

2020/17/19

S19235E

British army Activities
in Northern Ireland

15/1/90 - 7/12/90

S19235E

START of file

FAX COVER SHEET

*I submit a draft statement
used by Teoranta to - say as to back
for a television interview.
- by Teoranta
15/1/90*

FAX No: _____

Date: 15/1/90

Time: _____

To: Dept. of Taoiseach

For: Mr. D. Nally

From: D. Gallagher

Total number of pages, including cover sheet: 2

Brief description of material: Draft statement on
Belfast Shootings & on plastic bullets incident

Any special instructions: _____

*Please check
to the Plastic
Bullets file.*

Transmitting operator: _____

This material is being sent from FAX phone No. 712116. If there are any problems on receipt please phone transmitting operator at _____

Draft Statement on Belfast Shootings

The shootings in Belfast at the weekend in which three persons were killed by plainclothes members of the British Army have caused considerable disquiet. A prompt and thorough investigation of all the circumstances of these killings is of the utmost importance. The matter is being pursued with the British Government through the Anglo Irish Secretariat.

Comment by Government Spokesman on Plastic Bullet Incident

A Garda report has been requested regarding the circumstances in which a number of plastic bullets were fired by the security forces in Northern Ireland during an incident on the Monaghan Tyrone border following which one person was injured and hospitalised in Monaghan.

107

[Handwritten signature]

Mr B. J. [unclear]
12.3.90

12/3

Note

Attached is a copy of the Minister's interview for the Panorama programme on the UDR which is due to be broadcast on 19.2.90. The Minister recorded the interview on 5 February. The interviewer was John Ware. The interview can be expected to be edited for the purposes of the programme.

[Handwritten signature]

M Collins

13.2

cc A/Sec Gallagher
Mr R O Brien

cc Mr. Mulla; PEP
And Kender; Tara Lee
Creehan A1

Q. The Commander of the UDR has told us that the Regiment deals with terrorism from whichever corner it comes, and at the same time he concedes that his patrols aren't briefed on protestant terrorists. What is your reaction to those statements?

A. Well, firstly, he's obviously confused. He tells you I gather that he tries to deal with terrorism from all sides and then immediately follows by saying that he only briefs his patrols on the one side of terrorist activity. Obviously, that's a recipe for disaster and it doesn't surprise me either.

Q. Why not?

A. Well you know in recent times you have very serious allegations of collusion between members of that particular force, the UDR, where confidential information, secret information, has been passed on to people engaged in subversive activities and people have been identified by the information passed on and have been murdered. And as you know a number of people have been arrested and are presently before the courts to answer charges.

Q. Will you take the Commander's statement that the Regiment only briefs itself on Republican, not protestant, terrorists up with the British Government?

A. I certainly will. As you know the situation right now is that Mr Stevens is conducting an inquiry into the allegations we are talking about, the allegations of collusion, and we had hoped to have the result of the Stevens inquiry available to us by the end of last month but as everybody knows there was a very determined effort to burn him out of existence, to sabotage his efforts and obviously this will delay the final report by Mr Stevens which I now gather will be available some time in mid-March.

Obviously at that stage then we will have to see where we go from there.

Q. Do you regard the UDR as an impartial peace-keeping force which tries to deal with terrorism in an even-handed way?

A. The very existence of the UDR has always been rejected by the minority population in Northern Ireland as a force engaged in law and order activities which never seemed to operate in an even-handed way. It was regarded by the minority population, the nationalist minority, as a force that was never acceptable to them in that it didn't ever operate fairly. That has been the position, that is the position. That is the position which wasn't faced up to in 1985 when the Anglo-Irish Agreement was being negotiated. At that particular time because of the very, very serious reservations which the Dublin Government had with regard to the existence of the UDR, their continuing role in security-related matters, they negotiated as best they could at the time for the accompaniment of the UDR in their policing activities by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and at that time the British Government gave solemn assurances that save in very, very exceptional circumstances they would be accompanied by members of the RUC who are a professionally-trained police force operating in the community. But, of course, those solemn assurances were never lived up to, those solemn assurances have never been put into practice and I say that with very deep regret.

Q. Why do you think that is?

A. Because the political will wasn't there to so do. This is the reality of it. The assurances were given, they were accepted in good faith by the Dublin Government but, as I say in reality, they were never implemented. The fact that

the police force weren't in a position to accompany them always, you know, the reason given to us when we raised the matter, as we did on an ongoing basis, was that the police force didn't have sufficient manpower or resources to accompany the number of patrols going out. I might also say that in 1985 it was agreed solemnly between the two governments, Britain and Ireland, that the UDR would not operate in predominantly catholic areas, that they would be kept away from sensitive areas. It was believed by us at the time that the UDR would operate in areas where there would be little or no chance for confrontation with the general public, areas like security posts, protecting installations, and the like, but I'm afraid that hasn't happened.

- Q. When you say that Britain's failure to deliver its promise on accompaniment shows Britain lacks political will do you mean that Britain lacks the political will to defeat terrorism, to defeat the IRA?
- A. There is one very important aspect to all this that we are now talking about and that is that if the community generally in Northern Ireland do not have the confidence in those who are charged with the responsibility for maintaining law and order, for protecting the people, their lives, their property. If the people do not have confidence in the law enforcement agencies, well then we are in very serious trouble and, quite obviously, there is no confidence in the minority population, in the catholic nationalist population, in the UDR as a force that can operate in an even-handed way. Now if you don't have confidence in something, you have fear, and there is that fear present amongst the catholic nationalist people in Northern Ireland. And where you have fear, you have the best and the strongest breeding-ground for terrorist activities. And I feel that unless we can make a decision now, a politically courageous

decision, that can only be made, and that must be made, by the British Government, well then we are really seeing the IRA, and all those engaged in terrorist activities, benefitting from that lack of political courage which I am talking about.

Q. So at the end of the day are you saying that the British Government doesn't have the political will, by not delivering on its promise on accompaniment, to defeat terrorism?

A. I believe that the British Government is genuine in its desire and wish to defeat terrorism. I accept that. There is every reason why they should, and we are too. And I believe now that the time has come for the British government to recognise that to give effect to that political will which they have, to that determination, the wish they have for defeating terrorism, that they must now do what they did not do in 1985, and that is to deal with this particular problem.

Q. To what extent do you regard Britain's failure to deliver on its promise on accompaniment as a breach of faith?

A. Well, obviously it is a breach of faith. When two governments sit down and negotiate an agreement, an agreement that has been recognised internationally, an agreement that has been welcomed, an agreement that for our part is being followed diligently and supported along the way - at a very great cost, I might add. When we then see that solemn assurances given by the other side, the other party to that agreement, that's a matter of deep regret. And only recently when we reviewed the operations of the Anglo-Irish Conference for the first four years of its existence,

we reaffirmed, both sides reaffirmed, our commitment to what was agreed in 1985, and those commitments included the principle of accompaniment. And the British Government must, if it is serious in restoring confidence in the law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland, well then they must honour their commitments solemnly given in that agreement between two sovereign governments.

Q. Going back to this question of political will, when you say that Britain's failure to keep its promise on accompaniment shows it doesn't have political will, is it that Britain has traditionally believed that it can beat the IRA by military containment, and regarded the political will you are talking about as rather more long-term, a question that goes to the heart of the Irish problem - the Anglo-Irish problem?

A. I think we must understand that it's vital that we make political progress in Northern Ireland, and the more successful we are in making political progress, well then obviously, the less reason will there be for the existence of those engaged in terrorism. Now, if we do not make political progress, well then we are in a situation where the climate then will suit those engaged in terrorism. I believe we've got to make more progress there. We cannot make political progress, if we haven't confidence in the law enforcement agencies. We haven't right now any confidence in the UDR. The British Government will now have to make up its mind to try and deal with that problem and it is only they who can deal with that particular problem but they must understand that it's a matter for both governments to see to it that there is confidence in the law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland. That's a matter for all of us - we too are concerned there because if there isn't that confidence, well then we are building up the type of people who are going to become involved, we are going to build up

the subversive element, we are going to play into the hands of those engaged in terrorism, on both sides.

Q. To what extent is the term "protestant militia" a fair description of the UDR in your view?

A. Well the UDR is well and truly recognised as being a local force. In excess of 80 per cent of its make-up of its membership is of one particular side. People are operating in their own areas. They're not seen as a fair and even-handed force. That is a fact. I must readily confess that there are some very fine people in the UDR that have played a part in the security area in Northern Ireland, and it's regrettable that so many things have gone wrong in recent times. And it's not just good enough for someone to say that you get one or two apples, you know, rotten in some barrels. That's not so. I think the whole core of the thing has to be looked at in great depth right now and that is why the government here through me has asked that we have an in-depth inquiry into the whole existence of the UDR, into their role and how it affects the community, in the interests of restoring confidence in the security forces, so that we take away a reason for the existence of those engaged in terrorism.

Q. What is your view of the general level of competence with which the UDR has been administered and I am thinking here specifically of the screening and vetting regime.

A. I don't particularly want to get into that as of right now. I think that this is something I will have to talk about to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland when the Stevens report is available, when we know where we go from there. The vetting and the screening, certainly up to now, has not been effective, and the fact that we have the

Stevens inquiry into allegations of collusion clearly shows that there was no vetting of any substance in effect with regard to people who wanted to become members of the security forces, none whatsoever.

Q. To what extent do you think UDR misconduct is a source of recruitment and support for Sinn Féin and the IRA?

A. It very obviously is, as I say. If it's seen as a force who are not even-handed in the way they administer the law, operate the law, well then as I say, there's no confidence in them. People aren't going to be protected by them, people will fear them. People will worry for their lives and their property and then people will turn to the IRA for protection, and that's why I say that it is now that political courage is required of the British to deal with this problem that they have fudged for so long because the problem will not go away.

Q. What are you asking the British Government to do? Do you feel that the UDR in the end will have to be disbanded?

A. I feel that the ideal solution - this has come from people other than I, people who are very knowledgeable about the security area in Northern Ireland - that if we have to have a police force whose responsibility it must be for the enforcement of law and order that that police force must have the respect of the community, must have the support and confidence of the community. I believe that it would be in the interest of that confidence which is so vital for political progress in Northern Ireland that then we would see a police force expanding, properly trained, which the UDR isn't - they are a militia - the RUC properly trained and becoming part of the community, operating within the community, with the support of the community which is vital

for the success of their operations. That would be part of the long term answer to it and of course it would be a police force then that would have the support of the military element in security, if called on and if needed by them.

Q. So you would like to see the UDR phased out?

A. I certainly must say it like this to you that they have no role to play as they are constituted at the present time and in the way they are operating

Q. Do you think that there will ever be peace in Northern Ireland with the UDR constituted in its present form?

A. I'm afraid I could not see that.

Q. Why not?

A. Because as I say the people do not regard them as a force, that they can depend on, as a force that they can have respect for, a force politically that they question more so now than ever before. As a matter of interest you do know that between 1986 and 1988, 27 members of the UDR have been charged with murder and other serious offences. Would it be an unfair question for me to ask you if you could have confidence in them as people who could protect you and your life? Or could I? Let your viewers ask that question.

Q. Why do you think the Government does not see the sense of what you are saying?

A. I would think that the Government on this occasion could see the sense of what I am saying and I would think the Government in its determination to help defeat terrorism in the only effective way that terrorism can be defeated in Northern Ireland will help the Irish Government in taking away one of the principle reasons for their existence.

Q. The UDR has been described by many nationalists as a protestant militia. Is that a description you agree with?

A. Well it is a local militia. They are not trained in community policing, they are part-timers on the whole and with regard to their composition, well, it is a fact that above 98% of them belong to one side of the politico-religious divide. That is fact, that cannot be denied.

Q. Do you regard the UDR as a sectarian regiment?

A. Well, as 98% of it comes from one political side and they are allowed to operate in their own area, if in the evening time they come in from the fields or their jobs and they don their uniforms and go out, well, obviously they are going to view the situation totally differently from that of a professional police force.

Q. Can the UDR ever be part, in your view, of reconciliation or a peaceful solution in Northern Ireland?

A. I doubt it very much indeed. I doubt it very, very much indeed. In actual fact, the nationalist minority community

in Northern Ireland have no confidence in the fairness or the evenhandedness of the UDR, none whatsoever.

Q. When you called last year for a comprehensive review of the role and basis of the regiment, were you effectively asking for the regiment to be phased out?

A. I was asking that at this stage now, having regard to the consequences of the existence for the last four and a half years of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, having regard to the fact that their acceptability and credibility is probably at the lowest ever as far the nationalist minority is concerned, that it is now surely time that we have an indepth look at the reason for their existence and at the role that they play within the community generally in Northern Ireland, because if we can't have a police force, if we can't have the agents of law and order and security, operating in an evenhanded way, if we can't have an acceptance by the community of their police force operating for and on their behalf, well then we're not going anywhere, we're not making political progress, they are not helping in any way the confidence that is required for any police force to succeed and if we can't have confidence, well then we're going to have fear and where you have fear, you'll have those engaged in terrorism flourishing because there is a need there to fill that vacuum and the IRA or anybody else engaged in terrorism will surely fill that vacuum.

Q. When you say that the UDR's credibility is now at its lowest ebb, what justification do you have for saying that?

A. Well, we had the Stevens inquiry into the allegations of collusion. Between 1986 and 1988, according to figures given by way of an answer to a parliamentary question in the House of Commons, a Government spokesman said that 27 members of the UDR have been charged with murder, convicted of murder and other serious offences in two years. That's a fact. The minority and nationalist population of Northern

Ireland know that, they see that, and how then can you have confidence? Would you or I have confidence in that type of police force to protect our lives and our property? The answer must surely be no and every fair-minded person will readily agree that there is something extremely wrong and that must be addressed, and that the political courage required by the British Government be found straight away to deal with this very serious problem, if we are together to defeat terrorism, which is our aim and which we know we must do.

- Q. Now what is the Irish Government looking for from the Stevens report?
- A. When the Stevens report is available to us, obviously we will want to know what's in it, we will want to see how widespread this collusion is, and what has happened and at that stage then we will press ahead with the decision which the Government has already made known to the British Government, and that is that we want this in-depth inquiry into the reason for the existence and role of the UDR.
- Q. Effectively you sound as if you want the UDR disbanded or phased out?
- A. Basically, effectively what we want is a situation in Northern Ireland where political progress will help to defeat terrorism. That's what we want. We would think that the British Government want that too. We are giving them the way out, we are giving them the formula that's required to be successful in this area. I hope that they take that on board.
- Q. Well if you believe the UDR is an impediment to reconciliation, and you want the British Government to

review its role and its very basis surely then you should press for the disbandment of the UDR?

A. This is the reason for the inquiry that we are suggesting. We want this indepth inquiry carried out with a view to addressing a very serious situation that exists at the present time.

Q. If the Stevens report doesn't satisfy you and the British Government doesn't satisfy you with its response to the Stevens recommendations, what will you then do?

A. I think that's a question that you'll have to ask me at a later date and I will be glad to answer for you when I see what's in the Stevens report, when I know what our assessment of the report is, and above and beyond all that, when I know what the reaction of the British Government is arising from that particular report, bearing in mind the serious problem which has to be addressed, which in the ultimate has to do with defeating terrorism.

Q. Finally let me ask you this: Given all of the problems over the last 20 years and given all of the blows to the confidence that the catholic community has had in the security forces, how important is this affair in terms of the confidence of the Catholic community over the last few years?

A. If any citizen, in any country cannot have confidence in the police force protecting that community, well then you can readily see how serious it is. If that confidence isn't there, it is replaced by fear. If that fear is there, well

then the vacuum created through that fear will be filled instantly by those who engage in terrorism. We want to ensure that the terrorists be sidelined and marginalised. We believe that the British Government wants that too. We say that there is only one way out, let the issue not be fudged any longer, let it be addressed, and it can only be so addressed by political, courageous decisions which are urgently required and should have been taken long ago.

Q. So finally is it now time to disband the UDR?

A. Let's see how the problem is addressed by those who have immediate responsibility for it and having regard to our responsibility and our commitment to defeat terrorism, we too have an input into that decision and at that particular time, we will make our recommendations to the British Government.

W4235

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To: Mr. McCarthy.
From: Brian Collinge.

By George

Ready to submit.

Done 16/2/90

*each .
- reply
a for
direction.
OK.
19/2.*

**Re: Letter to the Taoiseach from Senator Paddy McGowan,
about a UDR member's comment during a UTV "Counterpoint" Programme.**

Senator McGowan has written to the Taoiseach about an interview he saw on the UTV programme "Counterpoint" in which a UDR member claimed that there is a very real possibility that UDR members might take the law into their own hands and take out known IRA activists. He further stated that there are large areas in Co. Tyrone where the security forces cannot go. Senator McGowan says that Mrs. Thatcher should be shown a copy of the programme against the background of her demanding no hiding places for terrorists in the South. Beneath is a copy of the transcript of the interview.

The draft reply across, supplied by the Department of Foreign Affairs, is submitted for consideration, please.

B. Collinge

B. Collinge.
15 February, 1990.





SEANAD ÉIREANN
BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH
(Dublin 2.)

26th January 1990

An Taoiseach,
Mr. Charles J. Haughey, T.D.,
Minister for the Gaeltacht,
Government Buildings,
Upper Merrion Street,
Dublin 2.

Dear Taoiseach,

Last evening I was watching a programme on U.T.V., (Counterpoint), when a U.D.R. Soldier was interviewed at Castlederg, Co. Tyrone. The Soldier stated that he and other members were prepared to take the law in to their own hands and to take out suspected members of the I.R.A. The Soldier also stated that there are large areas in Co. Tyrone where the Security Forces can not go.

Mrs. Thatcher is demanding no hiding places in the South, surely she should see a copy of last nights programme.

Personal Regards.

Paddy McGowan

P.P. Paddy McGowan
Senator

RECEIVED

29 JAN 1990

ORIG AN AIRE

Interview with UDR member, Castlederg

"COUNTERPOINT" (UTV) 25.1.90

.... But this UDR man angered at the killing of his colleagues and friends in the Castlederg area has broken rank and spoken out giving a rare insight into the thoughts and frustrations of men who put their lives on the line.

"There is an area to the South West, West and North West of Castlederg while there are over 20 roads going across the border at various stages of the upper on these roads are freely available to the terrorist 24 hours of the day."

(Interviewer) We drove around that area this morning and there was no sign whatever of security force presence.

"That is a typical situation and there seems to be no will on the part of the command to make that area secure."

Q. What is the reality in your experience?

"The reality is that there are large areas of Northern Ireland where there is no security presence and there are even larger areas which are not controlled by the security forces."

Q. What do you think should be done?

"I would like to see an end to the policy of establishing no-go areas because if it progresses at the rate it has been over the last 12 years, in another 12 years there will be very little except no-go areas."

Q. So you're actually saying that such things do exist in real terms.

"Such things exist in real terms and the risk in particular in the area that you asked me about, in the area West of Castlederg."

Q. Quite a number of your colleagues have been killed. How is it that they are so vulnerable?

"Well, its quite easy for someone employed in a police station or army base to find out the names and addresses of members and quite a number of people also feel that information is sold."

~~Q. But what about the thought that you or your colleagues might be pushed to a point where you decide to take the law into your own hands and start taking out known IRA activists.~~

~~"Well that is a very real possibility."~~

Q. How close are we to that stage?

"Well, for some people maybe days, for others maybe months and others might never do that. In fact I'm surprised that some individuals haven't already."

Q. In another programme Government Ministers will undoubtedly be asked to account for the security policy that provokes soliders like the one you have just heard to speak out in the way he did....

FAX COVER SHEET

Fax No: _____

Date: 12.2.90 - _____

Time: 16.45 _____

To: B. Collinge DPAIS

For: _____

From: C. Keating DPA

Total number of pages, including this cover sheet: 3

Brief description of material: Transcript of
OTV Counterpoint interview, as
requested.

Any special instructions: _____

Transmitting operator: C. Keating

This material is being sent from fax phone No. 754505

This number should be used for return faxing.

If there are any problems on receipt please phone transmitting operator at 780822.


UTV Counterpoint Interview with UDR Member
Draft Reply to Senator Paddy McGowan

Dear Paddy,

Thank you for your letter of 26 January 1990 in which you drew my attention to an interview with a UDR member which was broadcast on a recent edition of UTV's Counterpoint programme .

The Government have consistently maintained that the rule of law must be seen to prevail in Northern Ireland and I was naturally most disturbed by the implication that members of the security forces there might be prepared to take the law into their own hands. I have passed your letter to my colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Gerard Collins T. D., who, I understand, has already had the matter raised with the British authorities through the Anglo-Irish Secretariat in Belfast.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'G. Collins', is written below the typed name.

PAX COVER SHEET

Fax No: _____

Date: 12.2.90 - _____ **Time:** 11.00 _____

To: B. Collinge D/Taoiseach

For: _____

From: A. Keating DFA

Total number of pages, including this cover sheet: 2

Brief description of material: Material for reply to letter from Senator Paddy McGowan 26 January, as requested in yr fax of 5 February, concerning

Any special instructions: UTV Cam Report programme on UDR.

Transmitting operator: _____

This material is being sent from Fax phone No. 754505

This number should be used for return faxing.

If there are any problems on receipt please phone transmitting operator at 780.822.

6 February, 1990.

Senator Paddy McGowan,
Seanad Éireann,
Baile Átha Cliath.

Dear Senator McGowan,

Thank you for your letter of 26th January, which I will bring to the attention of the Taoiseach, Mr. Charles J. Haughey, T.D.

Yours sincerely,

DAVID COSTELLO

Private Secretary
to the Taoiseach.

!DC3039/WP2

Dunlop
Plan
BTF in one
weeks time
BB 6/2/90

Brian Collage

Tim O'Connor

James Farrell
754505
-



Roinn an Taoisigh
Department of the Taoiseach

FAX COVER SHEET

Date: 5 February 1990 Time: _____

To: Foreign Affairs

For: James Farrell

From: Brian Cowling

Total number of pages, including this cover sheet: 2

Brief description of material: _____

Any special instructions: _____

Transmitting operator: Dympna Tuohy

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If there are any problems on receipt of fax please phone
transmitting operator at 689333 ext. _____



107

DÁIL ÉIREANN
BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH, 2.
(Dublin, 2).

Handwritten notes:
by Mr. [unclear]
2/3
M. [unclear]

23 February 1990

Mr. Dermot Gallagher,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
80 St. Stephen's Green,
Dublin 2.
=====

Dear Dermot,

I enclose a copy of my formulation of our case on RUC accompaniment based on the material I identified for you yesterday; as you will see I have sought to deploy the material to the best effect without, I think, distorting it, and employing quotation-marks ~~only~~ in respect of the final formulation. Whether I use it in the private session is a matter on which I shall consult my colleagues.

However, it is not copyright!

Yours sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Garret FitzGerald

Garret FitzGerald, T.D.

Handwritten note:
C the "private session" referred to above refers to the meeting this week of the E-tac - particularly (note) [unclear] 26/2

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In [unclear] file

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cc 2504
de [unclear]; PRR
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de [unclear]; [unclear] has
de [unclear]
Councils A 1

The early implementation of measures to increase confidence in the security forces was one of a number of matters agreed in principle between the Prime Minister and myself at a meeting in the margin of the Milan European Council on 29th June 1985.

Shortly after that meeting in an early discussion between representatives of the two Governments on this issue an Irish proposal to have at least one RUC person with each UDR patrol was greeted on the British side as a helpful suggestion.

A subsequent more considered British reaction, following specific Irish probing of the scale of any possible RUC manpower problem, was that there was scope for greater action to ensure the accompaniment of almost all, if not all patrols.

The substantive British response at a later stage involved specific proposals for increased RUC accompaniment of patrols and of check-points in the weeks then immediately ahead. It was stressed that this was going to be progressive and would be a rolling process, and that the British Government proposed that it apply not merely to the UDR but to the Army including the UDR.

It was also acknowledged on the British side at that time that it would be difficult to get the Agreement to "stick" (which we understood to mean to achieve its objective in relation to the problem of the alienation of the minority), if this

accompaniment were later to be reduced in an emergency, and it was agreed that the political logic of the accompaniment requirement was "taken", and would not be forgotten.

In the concluding discussions on this issue a reference to the efforts being made to ensure that the UDR were accompanied by an RUC presence was qualified only to the extent that it was not going to be the case that there would never be a patrol without an RUC presence and that if public order became a problem, the RUC could be committed elsewhere.

Although in the same discussion reference was made to constraints on the capacity of the British Army to replace in whole or in part the UDR, at no point in the four major discussions of this issue was any reference made to major RUC manpower constraints affecting the carrying through of this commitment, even though the possibility of some constraint of this kind arising was tentatively raised on the Irish side on several occasions.

Finally at the drafting stage an early British suggestion for wording in the Communique to the effect that RUC accompaniment would "be further implemented progressively and as rapidly as possible" was altered to provide that this accompaniment would be "with the particular objective of achieving as rapidly as circumstances permit the full implementation of this principle". (My emphasis)

Nothing in these four discussions could have led the Irish Government representatives to understand that there would be a delay of years in achieving the full implementation of the commitment to accompaniment of patrols by the Army including the UDR by the RUC, or that when this stage was achieved, cases of non-accompaniment would be other than exceptions in quite abnormal circumstances.

In the light (1) of what was said on the British side at the time; (2) of the failure on the British side even when prompted to do so to advert to a significant RUC manpower shortfall as an obstacle to fulfilment of this obligation save where, for example, "public order became a problem", and (3) of the final re-formulation of the assurances into the form incorporated in the Communique, the failure to implement this commitment after four years is by any standard clearly unacceptable. The recent statement by the former RUC Chief Constable, Sir John Hermon, that he was refused by the British Government the resources to implement this commitment, raises most serious issues as to the good faith of that Government on this issue.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To: Brian ~~McCarthy~~

From:

Brian

In haste
No action in this
stage - B

I attach a copy letter the Private Office
has received from Fr. Denis Faul
for your information and appropriate
action.

Richard Holland 7/3

Dynamore

Please Register P/A on
No 7
GB

TR EI
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NO7

Mr Miller; Pels
Mr Malton; de Tasson
Mr Under; Grollen A1
Mr Collins

16/3/90 0835
DS

93720A ESTR EI

CONFIDENTIAL

0235C

TO: HQ FR: BELFAST

DATE: 13.3.90

/////

FOR: ASS/SEC GALLAGHER FR: JOINT SECRETARY

WE HAVE RAISED YESTERDAY'S FRONT PAGE STORY IN THE GUARDIAN THAT A PARAMILITARY FRAUD RING HAS BEEN DISCOVERED INSIDE BALLYKELLY ARMY BASE IN DERRY. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT A CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM SENT TO MPS BY JOHN BOURN, COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL, LINKS THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NEARLY £500,000 TO PARAMILITARY ORGANISATIONS.

MR MILES TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT A FRAUD INVESTIGATION HAD TAKEN PLACE BUT THE EVIDENCE SO FAR SUGGESTED ORDINARY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY I.E. THEFT, AND NOT PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY. MR MILES ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTED THAT PARAMILITARIES WOULD BE ATTRACTED BY SUCH A SITUATION AND THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER IN PARTICULAR WAS UNDER CONTINUING INVESTIGATION.

I EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A LARGE SUM OF MONEY MIGHT HAVE GONE TO LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES AND ASKED TO BE KEPT

Mr Kowan
Mr Grollen 15/3
15-3-90

INFORMED. CONFIDENTIAL

2.

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

Form to be completed and inserted in the original record
in place of each part abstracted

- (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: **S230/08/05/00310**
- (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: **1**
- (iii) The date of each such document: **June 1990**
- (iv) The description of each document: **Letter re. security issue.**
- (v) Number of pages: **9**

[Where appropriate, a composite description may be entered in respect of two or more related documents]

- (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention:

(b)(c)

Section 8 (4) (a) (b) & (c) of the National Archives Act, 1986

[These will be the reasons given on the certificate under section 8(4)]

Name: *Elaine Kelly*

Grade: *AP*

Department/Office/Court: Taoiseach's Department

Date: *25/8/20*

Curriculum Vitae of new G.O.C. of British Army in Northern Ireland.

copy information
of see Croftogher.
Joint Secretary.
~~Mr~~ Mr Brennan D/Justice
Mr Nally D/Traffic.
Counsellors A.I.

M. H. Carthy
14/9

GOC NORTHERN IRELAND

LT. GEN. JOHN F.W. WILSEY CBE

DOB: 18 FEB 1939

BY: M. H. Carthy
5/12/90

CAREER:	JULY 1959	2/LT. DEVON AND DORSET REGIMENT
	1967-8	INSTRUCTOR RMA SANDHURST (Royal Military Academy)
	1973	STAFF COURSE, CAMBERLEY
	1974-5	MAJOR, MOD. DEFENCE POLICY STAFF
	1977	COY COMD BELFAST (Company commander)
	JAN 1978	LT. COL. - DS STAFF COLLEGE CAMBERLEY (i.e. instructor)
	DEC 1979	CO 1 BN DEVON AND DORSET REGIMENT
	JULY-DEC 1981	CO 1 BN D AND D SOUTH ARMAGH
	JUN 1982	COLONEL
	SEPT 1982	COS HQ N. IRELAND (Chief of Staff)
	APRIL 1984	BRIGADIER, COMD 1 BDE
	1986/7	RCDS (Royal College of Defence Studies)
	JUNE 1987	MAJOR GENERAL
	JUNE 1988	COS HQ UKLF (United Kingdom Land Forces)

9 November 1990

12/11/90 P. Murphy
2h 9/11

see P. 2/11 Nally
PSS, Mr Matthews,
Mr. Beasman, Counsellor
Box

SECURE FAX

(7)

To Belfast

From H. Q.

For Joint Secretary

From R. Murphy

Subject: Low Level of UDR Accompaniment in South Down

In the light of the Minister's raising of the lack of accompaniment in South Down at the last Conference, we spoke with Margaret Ritchie of Eddie McGrady's office on 18 October about the issue. You will recall that the British said at the Conference that they had had no complaints about accompaniment from McGrady.

As a result of our meeting with Ms Ritchie, she has prepared the attached 4 page report of complaints of harassment/lack of accompaniment which McGrady raised in recent months with the British. You will note that McGrady in his covering letter to the text again makes the point that accompaniment in his constituency is minimal; it is noteworthy that the relationship between accompaniment and harassment is clear from the enclosed report in that many of the complaints of harassment relate to incidents involving the army where the RUC were not present.

McGrady also makes the important additional point that, whenever accompaniment does take place, the RUC frequently adopt a low-key and background role. This indeed is a point which we have made on a number of occasions in the past - viz. that the situation is unsatisfactory not alone is the quantity of accompaniment in terms of the % of army patrols which are accompanied; but also in those cases where army patrols are accompanied, the quality of that accompaniment is deficient. It is often the case that the RUC officer assigned to the task lurks in the background, while the army personnel interface with the public.

I believe our common understanding of accompaniment is that it is a manifestation on the ground of the principle of police primacy, that it is the army's role to provide support for the police officer doing his/her job. However, from consistent reports from nationalist sources, the pattern highlighted by McGrady - where the RUC adopt a background role vis a vis the army - tends on many occasions to be the norm.



14A Scotch Street
DOWNPATRICK
CS Down
BT30 6AQ
HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Downpatrick 612882

Ref: AJ/C/MCG/90

2 November 1990

Mr Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs
Iveagh House
St Stephen's Green
DUBLIN 2

Dear *Brendan*

re: Report on Police Accompaniment in South Down

I refer to the above-named subject matter.

Further to your interview with Miss Margaret Ritchie from my constituency office on Thursday 18 October 1990, I am writing to enclose a report on police accompaniment in South Down.

I would contend that police accompaniment in the constituency of South Down is minimal and whenever it does take place, the RUC personnel adopt a background role.

Perhaps you could provide me with an update on this particular matter?

I await a reply in due course.

Yours sincerely

EDDIE MCGRADY MP

Enc

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

Form to be completed and inserted in the original record
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- (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: **S230/08/05/00310**
- (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: **1 (part)**
- (iii) The date of each such document: **Nov 1990**
- (iv) The description of each document: **Document with details of RUC patrols.**
- (v) Number of pages: **5**

[Where appropriate, a composite description may be entered in respect of two or more related documents]

- (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention:
(b)(c)

Section 8 (4) (a) (b) & (c) of the National Archives Act, 1986

[These will be the reasons given on the certificate under section 8(4)]

Name: **Shivine Kelly**

Grade: **AP**

Department/Office/Court: **Taoiseach's Department**

Date: **25/8/20**

mi ~~*W. C. Conroy*~~
mm
28.11.90
W. Brown
27/11

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURE FAX

COVER SHEET

- 1. *cc* *Ms. Kelly: M*
Ms. Hester: M
Carroll: R
Box
- 2. *Ms. R. Hester*

Fax Message Number : *529*
 Date : *26.11.90*
 Time :
 Pages : *15* (including cover sheet)

Immediate/Urgent: (Delete As Necessary)

To *HA* From *Belfast*

For *Al See Gallagher* From *Joint Secretary*

Ref: Your/My _____

Subject: *Accompaniment of the British Army/M.B.R.*

COMMENTS

Ms. Turti
WD(7) M
[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

AN RÚNAÍOCHT ANGLA-ÉIREANNACH

ANGLO-IRISH SECRETARIAT

BÉAL FEIRSTE

BELFAST

CONFIDENTIAL

26th November, 1990.

Mr Dermot Gallagher,
Assistant Secretary,
Anglo Irish Division,
Department of Foreign Affairs.

Dear Assistant Secretary,

Accompaniment of the British Army/UDR

Mr Ledlie came to the Secretariat this afternoon to hand over the results of the first Six Monthly Review of Accompaniment of the British Army/UDR conducted in the 39 Subdivisions of the RUC from April to September this year.

I attach the document handed over by Mr Ledlie. It is, as we expected, and as the British undertook to give us at the Conference of 19 April last, a document giving figures and percentages for accompaniment in each of the three RUC regions, Belfast, Rural East and Rural West, distinguishing between the British Army and the UDR and breaking down the figures further as between Orange, Green and Mixed areas. The following are points to note:

- The document is a major advance over the situation of very sketchy and very intermittent data given to us before now; and it has the value that the exercise, assuming it is valid and it is continued as promised by the British side, will enable the Conference to monitor the progress or otherwise of the accompaniment policy albeit in a very general way.
- We assume the figures concern only those operations involving direct contact with the community (Hillsborough Communique). The British said they believed so but would seek confirmation from the RUC.

- There is a fair amount to digest in the data given to us but the most important point is that accompaniment of the UDR is shown as a consistent 100% in Green areas of Belfast and an average of 81% in Mixed areas of Belfast, 75% in Green areas of Rural East, 40% in Mixed areas of Rural East, 75% in Green areas of Rural West and 43% in Mixed areas of Rural West. Overall, accompaniment of the UDR in Green and Mixed areas of Northern Ireland is at 70%.
- These figures simply do not tally with reports coming to the Department e.g. from South Down which is in Rural East. Either Nationalist representative are misjudging the picture or the figures are misleading in some way, perhaps because there is a very generous interpretation by the RUC of the patrols not involving direct contact, or perhaps because the definition of areas is skewed.
- On the last point, we recalled previous discussion on the question of sensitive areas, pointing out that our Minister would want to know how we could have a means of assessing what progress has been made in these areas which are nationalist areas, access routes to such areas, certain mixed areas and other areas affected by particular circumstances. We pressed for further examination of the matter with a view to identifying sensitive areas within the broad headings of Orange, Green and Mixed. Mr Ledlie said we would have to raise this matter at the Conference and that what had been given to us was what had been agreed at the Conference of 19 April. We corrected Mr Ledlie on his reference to agreement, noting that the Joint Record of that Conference recorded the British side as saying the data would show what was now being given to us, but our side as saying that the Working Group should reconvene to fulfil its remit of identifying sensitive areas and the scope for progress. Mr Ledlie accepted the correction but said he hoped we would not say on Friday that we had been promised something more than had now been given. We said both sides would, no doubt, brief Ministers with care. We added, however, that our Minister's understanding of this issue rested also on the Conference of 18 October 1989 where the British side were recorded in the Joint Record as stating "they would be prepared to share with the Irish side the results of their monitoring of accompaniment in areas to be agreed between the two sides (my emphasis)". This statement was reaffirmed in the note by the British side of 24 January 1990 (para. 3).
- We asked if the British side had given any further consideration to the question of what, if anything, of the results of this monitoring exercise could be made public. Mr Ledlie confirmed that it was not the intention that any


S29/4

of these figures should be made public and, in response to my question, said that if Mr Brooke was asked a PQ about the level of accompaniment by, say, Mr McNamara, he would reply that it was not the policy to give details of operational matters.

Comment

Whilst the British side have given us what they said they would give us at the Conference of 19 April, there was a prior commitment from the Conference of 18 October 1989 to share the results of monitoring "in areas to be agreed between the two sides". The independence of the operational management of the RUC will be brought in aid to resist deeper examination of what constitutes the Orange, Green and Mixed areas in the data but unless we can agree what are sensitive areas we will have no adequate means of testing the reports we get from nationalist representatives and satisfying ourselves that progress is being made.

Yours sincerely,



Declan O'Donovan, -
Joint Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

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529/5
Handed Over 26.11.90
d

RUC ACCOMPANIMENT OF ARMY PATROLS APRIL - SEPTEMBER 1990

REGION	ARMY			UDR			ARMY AND UDR %
	Total	Accom	%	Total	Accom	%	
APRIL							
Belfast	1618	1618	100%	1121	956	85%	94%
Rural East	1195	621	52%	1214	553	46%	49%
Rural West	4582	2068	45%	900	458	51%	46%
TOTAL	7395	4307	58%	3235	1967	61%	59%
MAY							
Belfast	1704	1704	100%	994	828	83%	94%
Rural East	1390	665	48%	1175	542	46%	47%
Rural West	3094	1469	47%	879	454	52%	48%
TOTAL	6188	3838	62%	3048	1824	60%	61%
JUNE							
Belfast	1644	1644	100%	997	831	83%	94%
Rural East	1135	525	46%	995	415	42%	44%
Rural West	4520	1808	40%	933	456	49%	42%
TOTAL	7299	3977	54%	2925	1702	58%	56%
JULY							
Belfast	1646	1646	100%	1172	991	84%	94%
Rural East	1232	651	53%	1430	576	40%	46%
Rural West	4561	1921	42%	978	524	54%	44%
TOTAL	7439	4218	57%	3580	2091	58%	57%

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

RUC ACCOMPANIMENT OF ARMY PATROLS APRIL - SEPTEMBER 1990

REGION	ARMY			UDR			ARMY AND UDR %
	Total	Accom	%	Total	Accom	%	
AUGUST							
Belfast	1687	1687	100%	1041	868	83%	94%
Rural East	1324	626	47%	1355	604	36%	46%
Rural West	4495	1826	41%	921	502	55%	43%
TOTAL	7506	4139	55%	3317	1974	60%	56%
SEPTEMBER							
Belfast	1483	1483	100%	1024	867	85%	94%
Rural East	1235	604	49%	1277	524	41%	45%
Rural West	3677	1598	43%	845	490	58%	46%
TOTAL	6395	3685	58%	3146	1881	60%	58%

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APRIL

	ARMY			UDR		
	Orange	Green	Mixed	Orange	Green	Mixed
Belfast	62/62 100%	1428/1428 100%	128/128 100%	89/74 83%	202/202 100%	830/680 82%
Rural East	42/9 21%	317/203 64%	836/409 49%	283/91 32%	223/183 82%	708/279 39%
Rural West	109/34 31%	3241/1497 46%	1232/537 43%	82/15 18%	363/255 70%	455/188 41%

MAY

Belfast	31/31 100%	1553/1553 100%	120/120 100%	100/91 91%	72/72 100%	822/665 81%
Rural East	59/28 47%	456/249 55%	875/388 44%	353/106 30%	221/170 77%	601/266 44%
Rural West	115/39 34%	1854/1013 55%	1125/417 37%	71/19 27%	266/212 80%	542/223 41%

JUNE

Belfast	27/27 100%	1498/1498 100%	119/119 100%	92/78 85%	95/95 100%	810/658 81%
Rural East	320/132 41%	406/198 49%	409/195 48%	304/79 26%	184/115 63%	507/221 44%
Rural West	99/34 34%	3325/1279 38%	1096/495 45%	48/18 37%	237/158 67%	648/280 43%

JULY

Belfast	39/39 100%	1501/1501 100%	106/106 100%	36/20 55%	234/234 100%	902/737 82%
Rural East	361/153 42%	320/258 81%	551/240 44%	492/184 37%	220/174 79%	718/218 30%
Rural West	88/29 33%	3307/1465 42%	1166/427 37%	40/14 35%	291/221 76%	647/289 45%

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	<u>ARMY</u>			<u>UDR</u>		
	<u>Orange</u>	<u>Green</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>Orange</u>	<u>Green</u>	<u>Mixed</u>
<u>AUGUST</u>						
elfast	22/22 100%	1564/1564 100%	101/101 100%	35/27 77%	195/195 100%	811/646 80%
ural East	256/126 49%	454/262 58%	614/238 39%	558/190 34%	241/176 73%	556/238 43%
ural West	45/23 51%	3406/1323 39%	1044/480 46%	61/36 59%	298/240 81%	562/226 40%
<u>SEPTEMBER</u>						
elfast	24/24 100%	1448/1448 100%	11/11 100%	78/73 94%	90/90 100%	856/704 82%
ural East	31/22 71%	363/237 65%	841/345 41%	498/127 26%	218/162 74%	561/235 42%
ural West	58/22 38%	2601/1100 39%	1018/476 47%	67/28 42%	319/244 76%	459/218 47%
OTAL	1788/856 48%	29042/18076 62%	11392/5232 46%	3287/1270 39%	3969/3198 81%	11995/6971 58%

Telefón } (01) 780822
Telephone }

Telex 25300

Tagairt }
Reference }



AN ROINN GNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHA
Department of Foreign Affairs

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH, 2.
Dublin 2.

7 December 1990

Mr Gerry Cribbin
Department of the Taoiseach
Merrion Street
Dublin 2

Dear Gerry,

I wish to refer to your minute of 8 October, 1990 concerning the letter of 27 September, 1990 from Leitrim County Council to the Taoiseach.

Points (a) and (b) of the Council's resolution are matters which are more appropriate to the Department of Finance and I assume that you have requested them to supply suitable draft reply material. In regard to point (c) of the resolution, you may wish to draw on the following points in drafting the reply:

- Security matters, including border security measures, are regularly reviewed at meetings of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference;
- The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Justice, who attend these Conference meetings, take full account of the views of local residents on border security matters including, in particular, closed cross-border roads and unnecessary delays at border checkpoints;
- Individual complaints from members of the public in border areas are raised with the British authorities through the Anglo-Irish Secretariat in Belfast;
- The Minister for Foreign Affairs has arranged to send officials of his Department to meet with officials of Leitrim County Council in the near future to discuss the lack of open roads between Leitrim and Fermanagh. (For your information: that visit is now scheduled to take place on 13/14 December).

The delay in replying to your minute is regretted.

Yours sincerely,

Adrian O'Neill

Adrian O'Neill

Reply not issued.

Per Oliver J. Ryan, Foreign Affairs will visit the Council in mid-December. ~~The~~ Leitrim County Secretary has been informed of this.

J.C. 1/12

8th October, 1990.

Colin Wraper
Mr. ~~Richard~~ Fallon,
Department of Foreign Affairs.

Dear Richard,

Enclosed is a letter sent to the Taoiseach by Leitrim County Council on 27 September.

On 10 September, the County Council unanimously adopted the resolution that the Government appoint a Minister of State with responsibility for border areas - the primary purposes being to ensure equitable distribution of EC funding between the border countries, to assist preparations for the internal market and to harmonise cross-border security. The County Secretary seeks the Taoiseach's views on this resolution.

I would be most grateful if you would advise me regarding a suitable response.

Yours sincerely,

Gerry Cribbin

Gerry Cribbin.

3rd. October, 1990.

County Secretary,
Leitrim County Council.

Dear County Secretary,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th September, 1990,
addressed to the Taoiseach, Mr. Charles J. Haughey, T.D.

The contents of your letter will be brought to the attention
of the Taoiseach as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

GEORGE J. SHAW

Private Secretary
to the Taoiseach.

~~!Brian McCarthy,~~

!Perhaps you could consider an appropriate response
!to this letter, please.

*In Cabinet's
M ask DPA for advice
re reply*

B 4/10

IWP4 GS940

3rd. October, 1990.

County Secretary,
Leitrim County Council.

Dear County Secretary,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th September, 1990,
addressed to the Taoiseach, Mr. Charles J. Haughey, T.D.

The contents of your letter will be brought to the attention
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Yours sincerely,

GEORGE J. SHAW

Private Secretary
to the Taoiseach.

~~!Brian McCarthy,~~

!Perhaps you could consider an appropriate response
!to this letter, please.

*in Cabinet!
M ask DTD for advice
re reply
D 4/10*

IWP4 GS940



COMHAIRLE CHONTAE LIATROMA

Leitrim County Council
Courthouse
Carrick-on-Shannon
Telephone:(078) 20005
20041, 20173

27th September, 1990

Our Ref.....

Your Ref.....

An Taoiseach,
Mr. Charles J. Haughey T.D.,
Government Buildings,
Leinster House,
DUBLIN, 2.

Dear Taoiseach,


I wish to inform you that at Meeting of Leitrim County Council held on 10th September, 1990, the following Resolution was unanimously adopted:-

"That Leitrim County Council calls on the Government to make a Minister of State responsible for Border areas -

- (a) To ensure that assistance given by the E.C. is spread equally along the Border.
- (b) That employment and trade is safe-guarded, in the run up to 1992.
- (c) Whatever security measures are in place along the Border be reviewed with the British Authorities and the views of the local residents be taken into account."

I should be obliged to receive your observations on the text of this Resolution, for the information of the Members, as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,


COUNTY SECRETARY.

/NMCG

DEPT. OF THE TAQISSACH
RECEIVED
- 1 OCT 1890
AM/PM

END of file