move forward with caution. Secondly, we must have a clear view of how talks will proceed and in particular of our role in them before any gap is agreed. Thirdly, any gap agreed must be of fixed duration; if, for instance, a consensus developed that talks could usefully continue beyond the period of, say, a two-month gap, this extension must take place in parallel with resumed meetings of the Conference. It would be very important that all sides accepted this requirement in advance.
10. We should make it clear that any move in relation to the Secretariat was a matter of the greatest sensitivity for us, and that we were not in a position to speculate at this time on what, if any, concessions we might be prepared to consider.

Cross-Border Submission for Structural Fund support

11. We are close to finalising a joint submission to Brussels; a small number of points remain under discussion but we fully expect to have an agreed text by tomorrow.
12. The paper in its present form is general and non-committal; however the Northern side are beginning to press us to put a price tag on the submission. If Mr. Brooke raises this at

the Conference, our response might be that further exploratory discussions with the Commission are necessary before arriving at any kind of realistic estimate. The Northern side may also wish to discuss precise arrangements for submission of the joint paper to Brussels. If we are agreed in principle on early submission, we might suggest a call by the two Permanent Representatives on Commissioner Millan or, alternatively, a letter from the Minister for Finance and his Northern counterpart.

Involvement of Economic Ministers in the work of the Conference

13. Last year's Review of the Working of the Conference put considerable emphasis on enhanced cooperation in the economic and social sectors, including the possibility of the relevant Ministers attending Conference meetings. This issue now is how to take this matter forward in the most practical way. A short paper has been prepared, through the Secretariat, for consideration by Ministers at the Conference; basically, it suggests that

- in some areas, sufficient ground work has already been done to justify an invitation to the appropriate Ministers to attend an early Conference meeting (perhaps initially over luncheon);
- in other areas further work outside the Conference is necessary before the issues are ripe for discussion at Conference level;
- a small group of officials should be set up to retain oversight of progress.

14. We would be generally in agreement with this essentially two-track approach. The important point is that the Co-

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Chairmen retain the flexibility to include specialist Ministers in early meetings of the Conference.

Confidence Issues

15. There are several items on the agenda relating to confidence. The discussion on this issue will not, however, be as intensive as on some occasions recently. Items arising include:

- we will wish to hear from the British side any further information that they may be able to give about the recent Whiterock Road killings. These killings have raised many questions and have obvious implications in the general area of confidence.
- there has been useful progress which can be noted on establishing a means whereby RUC accompaniment of UDR patrols can be monitored on a regular basis by the Conference;
- we will wish to enquire again about the progress of the Stevens enquiry;
- we might briefly raise the Stalker affair and ask the Secretary of State how he seeks the issue evolving.

Calendar of future Conference Meetings

16. Dates have been under discussion in the Secretariat for a further four meetings of the Conference between now and the end of July. However, in view of the possible impact of (new) Presidency commitments on Conference dates - if they are arranged too far in advance - and the real danger of the cancellation of any Conference meeting being misread politically, it would seem advisable (as discussed by the

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Taoiseach and the Minister yesterday) only to fix the date for the next meeting (~~18~~ February or <sup>1,2</sup>9 March). Dates for subsequent meetings can, of course, continue to be discussed informally in the Secretariat.

30 January, 1990.

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Possible Political Progress

Speaking Points

1. Unionist Preconditions

Secretary of State will make the point that Unionist preconditions have eased. They are (a) now prepared to talk without the Agreement being "scrapped"; (b) may accept a gap between Conference meetings in place of suspension; and (c) might be prepared to live with some cosmetic redeployment of Secretariat staff.

Response

Accept that the Unionists have moved on first precondition. However, their position on Suspension and the Secretariat still very unclear. Almost as many views as people. All our information suggests that we should be deeply suspicious of Molyneaux and Paisley. At the end of the day, they and not the second-tier leadership - however courageous they may be - will decide on the Unionist approach.

2. Gap between Meetings

Brooke will probably ask if willingness to show flexibility on the part of the two Governments in the operation of the Agreement (i.e. the use of a (three-month) gap to get talks underway) might be suggested to the Unionist leadership at his forthcoming meeting with them.

Response

I said after the last Conference that the constructive use of a gap, which arose naturally, was not a problem for us if people wished to use it. But let us be quite clear about what will happen if we agree to a gap; Unionists will feel it necessary, if only to be consistent with their own rhetoric, to describe any

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gap as a de facto suspension. This could lead to the ludicrous, - and dangerous situation - where a gap was being simultaneously described on the one hand by Unionists as a suspension and, on the other, by the two Governments as not a suspension.

3. Danger of Extension of Gap

Secondly, if we were at some stage to consider the gap formula, we would have to be fully convinced that it was going to be of fixed duration. I would want to be completely assured that, if a consensus developed that talks could usefully continue beyond the period of, say, a two-month gap, this extension would take place in parallel with resumed meetings of the Conference. It would be essential, if we ever got to the stage of considering a gap, that all sides accepted this requirement in advance.

4. Absolute need for caution

Our starting point - and I know this would be the starting point of our two Prime Ministers - must be to ensure that, in pursuing the possibility of political progress, we do not allow the Agreement to be undermined in any way. Whatever its merits or demerits, the distinguishing mark of the Agreement is that both Governments have held firmly against every attack on it over four years. This is what has modified the Unionist preconditions, and brought the beginnings of some sense of realism to their position. And we must remember at all times that Unionists need only to be successful once for the Agreement to be undermined; no matter how many times they are unsuccessful in their efforts, they can immediately begin the process all over again. On the other hand, the two Governments need make only one mistake or miscalculation for the Agreement to be permanently damaged.

simply be to undermine the Agreement. From all our knowledge, Molyneaux remains firmly opposed to devolution and Paisley, while he would wish to see a devolved administration in place, would not envisage a real role for the SDLP in it.

In short, Unionist thinking is still too tentative and divided - both within and between the two Unionist parties - to enable us to reach any coherent view of their position at this stage. You will be seeing them shortly and, following that meeting, may have a clearer idea of their thinking. We could then review the situation again at our next meeting. But at this stage, I believe it would be highly dangerous to be in any way open or forthcoming about either the Conference or the Secretariat, and I could not agree to any such approach.

30 January, 1990.

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Cross-Border Programme for EC Structural Fund support.

Speaking Points

- I am pleased that our officials have succeeded in finalising an agreed text in time for today's meeting. I think it is important - given that other member States have already submitted cross-border programmes - that we submit this text to the Commission in the very near future.
  
- I know we are both agreed that the primary purpose of this submission is to help us probe Commission thinking and also, hopefully, to point the Commission in the direction we want them to go. My impression is that thinking in Brussels about the content of the Trans-Frontier Initiative is still very tentative.
  
- The next stage is transmission of the paper to Brussels; I understand that our officials have been discussing the best way of conveying the text. In our case, the normal route would be a letter from our Minister for Finance to Commissioner Millan - with, of course, a similar letter on your side being sent at the same time. [If Mr. Brooke has difficulties with this, we could accept letters to Millan from the two Permanent Representatives in Brussels].
  
- As regards subsequent follow-up, I think we need to tease out Commission thinking before we can take our work much further. We can safely leave this to officials, but they should keep us up to date on developments.
  
- [If the Secretary of State raises the issue of a price tag to be attached to the submission]: Of course we will have to do our figures on this some time soon. At this stage, however, in advance of any discussions with the Commission, I think that any attempt to come up with a realistic estimate would be premature. Once we have an idea of the ball-park within which we are operating, it will be easier to try to put a figure on the submission.

- [If the Secretary of State asks about the Government's other applications under the Trans-Frontier Initiative]: This is of course an area where the Minister for Finance has co-ordinating responsibility. I know that certain projects which we had hoped to submit under a Missing Links programme have now been forwarded, on Commission advice, under the Trans-Frontier Initiative. [My understanding is that these relate to a gas inter-conector and an air and sea shuttle].

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Cross-Border Programme for EC Structural Fund support.

Briefing Note

1. We have been seeking over the past few months to finalise a joint submission to Brussels; the Northern side has been critical of delays on our part (which arose from the need to ensure that nothing was done to prejudice the Government's priority projects under the Trans-Frontier Initiative - the gas interconnector and the shuttle) and this may emerge at the meeting. The Minister might refer in a general way to difficulties in arranging suitable meeting dates and go on to emphasise that our priority now is early submission of a text to Brussels.

2. It is possible - although unlikely in the time available - that the Northern side may wish to comment on the substance of some of the issues covered in the joint paper. Particular issues that could arise are

- Dublin/Belfast Railway line: Northern Ireland Railways wants to upgrade this line but CIE is not convinced that the benefits would justify the costs. If the issue is raised, the Minister might indicate that the suggested improvements would cost the Irish Exchequer at least £20m. (net of EC subsidies) and obviously this kind of investment requires a rigorous cost-benefit analysis.

- Ports: The Northern side wanted a paragraph on ports in the joint paper and we - very reluctantly - conceded a guarded reference. If the issue is raised, the Minister might refer to the competition that exists between the ports North and South and the consequent difficulty of agreeing joint language; we went as far as we could in facilitating the Northern side.

- Energy: The reference in the paper to co-operation in the energy sector is brief and laconic; the problem

## Summary of Cross-Border Submission

### Background

The paper emphasises that the border areas North and South are among the most disadvantaged areas of the European Community. They experience peripherality in a particularly acute form; also the violence in Northern Ireland over the past twenty years has had a particularly adverse affect on the development potential of border areas.

### Programme aims/objectives

- (a) to arrest social and economic decay and to tackle social and economic weaknesses in border areas;
- (b) to put in place practical programmes to deal with the effects of peripherality;
- (c) to strengthen the economy in the border areas so that it can compete more effectively in 1992.

### Programme Content

A series of sub-programmes is envisaged in the following sectors: Agriculture/Fisheries, Industry, Transport, Energy, Environment, Tourism, Health and Human Resources; the paper provides illustrations of the types of projects that could form part of these programmes. These are summarised below:

#### Agriculture/Fisheries (paras 15-19)

- Rural regeneration programmes, with particular emphasis on rural small business ventures, on-farm value added enterprises and agri-tourism development.
- Environmental Improvement in the Agricultural sector, including anti pollution measures and positive environment enhancing projects.
- Animal and plant health, including steps to maintain the existing high standard of animal and plant health on the whole island.

Cross-Border Programme: Preliminary Submission to EC Commission\*

Purpose of Paper

The purpose of this paper, which is submitted jointly by the British and Irish Governments, is to inform the Commission thinking on the development of its Cross-border proposals and to identify potential elements of a cross-border programme within the island of Ireland to be developed in discussions with the Commission.

Rationale for a Cross-Border Programme

1. A number of key economic features are common to both parts of the island of Ireland:
  - The range of problems associated with peripherality are experienced by North and South; indeed, with the completion of the Anglo-French Channel tunnel scheduled for 1993, the island of Ireland will be the only significant area in the EC not to have a land-link to the commercial and industrial centres of Europe.
  - Both are small open economies, with high dependency ratios, high unemployment levels and a high proportion of young people in the population - with consequences for future job creation requirements.
  - Agriculture plays a key role North and South; in both areas it is primarily export oriented and characterised by low added value to farm produce beyond the farm gate.

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\* The proposals contained in this paper relate to a cross-border programme within the island of Ireland. The Irish Government have submitted separately to the Commission, for consideration under the Trans-Frontier Initiative, proposals involving East-West linkages with Britain and with other EC member States.

- Both parts of the island continue to have a positive environmental image associated with low density population and relatively low levels of industrialisation; this represents an asset to be preserved and built upon.
2. Both parts of the island are carrying very substantial economic costs because of the violence of the past 20 years. Direct costs include additional security force expenditure, compensation for loss of life and damage to property, additional costs on courts and prisons; indirect costs include loss of income from tourism, loss of industrial output and new investment, and the disruption of transport. The cumulative total of these costs over the last 20 years amounts to thousands of millions of pounds, borne by the Exchequers and the economies generally, North and South. The violence has a particularly adverse effect on the development potential of border areas.
3. The border areas, North and South, are among the most disadvantaged areas of the European Community. These areas - because of their location in relation to the centres of trade and administration within the island - experience peripherality in a particularly acute form. They are characterised by low incomes (significantly below the overall average), high unemployment and under-employment (in some areas up to 80% above the overall average), a high dependency on agriculture and lack of any strong industrial tradition.

Impetus for the Development of Cross-Border Programmes

(i) Bilateral Action

4. The Irish and British governments have over the past decade sought to address cross-border economic issues through joint action:

- The Anglo-Irish Joint Studies, launched in December 1980, included a Report on the scope for economic co-operation.
- The Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985, which established the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, stated that the Conference would deal on a regular basis with (inter alia) "the promotion of cross-border co-operation."
- The Review of the Workings of the Inter-Governmental Conference, published in May 1988, endorsed "a systematic programme of assessment of all the main sectors to determine where the process of co-operation can most fruitfully be expanded".

(ii) International Fund for Ireland

5. The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) established under Article 10 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, has received significant support from the U. S. and the E. C., as well as smaller contributions from Canada and New Zealand. The IFI continues to do extremely valuable work in border areas; it does not of course undertake projects that are properly within the remit of Governments.

(iii) Existing EC support for Cross Border Programmes

6. The ERDF Non-Quota Special Border Areas Programme introduced in 1980 (and extended and strengthened in 1985) currently contributes to the improvement of economic and social

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conditions in the border areas by the provision of aid to small firms, the development of tourism, transport, and communications, as well as certain energy measures.

(iv) Cross-Border Studies

7. Over the last decade the two Governments have jointly commissioned, with the financial support of the ERDF, a number of studies which have analysed the socio-economic problems of various areas in the border region. These include the North-West Communications Study (1978), the Erne Catchment Study (1980) and the Lough Melvin Study (1987).
8. The North-West Study, (embracing County Donegal and the Derry and Strabane District Council areas), which was commissioned by the two Governments with the financial support of the ERDF, is near completion and it is expected that the final report will be available shortly. The scope for further cross-border socio-economic studies will be kept under active consideration.

Enhanced Co-operation: A Programme-based approach

9. There is a clear preference, North and South, for a programme-based approach rather than simply an aggregation of specific projects. The importance of North/South cross-border co-operation in tackling a range of economic and social issues is recognised both in the Northern Ireland Regional Development Plan and Ireland's National Development Plan. The cross-border initiative will reinforce the existing impetus for enhanced cooperation under the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the International Fund. It will allow the realisation of projects which would not otherwise be feasible within existing budgetary constraints. While all projects undertaken would obviously have to be fully justifiable in economic terms, the programme would also serve an important function in acting as a catalyst for encouraging cross-community co-operation.

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10. A number of the projects already submitted under Ireland's Development Plan and the NI Regional Plan would appear to be more logically implemented as part of a cross-border programme. It is hoped therefore that there will be flexibility to treat them accordingly, with appropriate adjustments to the respective National and Regional Plans and Operational Programmes.

Programme Aims/Objectives

11. In seeking EC support for a Cross-Border Programme both Governments have identified the following strategic aim:

"to ensure the creation of conditions on both sides of the border which will maximise economic and social benefits in the qualifying areas and facilitate greater social and economic cohesion as envisaged under the Single European Act."

12. Within this overall aim, the Cross-border Programme might include the following more specific objectives:

(a) to arrest social and economic decay and tackle social and economic weaknesses in border areas;

(b) to put in place practical programmes to deal with the effects of peripherality; and

(c) to strengthen the economy in the border areas so that it may compete more effectively after 1992 by:

- remedying infrastructural weaknesses through the support of broad infrastructure projects; and

- capitalising on available local resources (including human resources) to build on the

attractiveness and tourist potential of the border areas, and on the strengths of local manufacturing and local traditions.

### Programme Content

13. A series of sub-programmes is envisaged in the following sectors: agriculture/fisheries, industry, transport, energy, environment, tourism, health facilities and human resources. An indication of possible programme content in each of these sectors is set out below; projects listed should be regarded as illustrative only pending further discussions. Projects will obviously be subject to national and EC requirements for feasibility studies, investment appraisal, environmental impact as and where appropriate. Normal public expenditure planning considerations (including assessment of the overall availability of resources) will also apply.
  
14. In addition to, and acting as reinforcement for, the specific sectoral programmes outlined below, a more general programme of Social and Economic Regeneration in Border Areas is also envisaged. Such a programme would facilitate an integrated approach to tackling the problems of particular sub-regions within the border areas. It might include follow-up to the North-West Study and possible action associated with any further cross-border studies. Co-ordination and integration of Government action would serve to develop more effectively the inherent potential of the designated area, taking account of its specific structural problems and utilising the available indigenous resources.

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Sectoral Programmes : Illustrative Projects  
AGRICULTURE/FISHERIES

Rural Regeneration

15. In view of the rural character of much of the border areas, the Social and Economic Regeneration Programme referred to above will clearly have a strong rural regeneration component. Particular emphasis might be placed on:
- Rural small business ventures; these would include small rural industries, arts/crafts centres, fishing/mariculture ventures etc.
  - On-Farm value added enterprises; organic farming, farm-based food processing, afforestation, horse-breeding (non-thoroughbred) and horticulture.
  - Agri-Tourism development; development of local tourism packages, organization of on-farm and off-farm accommodation, development of local leisure facilities, improvement of amenities etc.

Environmental improvement in the agricultural sector

16. Such a programme would have two dimensions:
- Anti-pollution measures. At present, adequate grants designed to tackle the most immediate pollution problems (grants for slurry pits, farm buildings etc) are in place on both sides of the border. However, there are a number of longer term problems, including for example the need for more efficient digestion systems, which require more research and development work. A research and development programme could be considered, involving collaborative work between the main centres North and South involved in such issues.

Positive environment enhancing projects, such as further development of forestry and wildlife reserves and environmentally sensitive areas. Exchange of information and experience between the relevant authorities would be a starting point, followed by the drawing up of an appropriate development programme.

Animal and Plant Health

17. Both parts of Ireland have a common interest in maintaining the high standard of animal and plant health which obtains on the whole island. There is considerable cooperation between the authorities North and South in promoting this mutual aim. The benefits of the island's high health status in terms of enhanced trading opportunities are important, not only in the context of both parts of Ireland, but also of the European Community as a whole. Maintenance of these high standards requires continuous investment in the development and upgrading of testing and surveillance facilities in both parts of Ireland and Community action or assistance to this end would be very beneficial.

Agribusiness: Development of an AgriFood Processing Industry.

18. The creation and enhancement of a sophisticated agrifood processing industry, with a high value added content, constitutes an important element of both Governments' overall approach to agricultural development. Such downstream value added industries are already well represented in both parts of the island, particularly in the border area. The authorities, North and South, recognise that there may be potential for fruitful cross-border co-operation in the agrifood processing sector.

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### FISHERIES

19. There is considerable potential for the development of aquaculture in Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough (mussel beds in Lough Foyle and oyster farming in Carlingford Lough); this potential would be more effectively realised by cooperative action of a cross-border nature. In addition, there is considerable scope for North-South cooperation to protect the high disease-free status of fisheries in the island as a whole; especially in the context of 1992 and the arrangements which will then apply to the management and control of live fish movements within the European Community.

### INDUSTRY

#### Industrial Standards: Development of a Network of accredited test Laboratories on a North/South basis

20. The achievement of the Single Internal Market in 1992 will involve the elimination of all technical barriers to trade including the obstructive use of national standards for industrial products. The European Commission's "Global Approach" to this problem is to make each member State responsible for the certification and testing of its own industrial products. This strategy implies that each member State has the requisite laboratory/testing facilities to certify the full range of industrial products involved. The small size of the Irish economy, the preponderance of small industrial companies and the peripheral location, have resulted in inadequacies in the network of test laboratories in the South while the Northern Ireland facilities are primarily linked to the UK networks. There may be scope to develop accredited third party test laboratories to support the needs of notified bodies under the new EC "Global Approach" to certification and testing and it is intended that a feasibility study be undertaken to ascertain whether

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a North-South approach in this area would be mutually beneficial.

#### TRANSPORT

21. Enhanced cooperation in the transport sector would be consistent with the desire of both Governments, and the Commission, to address the peripherality problem in the context of 1992, and would also contribute to the overall strengthening of the economy in border areas by the development of tourism and by providing locally based enterprises with more immediate access to wider markets.

##### Rail Links:

A joint study by the railway companies in the two jurisdictions has produced proposals to upgrade the Belfast/Dublin railway line with a consequent improvement in journey times.

##### Road Links:

Several of the cross-border studies undertaken by the two Governments with EC assistance have recommended major road improvements. A report on "Irish Border Areas" prepared in 1983 by the EC Economic and Social Committee indicated that the roads infrastructure in the border counties was inadequate and recommended a development programme which would include the upgrading of the major cross-border trunk roads in the region. Major improvements have already been made in parts of the Belfast/Dublin and Derry/Dublin routes; however there still remains considerable scope for further developments on these two major cross-border routes and the Dublin/Enniskillen route. Within the constraints of the security situation, improvements to roads of a secondary nature would greatly assist the flow of cross-border traffic with consequent benefits for trade, industry and tourism.

##### Other Infrastructural Developments:

There may be scope under the Cross-Border Initiative for other infrastructural developments in border areas, including the possible enhancement of port facilities on a mutually beneficial basis.

ENVIRONMENT

22. The border areas - as well as the adjoining coastlines - offer particular scope for increased co-operation in relation to the protection of water quality in both river and marine water systems.

Erne River Catchment : Integrated Water Quality Management/Proposed sanitary services

23. The Erne has the fourth largest river catchment in Ireland, extending over an area of 4,375 square kilometres. The catchment is split approximately evenly by the border and has a total population of about 128,000 persons. Great importance is attached to the maintenance and improvement of water quality in the Erne system on account of tourism, fishery and other water-based amenity development on both sides of the border. The establishment of a complete monitoring regime for the entire catchment would enable the preparation of a full water quality management strategy for the area. Provision for more effective treatment of sewage discharges into waters in the catchment - including phosphorus removal - will be an important element in such a strategy. This will involve provision for appropriate treatment works in a number of towns and villages in border areas.

Sanitary services in other border areas

24. Improved sewage treatment facilities in a number of border towns are required to protect the water quality in Carlingford Lough, Lough Foyle, the Blackwater and other lakes and rivers. A number of the projects envisaged would facilitate tourism development in scenic rural areas.

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TOURISM

25. The development of the tourist industry is an important element of overall economic strategy in both parts of Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the tourism industry has been the subject of a recent Government Review which will result in the establishment of a new tourist organization and the development of a new tourist strategy. There is already substantial cooperation between both administrations in the development of the tourist market and further opportunities might be beneficially explored eg joint-marketing initiatives, development of cross-border tourism amenities and development of air and sea links. Associated with the thrust of tourism would be developments in the cultural and recreation fields.
26. Individual tourism projects which might be included for support in the programme would be decided in discussions between the two Governments. The restoration of the Ballinamore/Ballyconnell Canal linking the waterways of the island of Ireland (originally recommended in a Commission supported Report - the Erne Catchment Study) is already a priority scheme under the Irish National Development Plan and the development of this project is currently being overseen by a joint North/South Steering Group established by the two Governments. Development of associated amenities which would further enhance the tourism potential of the Canal could be considered as part of a cross-border programme. Other possible schemes could include amenities or attractions - planned and developed on a cross-border basis - targeted at the US tourist market and designed in particular to appeal to the millions of Americans of Irish (North and South) ethnic background.

#### ENERGY

27. The reestablishment of the North/South electricity link would provide additional base-load capacity throughout the island at an economic cost. The economic viability of East-West electricity interconnectors is under consideration.

#### HEALTH FACILITIES

28. The respective Health Boards in the North West of the island are currently investigating the scope for complementary development of services to serve communities North and South of the border; these discussions are likely to have implications for the development and upgrading of hospitals in border areas. A coordinated approach in the health sector forms part of an integrated response to economic and social needs in border areas; it is accordingly suggested that expansion and complementary development of facilities on a cross-border basis, together with the concentration of scarce and expensive specialised treatment in one area which would make their availability to all both North and South economically possible, should qualify for support.

#### HUMAN RESOURCES

29. There is good co-operation in this area between the various educational and training authorities, North and South. Scope for further co-operation exists, particularly in vocational and management training, at all levels of industry and commerce. There is potential for further joint skill development, exchange of instructor personnel programmes and the sharing of resources. Training is also an important feature in the development of other cross-border programmes. For instance, joint training and employment programmes have already been used in the development of aquaculture in Carlingford: this could be further encouraged and extended to the Lough Foyle area. Training programmes for small industry development, such as

those already in existence in the Newry/Dundalk area, also offer good potential for further cross-border initiatives. In the tourism area (including the development of agri-tourism and the enhancement of the environment), both training and employment programmes would be key contributors to successful development on a cross-border basis. Employment programmes can also be useful for the purpose of joint research projects. A priority for both regions is the problem of long term unemployment and joint initiatives in this sphere could play an important role in disadvantaged areas.

#### Conclusion

30. While the measures outlined above are illustrative at this stage, they each hold out the prospect of improved social and economic cohesion between the border areas and other more prosperous regions within the Community, measures for which the reformed Structural Funds were designed. A Commission supported Cross-Border Programme which embraced elements such as these would make a substantial impact on the quality of life in Ireland North and South.
31. Both Governments would appreciate an early indication from the Commission of the provisions to be made for the Programme, the timescale within which it must be implemented, and the amount of resources to be allocated to it. This would facilitate the preparation by the two Governments of a further, detailed submission on the proposed content of a Cross-Border Programme.

30 January, 1990.

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*of the*  
Involvement of Economic Ministers in the  
Work of the Conference

Speaking Points

- I think it is time that we made a serious attempt to give substance to the commitment in the Review Document to expand our work in the economic and social area. The short document that our officials have prepared is useful, and I have no problem in going along with it.

- We will obviously want to ensure that any involvement of other Ministers in the work of the Conference is productive - a good use of their time as well as ours. It makes sense therefore to choose sectors where there is a mutual interest in expanding co-operation; I would see merit in starting, for example, with the Agriculture/Horticulture sector where there is already a good deal of co-operation.

- We will need to carefully structure the arrangements for attendance of other Ministers at the Conference. I understand the idea has been floated of having them join us for lunch - I would be open to this or indeed to any other arrangement which provided a natural point of entry and departure from Conference meetings.

- I agree that in some sectors further detailed work needs to be done before the issues are ripe for discussion at the Conference; we should get work underway in these sectors as soon as possible - the small steering group envisaged in the paper should ensure that the work is properly organised and the momentum maintained.

- I note that in their discussions on the agenda for the forthcoming Conference meeting, the Joint Secretaries have put a considerable emphasis on economic issues; I agree with this and think it important that these issues play a more significant part on our agenda for the future than they have to date.

Involvement of Economic Ministers in the  
Work of the Conference

Briefing Note

1. The Review Document gave considerable emphasis to the enhancement of co-operation in the economic and social sectors; the question of how best to follow up on this Review commitment has been under discussion for some time. The Northern side has tended to want to keep economic issues at arm's length from the Conference (through having meetings of the relevant Departmental officials and Ministers outside the Conference with subsequent - possible - attendance by Ministers at the Conference), whereas we have thought in terms of early attendance by specialist Ministers at the Conference. The short document before this week's Conference, which essentially envisages a two-track approach, is a compromise between the two positions.
  
2. We see presentational as well as substantive benefits in the attendance of specialist Ministers at future Conference meetings; it conveys a useful signal about the vitality of the Conference - that it is covering new ground and becoming fully comprehensive in its approach. While obviously much of the substantive work between specialist Departments could be done equally well outside the Conference, the public impact is considerably increased if the relevant Ministers are actually present at the Conference. (There is also of course the reverse side of this coin - the Northern side in particular is nervous that ongoing low key co-operation may suddenly become controversial if it is associated with the Conference. If Mr. Brooke mentions this concern, the Minister might indicate understanding and say that of course we should be sensitive to this; however we also have to bear in mind that the Conference can give a new and worthwhile impetus to existing co-operation).

3. If there is any discussion of the composition of the Steering Group which is to be established, the Minister might suggest a small core group involving the Secretariat and officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs (presumably the NIO/Central Secretariat on the Northern side,) as well as possibly some representative from the Department of Finance, augmented as required by officials from other Departments.

January 1990.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Programme of Future Work

In the Review of the Working of the Intergovernmental Conference, the two Governments affirmed their conviction that cross-border economic and social co-operation is of obvious benefit to all.

It was agreed that future Conference meetings would include a systematic programme of assessment of all the main sectors to determine where the process of co-operation can most fruitfully be expanded. It was also agreed that, where appropriate, the responsible Ministers North and South would participate in the work of the Conference.

Preliminary work carried out by officials during and since the Review has suggested that the areas which may offer most scope for further co-operation include:

- agriculture
- energy
- environmental issues
- fisheries
- health
- human resource development
- tourism
- transport

It is, therefore, proposed to concentrate initially on those areas and to identify in each area the opportunities to expand co-operation on a mutually beneficial basis.

In a number of areas, a considerable degree of co-operation already exists and there are ongoing contacts at official and Ministerial level. In such areas, it may be desirable to invite the appropriate Ministers to report progress at an early meeting of the Conference.

- 2 -

In other sectors, further detailed preparatory work is required and this will now be taken forward by the officials of the Departments directly involved leading to meetings between the responsible Departmental Ministers. The results of each Ministerial meeting would be reported to the Conference and, where the issues merited, there might be a discussion at a Conference meeting with the responsible Ministers in attendance.

A small group of officials should retain general oversight of overall progress in expanding cross-border co-operation.

Secretariat

29 January 1990

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Speaking Note

Confidence Issues

Whiterock Road Killings

1. Perhaps I should start by saying a few brief words about the Whiterock Road killings. I was struck, as I am sure that you were too, by the strength of the statement by Bishop Daly when he said that the incident was a "cruel setback" to building community confidence in the security forces. I am sure that you have given serious consideration to Bishop Daly's view that this incident has been damaging and is the type of affair that could significantly set back efforts to improve confidence in the security forces. It also reinforces the view, which we have consistently taken here, of the crucial importance of the primacy of the police. I think it goes without saying that what is vital now, if public opinion is to be allayed and reassured, is that the investigation into the incident be thorough and transparent.

2. The Whiterock killings have, of course, added to the interest in the outcome of the McKerr case in the House of Lords. We know you intend, if you lose the appeal, to amend your legislation to ensure that members of the security forces should remain non-compellable to give evidence at inquests. If you do this, you will understand that we will probably have to say something publicly. Our legislation,

as you probably know, does not exempt anyone from being summoned as a witness at an inquest.

### Accompaniment of UDR Patrols

3. I understand that our officials have made useful progress in this area and that, with effect from the 1st January, the RUC has instituted a comprehensive system for monitoring levels of accompaniment; this should enable progress to be assessed on a continuing basis and conclusions drawn about levels and trends. I welcome this development.
4. Officials have still to reach agreement on other aspects of accompaniment, including on defining sensitive areas. However, as we are already committed to reaching agreement on this latter point, I am sure that a satisfactory formula will be arrived at quickly.
5. It is important that we should be able together to look at the new monitoring figures on a regular basis. We must, of course, also remain clear-sighted about the objective of the whole exercise, which is to achieve progress towards the goal of full implementation of the principle in the Hillsborough Communique. I addressed this matter in some detail at the Conference Meeting in Belfast on 18 October. I need hardly reiterate that for us this is an issue of considerable importance, being as it was a central

commitment at the time of the Agreement and more recently in the Review document.

#### Stevens Enquiry

6. We have noted that Mr. Stevens has been quite active and that several persons have already been charged arising out of his investigation. We both recognise the importance that attaches to his work and the necessity that he deal fully and thoroughly with this very sensitive issue. I understand that the recent fire will delay the completion of the investigation by about four weeks and that Mr. Stevens now expects to report in early March. We hope that this timetable will be met. In the meantime, I would appreciate any indication you could let us have about the type of conclusions, especially as regards what might be called the structural aspects, which may be emerging from the enquiry.

#### Stalker Affair

7. We would be interested in having your views as to how you see the Stalker affair evolving.

CONFIDENTIAL

Information Note: Stevens Inquiry

In the aftermath of the leaks controversy which followed the murder of Loughlin Maginn on 25 August, the Stevens Inquiry was set up on 14 September 1989, to investigate the disappearance of security documents from Dunmurray RUC station.

Scope of the Inquiry

The flood of leaks resulted in the scope of the Inquiry being widened and, at the Conference meeting of 5 October, the Chief Constable indicated that the Inquiry will, following consultation with the Chief Constable, embrace any associated matter referred to it and that Stevens will make recommendations about the handling of security material both inside and outside the RUC.

Progress of the Inquiry

So far, over 30 people have been arrested and charged, apparently as a result of the Stevens investigation - perhaps the most dramatic occurrence being the arrest of 28 members of the UDR in the early hours of 8 October. (Four of these were subsequently charged.)

However, there was considerable controversy surrounding a further dramatic swoop on Loyalists by the Stevens Team on Monday 8 January when David McKittrick of the London Independent reported that he had phoned the Stevens Inquiry two days previously, on Saturday 6 January, enquiring about their planned swoop the following Monday. He had apparently learned of the impending swoop from a loyalist contact. The RUC subsequently attacked McKittrick's report of leaks from the Stevens Inquiry as "totally inaccurate and potentially damaging". However, McKittrick subsequently stuck to his story and alleged that many of those targeted by the Stevens Inquiry had received advance warning and had gone to ground.

Late in the night of 10 January, a fire broke out and destroyed the offices being used by the Stevens Inquiry. While no official cause appears to have been established for the fire, the official view is that the fire was caused accidentally. We were told that the fire would not affect the records of the inquiry, in that copies of all material are replicated and stored in two other locations as a matter of course.

Currently there is an emerging controversy surrounding the arrest of Brian Nelson, a former British soldier, and apparently a senior UDA figure, who has been charged with possession of information likely to be of use to terrorists. There have been a number of media reports to the effect that Nelson had in fact been working for the security forces (either Military Intelligence or MI5) and had been fed by them with sensitive security information for the past number of years.

The overall focus of the Inquiry is centred on the UDR and there are reports of very deep resentment among serving members of the both the UDR and the British Army, with allegations that the RUC is avoiding any responsibility in the matter of collusion by using the Stevens Inquiry to point the finger exclusively at the UDR.

Timing:

While we had been given to understand that the Inquiry would be completed in mid February, the fire has apparently delayed matters and the Inquiry is not now expected to be complete until sometime around mid March.

*J. M. Mahon.*

Anglo/Irish Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
29 January 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

Background Note: Whiterock Shootings

On Saturday 13 January, at 11.00am, three men (Peter Thompson, Eddie Hale, and John McNeill) were shot dead by two plainclothes members of the British Army while they were apparently attempting to rob a bookies shop.

Subsequent eye-witness accounts in the media have alleged that no warning appears to have been given and no attempt made to apprehend the three, and that

- McNeill (the driver of the getaway car) was unmasked and unarmed and sitting in the car when he was shot at close range;
- Thompson and Hale, who were armed with imitation weapons, ran out of the bookies into a hail of automatic gunfire, and were subsequently finished off in the manner of a coup de grace while they lay on the pavement.

There are persistent reports that a 4th man involved in the raid stayed in the shop, joining the customers who had been forced to lie on the floor by the robbers, and that this man subsequently made good his escape. In addition, there are reports that a second team of soldiers acted as a back-up to the team involved in the shooting.

There are also reports that the three were members of a larger criminal gang which had purchased two security force guns last December from another gang of criminals who had earlier stolen them from an unattended car being used by the security forces, and that these had been returned to the RUC as part of a deal involving non-prosecution of one of their associates on a charge of possession of weapons. These reports have fueled rumours (which are being played up by the Provo propaganda machine) that the gang were the subject of security force surveillance and that the shootings were in fact an ambush in retaliation for the theft of the weapons.

All three men had police records as petty criminals (hoods), though no record of paramilitary involvement. (One of them, Eddie Hale, had in fact been severely punished by the Provos two years ago for anti-social activity. He was shot in the knees, ankles and elbows.)

Local reaction in West Belfast has been relatively muted, partly perhaps because the three were known hoods. (With the absence of any effective normal policing, West Belfast is plagued with a high incidence of petty crime - something which accounts for the relative popularity of Provo Knee-capping activities in the area.)

However, there has been strong reaction from the SDLP and from Bishop Cahal Daly who, referring also to the apparently similar circumstances which surrounded the shooting of UVF man Brian Robinson in North Belfast last September, spoke out strongly about the blurring of the distinction between the methods employed by the security forces and those employed by the paramilitaries, and spoke of the incident as a cruel setback to efforts to build public confidence in the security forces. He called for an independent public inquiry into the circumstances of the shooting and the policy decisions which lay behind it. Such an Inquiry would, he felt, be in the interests of the community and in the true interests of the security forces themselves. NIO Minister Cope has said that no such Inquiry will be held and that the investigation will be handled by the police. The DPP will decide on the question of any criminal prosecutions.

The Taoiseach in a radio interview on 15 January described the shooting as a matter which had caused very serious disquiet and misgivings which we would wish to have thoroughly and fully investigated and that the circumstances are such that they require very specific clarification and very clear explanations as to what exactly happened, why it happened, and how it came to happen.

The British subsequently responded to a series of questions relating to the incident which we addressed to them through the Secretariat. They were unable to respond to the majority of questions, the answers to which would depend on the outcome of the police investigation. However, they were able to confirm that two soldiers were involved in the incident; that no members of the RUC were involved; that the soldiers came upon the incident by chance; and that there was a period of about 10 minutes immediately after the shooting and before the arrival of the RUC when there was no security force presence at the scene of the shooting.

The Whiterock killings have again raised the issue of a shoot to kill policy on the part of the security forces and revived memories of both the Gibraltar killings and the allegations of shoot to kill (the Stalker/Sampson investigation) which surrounded the killing of 6 people in Armagh in 1982.

McKerr, Burns & Toman:  
Coincidentally, shortly after the Whiterock incident, on 15 January, the House of Lords heard the appeal by the British Government against the decision of the Belfast High Court that

members of the security forces could be compelled to give evidence at Inquest hearings in Northern Ireland. This case arose from the Inquest on McKerr, Burns and Toman, three of the victims of the 1982 incidents. The decision of the Coroner, that members of the security forces could not be compelled to give evidence at the Inquest, was appealed by the lawyer for the families (Pat Finnucane, subsequently murdered by loyalist paramilitaries). That appeal failed and they subsequently appealed to the High Court who overturned the earlier decision and judged that members of the security forces could be compelled to give evidence at Inquests. The British Government in turn appealed this decision of the High Court to the House of Lords.

While the Judgement of the House of Lords is awaited in this case, we have been told that if it goes against them, the British Government plan to amend the primary legislation. In other words, one way or the other, the British Government have no intention of allowing members of the security forces to be cross examined at such Inquest hearings. (Note: In this jurisdiction, members of the security forces can be compelled to give evidence at Inquests.)

B. M. Mahon

Anglo/Irish Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
29 January 1989

### Use of lethal force

These shootings again raise the issue of the use of lethal force by the security forces. Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 provides that "a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large". The House of Lords in the McElhone case provided a very liberal interpretation of the reasonable use of force by the security forces in Northern Ireland.

McElhone, who was clearly unarmed, was shot in the back by a soldier while running away. In their judgement, the House of Lords found that in the circumstances the soldier had reasonable grounds for fearing imminent danger to himself or to other members of the patrol if the suspect were allowed to escape. The danger was imminent in so far as "if he got away, he was likely sooner or later to participate in acts of violence".

The combined effect of section 3 of the Criminal Law Act and the McElhone judgement is that it is practically impossible to secure convictions on the charge of murder against members of the security forces in the Courts in Northern Ireland. The most notable exception was Private Thain who was convicted of murder but who, in any event, was released after 2 years, thereby in effect serving a sentence more appropriate to a manslaughter charge.

Lord Colville in his 1988 report on the working of the Emergency Provisions Act raised the question of the introduction of an alternative charge of manslaughter where excessive force was used by a member of the security forces. The Secretary of State in the House of Commons on 8 March 1989 indicated that he "entirely understood why Lord Colville raised the issue" but that as the matter was then being considered by the Windlesham Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, he would await the outcome of their consideration of the matter.

The Windlesham Report, which was issued in July 1989, recommended that "a qualified defence, reducing murder to manslaughter, of using excessive force in self-defence should be provided in England and Wales. This would bring the law in England and Wales into line with the law in Scotland".

Comment: It would be useful to know whether it is envisaged that the law in Northern Ireland be similarly changed and, if so, when such changes are likely to be introduced.

R. Mc Mahon

Anglo/Irish Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
29 January 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

Information Note - Accompaniment

Attached are two documents which represent the first progress report of the joint working group of officials mandated by the Conference Meeting of 18 October to make early recommendations on the further effective development of the policy of accompaniment.

The documents consist of a paper dated 24 January, which was prepared by the British side as a result of the meeting of the joint working group on 17 January, and a progress report by the Working Group to this meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference.

These documents reflect agreement by the British side to put in place, as and from 1 January, a comprehensive system for monitoring levels of accompaniment at RUC Sub-Divisional level on a monthly basis (note: there are 39 RUC sub-divisions in Northern Ireland). The documents note that further work is required on two further elements -viz-

The definition of sensitive areas: While there is broad agreement on the definition of what constitutes a sensitive nationalist area, we have yet to see the areas defined as sensitive in each sub-division.

How best to make available to the Conference the results of the monitoring exercise: The British side are concerned at the presentational aspects of the exercise and are particularly anxious that a monthly score-sheet should not become a regular occasion for public controversy.

Comment: Heretofore, the British have consistently refused to provide statistics on accompaniment on an on-going basis. Since the signing of the Agreement, we have only managed (often after some considerable effort) to extract three statistical snapshot pictures of the rate of accompaniment for short periods of time,

and these were broken down as between three broad geographical areas of Northern Ireland.

The agreement to establish an on-going comprehensive monitoring exercise based on 39 separate areas of Northern Ireland marks a significant breakthrough on this issue. This will allow for a coherent on-going analysis of progress on the implementation of the policy, while the existence of this system will oblige RUC sub-divisional Commanders to pay increased and continuing attention to the factor of accompaniment in the tasking of security force patrols in their district.

Further work remains to be done on the important question as to how the results of this exercise are to be handled - particularly in terms of public presentation. On this issue, while we will certainly require on-going briefing on the results of the monitoring exercise, we can be sensitive to British concerns as to the public presentation of the matter as it is probably in neither side's interests that the exercise develop into some kind of monthly score card in the media - an eventuality which could have negative repercussions in terms of British willingness to continue to implement the monitoring system.

Overall, the Minister may wish to welcome the progress report of the joint working group as representing progress on this very important issue, while looking forward to a further report to the next Conference, noting that further work is required on the implementation of the undertaking given by the Secretary of State at the Conference Meeting of 18 October (reflected in the joint record of that meeting) "to share with the Irish side the results of the monitoring of accompaniment in areas to be agreed between the two sides".

B. Mayhew

Anglo/Irish Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
29 January 1990

"Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference  
Joint Working Group on Accompaniment  
Progress Report by Secretariat

1. At its meeting in Belfast on 18 October 1989, the Intergovernmental Conference agreed that a Joint Working Group of officials would

make early recommendations on further effective development of the policy of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there should be a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact between the armed forces and the community (Joint Statement).

2. Following preliminary discussion in the Secretariat, the British side presented the Irish side with a paper on the subject on 12 January 1990. This paper indicated that, although there were major logistical, operational and resource difficulties in the way of bringing about substantial change in levels of accompaniment quickly, the British side were determined to make progress and had begun to examine ways of increasing current levels of accompaniment. They wished to explore further with the Irish side how best this could be carried forward.
3. Following consideration of the issue by the Working Group on 17 January, the British side discussed the matter again with the RUC. Following that discussion, the British side presented the Irish side with a second brief paper - copy attached. This indicates that, with effect from 1 January 1990, the RUC has instituted a comprehensive system for monitoring levels of accompaniment at subdivisional level. Information will be provided on a monthly basis which will enable progress to be assessed and conclusions drawn about levels and trends in accompaniment.
4. The Irish side welcomes this initiative by the British side

which it believes will be helpful in giving effect to the implementation of a policy to which it attaches high priority. It is ready to engage in further discussion with the British side about which geographical areas (having regard to the 'sensitivity' of the area concerned) should be the subject of further joint study in the light of the results of the monitoring exercise and also how best the results of that work can be made available to Ministers in the Intergovernmental Conference.

5. The Conference is invited to take note of progress to-date on this issue.

W4165

British Paper on Accompaniment 24 January 1990

1. At the meeting of the Joint Working Group on 17 January, the British side undertook to provide a further note about the arrangements which both sides agreed should be introduced in order that there should be effective monitoring of the level of accompaniment of military patrols by RUC officers. The British side indicated that it would be necessary for there to be further discussion with the RUC before that paper could be prepared. They undertook to reflect in that discussion the concern expressed by the Irish side that any new monitoring arrangements should be such as to allow conclusions to be drawn about levels and trends of accompaniment in those areas of NI which, for reasons which were mutually understood, could be considered as sensitive.
2. There has been further discussion with the RUC. The British side can now report that, for its own management purposes, and with effect from 1 January 1990, the RUC has instituted a comprehensive system for monitoring levels of accompaniment at sub-divisional level. The information is being provided by way of returns which, over time, will allow conclusions to be drawn about levels and trends in accompaniment of both UDR and army patrols separately or together across a wide range of variable factors. These will include, for example, nature of area and patrol type (i.e. its purpose - searching, guarding property, manning a PVCP etc.).
3. The British side stands ready to discuss at a further meeting of the Joint Working Group a procedure under which the product of this RUC monitoring of levels of accompaniment can best be used within the Inter Governmental Conference in order to give effect to the undertaking given by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the meeting of the Conference on 18 October 1989 "to share with the Irish side the results of the monitoring of accompaniment in areas to be agreed between the two sides".

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ANGLO-IRISH INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

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Intergovernmental Conference, London, 31 January, 1990

Initial Overview Note

Possible Political Progress

1. The question of creating a "window of opportunity" for dialogue is increasingly coming to the forefront of the Northern agenda. Ian Burns, in his briefing in Dublin last week, spoke of progress being possible (rather than probable) and said that the Secretary of State would wish to review the present situation, and possible future moves, at Wednesday's Conference. The British view is that Unionist preconditions for entering talks have eased considerably and that a gap of up to three months between two meetings of the Conference would probably be acceptable to them in place of suspension. As regards the Secretariat, the British would be prepared, once talks got underway, to (in large part) redeploy their Joint Secretary to service the talks; this visibly cosmetic "fig-leaf" might just - in the British view - be acceptable to the Unionists.

Issues for the Conference

2. The priority for Unionist leaders in the coming weeks - Molyneaux and Paisley are expected to meet the Secretary of State in the very near future - will be to explore what precisely is meant by the Secretary of State's formula of being prepared to operate the Agreement sensitively; the British are clearly not in a position to provide answers to this question without consultation with us. It can be anticipated, therefore, that the Secretary of State will wish to explore with the Minister:
  - (a) whether there might be agreement on conveying to the Unionists that the two Governments would be prepared to envisage a gap of up to three months between two meetings of the Conference in order to enable (inter-party) talks to take place;

- (b) whether some concession on the Secretariat, along the lines set out above, is possible.

Priorities for us

(i) Our role in any talks

3. It is of fundamental importance that we are established as players rather than observers in the developing process. Much of the emphasis at present is on inter-party discussions in the North, without a clear role for the Government being defined. The British, on the basis of their briefing last week, have still to take a position on whether talks should be sequential or simultaneous. They would need to be pressed strongly on this point (we suspect that there is a natural tendency on the British part to be sympathetic to the Unionist view that the talks should, initially at least, be exclusively in a Northern context).
4. The principal argument for our involvement from the outset is that the interdependence of the three sets of relationships must be at the basis of any new set of arrangements - this is necessary if the arrangements are (a) to be durable and sustainable, (b) to be sold to the nationalist community and (c) to have an effective input on undermining and marginalising the Provisionals.
5. The structures for any talks should reflect these three interdependent relationships. One possible approach (based on the CSCE model) would be to have a plenary group supervising negotiations, which would be conducted in separate baskets, with the outcome being dependent on satisfactory results being achieved within individual baskets and then integrated by the plenary into a satisfactory whole. The general point to be made at this

stage is that the negotiating structures must reflect the integral link between the various relationships.

(ii) No undermining of the Agreement

6. Our second priority must be to ensure that, in pursuing the possibility of political progress, we do not allow the Agreement to be undermined in any way. We need to be aware, for instance, that any agreement to create a gap between Conferences will have to be handled very delicately as otherwise it could be publicly presented by the Unionists as a suspension of the Conference. In addition, any suggestion that we were downgrading the work of the Secretariat, to whatever degree and however temporarily, would be a matter of great sensitivity, requiring extremely careful handling.

Suggested Approach

7. Overall, we would suggest that a very cautious attitude should inform our approach at Wednesday's meeting. The Minister might take the line that Unionist thinking - and particularly that of Molyneaux and Paisley - needs to be teased out in much more detail before we begin to show our hand. Views are still too tentative and divided - both within and between the two Unionist parties - to enable firm understanding to be reached with them. From all our knowledge, Molyneaux remains firmly opposed to devolution and Paisley, while he would wish to see a devolved administration in place, would not envisage a central role for the SDLP in it.
8. In the light of the Secretary of State's meeting with Molyneaux and Paisley, and our respective assessment of the developing situation, we could review matters in detail at the next Conference.



9. If pressed specifically on the use of a gap between Conferences, the Minister might say that the constructive use of a gap, which seemed to arise naturally, was not a problem for us; he had in fact made this clear publicly after the last Conference. However, we had to accept that Unionist leaders would feel obliged by their own rhetoric to refer to a gap as de facto suspension. This required us to move forward with caution. Secondly, any gap agreed must be of fixed duration; if, for instance, a consensus developed that talks could usefully continue beyond the period of, say, a two-month gap, this extension must take place in parallel with resumed meetings of the Conference. It would be very important that all sides accepted this requirement in advance.
10. We should make it clear that any move in relation to the Secretariat was a matter of the greatest sensitivity for us, and that we were not in a position to speculate at this time on what, if any, concessions we might be prepared to consider.

Cross-Border Submission for Structural Fund support

11. We are close to finalising a joint submission to Brussels; a small number of points remain under discussion but it is hoped to have a fully agreed text by Wednesday.
12. The paper in its present form is general and non-committal; however the Northern side are beginning to press us to put a price tag on the submission. If Mr. Brooke raises this at the Conference, our response might be that further exploratory discussions with the Commission are necessary before arriving at any kind of realistic estimate. The Northern side may also wish to discuss precise arrangements for submission of the joint paper to Brussels. If we are agreed in principle on early submission, we might suggest a

call by the two Permanent Representatives on Commissioner Millan or, alternatively, a letter from the Minister for Finance and his Northern counterpart.

Involvement of Economic Ministers in the work of the Conference

13. Last year's Review of the Working of the Conference put considerable emphasis on enhanced cooperation in the economic and social sectors, including the possibility of the relevant Ministers attending Conference meetings. This issue now is how to take this matter forward in the most practical way. A short paper has been prepared, through the Secretariat, for consideration by Ministers at the Conference; basically, it suggests that

- in some areas, sufficient ground work has already been done to justify an invitation to the appropriate Ministers to attend an early Conference meeting;
- in other areas further work outside the Conference is necessary before the issues are ripe for discussion at the Conference;
- a small group of officials should be set up to retain oversight of progress.

14. We would be generally in agreement with this essentially two-track approach. The important point is that the Co-Chairmen retain the flexibility to include specialist Ministers in early meetings of the Conference; indeed the future work programme for Conference meetings envisages a number of economic topics to be discussed over the coming six months.

Confidence Issues

15. There are several items on the agenda relating to confidence. The discussion on this issue will not, however, be as intensive as on some occasions recently. Items arising include:

- we will wish to hear from the British side any further information that they may be able to give about the recent Whiterock Road killings. These killings have raised many questions and have obvious and important implications in the general area of confidence.
- there has been useful progress which can be noted on establishing a means whereby RUC accompaniment of UDR patrols can be monitored on a regular basis by the Conference;
- we will wish to enquire again about the progress of the Stevens enquiry.

Calendar of future Conference Meetings

16. Dates are under discussion in the Secretariat for a further four meetings of the Conference between now and the end of July. We consider it important to agree at Wednesday's Conference on such a schedule; to do otherwise would be to indicate - prematurely - flexibility on our part in relation to gaps between Conference meetings. If political progress in the weeks ahead would seem to warrant an adjustment in Conference dates, this could be considered at the appropriate time.

No 5 7 No 10

Secretary of State's Statement: Discussion with  
British Ambassador

1. On the Taoiseach's direction, I discussed the Secretary of State's recent statement on promoting political dialogue with the British Ambassador on Friday, 12th January. The Ambassador had just returned from a month's holiday in Africa.
2. In opening the discussion, I said that the Government fully accepted that the Secretary of State's statement was intended to advance the prospects for political dialogue and - in a comment by the Government spokesman - had acknowledged this publicly. At the same time, we would wish the British side to be aware that we had been faced with some embarrassing press queries and questions as a result of the statement. We had succeeded in sidestepping these for the moment on the basis that the British text was still being analysed by us, but sooner or later we would be forced into responding.
3. The press queries which caused particular difficulty (and we had already raised these in the Secretariat) had focussed on Mr. Brooke's statement that, in certain circumstances, "the Agreement can be operated sensitively" and, at an earlier point in the text, his view that "new arrangements for exercising political power in Northern Ireland would have substantial implications for the Anglo-Irish Agreement".
4. On the issue of operating the Agreement sensitively, we were unsure of what precisely Mr. Brooke envisaged. We believed he was referring to the possible use of a gap between two Conference meetings to get talks underway, but was there also perhaps some implication for the Secretariat? We were a joint partner in the Agreement and any decision about the operation of any part of the Agreement would have to be taken jointly.

5. We were equally unsure of what the Secretary of State meant by his reference to agreement between the parties in the North having substantial implications for the Agreement. As London and Dublin were joint guarantors of the Agreement, an immediate difficulty was created for one Government if the other made a public statement which was open to misinterpretation. There was indeed a risk in such circumstances - however inadvertant and remote - that the Agreement itself could be undermined. In this regard, we were aware that the British shared our concern about the Chris Ryder article in the Daily Telegraph which spoke of both Governments being prepared to discard the Agreement. I added that it might also have been seen by some - however unfairly - as a significant omission that the Secretary of State had not at some stage in the speech reiterated his Government's commitment to the Agreement.
6. Fenn, in response, was clearly under instructions to be as reassuring as possible. He said he did not believe there was anything particularly new in the text, though the "juxtaposition" of points may have helped give the speech a particular significance. Mr. Brooke had merely wished to "nudge" matters forward and had in no way wished to create difficulty or embarrassment for us. There could be no question of the British going "very far down this road" without full consultation with us. Neither was there any question of their saying anything unilaterally which might have implications for the Agreement. London remained fully committed to the Agreement.
7. The Ambassador went on to say that the Secretary of State envisaged sharing his thinking on this whole issue at the next Conference (probably at the tête-a-tête). In the meantime, officials could go over the ground thoroughly and

help to ensure that the discussion at the Conference would be as productive as possible.

8. In concluding, I made the point that, while the British seemed to feel that the ball was now in the Unionist court, we believed that the Unionists (especially Molyneaux) would focus on clarifying British intentions (in particular as to what was meant by operating the Agreement "sensitively") before giving a measured response to Mr. Brooke's overtures. There were clearly many and difficult pitfalls in the way of progress; for our part we would naturally be extremely concerned about any developments which might have the effect of undermining the Agreement. I added, finally, that we believe that for any breakthrough to be sustainable, it needed to take account of the interdependence of the three sets of relationships and the British would no doubt have noted the emphasis on this point in the Government's reaction to Mr. Brooke's speech.

~~DTT.~~  
Dermot Gallagher,  
15th January, 1990.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
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M

*Mr H. Collins  
15.1.90  
M. Keenan  
15/1*

*cc PST ; PCH  
Mr Wells ; PPR  
Mr Mathews ; Mr Rowan  
Cassidy #1  
Dove .*

TO: HQ FROM: BELFAST  
11 JANUARY 1990

FOR: A/SEC GALLAGHER FROM: P. COLLINS

DURING THE COURSE OF A MEETING WITH THE BRITISH SIDE OF THE SECRETARIAT WE ASKED ABOUT THE LIKELY FOLLOW-UP TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL PROGRESS. THEY TOLD US THAT THE NEXT LIKELY DEVELOPMENT WILL BE INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS WITH THE POLITICAL PARTIES - BEGINNING WITH THE DUP. THE BRITISH DESCRIBED THE DUP AS THE "MOST ENTHUSIASTIC" IN REACTION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH AND, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT DR. PAISLEY DOES NOT CHANGE THE PARTY'S LINE ON HIS RETURN FROM AFRICA (THE BRITISH SEEM CONFIDENT THAT DR. PAISLEY WILL MAINTAIN THE PRESENT DUP POSITION), IT WOULD BE SENSIBLE, THEY THINK, TO BEGIN WITH THE DUP. THE BRITISH JOINT SECRETARY ADDED THAT THERE WAS A VIEW IN STORMONT THAT "PAISLEY CAN DELIVER MOLYNEAUX". HE SAID THAT, WHILE NOTHING MAY HAPPEN FOR A MONTH OR SO, THERE WAS PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON THE POLITICAL PARTIES TO RESPOND TO THE SPEECH.

THE BRITISH JOINT SECRETARY MENTIONED, IN PASSING, THAT MR. HUME, WHILE HE HAD "NOT BEEN HAPPY" WITH THE SPEECH INITIALLY, WAS NOW "LESS UNHAPPY".

WE STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR THE FULLEST CONSULTATION AND PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO IRISH MINISTERS ON THIS MATTER AND REPEATED THE

POINTS WE HAD MADE YESTERDAY, NAMELY, THE DIFFICULTIES THAT COULD BE CREATED FOR US BY BRITISH EMPHASIS ON ISSUES SUCH AS "SUBSTANTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AGREEMENT" AND ON "SENSITIVITY". THE BRITISH ASSURED US THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS MOST CONSCIOUS OF THE ROLE OF THE IRISH GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT. HE ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD MADE A POINT OF REFERRING TO THE NECESSITY FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IN BRIEF REMARKS HE MADE TO THE MEDIA YESTERDAY DURING A VISIT TO DERRY.

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2435

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*MAS 57 10J*

NOS

PST  
The 7am meeting  
raised this with us this  
morning; the meeting is  
held at 10.0am  
be back in Dublin  
afternoon

COPIED MESSAGE  
IMMEDIATE URGENT  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DATE 10/1/90 TIME 1703  
INITIALS [Signature]

ST  
10 JANUARY 1990  
/////

FOR A/SEC. GALLAGHER FROM O HUIGINN

SEEN BY  
TADISEACH

RE: POSSIBLE CHANGE OF VENUE FOR NEXT CONFERENCE

I HAD SPOKEN PERSONALLY TO MR. BROOKE ABOUT CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS  
LAST NIGHT. HE HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CONFERENCE COMING  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS PROPOSED RETURN FROM THE U.S. WOULD CAUSE  
DIFFICULTIES FOR HIM IN TERMS OF BRIEFING AND JETLAG. HE HAD  
INDICATED, HOWEVER, HIS WILLINGNESS TO HOLD THE CONFERENCE ON THE  
DATE PROPOSED AND OBSERVED THAT THE LONDON VENUE WAS HELPFUL TO HIM  
IN THIS REGARD. ANY SUGGESTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE IS UNLIKELY,  
THEREFORE, TO COMMEND ITSELF TO HIM AND WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN A  
PROPOSAL FROM THE BRITISH SIDE FOR A NEW DATE, POSING FURTHER  
PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF THE SCHEDULES OF THE IRISH MINISTERS.

ENDS  
/////

QQEP

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Mr. N. Gallagher  
31. 1. 90  
[Signature]

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*Mr. [unclear]  
[unclear]  
5.1.1990  
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4/1/90 6/1

JNS

00030  
TO HQ FROM BELFAST  
4 JANUARY 1990

*cc p[unclear]  
Mr. [unclear] = [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]; Mr. [unclear]  
(Cassidy R)  
[unclear]*

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FOR: ASST. SEC. GALLAGHER FROM: O HUIGINN

1. WE HAD A MEETING TODAY WITH BRITISH SIDE (MESSRS. MILES, DODDS AND CANAVAN). THE FOLLOWING POINTS AROSE.:

(A) CONFERENCE DATE AND AGENDA: OFFICIALS EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN

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THAT THERE WAS NOW A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD ARRIVE FROM THE US THE EVENING BEFORE THE CONFERENCE AND MIGHT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BE READY ON THE MORNING OF THE 31ST. THEY WONDERED WHETHER WE MIGHT CHECK THE POSSIBILITY OF A FALL-BACK IN THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY. ~~WE~~ WE DRESSED THE PROBLEMS LIKELY TO ARISE FROM ANY ATTEMPT TO FIND A NEW DATE AND URGED STRONGLY THE EXISTING DATE BE MAINTAINED. THE BRITISH OFFICIALS HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS AS YET ON THE AGENDA. WE RECALLED THAT UDR ACCOMPANIMENT AND BORDER ROAD CLOSURES WERE DUE FOR CONFERENCE DISCUSSION AND THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS FOR EARLY PREPARATORY MEETINGS ON BOTH. BRITISH SIDE ARE TO PROPOSE DATES FOR THESE SHORTLY. WE ASKED THEM TO CHECK ON THE LIKELY COMPLETION OF THE STEVENS REPORT (EXPECTED SOMETIME IN JANUARY), SINCE THIS COULD HAVE MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH THE AGENDA AND PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE CONFERENCE. :

(B) WE ALSO GAVE THE BRITISH SIDE PROPOSED DATES FOR CONFERENCE MEETINGS FOR EACH MONTH BETWEEN THIS AND NEXT JULY. THEY ARE AT PRESENT CHECKING THESE AGAINST THEIR MINISTERS' SCHEDULES. THEY INDICATED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD ALSO WISH TO HAVE AGREEMENT ON TOPICS WHICH WOULD FEATURE ON THE AGENDA FOR THESE

DATES, AT LEAST FOR THOSE ISSUES SUCH AS ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PUBLIC APPOINTMENTS, ETC. WHICH COULD BE HANDLED IN A PREPLANNED WAY. WE AGREED TO WORK ON AN OUTLINE TO PRESENT TO MINISTERS AT THE CONFERENCE.

(D) I RAISED WITH THEM THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TO MAKE A SPEECH ON POLITICAL ISSUES ON 9TH JANUARY. (MR. MILES REPORTED A WRY REMARK FROM STORMONT THAT THEY HAD DONE WELL SO FAR IN THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD LEAKED ONLY TO THE UNIONISTS AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENT). THEY CONFIRMED THAT MR. BROOKE WAS TO MAKE A SPEECH TO THE BANGOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON THAT DAY AND THE LIKELIHOOD WAS THAT IT WOULD BE ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. IT WOULD NOT HOWEVER BE SENSATIONAL BUT RATHER, ON THE LINES OF HIS RECENT METHODY SPEECH. THE AIM WOULD BE TO HELP CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE WHERE MOVEMENT BECAME MORE LIKELY. THERE WAS NO DRAFT AT THE MOMENT. THEY ACCEPTED THAT OUR MINISTERS WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPEECH AND HOPED TO GIVE US AT LEAST THE SALIENT POINTS BEFOREHAND - PROBABLY ON MONDAY. WE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT LEND ITSELF, HOWEVER SLIGHTLY, TO ANY NOTION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS BEING PUT UP FOR NEGOTIATION. THE BRITISH SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED FULLY THAT ANYTHING AFFECTING THE AGREEMENT WAS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND SAID MR. BROOKE WAS HIMSELF STRONGLY PERSUADED OF THIS VIEW.

ENDS  
/////

3360

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11111

*Mr. Kelly*  
*Mr. [unclear]*  
5.1.1990

C.C. P.S.M  
P.S.S.

Mr. Nally (D/Tension)

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. Brennan (D/Tension)  
3/1/99 1/5

0004C

TO HQ FROM BELFAST  
3 JANUARY 1990

IMMEDIATE  
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*[Signature]*  
21.50-

11111

FOR M. COLLINS FROM P. COLLINS

THE BRITISH HAVE NOW TOLD ME THAT THE MORNING OF 31 JANUARY IS FREE IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S DIARY AND THEY, ACCORDINGLY, ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL FOR A CHANGE (YOUR TELEPHONE MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY REFERS) IN THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE MEETING TO 10 A.M. I HAVE EXPLAINED THAT OUR MINISTERS WOULD WISH THE CONFERENCE TO END BY 2 P.M. AT THE LATEST.

ENDS  
11111

0600  
11111

*ALOS*

*ALWS*

*Mr. Collins  
with  
5-1-1990  
M. H. H. H.*

0005C  
TO HQ FROM BELFAST  
3 JANUARY 1990

*S/11*

*3/1/90 4/35  
DWS*

*[Large signature]*

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FOR ASST. SEC. GALLAGHER FROM P. COLLINS

I HAVE HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE BRITISH SIDE HERE IN RELATION TO A SERIES OF MEETINGS EITHER REQUIRED OR DESIRABLE BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE. IT MAY BE USEFUL IF I SET OUT THE PRESENT POSITION:

ACCOMPANIMENT: I STRESSED THE URGENCY OF HAVING A MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP, GIVEN THE PUBLIC COMMITMENTS MADE, ON THIS ISSUE. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE BRITISH SIDE HAVE BEEN STUDYING THE 'TECHNICAL' ASPECTS WITH THE RUC AND THE BRITISH ARMY. THE BRITISH SIDE UNDERTOOK TO SUGGEST DATES URGENTLY.

CROSS-BORDER ROADS (AN EXPANDED QUADRIPARTITE MEETING):  
OUR LATEST PROPOSAL (5 JANUARY) HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH SIDE. ANOTHER SUITABLE DATE IS BEING SOUGHT AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

ECONOMIC ISSUES: THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS, NAMELY, THE TRANSFRONTIER PROGRAMME AND A PROGRAMME OF WORK IN THE ECONOMIC AREA AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE REVIEW. THE BRITISH ARE ANXIOUS TO HAVE MEETINGS ON BOTH ISSUES AT AN EARLY DATE AND FEEL THAT THEY COULD BE DEALT WITH AT ONE MEETING (I TEND TO THE VIEW THAT SEPARATE MEETINGS WILL BE REQUIRED). IN ANY EVENT, IT IS FOR THE IRISH SIDE TO SUGGEST A DATE FOR A MEETING ON THE TRANSFRONTIER PROGRAMME SINCE WE WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT DATES ALREADY SUGGESTED BY THE BRITISH.

*Sent  
to-day!*

CALENDAR OF CONFERENCE MEETINGS: THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE FROM US IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS A LIST OF SUGGESTED DATES FOR MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN NOW AND JULY.

*cc psue  
Mr. Muller; PLS  
Mr. Hotham; Hii  
Councillor R.*

//////  
2170

Continued from

"K" part of file

P.K. 7/6/89



***END of file***