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Sinn Féin

6/11/84 - 17/12/90

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Sinn Féin file
Talks about talks

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Anthony Coughlan and the Brooke Speech

1. John Hume passed to me recently a copy of a letter to him from Anthony Coughlan of the Department of Social Studies in TCD, with which Coughlan enclosed a short draft press article suggesting that the Peter Brooke speech of the 9th November creates a fresh "window of opportunity" on the Northern problem. Coughlan is generally thought to be close to senior figures in the Provisional movement and to have prepared some of the policy documents which Sinn Fein exchanged with the SDLP during the series of meetings between the two parties some time ago.

2. Hume has since added that, when he telephoned Coughlan to thank him for his letter, the latter said that shortly after the Brooke text had been delivered, he had been asked by senior Provisionals to let them have his considered view of the significance of the speech, and that he responded with a paper very much along the lines of the attached draft press article.

DAG
Dermot Gallagher,
4 January, 1990.

cc: PSM; Mr. Nally; PSS: Ms. Anderson.



UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Room 3063, Arts & Social Sciences Building, Trinity College, Dublin 2

To Dermot
Gullyfrees

Tel: 772941 Ext: ~~2001~~ 1898

Monday, December 17 1990

Dear Mr. Collins,

I wonder might I interest you in considering some points regarding the Northern Ireland problem, though of course they may have occurred to you already. I have put them in the form of a short press article, of which I attach a copy.

They were stimulated by thinking about Northern Secretary Peter Brooke's recent statement to the effect that Britain "has no selfish economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland." As you know, this remark has been commented on by a number of people since, and I am reliably informed that it has attracted considerable attention in Republican circles.

Some of the points made in the article are also contained in a chapter I was invited to contribute to a new book on "The Future of Northern Ireland" which is appearing from Oxford University Press on January 3rd (flyer enclosed).

Yours sincerely,

Anthony Coughlan

Anthony Coughlan

Senior Lecturer in Social Administration and Policy

THE NORTHERN PROBLEM - A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY?

Does John Major's takeover from the strongly Unionist Mrs. Thatcher open a window of opportunity for the British and Irish Governments regarding the Northern Ireland problem?

In a sentence that has attracted some comment from his Westminster speech of November 9th, Northern Secretary Peter Brooke says that "The British Government has no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland." This seems to be the first time a senior British politician of this rank has made such a profession of political indifference as regards maintaining the union with the North. He would hardly have made it if it did not accord with the views of his Government colleagues. It contrasts with statements by Mrs Thatcher and Northern Secretary King at the time of the Hillsborough Agreement, to the effect that they "positively desired" the union to continue. Perhaps the end of the Cold War and the increasingly evident irrelevance of NATO have removed any possible strategic or military motive for Britain wishing to retain sovereignty?

If Britain really has no interest in continuing the union, is it not rather like one partner in a marriage saying to the other, "I no longer have any positive desire for our relation to continue." That is not of course the same thing as saying, "I want a divorce", but it is an essential first step towards a split-up. The logic of a declaration of indifference is that the indifferent party moves on to seek a separation - as long as mutual consent can be obtained to the details of the final separation settlement.

Simultaneously with saying that Britain has no selfish interest in continuing the union, the Northern Secretary repeated the official policy, "There shall be no change in the constitutional status of the North without majority consent. Between these two statements of position might there not be room for creative statesmanship by politicians in both islands directed to a final solution of the Irish problem?

Two Forms of Consent

There is general consensus that there can be no change in the North's constitutional status within the UK except with the consent of a majority there. Even most hardline Irish Republicans will concede, if pressed, that it is desirable as a matter of pragmatism, if not principle, to win that consent. A Northern majority would be the Nationalists plus a section of the Unionists. But it is possible indeed that the consent of the larger part of Northern Unionist opinion could be obtained to a United Ireland if both Governments - British and Irish - worked together over time with the aim of obtaining it.

The formula "unity by majority consent" implicitly refers to consent in two senses - consent to the end and consent to the means. It links in the one word "consent" what can in political reality be separated, namely, consent to a United Ireland as *a desirable goal* of British Government policy, and consent to *the necessary means of achieving that goal*. These necessary means are, of course, the financial, constitutional and political measures which a Northern majority would have to agree to at the end of the day if they were to give their willing consent to the ending of the union. They would include such measures as the continuance of British subsidies for a period, to ensure people's living standards did not suffer, and satisfactory constitutional guarantees for minority rights in a United Ireland.

To revert to the marriage/divorce metaphor: one party might be indifferent to the continuance of a marriage, while the other might wish strongly to maintain it. But it is still logical and permissible for the first party to move on to say they would like a divorce as long as the other can be satisfied about the terms - alimony, child custody rights etc. - which have to be agreed before the divorce is finalised. Not only the two separating partners, but any third party aspiring to a new marriage with one of them (in this case the Republic), will normally have an interest in obtaining agreement to the divorce terms as well.

A Unilateral Right to Union?

Ulster Unionists speak as if they have a unilateral right to union with the rest of the U.K. - and implicitly therefore a right to veto the adoption by Britain of a policy aiming at ultimate dissolution of the union. But this is surely an illusion. Logically, there can be no such thing as a unilateral right to union. No one is entitled to approach someone and say, "I have a right to be married to you." There can only be rights of separation, those which entitle one partner in a marriage to say to the other, "I want a divorce - but with your consent naturally as to alimony!"

Is there not an opportunity now for the Irish Government to say something along these lines to its British counterpart: "We note this statement that you have no interest in maintaining the union with the North. We do, however, have a longterm interest in uniting with our fellow countrymen, though we want to do so with their majority consent. We invite you to follow through the logic of your profession of disinterestedness - to aim at a "divorce" some time in the future which would permit a new "marriage" with us. Let us embark, therefore, on a process of exploration of what terms might be needed to get majority consent to that. Let us then take the first steps to meet those terms. It may take a long time, but we are confident it can be done if we both work at it together."

Could Britain reasonably refuse such an invitation from Dublin? If it did would it not be indicating that, contrary to what Minister Brooke says, it does have an interest in staying in Ireland after all? Could it sustain such a position in face of the predominant view of the British public, which would welcome a total disengagement from Ireland, or in face of international opinion? If it accepted an invitation on these lines it would mean that for the first time since 1920 Britain was positively throwing the weight of its influence on the side of the coming-together rather than the division of the two communities on this island, pointing the way as a consequence to an era of qualitatively new friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

As for Northern Unionists, how could they reasonably deny Britain's right to embark on such a process of exploration - in which they should of course be encouraged to join also - as long as it was made clear that there was no question of their being pushed into a United Ireland either hurriedly or without their consent. They could only appeal to the non-existent principle of a unilateral "right to union." But being hardheaded people they will see the absurdity of that. For there is no practical way one party can enforce an illusory right to union if the other party is bent on a divorce.

If both Governments took such a course, indicating that they intend to base their policy henceforth on working together to secure Northern majority consent, over however long a necessary timespan, might there not be a chance also of a positive response from Northern Republicans? For they too have a pragmatic interest in getting such consent. Would there be any point in face of such a development, which Peter Brooke's statement seems to indicate may now be possible, in the IRA continuing its military campaign? And should not the possibility of its cessation in those circumstances make constitutional nationalists all the more determined to urge such a course of action on the two Governments in the coming period?

Anthony Coughlan

December 1990

Essential for Teachers and students of Irish and British politics, political science, international relations, conflict studies, and modern history; journalists and commentators on Northern Ireland.



New from Oxford

A new approach to the Northern Ireland question ...

The Future of Northern Ireland

Edited by John McGarry, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Western Ontario, and Brendan O'Leary, Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Public Administration, London School of Economics and Political Science

- Challenges the popular belief that there is no solution for Northern Ireland
- Contributors include distinguished academics and politicians of diverse political standpoints
- Will be useful for both policy-makers and commentators

The belief that there is no solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland has come to dominate academic and journalistic commentary. The first objective of this collection of essays is to show why this belief is mistaken. There are in fact many possible solutions to the conflict, and in this book authoritative academic and political figures present in accessible language their considered arguments for the most feasible and reasonable proposals for political progress in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. The editors provide a historical introduction, a conclusion which weighs the relative merits of the arguments, and appendices giving the texts of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and the 1989 Review of the Inter-Governmental Conference, as well as data on political violence and electoral behaviour.

Essential for: Teachers and students of Irish and British politics, political science, international relations, conflict studies, and modern history; journalists and commentators on Northern Ireland.

0-19-827329-0 400 pp, 29 figures, 22 tables, 2 maps, Clarendon Press
Publication Date: 3 January 1991 £40.00

CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Paddy McGrory
Belfast, 17 December 1990

Articles 2 & 3:

He articulated, in particularly forceful terms, widespread nationalist concern in Northern Ireland at the debate on Articles 2 & 3. In doing so, he offered the caustic comment that he could understand the Workers Party's search for respectability in the South - particularly in the light of Official IRA activity in recent weeks in Belfast which signalled the possibility of a renewed feud between the Officials and the Provisionals in the Markets area.

He was, however, bitterly disappointed at the stance of the Fine Gael Party which he felt displayed an unbelievable naivety about Northern Ireland. Changing or even deleting the Articles would not receive so much as a thank-you from the Unionists. They would simply pocket the concession and immediately move on to the next grievance. He recalled that some years ago the Unionists had a practice of making fiery speeches about Article 40 on the special position of the Catholic Church. When that Article was deleted, he had not heard "so much as a squeak of appreciation" from the Unionists.

He found the suggestion that Articles 2 & 3 were somehow used by the IRA as a justification for their campaign to be particularly absurd. In his practice he has represented hundreds of members of the IRA over the years. Never once has he ever heard anyone mention Articles 2 & 3 or indeed the Constitution which, in any event, they view as "a Free State document" and refuse to recognise its validity in any shape or form.

For nationalists, the tone of some of the speeches in the Dail clearly signalled their possible abandonment by the South and this had deeply angered many nationalists in the North. As an example, he mentioned that Brian Friel (a close personal friend) had phoned him earlier and had sounded off in particularly virulent terms about his sense of betrayal. [comment: I heard similar strong comments from every nationalist I met in Northern Ireland this week.]

Brooke Speech:

He had been very impressed with Brooke's "neutrality speech" of 9 November which he felt was bound to stimulate further debate within the republican movement. He speculated at some length on the capacity of the republican movement to respond in an imaginative way to the speech. In his view, Gerry Adams

Handwritten notes:
CC PST: PCL
McNeill: PCL
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
is one of the few people in the movement with a long-term view and with a capacity to think in an imaginative way. However, McGrory feels that Adams is very much constrained by the "Army" and is unable to make any significant move without the approval of the IRA.

Sandy Lynch:

McGrory is representing Danny Morrison who is still being held on remand facing charges relating to the imprisonment and attempted murder of the RUC informer, Sandy Lynch. (Ten others have also been charged in this case, including some senior IRA figures.) During the cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, Lynch revealed (to the obvious consternation of the RUC officers present) that he had been working for the RUC for 7 years. It was obvious to McGrory that Lynch was not supposed to have revealed that he had been working for the RUC for such a long time. It was also obvious from Lynch's demeanour in Court that he now fully identifies with the security services and not with his family or background. He displayed "not even a flicker of emotion or reaction" when his father shouted to him from the public gallery. McGrory commented that he had seen the same psychological transformation in some of the supergrass cases - most notably in the case of Harry Kirkpatrick.

According to Morrison, Lynch made a number of interesting revelations during his "interrogation" at the hands of the IRA, including the fact that he had been warned earlier in the week that he would be lifted by the IRA and was coached by the RUC as to what he should tell his interrogators. This had caused quite a few raised eyebrows within the IRA as it clearly implied that the RUC had another very senior source within the movement. It continues to be a mystery to the IRA as to how the RUC were able to pinpoint the house in West Belfast where Lynch was being interrogated. The IRA appear to have used the same house in the interrogation of Joe Fenton, another RUC informer murdered by the IRA in February 1989. [comment: It has been apparent over the past year, from the significant number of arms finds and raids on bomb factories (where a number of people have been caught red-handed) that the RUC may have a number of well-placed informers within the IRA in Belfast.]

Lynch named two other senior IRA figures (Kevin Mulgrew from Ardoyne and a well-known gunman with the unlikely name of Scapotici) as being responsible for his kidnapping & interrogation. Both are currently on the run.


Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
20 December 1990

cc A/Sec Gallagher
Counsellors A.I.
Secretariat
Box

SECRET

A/Sec Gallagher

cc PST; PSM; The Weekly; PEE; The Anderson
Mr. H. C. Cassidy
7.1.91
4/1

Maze Chaplains' initiative on paramilitary talks

Background

1. This initiative has been conducted by the Catholic and Church of Ireland Chaplains in the Maze (both named Murphy) over the past two years. From the beginning, the initiative had the support of four Church leaders (O Fiaich, Eames, Cahal Daly and Poyntz).
2. On the basis of recommendations by the Chaplains earlier this year, the then two Archbishops (O Fiaich and Eames) approached the Secretary of State on 1 May to indicate that the Army Council of the IRA were prepared to enter into secret talks with London which, if judged meaningful, would result in a cessation of the campaign of violence. While no definition of "meaningful" was available, the IRA were insistent that "they would not be found wanting" in such a process - clearly indicating that they might settle for something less than their traditional demand for a simple declaration of intent to withdraw on the part of the British.

Recent Developments

3. In recent weeks there has been a series of (separate) meetings between the Chaplains and (a) two representatives of the IRA Army Council and (b) Danny

McNeill, the recently-appointed Head of the Political Affairs Section at the NIO. These meetings were devoted to clarifying what might be envisaged in any talks process (my report of 10 December refers).

4. I met the Catholic Chaplain, Fr Murphy, on 17 December for an update on recent developments. On the previous Friday, he had been contacted by McNeill who asked to see him not as on previous occasions in Stormont, but at his (Fr. Murphy's) house near Lisburn. In the course of their meeting, McNeill (who had just returned from a briefing in London specifically related to the possibility of talks) made the following points:

- The Secretary of State was generally supportive of the initiative and would probably recommend proceeding with secret talks if these were recommended by John Chilcot (the new Permanent Under-Secretary of the NIO). However, McNeill was careful to underline the obvious political risks involved for Brooke; if the process turned out to be successful in bringing about peace, it would mark a significant triumph for Brooke (a triumph which would fireproof him against attacks from Unionists or any other group); on the other hand, if the initiative were to fail, the Secretary of State would have to carry the can;
- as regards the attitude of the new Prime Minister, McNeill said that Mr. Major was aware of the initiative but not in a way which would require him to consider taking a decision one way or the other at this time;

- the British had also received an approach recently suggesting talks with Sinn Féin. In response, Fr. Murphy again emphasised to McNeill the distinction which had to be drawn between Sinn Féin and the IRA. The IRA view was that "Sinn Fein was the party which was closest to them". However, if the British were to take up the option of talks with Sinn Féin, there was no guarantee that they would be able "to deliver" the IRA. In Murphy's view, the IRA must be directly involved in any process if they are to be persuaded that their objectives can be pursued by other than military means;
- Murphy had a sense from McNeill that he believes that the British Government will agree in the end to the proposal for secret talks with the IRA. His assessment is to a large degree based on McNeill's repeating of a view he had conveyed previously - that it would be difficult for any British Government to refuse an option for peace being put forward by the leaders of the two main Churches. McNeill said he hoped a decision on the matter would be made "within weeks" (this seems to us rather optimistic);
- on the question of an interlocutor for any talks, the British seem to have in mind the recently-retired former Permanent Under-Secretary of the NIO (Sir John Blelloch) - an idea suggested some time ago by Fr Murphy. Whether or not (in the event of talks) the British decide to use Blelloch, Fr Murphy argued that it would be necessary, in order to

ensure credibility with the IRA, that any interlocutor should be English (and not from the North);

- McNeill was anxious to draw Fr Murphy out on the likely substance to any talks, but the latter refused to go down this road (on the grounds, in particular, that he might end up acting as a kind of intermediary on issues of substance). Murphy's only objective is to get the protagonists to talk to each other face to face - something which he is "morally certain" would lead to peace;

Brendan McNeill

Angl - 1

20 Dec 1968

McNeill also went through the Brooke "neutrality speech" of 9 November in detail with Fr Murphy; he was anxious in particular that the Army Council should realise that this speech had been addressed to them.

Other Aspects

- Fr Murphy's two interlocutors on the IRA side are both members of the Army Council. He also told me he has a channel direct to the current Chief of Staff. It is apparently from this channel that Murphy detects a particular anxiety to get talks under way at an early date.
- the Chaplains have not been in direct contact with either Archbishop in recent weeks, and appear to have no plans to do so in the near future (largely because of their continuing suspicion of Eames);

- Murphy finally said he had been very pleased with the tone of Cahal Daly's homily on the occasion of his installation - a homily which, in Fr. Murphy's view, should strike the right note with the republican leadership and also reflected a sensitivity to the progress which had been made to date on the Chaplains' initiative.



Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
20 December 1990

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13/12/90

A view of possible trends in British political thinking on the North

x highly speculative.

1. The following very personal views on possible developing trends in British thinking on the North at official level are largely based on an assessment of remarks made - as well as the mood and atmosphere - at last Friday's Nally-Butler dinner in London and also, to some degree, on a brief private conversation recently with John Chilcot, the new Permanent Secretary at the NIO.
2. One is clearly hesitant to hypothesise on the basis of fairly slender evidence; however, the lack of urgency with which the Brooke initiative is being conducted at present, allied to Chilcot's apparently considered remarks on Friday suggesting they would be talking to us within weeks about a "solution", seem to point towards some significant rethinking being under way on the British side. In the circumstances, it would seem prudent to try to anticipate the direction in which British thinking may be moving, so as to ensure that we are not taken by surprise by any unexpected moves on their part.

Anglo-Irish Agreement

3. The British would appear to have carried out an assessment of the Agreement and to have concluded that it has seriously failed to live up to expectations, either for London or Dublin. They, I suspect, no longer see the Agreement as offering a framework for progress on either the political or the security fronts. They may also feel that, with Mrs. Thatcher's departure, they have now wider autonomy within which they can explore options outside the Agreement - including considering whether any new initiative might

embrace the two groupings excluded from the 1985 Agreement, the Unionists and the Provisionals.

Security

4. If Friday night's meeting left me with one over-riding message, it was of a deep British anxiety about security, both in the immediate future and in a general on-going sense. The depth of this anxiety was such that one wondered if they were anticipating an upsurge of violence in Britain itself rather than (or as well as) an intensified pre-Christmas campaign in the North.
5. The British clearly take the view that the Provisionals can continue their campaign of violence indefinitely at the present, or even at an increased, level. This has horrendous implications for their security forces and also for the protection of public persons in Britain. The Leader of the House, John MacGregor, privately emphasised to the Minister on Monday how shaken the Conservative Party had been - and still is - by Ian Gow's murder. In the Secretariat last week, the Chief Constable emphasised the scale of the security problem - as he put it, five thousand troops could be swallowed up in any one area of the border.
6. The British, I suspect, also realise that the Provisionals have the capacity, in the absence of draconian security measures, to bring down any new political structures in the North which exclude them.

British Position Paper

7. The temptation for London at present may be therefore to consider putting forward relatively radical political proposals which might either enable:

- (a) the Provisionals to be brought on board the political process; or
- (b) even if the IRA were to reject such proposals, the package might be sufficiently attractive to nationalists (in the British assessment) as to facilitate the type of security measures which would enable the IRA's campaign of violence to be defeated.
8. As regards (a) above, Archbishop Daly said to me recently (in strict confidence) that the British seem at present to be preparing a position paper on whether to talk to the IRA (through the Chaplains' initiative). As an alternative to this, they may be looking at the possibility of talks with Sinn Fein (through the Hume/Reid/Adams route). If they do decide to talk to the Provisionals, it may well be through someone who is nominally a third party (John Blelloch, Chilcot's predecessor, may offer one possible option).
9. If such a British position paper is indeed being prepared, it will presumably address the question of how such talks could be integrated into, or merged with, the Brooke initiative. One possible way that occurs to us might be for the Brooke talks to open and, once having moved into the North-South stage, to adjourn to give the nationalist community in the island the opportunity to consider in depth its approach to this major development (i.e. all-island talks). This would involve the establishment of what might be called a Forum Mark II; such a development might - on the basis of private understandings between the two Governments and signals from the British to the Provisionals - enable the latter to announce a cessation of violence and opt into the political process. The biggest challenge in such a scenario of course would be to keep the Unionists on board while facilitating an involvement by Sinn Fein (with IRA endorsement); the risk must be very high that signals

- which went far enough to bring the IRA into the process would, almost by definition, be too much for the Unionists to swallow.
12. An accession to power can be seen as an important opportunity from our viewpoint. The indications are that,
 10. Another possibility is that the British may have at this stage effectively given up on the Brooke initiative and are simply keeping the ball in play while planning their likely strategy for the aftermath of breakdown. It is not to be excluded, for instance, that the NIO is already working on a set of ideas or proposals which the Secretary of State might present on his own behalf at such time as he publicly acknowledges that the initiative in its present form has run its course. These ideas might be presented simply in the form of a speech; more ambitiously, the British may even be contemplating something on the lines of a Green Paper which could lead subsequently, following a period of consultation, to a White Paper. thinking at official level may have filtered upwards at this stage is also unclear.
 11. Irrespective of what (if anything) the British have in mind, the possibility is that we may get relatively little notice of what might be in prospect. In addition, and while there may well be attractive elements from our viewpoint in any new set of proposals, inevitably there would also be some highly sensitive and possibly unpalatable elements on the security side in particular. More importantly, whatever the nature and balance of any package of proposals, one must question the desirability of allowing ourselves to be pushed into a reactive posture, with British ideas setting the agenda for the subsequent debate. There may therefore be merit, especially if there are further pointers which confirm our sense that the British may be developing some new proposals, in beginning work on our own set of ideas which could be tabled at short notice if circumstances seemed to warrant this.
 14. In the process, the signals the British might give privately to the Provisionals to opt into the talks (e.g. would they, to quote Dick Spring's speech to the IPS

Taoiseach's Meeting with the Prime Minister

12. John Major's accession to power can be seen as an important opportunity from our viewpoint. The indications are that, as of now, Major has no fixed views or indeed little knowledge about Northern Ireland. At the same time, by instinct and temperament, the new Prime Minister is likely to find the Unionist posture essentially anachronistic. Unionist rhetoric - which at least at times struck a chord with Margaret Thatcher - will sit uneasily with his pragmatism. To the extent that the nationalist case can be couched in terms of logic and common sense, there may be a real possibility of enlisting Major's sympathy and support.
13. British official advice is that we should not "rush" Major and they probably have a point. The extent to which evolving British thinking at official level may have filtered upwards at this stage is also unclear. In the circumstances, it would seem advisable in initial contacts with the new Prime Minister to concentrate in a general way on the need for a joint approach - the importance of the two Governments setting out together to resolve this last remaining legacy of Anglo-Irish relations; this would suggest the two Governments working intensively together to decide on a framework for talks, and the direction in which they would envisage a solution lying and towards which they would orchestrate the process.
14. At the same time we will obviously wish to continue at official level probing British intentions. If indeed they are edging towards a new strategy, as conjectured above, this would of necessity involve the frankest discussions between London and Dublin on the involvement of the Provisionals in the process, the signals the British might give privately to the Provisionals to opt into the talks (e.g. would they, to quote Dick Spring's speech to the IPB

on Monday, move "from disinterest to a positive statement of interest" in a united Ireland), how far they would push the Unionists in this direction, and how the European Community dimension - and this could be of increasing importance - can be brought to bear actively to help make any new scenario happen.

DAT
Dermot Gallagher,
12 December, 1990.

cc: PST; PSM; Mr. Nally; PSS; Ms. Anderson

Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams popped up in Galway yesterday to make a plea to constitutional nationalists.

He said that all nationalist parties should concentrate on advancing Irish unity, rather than attacking the Republican movement.

Mr Adams believes that the fact that there is now a new Prime Minister in Britain might afford an opportunity to talk the British into accepting the principle of withdrawal.

In fact when Mr Major took office one of the first letters to fall on the doormat of Number 10 Downing Street was from the MP for West Belfast. It urged him to reconsider British policy in Ireland and stated that Sinn Fein was ready for talks.

It is not difficult to work out what is going on here. Sinn Fein has become intrigued by Peter Brooke's recent statement where he denied that Britain has any "selfish or strategic interest" in Northern Ireland and Mr Adams and his friends are trying to tease him out.

They want nationalists of all hues to unite to press Mr Brooke on precisely what he means by this and to work together to persuade him that Britain's best interests will be served by paving the way for Irish re-unification.

That is all very well and good. But Mr Adams and his friends have got to understand that constitutional nationalists cannot and will not condone IRA violence. There will only be peace, and justice in Ireland when they come to realise that violence is driving the two communities apart.

It is not good enough for Sinn Fein to simply blame all violence on partition and British colonialism. That is a complete cop out. Individuals have to accept responsibility for their own actions.

And it was not British colonial oppressors who gunned down a

civillan the other day, drove off, and then did a U-turn to pump more bullets into his wife.

Constitutional nationalists cannot simply ignore this sort of atrocity. We cannot let it go uncondemned, we have to speak out against cruelty and barbarism. And no amount of cant about colonialism will stop us.

The fact is that far from advancing the cause of nationalism, violence is working against it. The reason for this is quite simple. The biggest obstacle to a united Ireland is not British colonialism, it is the intractable opposition of Ulster Unionists.

Anyone who believes that the Rev Ian Paisley and his supporters will be queuing up down the Falls Road to join Sinn Fein if the British were to withdraw from Northern Ireland is seriously deluded if not certifiably insane.

Irish unity will be the ultimate fruit of those who labour for reconciliation, of those who promote trust and understanding between the two communities and of those who are prepared to show the courage to shake of the shackles of bigotry and sectarianism.

It is for this reason that we cannot cease to condemn IRA violence, it is systematically helping to destroy everything that we want to build, it is an obstacle on the road to Irish unity.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that many Sinn Fein supporters are beginning to realise this and are beginning to examine more closely the morality of the actions they support rather than seeking to deflect responsibility for atrocities onto others.

There is no doubt that the Irish problem can be traced to British colonial policies. But it was not Henry II or James I or Lloyd George who pumped bullets into Mr and Mrs Gilmore the other day, and that is why their assailants and their supporters stand condemned.

The Irish News
Pro Fide et Patria
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1990
IRA a block
to Irish unity

SECRET

Talks about talks
or
Séin Féin
files



Tuesday
10/12
11/12
11/12.90

S7 Hume

Telephone Conversation with John Hume
6th December, 1990

1. John Hume telephoned yesterday evening to say that he had briefed Peter Brooke privately at Westminster about his recent meeting with Gerry Adams. Brooke was accompanied only by his Private Secretary. According to Hume, the Secretary of State appeared interested in Adams' thinking and in Hume's firm belief that he was serious in seeking an alternative way forward to violence.
2. At the conclusion of their discussion, Hume suggested that a senior British official (he mentioned John Chilcot) might visit him at his Donegal home at an early date. Hume would then organise for Adams and Martin McGuinness to call to the house while Chilcot was there. Brooke promised to consider the suggestion and come back to Hume.
3. Hume also said that - to his astonishment - Brooke never once referred to the proposed talks with Unionists during their discussion - neither, of course, did Hume.
4. Hume went on to say that he is under pressure from Adams at the moment to indicate whether Dublin is interested in responding to the signals he has been conveying through Hume, specifically through meeting Adams in strict privacy. In this regard, Adams emphasised to Hume that, if it could be established that Dublin would respond seriously, he would be prepared to go to the IRA Army Council and urge them to consider agreeing to a cessation of violence. Hume's fear at the moment is that, if some response or signal is not returned in the near future, the impetus might well go out of the Adams initiative. I told Hume that I would convey his message at political level.

Dermot Gallagher,
7 December, 1990.

cc: PST; PSM; Mr. Nally; PSS; Ms. Anderson.

AMBASÁID NA HÉIREANN, LONDAIN



IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON.

17 Grosvenor Place
SW1X 7HR



11. 12. 90

Tadiseach
To be placed
10/12

1. cc PS4
Mr. Miller; pes
Another A1
2. Mr. Cullen.

6 December 1990

Mr Brendan Scannell
Counsellor
Embassy Washington

57 file

Dear Brendan

Thank you for your fax concerning the visit to London of Congressman Joe Kennedy.

I spoke to his aide, Jim Mahoney, last week and had a chat with him about Rep. Kennedy's meeting with Northern Ireland Secretary Brooke. According to Mahoney, Brooke characterised the new Prime Minister as being pragmatic, sensible and open-minded in his handling of issues and said that he expected him to approach Northern Ireland in this way. Kennedy asked whether the new government would be taking an initiative on ending violence. Brooke responded with an account of his initiative and also added that there would be no negotiations with the IRA. In response to Kennedy's argument that there should be some way of getting through to the IRA and his offer to do anything he could, or to convey any message while in Northern Ireland, Brooke suggested that he talk to our government before doing anything. It was clear from the NIO version of the meeting that, although it confirmed that Kennedy had offered to use his good offices as intermediary, great importance was not attached to it. It was characterised as 'pleasantries'.

Mahoney was appreciative of my offer that Paul Murray could brief Rep. Kennedy on what the Government have been doing in relation to the Birmingham Six, particularly given Paul's frequent and recent visits. We made tentative arrangements for the meeting but, in the end, Kennedy's schedule did not allow him to take up the offer. The reporting of Kennedy's visit to the Six was predictable, with the qualities giving straight coverage by and large and the tabloids at the bottom of the market being vituperative in their criticism.

Yours sincerely

Brendan J Lyons
Counsellor

c.c. Anglo Irish Division

SECRET

*Mr Turle
for S. F. Hume*


Discussion with John Hume,
29th November, 1990

*Mr Hume
hmm
4.12.90
W/R*

1. John Hume made contact briefly on Thursday evening to fill me in on his meeting the previous day with Gerry Adams. He said he will take an early opportunity to brief the Taoiseach in private on the meeting - the other SDLP members are not aware, according to Hume, of these on-going discussions. (Hume is also to meet the Secretary of State privately tomorrow afternoon to brief him).
2. Hume said his meeting with Adams had been very constructive. The Sinn Féin leader categorically stated that he was very interested in discussing an alternative strategy to violence. If he was convinced that the South was serious, and it was possible to devise such an alternative strategy, he would be prepared to go to the Army Council and argue in support of this approach.
3. In a brief discussion on Friday with John Chilcot, the Permanent Under Secretary at the NIO, I asked him if he had detected any change in the attitude of the Provisionals in the light of the Brooke statement of the 7th November. In response, Chilcot said that he was beginning to believe that the Provisionals were now serious in being prepared to consider all the options open to them. He referred in particular to the article by Fr. Alex Reid in the Irish Times on Thursday and said he saw this as being particularly significant. (This is indeed an article which merits careful reading; Fr. Reid, who is extremely close to Gerry Adams, said he believed that "the Republican movement could be persuaded to end its strategy of armed force in favour of a strategy of political force", and that "the tragic and violent dimensions of what is essentially a political conflict could be ended, as far as the nationalist side of it is concerned, within any given six-month period,

provided it were handled properly"; a copy of the article is enclosed).

4. Chilcot said he would like to meet me privately at some stage for a discussion - though he added that he might not be able to "tell me everything" he knows (he seemed to be implying that he would wish in particular to talk about the manner in which recent signals from the Provisionals might be interpreted).



Dermot Gallagher,
3 December, 1990.

cc: PST; PSM; Mr. Nally; PSS; Ms. Anderson.

The Rev Alex Reid, who made headlines when he administered the last rites to the two British soldiers killed by a crowd in Andersonstown in 1988 and who has himself been at the centre of mediation efforts between Belfast paramilitaries for the past 20 years, explains why he thinks the violence in the North could be ended within six months if the situation were handled properly

Priest feels Church must provide talks channel for IRA


AS A PRIEST who has worked in Belfast since the 1960s, my main concern is not about the political dimensions of the Northern Ireland conflict but about the tragedy it is causing in terms of human life and human suffering. It is no exaggeration to say that the people of the north have been deluged by pain and sorrow over the past 21 years and that they are still enduring a nightmare of horror, agony and tragedy.

It is natural to ask how all this could happen in a Christian country and among a people whom, in both their unionist and nationalist traditions, are I believe, (and here I speak from long, personal experience) as God-fearing, as kind, as warm-hearted, as law-abiding, as hard-working, as sensitive, as gifted intellectually and emotionally as any people on this earth.

The saddest tragedy of all is that the conflict between the British unionist tradition and the Irish nationalist tradition need not and would not have erupted into violence, bloodshed and tragedy 21 years ago if the situation had been handled properly at the time.

More than this, I believe, that, even now, the violent, tragic dimensions of the conflict could be ended within any given six month period provided the situation were handled properly. I also believe that, although it has lasted for centuries, the political conflict between the Irish nationalist and the British unionist traditions could be ended within a reasonable period provided it is handled in accordance with the principles of democratic justice and charity as these principles are understood and practised throughout the world.

What are the democratic rights of the people of Ireland given that history has divided them into the people of the unionist tradition and the people of the nationalist tradition? How do you apply the principles of democracy to the present conflict especially at the point where British unionists say that Northern Ireland should be united to Britain and under British jurisdiction because this is the political wish of the majority of the people who live there,



Father Alex Reid believes the Catholic Church must intervene to provide the kind of "sanctuary setting" where lines of communication with the IRA can be set up and maintained.

namely, the people of the unionist tradition while, at the same time, Irish nationalists say that Northern Ireland should be re-united to the rest of Ireland and under Irish jurisdiction because this is the political wish of the majority of the people who live in Ireland as a whole, namely, the people of the nationalist tradition.

These are the kind of questions which the conflict asks of everybody who wants to end it justly and democratically. Can such questions be answered? I am certain they can provided we go to the heart of what democracy means and there listen to what it tells us about the just, political and human rights of all the people of Ireland in their two divided traditions.

Why, over the past 21 years, has the conflict become so violent? The answer to this question lies in the fact that both traditions have been and still are prepared to use military force to back their own answers to the kind of democratic questions I have just been asking. Here, however, I shall concentrate on attitudes to the use of military force within the nationalist tradition because, as a priest, my main pastoral responsibilities are towards the people of that tradition and also because it will help explain why there is so much bloodshed and tragedy.

As we know, the majority of

the people of the nationalist tradition have long ago rejected the use of military force as a means of achieving their political aims, that is, as a means of ending British rule in what they see as the northern part of their country. They have decided that they will use only political and diplomatic methods to achieve this.

There is, however, within the nationalist tradition, an historical heritage going back, at least, to the French Revolution and embodied today in the Republican movement which still believes what Irish Republicans generally used to but no longer believe, namely, that the people of Ireland have the right to use military force to resist and to end British rule and a British Government presence in any part of Ireland including Northern Ireland because, as they see it, this rule is a violation of the democratic right of the people of Ireland to rule themselves.

In spite of the opposition of majority nationalist opinion and of the continual condemnations of Church and State, the Republican movement, represented today by the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein, is still convinced that it is entitled to take up arms to achieve the traditional aims of Irish nationalism. At the same time, however, those who belong to this movement are also con-

vinced that their kind of armed force could not by itself achieve these aims and, for that reason, that political methods must also be used.

What they are really talking about is pressuring the British in an efficacious way. They are saying, in effect, that they are using armed force not because they want to but because, as they see the situation, they have to; that, for them, it is simply a pressure tactic which, however unfortunate, is nevertheless necessary under present political circumstances in Ireland. If, as they say, armed force is simply a tactic to pressurise the British authorities into giving the people of Ireland their democratic rights, then you can immediately enter into a dialogue with them about replacing the pressure and efficacy of armed and violent force with the pressure and efficacy of political and diplomatic force.

A very significant fact here is that the present political leaders of the Republican movement have been publicly requesting such a dialogue for several years now and two years ago its military leaders issued a statement saying they were willing to consider proposals for "an alternative" to "the armed struggle" for Irish independence.

I am pointing out all this to explain why I believe the tragic and violent dimensions of what is essentially a political conflict could be ended, as far as the nationalist side of it is concerned, within any given six-month period provided it were handled properly. But it would have to be handled properly, patiently and with diplomatic skill because the people of the Republican movement who are still committed to the use of armed force belong to a military tradition that goes back for centuries and that numbers among its adherents and supporters some of the greatest heroes of Irish history.

This means that Republican convictions about the need and the justification for armed force have been handed down from generation to generation, from father to son and mother to daughter like a religious faith and so they are deeply felt and held in the hearts of Republicans.

This account of Republican convictions will, I hope, help to explain why Church condemna-



A British soldier being cornered by mourners at the IRA funeral in Andersonstown in 1988 at which he and another British soldier were killed. Father Reid, author of this article, administered the last rites to the two men.

tions of political violence in Ireland, which have been repeated again and again over the past 21 years, have not been heeded by the Republican movement and why even the passionate plea of Pope John Paul in 1979 to end the use of force for political ends was ignored.

The strange thing about all this is that, apart from their refusal to accept Church guidance on the use of arms in the cause of Irish independence, Republicans are often faithful Catholics in every other way, faithful to the Church's teachings and practices and very loyal to the Pope and to the supremacy of Rome as the See of Peter. I believe, indeed, that many Republicans would lay down their lives for their faith as quickly as they would for their republicanism.

Why, then, do they refuse to accept the Irish bishops' and even the Pope's condemnations of their "armed struggle"? There are a number of reasons but here I shall mention just one.

This is that the Catholic Church and the Republican movement have been encountering each other for a long time in Ireland, for centuries in fact. Republicans have learned a lot of lessons from their quarrel with the Church about the use of arms: lessons, for example, about how bishops can be affected by their own political and social backgrounds and about how the official Church

in which a significant section of the people for whom they have pastoral responsibility have taken up arms to achieve their political aims in the spirit and with the commitment and expertise of a military tradition that goes back for centuries. They have to respond to the fact that in spite of all the efforts of Church and State to persuade them to stop or to defeat them — the use of constant condemnation by the Church; the application of all the security, military and legal resources available to the London and Dublin Governments — they are continuing to use arms today.

What, in face of such a situation, should the Church do or, at least, try to do through her representatives and ministers? It is clear that, while she must give guidance on the moral issues of the conflict, pulpit-type condemnations are not enough.

Here, I believe, we can learn from the pastoral example of

'Republicans have historical memories about the Church's attitude to political questions in the past . . .'

can differ from the pastoral Church; lessons even about the fallibility of the Church in matters that belong, not to the sphere of faith, but to the sphere of prudential and personal judgement. Republicans have historical memories about the Church's attitudes to political questions in the past, even the distant past; memories that tend to disillusion them. The democratic principles of republicanism have taught them to think for themselves and to be independent of mind in matters of personal conscience.

Priests in Northern Ireland must, therefore, face a situation

Jesus Himself. He is always "the Lord who is with us", the Saviour who is "in the midst"; the Friend who is "like unto us in all things except sin." He communicated directly with those whom He wished to influence including people who were condemned by the official Church of the time as the worst of sinners and outlaws. He sat down to table with them and engaged them in personal dialogue so often and so much that He became known by what I believe is His greatest title — "The Companion of Sinners" — of the sinners that we all are.

The pastoral approach of Jesus

indicates, I believe, that the Church must enter into direct communication and dialogue with the Republican movement if she wants to persuade it to abandon the gun and to follow the ways of peaceful politics. My own experience has taught me that, if the Church does this, she will find that the Republican movement is open, not only to such communication and dialogue, but also to such persuasion.

I believe, for example, that, given the necessary communication with the other political parties or authorities that would be concerned, the Republican movement could be persuaded to end its strategy of armed force in favour of a strategy of political force or even of new, realistic ways of defining and applying the democratic principles that should govern the just resolution of the present conflict.

I am convinced, however, that the Republican movement will not be persuaded to give up its armed strategy for a political strategy unless it has first been satisfied that such a strategy would be organised enough and strong enough to pursue effectively the broad thrust of the traditional aims of Irish nationalism in the political setting of the 1990s. Such an efficacious political strategy could, I believe, be set up but only if the main political parties on the nationalist side of the conflict and the main Republican movement agree to pursue it together because only then would it have the kind of political force behind it that would satisfy the Republican movement.

At the present time, however, there is no communication between the main nationalist parties and the Republican movement because these parties refuse to communicate with it while it is engaged in an armed campaign. This means that a political strategy acceptable to the Republican

movement as a replacement for its armed strategy cannot be organised at present and will not be unless and until the necessary lines of communication between it and the other nationalist parties are set up. Here the Church could play a crucial role because, for pastoral and moral reasons, she could and, I believe, should intervene to facilitate the creation and the organisation of these lines of communication and, by doing so, help to promote a dialogue which, at the end of the day, would, I am convinced, remove the gun forever from the nationalist side of the age-old conflict in Ireland.

I can sum up all this by saying that there is a tragic impasse at the heart of the peace-making process in Northern Ireland. It has been created, on the one hand, by the insistence of the Republican movement that it cannot and will not lay down its arms in favour of any new proposals for justice, reconciliation and peace unless and until it has been able to verify the political viability of such proposals through unconditional communication with the other political parties and authorities who would be involved in implementing them. On the other hand, it has been caused by the insistence of these parties and authorities that they cannot and will not engage in any kind of political communication with the Republican movement unless and until it lays down its arms.

How to resolve this impasse is, therefore, one of the crucial questions for peace in Northern Ireland. My own conviction is that it cannot and will not be resolved unless and until the Church, in keeping with her pastoral responsibilities in any situation of violent conflict, intervenes, through her representatives and ministers, to provide the kind of sanctuary setting where the lines of communication necessary to resolve it can be set up and maintained.

~~Don~~ ✓

This has gone directly
to Sarah Monpa.

→ 2/21

SECRET

Discussion with Bishop Cahal Daly,
24th November, 1990

McCarthy
7-1-91
4/1

1. I called by arrangement on the Primate-designate, Bishop Cahal Daly, at his brother's house in Belfast on Saturday. In our discussion, we ranged over a number of issues, the most important of which were as follows:

Chaplains' Initiative

2. It will be recalled that the peace initiative of the Catholic and Church of Ireland Chaplains at the Maze (both of whom are named Murphy) had apparently reached a stage where, in return for "meaningful talks" with the British, the IRA were prepared to declare a ceasefire. In the light of this development, Bishop Daly said that he had requested a private meeting, without civil servants present, with the Secretary of State. He wished to convey in particular to Mr. Brooke his considered view that the Provisional IRA were now serious in their desire to seek out an alternative method to violence in order to advance and achieve their political objectives. The IRA had the capacity, in the Bishop's view, to go on almost indefinitely at the present - or even at an increased - level of activity; at the same time they seemed to realise that their objective was now not achievable through military means. His overall assessment therefore, which he conveyed to Mr. Brooke, was that the signals coming from the Provisionals were sufficiently serious as to require a response from the British.
3. Following his meeting with the Secretary of State, Bishop Daly was contacted by the NIO and two meetings at senior official level were subsequently arranged. The first meeting was with the then (now retired) Under Secretary of the NIO, John Blelloch, who was accompanied by John

McConnell (the NIO's contact man with the Catholic community); the second meeting, on the 21st November, was with the successors to Blelloch and McConnell - John Chilcot and Danny McNeill.

4. At their two meetings with the Bishop, the NIO personnel put forward a series of questions, along the following lines:

- what does "meaningful" mean?

- if talks were held, would there be an agenda and would this introduce pre-conditions by the back door?

- were the IRA convinced that they could avoid a split?

- would there be continuing activity by the INLA and other possible splinter groups?

- would a ceasefire be announced in advance of talks or at the same time?

5. The above series of questions strongly suggested to Bishop Daly that the British, at civil service level, were in the process of preparing a paper on the possibility of talks with the Provisionals. The next step will involve the Chaplains meeting the IRA and asking them to provide answers to these questions.

6. The Bishop said that he was very conscious that any possible talks with the IRA posed an immense political and moral dilemma. If the talks failed and violence resumed, it would put the British Government and indeed all the constitutional parties in an extremely difficult position. At the same time, the prize of success was potentially so great that it justified taking a considered risk provided it could be established that the IRA were serious. In this

regard, he had the utmost confidence in the judgement of the Catholic Chaplain at the Maze, Fr. Murphy. Moreover, the Bishop said he had available to him the assessment of the former Chief of Staff of the IRA, Sean Mac Stiofáin. Mac Stiofáin keeps in regular touch with the IRA leadership and also briefs Dr. Daly from time to time on their thinking. For all these reasons, he had no doubt but that the signals coming from the IRA leadership were genuine and sincere.

Brooke Speech

7. The Bishop referred to the recent - no vested British economic or strategic interest in staying on in the North - speech by Peter Brooke as "historic". He had no doubt that the speech was directed primarily at the IRA and was intended to give a positive response to the signals that had been coming from them in recent times. He now very much hoped that Brooke would be asked to stay on as Secretary of State and added that he, and Douglas Hurd if he were elected Prime Minister, would constitute a most formidable team.

Archbishop Eames

8. The Bishop again expressed serious reservations about the role of Archbishop Eames in the present initiative (it will be recalled that the initiative started off under the sponsorship of the late Cardinal and Archbishop Eames). He said that Eames "had been caught up in his own deceptions" - by which I understood the Bishop to mean that the Archbishop had been found out in some inconsistencies or untruths recently. The Archbishop was also very "political and Unionist" and Dr. Daly hoped that he was not being listened to by the NIO. In this regard, he suspected that he was probably advising the NIO to put the Chaplains' initiative on hold pending the outcome of the present efforts to get talks under way.

Anglo-Irish Agreement

9. Bishop Daly is a strong supporter of the Agreement. At the same time, he is conscious of its limitations and in particular he expressed great regret that, once the Agreement came into force, the British had got "cold feet" and did not implement it in an active and imaginative way. As a result, the Agreement had served to alienate both communities - the nationalists, though they warmly welcomed the Agreement itself, were unhappy at the failure of the British to implement it, while the Unionist alienation sprang of course from the very existence of the Agreement.

Talks Process


10. The Bishop said that we had behaved with "dignity" in our approach to the Brooke initiative and at all stages had given the Unionists every opportunity to become involved. Likewise, on substance, we were completely justified - there could be no going back from the approach and philosophy behind the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Bishop also expressed concern that, if people in the South distanced themselves from Northern nationalists and their agenda, nationalists would feel quite exposed and, as a result, might be tempted to see the extremists as their only guarantor and protector.

Comment

11. Although by no means universally shared, there is a strengthening view among many reflective nationalists in the North at present - Bishop Daly did not specifically say as much but I had the impression that he implicitly shared this view - that an equal priority to getting the present political talks under way should be to find a formula to

move the IRA away from their campaign of violence. This view would also say that, even if the present talks process ended in some form of agreement, the IRA, if they were not in some way part of the process, had the capacity either to make any agreement unworkable or perhaps even to bring it down.

12. As to the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein, the Bishop said that he is convinced that they are separate organisations; he also expressed the view that, while the IRA was in a position to impose its view on Sinn Fein, the reverse was not the case. If this is true - and we suspect that the Bishop's reading of the situation in this regard is accurate - it follows that messages emanating from the IRA proper (as at present via the Chaplains) probably carry more weight than anything emerging from the on-going dialogue between Adams and John Hume.


Dermot Gallagher,
27 November, 1990.

cc: PST; PSM; Mr. Nally; PSS; Ms. Anderson


- The question of direct (secret) contact between the British Government and the IRA was explored. The British have not adopted a position on this as yet. McNeill told him that a question of that magnitude would need Prime Ministerial approval - something which was not possible in the current climate of political uncertainty in Westminster. Fr Murphy told me that he had no sense that the British had ruled out such a possibility. He also made the point to McNeill that if using a serving civil servant were to pose a problem, they might like to consider using a retired civil servant. [In this he was thinking of Sir John Blemloch, his former interlocutor in the hunger strike negotiations in 1981.]
- NB X/1
- You will recall from my earlier report that the IRA had indicated that they wanted the Chaplains present at any talks which might emerge. Archbishop Eames had opposed the Chaplains adopting such a role. Apparently Eames has conveyed the same message to the NIO. When McNeill raised the question, Fr Murphy made it clear that he did not feel bound by Eames in this matter. Similarly, his Church of Ireland colleague (Rev Murphy) made the same point. He gathered that the NIO would tend to share Eames' view on this point.
- The situation now is that the Chaplains will have a further meeting with the IRA Army Council next week. McNeill was anxious to have a further meeting with them shortly after that.



Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
23 November 1990

~~SECRET~~

27-11-90



~~A/Sec Gallagher~~

Maze Chaplain's initiative on paramilitary talks

Further to my report of 12 November re the above, I had a brief meeting with Fr Murphy on 22 November where he provided an update on the current situation in relation to their initiative -viz-

- The meeting involving Bishop Cahal Daly, John Chillcot (Permanent Under-Secretary of the NIO) and Danny McNeill (Head of the Political Affairs Division of the NIO), which had been scheduled for 13 November was delayed and was finally held on Wednesday this week (21 November). Bishop Daly received a full briefing from the Chaplains before the meeting and remains strongly supportive of the initiative, while leaving the detail of the matter in the hands of the Chaplains. When I met Fr Murphy he had not yet had the opportunity to debrief the Bishop after the meeting.
- Following that meeting, both Chaplains met with McNeill on Thursday 22 November in Stormont. The only other person with McNeill was a note-taker. The meeting lasted three hours and consisted of detailed questioning from McNeill which appeared to be designed to test the thesis of the Chaplains that the IRA were genuinely prepared to seek ways other than violence for advancing their agenda.
- McNeill apparently was quite clear that Brooke's speech of 9 November was directed to the IRA leadership and was anxious that the Chaplains convey this message to them.
- Fr Murphy was quite emphatic that it was not good enough to just deal with Sinn Fein, the IRA must be directly involved. If the IRA were to lay down arms, Sinn Fein will benefit in terms of becoming fully involved in the political process. In Fr Murphy's view, without the campaign of violence, Sinn Fein would stand to make significant electoral gains at the expense of the SDLP - a party which in his view lacks a similar level of committed following among northern nationalists. He could therefore see the benefits for Sinn Fein, but where are the benefits for the IRA? Some formula must be arrived at whereby they can show that their armed struggle achieved something - as Fr Murphy put it "Sinn Fein can go up the political road, but the IRA must be able to show that it was they who paved that road!" [He mentioned that McNeill tried to probe, without success, as to the identity of his interlocutors in the IRA Army Council. McNeill apparently kept mentioning Martin McGuinness in that context. Fr Murphy told me that eventually, in order to bury that particular red herring, he finally told McNeill that McGuinness was not involved in the process - something which seemed to surprise McNeill.]

- The question of direct (secret) contact between the British Government and the IRA was explored. The British have not adopted a position on this as yet. McNeill told him that a question of that magnitude would need Prime Ministerial approval - something which was not possible in the current climate of political uncertainty in Westminster. Fr Murphy told me that he had no sense that the British had ruled out such a possibility. He also made the point to McNeill that if using a serving civil servant were to pose a problem, they might like to consider using a retired civil servant. [In this he was thinking of Sir John Blemloch, his former interlocutor in the hunger strike negotiations in 1981.]

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- The situation now is that the Chaplains will have a further meeting with the IRA Army Council next week. McNeill was anxious to have a further meeting with them shortly after that.



Brendan McMahan
Anglo-Irish Division
23 November 1990

Brian McCarthy. Mr. Turlo

FOR S.F. J. H.

Brian,

~~ALCC~~
~~THIS D. H. H. H. H. H.~~
D. H. H. H. H. H.

The attached was received
in this morning's post.

Revised.

3/12

Le dea mhéin

Ó GERRY ADAMS

Teach Uí Chonghaile

147 Bóthar Bhaile Andarsan

Béal Feirste

Fón: 301939 BTU 9DB Telex: 231723

FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FROM GERRY ADAMS MP

Since Peter Brooke was appointed by the British Prime Minister as the British minister responsible for the 6 counties he has made three major (and sometimes contradictory) statements in terms which are clearly aimed at Irish republicans. His last statement has been represented by sections of the media as a major shift in British policy. No doubt this point will also be made by the SDLP leadership at their party's conference this weekend.

Republicans, and everyone else, must examine Mr Brooke's remarks carefully. Are they indeed a major shift in policy? Are they merely part of a clever propaganda exercise? Is there a change in emphasis? The answers to these questions may not emerge for some time. What is clear, however, is that Mr Brooke wants to be part of a public debate on the question of partition, and the claim of his government to ownership of a part of Ireland. Unfortunately, he wants such a debate on his own censored terms and he excludes the very people, (many of us with an Irish mandate which he lacks) to whom, we are told, he wishes to reach out. Those who will argue in support of Mr Brooke's position should remind him of this fact.

Mr Brooke either hints or points clearly to some future talks with Sinn Fein. Whenever he has been asked by us in the past to spell out his scenario for such talks he has fudged the issue. His refusal to talk to our party on the grounds stated by him, given his own involvement as head of the political wing of British army in Ireland is clearly untenable. His willingness to talk to other Irish parties, especially unionists delegations which include many incitees to violence, and other non-Unionist supporters of British crown forces, expose his refusal to talk to Sinn Fein as a propaganda position against our supporters.

His assertions of goodwill towards those we represent will be dismissed quite correctly by them as patronising propagandistic platitudes which bear no reality to the life they are forced to live under British rule. Sinn Fein's position on armed struggle is quite clear. We believe that Irish people have the right to use armed struggle in the context of seeking Irish independence and in the conditions of British occupation in the six counties. Whether Irish people wish to exercise that right is a matter for them. That is our opinion. It is also a matter of political reality and a fact of life. It will be so, unfortunately, until the conditions which create it are changed. Sinn Fein wishes to change those conditions. We want a total demilitarisation of the situation and an end to armed conflict of all kinds in our country.

Sinn Fein offer Peter Brooke talks at any time and without any preconditions as an indication of our party's willingness to assist a process towards peace and justice in our country.

In the meantime, some of the points contained in Peter Brooke's statement need to be challenged, for example, the question of partition.

Partition - a denial of democracy

Partition was never submitted to the Irish people for ratification. Its imposition represented and continues to represent a fundamental denial of democracy - a denial to the Irish people of the freedom to exercise their rights to national self-determination.

The pretext for partition - the wishes of a national minority to maintain British rule - holds no validity, morally or in international law, against the express wishes of the vast majority of the Irish people.

Partition perpetuates the British government's denial of the Irish people's right to self-determination. Because it is fundamentally undemocratic and repressive, partition perpetuates the cycle of oppression/ domination/ resistance/ oppression.

The anti-democratic nature of the 6 county state itself precludes any solution within its confines.

Partition, imposed by Britain against the wishes of the Irish people and through force of arms, was never intended to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict in this country.

It has not and cannot resolve the underlying causes of conflict in this country.

So it is that 67 years after the partition of Ireland the conflict and political instability remain as deep rooted as ever.

The effect, of partition was and is to erect a gerrymandered barrier against Irish re-unification in perpetuity. It flaunts all the accepted concepts of democracy. As such it is basically flawed. The inequities which the six-county state has spawned, and the political violence from the oppressed which they provoke, are the inevitable consequence of its very existence. Inequality and oppression, and the resulting resistance, are the price which has had to be paid for a state founded on a system of political, social and economic privilege.

Partition also effects the 26 county state. It effects all

of Ireland. It also affects the relationship between the people of Ireland and the people of Britain. These relationships can only be normalised in the context of Irish national self determination.

The IRA has stated clearly on a number of occasions that for republicans, armed struggle is not a dogma. The IRA says that armed struggle is a method of political struggle adopted reluctantly and as a last resort in the absence of any viable alternative. For nationalists locked into a hostile and repressive sectarian state, systematically discriminated against, denied their rights as citizens, their cultural identity and dignity, abandoned by the Dublin government, subservience or armed struggle become the only options. Political violence from all quarters stemming from the repressive and undemocratic nature of partition has been a feature of this state since its inception. The onus is on those who claim that there is an alternative to the IRA's armed struggle to prove that this is the case. Recent British claims that they are no longer politically committed to the union provide an opportunity for those who argue such a position to test its validity. refusal to recognise Irish national rights - nationhood, integrity of the national territory and sovereignty - which has caused the problem and maintains it.

Self-determination is a nation's exercise of the political freedom to determine its own economic, social and cultural development, without external influence and without partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity.

Ireland today clearly does not meet those criteria nor does the pretext for partition hold good against those criteria.

In the words of Sean McBride, winner of the Nobel and Lenin Peace prizes:

"Ireland's right to sovereignty, independence and unity are inalienable and infeasible. It is for the Irish people as a whole to determine the future status of Ireland. Neither Britain nor a small minority selected by Britain has any right to partition the ancient island of Ireland, nor to determine its future as a sovereign nation."

The right of the Irish people, as a whole, to self-determination is supported by universally recognised principles of international law.

On the basis of these principles Sinn Féin holds the realisation of the right of the Irish people to national self-determination as our primary political objective, and we identify its denial as the major source of conflict in this country today.

The people of Ireland have never been permitted to exercise their right to national self-determination. British government policy has consistently denied the exercise of that right to the Irish people. The British government veto - explicit in that policy and reiterated by Peter Brooke continues today.

British government policy has sustained a division of political allegiance in Ireland - the national allegiance of a clear majority and the unionist allegiance of a national minority, and which they do not have anyway. Had apart from its dependence on the illusion of self-determination, it British government policy - manifest in partition - upholds the unionist political allegiance of a national minority against the national and democratic rights of the majority.

When a people are divided in political allegiance the democratic principle is that majority rights should prevail; the more so when such fundamentals as national rights are in question, from the start and because the real nature of the problem is overlooked.

It is the British government's refusal to recognise Irish national rights - nationhood, integrity of the national territory, national independence and sovereignty - which has caused the problem and maintains it, and to grant democratic self-determination to all the Irish people without The unionist veto, grafted by the British government onto its deliberate fracture of Irish national unity, has become the cornerstone of the British government's rationale for its continuing exercise of sovereignty over the six counties as the major reason for its continuing presence in Ireland.

Today's unionists represent some 20% of the Irish nation. They are a national minority; a significant minority but a minority nevertheless. To bestow the power of veto over national independence and sovereignty on a national minority is in direct contravention of the principle of self-determination, where is the principle of democratic consent for the nationalists.

Unionist Rights

The concept that the consent of this national authority Sinn Féin recognises that unionists have democratic rights which not only can be upheld but must be upheld in an independent Ireland. That is a democratic norm, we ignored when we signed the Hillsborough Treaty. More significantly it ignores the democratic principle of consent. Moreover we would argue that those democratic rights would be greatly strengthened in an independent Ireland.

As Unionists have frequently pointed out, most emphatically since the signing of the Hillsborough Treaty, the British Government has, where it sees fit, chosen to ignore the wishes of the Unionist population. This concept of consent is one applied selectively, and rarely, by the British Government.

Because, under British rule, the political status of the six counties is exactly what the unionists say it is - an off-shore 'province' which is an integral part of the United Kingdom - its people cannot hope to have any significant say in the direction of their own affairs until they choose to exercise their influence within an all-Ireland system.

All argument which is based on a reference to the "wishes of the democratic majority" in the six counties is, therefore, based on a false premise, since it takes a stand in defence of something which they do not have anyway. And apart from its dependence on the illusion of self-determination, it tends - as all arguments based on false premises are wont to do - to lead in its practical application to contradiction and ambiguity".

Mechanistic democratic logic, applied rigidly to a situation such as that existing in the six counties, gets itself tied up in knots, basically because the problem is falsely presented from the start and because the real nature of the problem is over-looked.

The real problem can in no way be defined as one of forcing the Protestant population 'into' anything; the real problem is one of forcing Britain to get out - and to grant democratic self-determination to all the Irish people without reference to their religion. If that democratic assembly, the Westminster parliament, should decide that it was its democratic wish to withdraw from Ireland, there is no democratic reason why it should not do so". Peter Brooke knows this as well as I do.

The argument that the democratic wishes of the unionist population, a national minority, are paramount and that the concept of coercion is, in itself, undemocratic is fraught with similar contradictions, ignoring, not least, the fact that 600,000 nationalists were forcibly coerced into the 6 county state. Where is the principle of democratic consent for northern nationalists,

The argument that the consent of this national minority elevated into a majority within an undemocratic, artificially created state, is necessary before any constitutional change can occur is a nonsense which the British have ignored when it as suited them to do so. More significantly it ignores the moral argument that the state which resulted from the creation of this artificial minority was inherently oppressive and violent. It ignores the fact that the present constitutional arrangements based on this false premise of 'democratic consent' have lead to decades of bloody war, and that all attempts to fin a solution within these confines have failed. It ignores the reality in British and international law that the British Government, if it wishes,

can legislate itself out of Ireland and the unionists into a new situation.

Sinn Féin has long accepted that Northern Protestants have fears about their civil and religious liberties and we have consistently insisted that these liberties must be guaranteed and protected. We offer unionists a settlement based on their uniting with the rest of the Irish people and ending sectarianism.

Sinn Féin seeks a new constitution of Ireland which would include written guarantees for those presently constituted as 'loyalists'.
Our search for peace has to rise above the consequences of imperialist rule if the post-partition independent Ireland is indeed to be based on the unity of catholic, protestant and dissenter. We have no desire to turn back the pages of history, or to dispossess the loyalists and foolishly attempt to reverse the Plantation. We seek a settlement based on their throwing in their lot with the rest of the Irish people and the end of sectarianism.

As a first step both governments must establish Irish reunification as a policy objective. Will Peter Brooke advocate this? Will he advocate an end to the Union?

It is obviously desirable that everything reasonable should be done to obtain the consent of a majority in the North to the constitutional, political and financial steps necessary for bringing about the end of partition. This can best be achieved when the British Government has established Irish reunification as a firm policy objective.

It is Peter Brooke implies, the British Government is no longer bound by ideological or strategic considerations to the Union and the sole factor involved is unionist consent. This may be an opportunity to advance the situation clearly stated by Brooke's claim is that his government is politically neutral is contradicted by its pro-active defence of the Union and partition. But, nevertheless his claim is a challenging one which deserves to be tested. If the British position is indeed one of political neutrality then they are open to persuasion that they should shift the massive resources and energy presently being expended in defence of partition and in attempts to find a partitionist arrangement and build new instead towards some alternative arrangements. Given that the present partitionist arrangements have, objectively failed to deliver peace or stability, and given that the British have claimed to be politically neutral, then they ought to open up persuasion that peace and stability can be secured in the context of Irish reunification. The UK is willing, without any

British Neutrality?

The exercise of the right to national self-determination in practice involves, primarily, the acceptance of Irish national rights by the British government; in effect the ending of current British government policy and the removal of the veto that that government has arbitrarily imposed on the exercise by the Irish people of their national and democratic rights.

Without such a fundamental policy change by the British government it is difficult to conceive of unionists considering having to come to a consensus with nationalists. Indeed a guarantee of the maintenance of partition in perpetuity leaves unionists with no reason to seek a consensus. Within the context of such a policy change Sinn Féin believes that agreement between people of the nationalist and unionist traditions is not only desirable but achievable.

We believe that consent can be obtained if the relevant parties and particularly the two governments concerned demonstrate the political will to achieve it.

As a first step both governments must establish Irish reunification as a policy objective. Will Peter Brooke advocate this? Will he advocate an end to the Union?

It is obviously desirable that everything reasonable should be done to obtain the consent of a majority in the North to the constitutional, political and financial steps necessary for bringing about the end of partition. This can best be achieved when the British Government has established Irish re-unification as a firm policy objective.

If, as Peter Brooke implies, the British Government is no longer bound by ideological or strategic considerations to the Union and the sole factor involved is unionist consent, then then an opportunity to advance the situation clearly exists. Mr Brooke's claim to be that his government is politically neutral is contradicted by its pro-active defence of the union and partition. But, nevertheless his claim is a challenging one which deserves to be tested. If the British position is indeed one of political neutrality then they are open to persuasion that they should shift the massive resources and energy presently being expended in defence of partition and in attempts to find a partitionist arrangement and direct them instead towards some alternative arrangements. Given that the present partitionist arrangements have abjectly failed to deliver peace or stability, and given that the British have claimed to be politically neutral, then they must be open to persuasion that peace and stability can be secured in the context of Irish re-unification. Sinn Féin is willing, without pre-

conditions or rigidity to enter into immediate dialogue in this context. Peter Brooke in his 100 day statement accepted the inevitability of talks with Sinn Féin. We have a democratic mandate to represent the views of our electorate. Why then postpone the inevitable, more-so, when to do so perpetuates an unnecessary and bitter conflict,

But it is not only the responsibility of republicans to persuade the British of the logic of such a policy shift towards Irish national self-determination. Irish reunification is the declared aim of all Irish political parties except the unionists. It is therefore the duty of the representatives of Irish nationalism, north and south, particularly those who condemn armed struggle, to concentrate their considerable resources into such a process of persuasion.

Given British assertions of 'neutrality, the representatives of Irish nationalism, and in particular the Dublin Government and the SDLP, are duty bound to advance the argument that the best way to "see agreement among the people who share the island of Ireland " is for Britain to adopt a policy of ending the union in the context of a United Ireland and they should then actively seek agreement among the people who share the island of Ireland on how this can be accomplished.


Once this is the British objective the strategy (or strategies) for achieving it should be a matter of formal agreement between the representatives of the Irish people and the British government. The search for such agreement must of course involve northern Protestants and every effort must be made to get their agreement and involvement in the constitutional, financial and political arrangements needed to replace partition. Furthermore, regardless of their attitude to such arrangements, their rights must be guaranteed in whatever arrangements emerge from such deliberations.

In other words once the above objective becomes British policy and while the democratic policy contained in it is continued throughout its implementation, there must be due provision for the rights of northern Protestants and every effort made to win their consent. By adopting such a policy the British would be joining the persuaders.

It is also the context in which republicans and democrats will judge Mr Brooke's remarks and the comments of those who attempt to build a case against Sinn Féin based upon his statements. Surely if Britain now has no self interest in being in Ireland as Mr Brooke claims the British government must have an open mind on the future of Ireland and be open to such a proposition. In this proposition we are restating the democratic position that neither the British or the unionists have a right to maintain partition and the

union . We would also assert that the consent of northern Protestants, like any other interest group, is desirable on the constitutional, financial and political arrangements needed to end partition. It is a responsibility of all Irish democrats to guarantee that all Irish people are treated equally.

The fundamental republican and nationalist position has always been to get Britain to abandon its partitionist policy and adopt instead a policy of withdrawing from Ireland and handing over sovereignty to an all-Ireland government whose selection would be a democratic matter for the Irish people. This position is based on the principle of national self-determination and democracy.



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...and which should be a policy of withdrawal from India
...to be retained in the partition of India

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3 - DEC 1950

Handwritten signatures and initials:
~~by G. Adams~~
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PRESS RELEASE

*cc Mr News; PRR
Gen'l Sec; Als Rindan*

FROM GERRY ADAMS MP
DATE 15 November 1990
SUBJECT ADAMS OFFERS TALKS

Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams MP in a considered response to Peter Brooke's detailed statement last week, in which he asserted that Britain has "no selfish, strategic, or economic interest in the North", has offered to talk to the British Secretary of State, "at any time and without any preconditions as an indication of our party's willingness to assist the process towards peace and justice in our country".

Mr Adams, responding to Peter Brooke's claim, implicit in his statement, that the British government is now politically neutral, has outlined Sinn Fein's willingness to test this proposition and has urged other Irish nationalist parties to join in the process of persuading the British to adopt Irish re-unification as a policy objective.

Mr Adams, in a wide ranging political response makes a number of specific points:

SUMMARY - MAIN POINTS

Republicans, and everyone else, must examine Mr Brooke's remarks carefully. Are they indeed a major shift in policy? Are they merely part of a clever propaganda exercise? Is there a change in emphasis? The answers to these questions may not emerge for some time. What is clear, however, is that Mr Brooke wants to be part of a public debate on the question of partition, and the claim of his government to ownership of a part of Ireland. Unfortunately, he wants such a debate on his own censored terms and he excludes the very people, (many of us with an Irish mandate which he lacks) to whom, we are told, he wishes to reach out. Those who will argue in support of Mr Brooke's position should remind him of this fact.

Partition was never submitted to the Irish people for ratification. Its imposition represented and continues to represent a fundamental denial of democracy - a denial to the Irish people of the freedom to exercise their rights to national self-determination.

The IRA has stated clearly on a number of occasions that for republicans, armed struggle is not a dogma. The IRA says that armed struggle is a method of political struggle adopted reluctantly and as a last resort in the absence of any viable alternative. For nationalists locked into a hostile and repressive sectarian state, systematically discriminated

against, denied their rights as citizens, their cultural identity and dignity, abandoned by the Dublin government, subservience or armed struggle become the only options. Political violence from all quarters stemming from the repressive and undemocratic nature of partition has been a feature of this state since its inception. The onus is on those who claim that there is an alternative to the IRA's armed struggle to prove that this is the case. Recent British claims that they are no longer politically committed to the union provide an opportunity for those who argue such a position to test its validity.

The right of the Irish people, as a whole, to self-determination is supported by universally recognised principles of international law.

On the basis of these principles Sinn Féin holds the realisation of the right of the Irish people to national self-determination as our primary political objective, and we identify its denial as the major source of conflict in this country today.

When a people are divided in political allegiance the democratic principle is that majority rights should prevail; the more so when such fundamentals as national rights are in question.

Sinn Féin recognises that unionists have democratic rights which not only can be upheld but must be upheld in an independent Ireland. That is a democratic norm.

Moreover we would argue that those democratic rights would be greatly strengthened in an independent Ireland.

The real problem can in no way be defined as one of forcing the Protestant population 'into' anything; the real problem is one of forcing Britain to get out - and to grant democratic self-determination to all the Irish people without reference to their religion.

The argument that the consent of this national minority elevated into a majority within an undemocratic, artificially created state, is necessary before any constitutional change can occur is a nonsense which the British have ignored when it suited them to do so. More significantly it ignores the moral argument that the state which resulted from the creation of this artificial minority was inherently oppressive and violent. It ignores the fact that the present constitutional arrangements based on this false premise of 'democratic consent' have led to decades of bloody war, and that all attempts to find a solution within these confines have failed. It ignores the reality in British and international law that the British Government, if it wishes,

can legislate itself out of Ireland and the Unionists into a new situation.

Sinn Féin seeks a new constitution of Ireland which would include written guarantees for those presently constituted as 'loyalists'.

We believe that consent can be obtained if the relevant parties and particularly the two governments concerned demonstrate the political will to achieve it.

As a first step both governments must establish Irish reunification as a policy objective. Will Peter Brooke advocate this? Will he advocate an end to the Union?

It is obviously desirable that everything reasonable should be done to obtain the consent of a majority in the North to the constitutional, political and financial steps necessary for bringing about the end of partition. This can best be achieved when the British Government has established Irish re-unification as a firm policy objective.

If, as Peter Brooke implies, the British Government is no longer bound by ideological or strategic considerations to the Union and the sole factor involved is Unionist consent, then then an opportunity to advance the situation clearly exists. Mr Brooke's claim to be that his government is politically neutral is contradicted by its pro-active defence of the Union and partition. But, nevertheless his claim is a challenging one which deserves to be tested. If the British position is indeed one of political neutrality then they are open to persuasion that they should shift the massive resources and energy presently being expended in defence of partition and in attempts to find a partitionist arrangement and direct them instead towards some alternative arrangements. Given that the present partitionist arrangements have abjectly failed to deliver peace or stability, and given that the British have claimed to be politically neutral, then they must be open to persuasion that peace and stability can be secured in the context of Irish re-unification. Sinn Féin is willing, without pre-conditions or rigidity to enter into immediate dialogue in this context. Peter Brooke in his 100 day statement accepted the inevitability of talks with Sinn Féin. We have a democratic mandate to represent the views of our electorate. Why then postpone the inevitable, more-so, when to do so perpetuates an unnecessary and bitter conflict.

But it is not only the responsibility of republicans to persuade the British of the logic of such a policy shift towards Irish national self-determination. Irish re-unification is the declared aim of all Irish political parties except the Unionists. It is therefore the duty of the representatives of Irish nationalism, north and south,

particularly those who condemn armed struggle, to concentrate their considerable resources into such a process of persuasion.

The fundamental republican and nationalist position has always been to get Britain to abandon its partitionist policy and adopt instead a policy of withdrawing from Ireland and handing over sovereignty to an all-Ireland government whose selection would be a democratic matter for the Irish people. This position is based on the principle of national self-determination and democracy.

There is a charge in emphasis? The answer to these questions may not emerge for some time, what is clear, however, is that Mr Brooke wants to be part of a public debate on the question of partition, and the claim of his government to ownership of a part of Ireland. Unfortunately, he wants such a debate on his own restricted terms and he excludes the very people, (many of us with an Irish mandate which he lacks) to whom, we are told, he wishes to reach out. Those who will argue in support of Mr Brooke's position should remind him of this fact.

Mr Brooke either hints or points clearly to some future talks with Sinn Fein. Whenever he has been asked by us in the past to spell out his scenario for such talks he has judged the issue. His refusal to talk to our party on the grounds stated by him, given his own involvement as head of the political wing of British army in Ireland is clearly untenable. His willingness to talk to other Irish parties, especially unionist delegations which include many inclines to violence, and other non-Unionist supporters of British army forces, expose his refusal to talk to Sinn Fein as a propagandist ploy aimed at our supporters.

His assertions of goodwill towards those we represent will be dismissed quite correctly by them as patronising propagandistic platitudes which bear no reality to the life they are forced to live under British rule. Sinn Fein's position on armed struggle is quite clear. We believe that Irish people have the right to use armed struggle in the context of seeking Irish independence and in the conditions of British occupation in the six counties. Whether Irish people wish to exercise that right is a matter for them, that is our opinion. It is also a matter of political reality and a fact of life. It will be so, unfortunately, until the conditions which create it are changed. Sinn Fein wishes to change those conditions. We want a total de militarisation of the situation and an end to armed conflict of all kinds in our country.

FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT FROM GERRY ADAMS MF

Since Peter Brooke was appointed by the British Prime Minister as the British minister responsible for the 6 counties he has made three major (and sometimes contradictory) statements in terms which are clearly aimed at Irish republicans. His last statement has been represented by sections of the media as a major shift in British policy. No doubt this point will also be made by the SOLP leadership at their party's conference this weekend.

Republicans, and everyone else, must examine Mr Brooke's remarks carefully. Are they indeed a major shift in policy? Are they merely part of a clever propaganda exercise? Is there a change in emphasis? The answers to these questions may not emerge for some time. What is clear, however, is that Mr Brooke wants to be part of a public debate on the question of partition, and the claim of his government to ownership of a part of Ireland. Unfortunately, he wants such a debate on his own censored terms and he excludes the very people, (many of us with an Irish mandate which he lacks) to whom, we are told, he wishes to reach out. Those who will argue in support of Mr Brooke's position should remind him of this fact.

Mr Brooke either hints or points clearly to some future talks with Sinn Fein. Whenever he has been asked by us in the past to spell out his scenario for such talks he has fudged the issue. His refusal to talk to our party on the grounds stated by him, given his own involvement as head of the political wing of British army in Ireland is clearly untenable. His willingness to talk to other Irish parties, especially unionists delegations which include many incitees to violence, and other non-Unionist supporters of British crown forces, expose his refusal to talk to Sinn Fein as a propaganda position against our supporters.

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In the meantime, some of the points contained in Peter Brooke's statement need to be challenged, for example, the question of partition.

Partition - a denial of democracy

Partition was never submitted to the Irish people for ratification. Its imposition represented and continues to represent a fundamental denial of democracy - a denial to the Irish people of the freedom to exercise their rights to national self-determination.

The pretext for partition - the wishes of a national minority to maintain British rule - holds no validity, morally or in international law, against the express wishes of the vast majority of the Irish people.

Partition perpetuates the British government's denial of the Irish people's right to self-determination. Because it is fundamentally undemocratic and repressive, partition perpetuates the cycle of oppression/ domination/ resistance/ oppression.

The anti-democratic nature of the 6 county state itself precludes any solution within its confines.

Partition, imposed by Britain against the wishes of the Irish people and through force of arms, was never intended to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict in this country.

It has not and cannot resolve the underlying causes of conflict in this country.

So it is that 67 years after the partition of Ireland the conflict and political instability remain as deep rooted as ever.

The effect, of partition was and is to erect a gerrymandered barrier against Irish re-unification in perpetuity. It flaunts all the accepted concepts of democracy. As such it is basically flawed. The inequities which the six-county state has spawned, and the political violence from the oppressed which they provoke, are the inevitable consequence of its very existence. Inequality and oppression, and the resulting resistance, are the price which has had to be paid for a state founded on a system of political, social and economic privilege.

Partition also effects the 26 county state. It effects all

of Ireland. It also effects the relationship between the people of Ireland and the people of Britain. These relationships can only be normalised in the context of Irish national self determination.

The IRA has stated clearly on a number of occasions that for republicans, armed struggle is not a dogma. The IRA says that armed struggle is a method of political struggle adopted reluctantly and as a last resort in the absence of any viable alternative. For nationalists locked into a hostile and repressive sectarian state, systematically discriminated against, denied their rights as citizens, their cultural identity and dignity, abandoned by the Dublin government, subservience or armed struggle become the only options. Political violence from all quarters stemming from the repressive and undemocratic nature of partition has been a feature of this state since its inception. The onus is on those who claim that there is an alternative to the IRA's armed struggle to prove that this is the case. Recent British claims that they are no longer politically committed to the union provide an opportunity for those who argue such a position to test its validity.

National Self-Determination

Self-determination is a nation's exercise of the political freedom to determine its own economic, social and cultural development, without external influence and without partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity.

Ireland today clearly does not meet those criteria nor does the pretext for partition hold good against those criteria.

In the words of Sean McBride, winner of the Nobel and Lenin Peace prizes:

"Ireland's right to sovereignty, independence and unity are inalienable and indefeasible. It is for the Irish people as a whole to determine the future status of Ireland. Neither Britain nor a small minority selected by Britain has any right to partition the ancient island of Ireland, nor to determine its future as a sovereign nation."

The right of the Irish people, as a whole, to self-determination is supported by universally recognised principles of international law.

On the basis of these principles Sinn Féin holds the realisation of the right of the Irish people to national self-determination as our primary political objective, and we identify its denial as the major source of conflict in this country today.

The people of Ireland have never been permitted to exercise their right to national self-determination. British government policy has consistently denied the exercise of that right to the Irish people. The British government veto - explicit in that policy and reiterated by Peter Brooke continues today.

British government policy has sustained a division of political allegiance in Ireland - the national allegiance of a clear majority and the unionist allegiance of a national minority.

British government policy - manifest in partition - upholds the unionist political allegiance of a national minority against the national and democratic rights of the majority.

When a people are divided in political allegiance the democratic principle is that majority rights should prevail; the more so when such fundamentals as national rights are in question.

It is the British government's refusal to recognise Irish national rights - nationhood, integrity of the national territory, national independence and sovereignty - which has caused the problem and maintains it.

The unionist veto, grafted by the British government onto its deliberate fracture of Irish national unity, has become the cornerstone of the British government's rationale for its continuing exercise of sovereignty over the six counties as the major reason for its continuing presence in Ireland.

Today's unionists represent some 20% of the Irish nation. They are a national minority; a significant minority but a minority nevertheless. To bestow the power of veto over national independence and sovereignty on a national minority is in direct contravention of the principle of self-determination.

Unionist Rights

Sinn Féin recognises that unionists have democratic rights which not only can be upheld but must be upheld in an independent Ireland. That is a democratic norm.

Moreover we would argue that those democratic rights would be greatly strengthened in an independent Ireland.

As Unionists have frequently pointed out, most emphatically since the signing of the Hillsborough Treaty, the British Government has, where it sees fit, chosen to ignore the wishes of the Unionist population. This concept of consent is one applied selectively, and rarely, by the British Government.

Because, under British rule, the political status of the six counties is exactly what the unionists say it is - an off-shore 'province' which is an integral part of the United Kingdom - its people cannot hope to have any significant say in the direction of their own affairs until they choose to exercise their influence within an all-Ireland system.

All argument which is based on a reference to the "wishes of the democratic majority" in the six counties is, therefore, based on a false premise, since it takes a stand in defence of something which they do not have anyway. And apart from its dependence on the illusion of self-determination, it tends - as all arguments based on false premises are wont to do - to lead in its practical application to contradiction and ambiguity".

Mechanistic democratic logic, applied rigidly to a situation such as that existing in the six counties, gets itself tied up in knots, basically because the problem is falsely presented from the start and because the real nature of the problem is over-looked.

The real problem can in no way be defined as one of forcing the Protestant population 'into' anything; the real problem is one of forcing Britain to get out - and to grant democratic self-determination to all the Irish people without reference to their religion. If that democratic assembly, the Westminster parliament, should decide that it was its democratic wish to withdraw from Ireland, there is no democratic reason why it should not do so", Peter Brooke knows this as well as I do.

The argument that the democratic wishes of the unionist population, a national minority, are paramount and that the concept of coercion is, in itself, undemocratic is fraught with similar contradictions, ignoring, not least, the fact that 500,000 nationalists were forcibly coerced into the 6 county state. Where is the principle of democratic consent for northern nationalists.

The argument that the consent of this national minority elevated into a majority within an undemocratic, artificially created state, is necessary before any constitutional change can occur is a nonsense which the British have ignored when it suited them to do so. More significantly it ignores the moral argument that the state which resulted from the creation of this artificial minority was inherently oppressive and violent. It ignores the fact that the present constitutional arrangements based on this false premise of 'democratic consent' have led to decades of bloody war, and that all attempts to find a solution within these confines have failed. It ignores the reality in British and international law that the British Government, if it wishes,

can legislate itself out of Ireland and the unionists into a new situation.

Sinn Féin has long accepted that Northern Protestants have fears about their civil and religious liberties and we have consistently insisted that these liberties must be guaranteed and protected. We offer unionists a settlement based on their uniting with the rest of the Irish people and ending sectarianism.

Sinn Féin seeks a new constitution of Ireland which would include written guarantees for those presently constituted as 'loyalists'.

Our search for peace has to rise above the consequences of imperialist rule if the post - partition independent Ireland is indeed to be based on the unity of catholic, protestant and dissenter. We have no desire to turn back the pages of history, or to dispossess the loyalists and foolishly attempt to reverse the Plantation. We seek a settlement based on their throwing in their lot with the rest of the Irish people and the end of sectarianism.

As a first step both governments must establish Irish reunification as a policy objective. Will Peter Brooke advocate that? Will he advocate an end to the Union?

It is obviously desirable that everything reasonable should be done to obtain the consent of a majority in the North to the constitutional, political and financial steps necessary for bringing about the end of partition. This can best be achieved when the British Government has established Irish re-unification as a policy objective.

If, as Peter Brooke implies, the British Government is no longer bound by ideological or strategic considerations to the Union and the sole factor involved is unionist consent, then an opportunity to advance the situation clearly exists. Mr Brooke's claim to be that his government is politically neutral is contradicted by its pro-active defence of the union and partition. But, nevertheless his claim is a challenging one which deserves to be tested. If the British position is indeed one of political neutrality then they are open to persuasion that they should shift the massive resources and energy presently being expended in defence of partition and in attempts to find a partitionist arrangement and direct them instead towards some alternative arrangements. Given that the present partitionist arrangements have utterly failed to deliver peace or stability, and given that the British have claimed to be politically neutral, then they must be open to persuasion that peace and stability can be secured in the context of Irish re-unification. Sinn Féin is willing, without pre-

British Neutrality?

The exercise of the right to national self-determination in practice involves, primarily, the acceptance of Irish national rights by the British government; in effect the ending of current British government policy and the removal of the veto that that government has arbitrarily imposed on the exercise by the Irish people of their national and democratic rights.

Without such a fundamental policy change by the British government it is difficult to conceive of unionists considering having to come to a consensus with nationalists. Indeed a guarantee of the maintenance of partition in perpetuity leaves unionists with no reason to seek a consensus. Within the context of such a policy change Sinn Féin believes that agreement between people of the nationalist and unionist traditions is not only desirable but achievable.

We believe that consent can be obtained if the relevant parties and particularly the two governments concerned demonstrate the political will to achieve it.

As a first step both governments must establish Irish reunification as a policy objective. Will Peter Brooke advocate this? Will he advocate an end to the Union?

It is obviously desirable that everything reasonable should be done to obtain the consent of a majority in the North to the constitutional, political and financial steps necessary for bringing about the end of partition. This can best be achieved when the British Government has established Irish re-unification as a firm policy objective.

If, as Peter Brooke implies, the British Government is no longer bound by ideological or strategic considerations to the Union and the sole factor involved is unionist consent, then then an opportunity to advance the situation clearly exists. Mr Brooke's claim to be that his government is politically neutral is contradicted by its pro-active defence of the union and partition. But, nevertheless his claim is a challenging one which deserves to be tested. If the British position is indeed one of political neutrality then they are open to persuasion that they should shift the massive resources and energy presently being expended in defence of partition and in attempts to find a partitionist arrangement and direct them instead towards some alternative arrangements. Given that the present partitionist arrangements have abjectly failed to deliver peace or stability, and given that the British have claimed to be politically neutral, then they must be open to persuasion that peace and stability can be secured in the context of Irish re-unification. Sinn Féin is willing, without pre-

conditions or rigidity to enter into immediate dialogue in this context. Peter Brooke in his 100 day statement accepted the inevitability of talks with Sinn Féin. We have a democratic mandate to represent the views of our electorate. Why then postpone the inevitable, more-so, when to do so perpetuates an unnecessary and bitter conflict.

But it is not only the responsibility of republicans to persuade the British of the logic of such a policy shift towards Irish national self-determination. Irish reunification is the declared aim of all Irish political parties except the unionists. It is therefore the duty of the representatives of Irish nationalism, north and south, particularly those who condemn armed struggle, to concentrate their considerable resources into such a process of persuasion.

Given British assertions of 'neutrality', the representatives of Irish nationalism, and in particular the Dublin Government and the SDLP, are duty bound to advance the argument that the best way to "see agreement among the people who share the island of Ireland" is for Britain to adopt a policy of ending the Union in the context of a United Ireland and they should then actively seek agreement among the people who share the island of Ireland on how this can be accomplished.

Once this is the British objective the strategy (or strategies) for achieving it should be a matter of formal agreement between the representatives of the Irish people and the British government. The search for such agreement must of course involve northern Protestants and every effort must be made to get their agreement and involvement in the constitutional, financial and political arrangements needed to replace partition. Furthermore, regardless of their attitude to such arrangements, their rights must be guaranteed in whatever arrangements emerge from such deliberations.

In other words once the above objective becomes British policy and while the democratic policy contained in it is continued throughout its implementation, there must be due provision for the rights of northern Protestants and every effort made to win their consent. By adopting such a policy the British would be joining the persuaders.

It is also the context in which republicans and democrats will judge Mr Brooke's remarks and the comments of those who attempt to build a case against Sinn Féin based upon his statements. Surely if Britain now has no self interest in being in Ireland as Mr Brooke claims the British government must have an open mind on the future of Ireland and be open to such a proposition. In this proposition we are restating the democratic position that neither the British or the unionists have a right to maintain partition and the

union . We would also assert that the consent of northern Protestants, like any other interest group, is desirable on the constitutional, financial and political arrangements needed to end partition. It is a responsibility of all Irish democrats to guarantee that all Irish people are treated equally.

The fundamental republican and nationalist position has always been to get Britain to abandon its partitionist policy and adopt instead a policy of withdrawing from Ireland and handing over sovereignty to an all-Ireland government whose selection would be a democratic matter for the Irish people. This position is based on the principle of national self-determination and democracy.

Sinn Féin file

M. Murphy

*Tasach
To see it.*

SECRET

15/11/92
13/11/92



13/11/92

Chaplains' Initiative on Paramilitary talks

In the light of recent developments, it might be useful to summarise the history of this initiative and provide an update on recent developments, based on my conversations over the weekend with Fr John Murphy, Catholic Chaplain in the Maze.

History:

In earlier reports I outlined in some detail how, over two years ago, Fr Murphy, along with his Church of Ireland colleague in the Maze, Rev Will Murphy, launched an initiative designed to facilitate the establishment of talks involving the paramilitaries on both sides of the divide. This initiative was based on the thesis that there will be no cessation of violence until such time as those actually engaged in the campaign of violence are involved in the search for a basis for peace in Northern Ireland.

The initiative was given the go-ahead by the Four Church Leaders at the time (the late Cardinal O'Fiaich, Archbishop Eames, Bishop Poyntz and Bishop Cahal Daly). That "go-ahead" was by way of a general endorsement of their effort - none of the church leaders have become involved in any of the detail of the discussions. [To a considerable extent, the support of the church leadership appears to have been based on two considerations - (1) the fact that the initiative was born in the Maze would help its status and credibility in paramilitary circles; and (2) the high regard in which both clergymen are held by their respective churches - it perhaps most notably in the case of Fr Murphy. He has been working in the Maze for the past 15 years, appears to have the respect of the republican movement, and has a track record in terms of his involvement in the hunger-strike negotiations - where his interlocutor on the British side was Sir John Blelloch, recently retired Permanent Under-Secretary of the NIO.]

The initiative began within the Maze over two years ago and involved both the IRA and the UVF. The initiative subsequently moved outside the prison. In the course of these discussions the UVF leadership made it clear that they saw their campaign as purely reactive -ie: a cessation of the IRA campaign would automatically result in a cessation of the UVF campaign. [The UDA have not become involved in the initiative at the (not unreasonable) insistence of the UVF who view the UDA as gangsters and totally infiltrated by the security services.] At first there was some involvement with the Sinn Fein leadership, following which the matter was handed over by Sinn Fein to the Army Council of the IRA.

Developments - April/May 1990:

Following a number of discussions with the IRA leadership, both Chaplains reported to the Church Leaders in April of this year that the IRA were willing to seek an alternative to the campaign

of violence and, with this objective in mind, were prepared to enter exploratory discussions with the British Government. These discussions could be either private or public and, if judged meaningful by the IRA, could lead to some form of cease-fire or laying down of arms. The Chaplains were convinced of the sincerity of their interlocutors in this matter. While there was no definition of what the IRA might judge as "meaningful", in the Chaplains' view, some sort of formulation outlining Britain's limited and conditional commitment to the maintenance of the Union; coupled with some agreement on the withdrawal of troops from the streets; along with some sort of programme of releases/amnesty; might help to induce a change of direction on the part of the republican movement away from the campaign of violence.

As a result of this development, both Cardinal O' Fiaich and Archbishop Eames had a meeting with the Secretary of State on 1 May 1990 where they informed him of the IRA's position. At that meeting, the Secretary of State was apparently taken aback; expressed interest in the initiative; and expressed his anxiety that information on the initiative be kept absolutely quiet for the moment (possibly because of the initiative involving the constitutional parties - then at a critical stage).

Developments - September 1990:

The sudden death shortly thereafter of Cardinal O' Fiaich inhibited further development of the initiative. In that context, both Chaplains became progressively more sceptical as to whether Archbishop Eames was really supportive of their efforts. [Fr Murphy recently commented that Eames had probably initially given his endorsement to the initiative on the basis that it would get nowhere. Now that it showed some possibilities, he felt that Eames probably saw major difficulties in selling anything which might emerge from this process to his own community.] Growing frustration with Archbishop Eames' inertia led Bishop Cahal Daly to take action himself by seeking a meeting with the Secretary of State in September. At that meeting, Brooke again expressed interest in the initiative and scheduled a further and more detailed meeting involving Bishop Daly, Sir John Blelloch and the then head of the Political Affairs Department of the NIO (John McConnell).

Recent Developments:

Since then there have been further contacts with the IRA who have expressed continuing interest in talks with the British - either in public or in private and assured the Chaplains that "they would not be found wanting" in any such talks process. At the same time the IRA have cautioned the Chaplains to ignore statements from Sinn Fein which they implied were purely for public consumption.

Bishop Cahal Daly was in Rome for much of October and Fr Murphy had been keeping him informed of developments during that period. However, in the face of a growing reluctance on the part of the Church of Ireland leadership (Eames apparently was quite firm in telling them both not to get involved in negotiations) and the

concern which this engendered for both Chaplains that the NIO were not being told the full story, and in the absence of Bishop Cahal Daly in Rome, the Chaplains decided "to take the bull by the horns" and sought a face-to-face meeting with Sir John Blelloch at the end of last month. That meeting, which lasted some hours, involved Blelloch and the new head of the Political Affairs Department of the NIO (Danny McNeill).


Since that meeting, the Chaplains have received positive signals which appear to indicate a heightened interest in the initiative on the part of the British -viz-

- McNeill sought out the Chaplains at a recent routine lunch meeting devoted to Prison issues. After the meeting, McNeill asked both of them to stay back. He told them (a) that the original approaches by the church leaders had been fully understood; (b) that they must understand that they (the British) would have to go public on this - something which at the time worried both Chaplains but which they now see as a reference to the Secretary of State's speech; (c) that the idea that any talks would be private would be "palatable" from their point of view; (d) emphasised that "you will have to move at our speed".
- The previous day (9 November) the Prison Service held its annual Remembrance Day Service at the Training Centre in Millisle. Fr Murphy studiously avoids such occasions and did so again this year. Traditionally, Ministers rarely attend the Service. However, on this occasion, John Cope attended and apparently "made a bee-line for Rev Will Murphy" and asked whether Fr Murphy was present. The occasion was a public one and when asked by Cope how his work was progressing, Rev Murphy replied that "he was still working for peace", to which Cope responded that "we are very very happy with what you (plural) are doing".

Future Developments:

Both Chaplains were delighted with Brooke's speech on 9 November which they see as reflecting much of the language of their discussions to date. The next stage is that the New Permanent Secretary of the NIO (Chillcot) along with Danny McNeill are to meet Bishop Cahal Daly tomorrow (13 November). Following that meeting, both Chillcot and McNeill will meet with the Chaplains.

Fr Murphy agreed to keep in close touch on developments over the coming weeks.


Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
12 November 1990

cc A/Sec Gallagher; R. Murphy

cc PST, PSM; Mr Nally, PPS, Mr Anderson

Secret

Henry

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Discussion with John Hume

Hume-Adams Contacts

1. Hume, who asked to see me last week, said he had been approached a few days beforehand by Fr. Alex Reid, the Clonard Monastery priest who acts as an intermediary between Adams and Hume. Reid, who argued that Adams was genuinely interested in seeking a political alternative to violence, handed Hume a text (Annex A) which, he said, had been approved by Adams. The document, in summary, proposes the establishment of an "Irish Peace Convention" with the objective of agreeing a political and diplomatic strategy to persuade the British and the Unionists of the merits of a "new and independent Ireland".
2. According to Reid, Adams envisaged Hume and himself entering into a binding personal pact, with Hume agreeing to work for the establishment of a "Peace Convention" along the lines outlined in the document and Adams, for his part, committing himself to securing a cessation of violence. If agreement was reached and a Conference was called for a specific date, the IRA would be prepared to announce a cessation of violence in advance of this date. However, Reid added that he was unsure if the IRA would be prepared to trust Dublin and agree formally to such a cessation without hearing directly (though of course privately) from them.
3. Reid also made the point that the Adams' text was very much along the lines of the Fr. Reid and Fr. Raymond Murray document entitled "A Pastoral Response to the Present Conflict", which had been drawn up late last year (see Annex B); it will be recalled that the Reid/Murray initiative had been endorsed by the late Cardinal O Fiaich.

Related developments

4. Hume was also approached recently by a prominent Derry businessman, and SDLP supporter (Brendan Duddy), with what Duddy claimed was a document which had been agreed by the IRA Army Council. (Duddy was used by the IRA as an intermediary to Hume twice in the past, once when the ceasefire in the 1970s was mooted and, secondly, when he drove Hume part of the way to a secret meeting with the IRA. Any approach from him has therefore, in Hume's view, to be taken seriously).
5. Duddy did not leave a copy of his document with Hume. However, Hume's recollection is that - like the Adams' text - it envisaged a Conference being called by the Taoiseach in the knowledge that a date for a cessation of violence would be announced by the IRA in advance of the Conference. The document also foresaw a common nationalist strategy being worked out in the Conference and subsequently presented to European Community leaders. In this regard, the text was couched in language which emphasised Ireland's place and role in Europe, and the fact that Irish people had always been European in outlook. The thinking here seemed to be that the British could be pressurised into responding positively to nationalist objectives through an effective campaign waged in a European context.
6. Duddy went on to express great concern to Hume that, if the present feelers from the IRA were left unanswered, the violence in the North could continue for another twenty years - and would in this period plunge new depths of horror. There was, in his view, some hope of ending the campaign while Adams and people of his age group were in charge. He was deeply worried and frightened, however, by the attitude of the huge mass of young (i.e. under thirty-five) alienated, unemployed Catholics. If they took over at

some stage, then even more extreme action was possible - including, if they thought it helpful to their strategy, the shooting of nationalist politicians in the street. (Note: While Duddy's scenario may not be entirely unrealistic, it is possible that there was also an element of putting pressure on Hume).

Chaplains' Initiative

7. In addition to the above, it is important to recall that there is also an on-going effort by the Catholic and Church of Ireland Chaplains in the Maze to move the IRA away from their present campaign. This effort had the strong support of the late Cardinal; it was also raised by Dr. Cahal Daly when we met on the 26th July last (the relevant extract from the report of our conversation is at Annex C). On that occasion, Dr. Daly said that, while he recognised the "immense moral dilemma" of any contact with Sinn Fein and the IRA, it would be regrettable if the present feelers from that quarter - which he saw as a considerable movement forward from previous positions - were left unanswered.

Comment

8. Overall, the above three developments seem indicative of a willingness on the part of Adams and the Provisional leadership to move towards a political approach. While the language of the Adams' text is undoubtedly "provisional" in tone, it appears to mark a move away from the setting of rigid pre-conditions for a cessation of violence. In this regard, and while the Peace Convention would have specific and strongly nationalist policy objectives, these relate to the persuading of the British Government and the Unionists to agree to the creation of "a new and independent Ireland" rather than, as in the past, to a simple declaration by the

British of their intention to leave Ireland by a specific date.

9. At the same time, it is essential that the Provisional position and proposals - and in particular their status - be fully clarified before consideration could be given here to any possible response. The question has to be asked, for instance, whether Adams (assuming he is himself as fully committed to this initiative as Reid says he is) is capable of carrying the military wing of the Provisionals with him. The required clarification might best be done through those already involved, in particular Hume (but possibly also using the good offices of Dr. Daly).
10. There are inevitably clear dangers in any decision to go down this road. The "moral dilemma" mentioned by Dr. Daly is obviously a factor; additionally, if knowledge of the matter were to become public at any stage (and one could not exclude that the Provisionals might at some point leak it for their own benefit), allegations that the Government were dealing - even at some remove - with Sinn Fein and the IRA would undoubtedly be controversial, though the active endorsement of Hume (and possibly Dr. Daly) would clearly attenuate this. As to the substance, even if it were possible to get the proposed Convention underway on agreed terms, one must be sceptical that any recommendations emerging would be saleable to Unionists. In such circumstances, there is clearly a distinct risk that the IRA would return to its campaign of violence and, in the process, possibly claim the Convention recommendations as a moral underpinning for its campaign.
11. On the other hand, it can be argued that the possibility of achieving a cessation of violence is a sufficiently important objective to justify taking a degree of risk. There is little doubt but that the Provisionals seem to have

the capacity to continue almost indefinitely; in addition, any talks on the basis of the present Brooke approach, with its underlying and strong emphasis on devolution, is probably likely if anything to provoke the Provisionals into greater activity. (Of course, a real and open dialogue between Unionists and the Government would create a very different dynamic but this, given in particular the attitude of the present Unionist leadership, seems unlikely at present).

12. The British reaction to these approaches is extremely interesting. At an earlier stage, their main concern appeared to be that any outreach to Sinn Fein/IRA might cut across the Brooke initiative. Currently, however - perhaps reflecting reduced expectations for the Brooke initiative, or possibly indicative of a changed atmosphere due to Chilcot's influence - they appear to be showing tentative signs of interest. Last week's major speech by Peter Brooke was clearly directed primarily at Sinn Fein; this week Chilcot is meeting Bishop Daly and, subsequently, the Maze Chaplains (see report from Mr. McMahon being circulated separately). In these circumstances, if we were to decide to go some way in the direction being proposed by Sinn Fein, we should probably be open with the British about any such decision.
13. Overall, therefore, while the present signals from Sinn Fein would need to be treated with extreme caution, it would seem inadvisable to dismiss them out of hand. An early meeting at political level with Hume would seem desirable; the objective at this stage, while exposing the Government to the minimum possible risk, would be to help clarify the status of the Adams approach and allow the potential for taking the process further to be assessed adequately.

DAG
Dermot Gallagher,
13 November, 1990.

A.

3. To seek the active support and encouragement of the British Government
The Irish Government would agree to organise a formally constituted Irish Peace Convention, which would formulate and advise on the implementation of a political and diplomatic strategy for justice and peace in accordance with the following policy objectives.

6.1 The policy objectives set out above, would form the basis of an overall political and diplomatic strategy for justice and peace. In combination with the Convention, the Irish Government, without prejudice to the continuing exercise of its normal responsibilities,
1. To persuade the British Government, in the best interests of the people of Ireland and the people of Britain, and in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, to adopt a policy to allow for the creation of a new and independent Ireland.

6.2 This Irish Peace Convention would have:
2. To persuade the British Government that the 1920 arrangements have failed and, with the Irish Government, to call a Constitutional Peace Conference representative of all the people of Ireland which, in accordance with the principles of national self-determination, would decide the constitutional, political, social and economic future of the people of Ireland.

b. Without prejudice to the rights and functions of Dail Eireann and the Oireachtas under the Constitution.
3. To persuade the British Government, that, in accordance with the policy for the creation of a new, independent Ireland, they should plan for a democratic and peaceful disengagement from Ireland over a determinate period of time, the procedures which would govern debate and decision making within the Convention.

4. To persuade the people of the Unionist tradition that their participation in and consent to the creation of a new and independent Ireland would best serve their own fundamental interests, the fundamental interests of the people of the Nationalist tradition and of the people of Britain and the general interests of justice and peace in Ireland.
7. economic freedom of the Irish people and so provide a secure future and increased prosperity for everyone.

B.
5. To seek the active support and encouragement of the British Government for 4 above.

6.1 The policy objectives set out above, would form the basis of an overall political and diplomatic strategy for justice and peace. In combination with the Convention, the Irish Government, without prejudice to the continuing exercise of its normal responsibilities, would actively promote through its executive organs and representatives any agreed strategy and seek effective support for it from the Irish abroad and from the wider international community.

FOR

6.2 This Irish Peace Convention would be:-

A DEMOCRATIC OVER-ALL POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

a. Truly and democratically representative of all the people of Ireland as a whole.

FOR

b. Without prejudice to the rights and functions of Dail Eireann and the Oireachtas under the Constitution.

JUSTICE, PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
c. Formally constituted by agreement between the parties with a foundation-charter based on the Proclamation of 1916 which would define and set out its policy objectives, the methods for implementing them and the procedures which would govern debate and decision making within the Convention.

7. In keeping with the social and economic principles of the 1916 Proclamation, it would also be the function of the Convention to consult on the formation and implementation of policies, relating to the island as a whole, which would promote the social and economic freedom of the Irish people and so provide a secure future and increased prosperity for everyone.

B,

PROPOSAL

FOR

A DEMOCRATIC OVER-ALL POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

FOR

JUSTICE, PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

A PASTORAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The Conflict in Northern Ireland

The daily, tragic consequences of the conflict in Northern Ireland - bloodshed, imprisonment, widespread suffering and general despair of any just and democratic solution - are a constant source of anguish to the Christian heart and demand a compassionate and effective response from it.

It is the responsibility, therefore, of every Christian but particularly of Christian leaders to do everything possible to end this inhuman situation by seeking to channel the course of events away from the road of armed and violent confrontation which is strewn with death and destruction and on to the road of political communication and dialogue which is marked out by the principles of justice and charity and characterised by the democratic use of political and diplomatic persuasion.

We must begin by lifting our eyes to a vision of the peace we want to create and that, in general, can only be a new political situation where the people of Ireland in their nationalist and unionist traditions are living together in friendship and mutual co-operation for the common good of all and where the people of Ireland and the people of Britain are living together in the same way.

How to make this vision a reality is, therefore, the great question on which all our peace-making energies and abilities must focus. For those who believe in the Christian message of justice and love, there can be only one way to do this and that is the way which begins from the fact that people are people, God's sons and daughters, before they are Irish, British, Nationalist, Unionist or Republican. This means that the principles of peace are essentially the principles which respect and correspond to the human dignity and the human rights of all the people who are involved in the present conflict.

This, in turn, means that the principles by which it must be resolved are the principles of political and democratic justice as they are understood and practised throughout the world and as they pertain to the particular nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Rooted in the God-given dignity of the human person, these principles define "the narrow road" which leads to political salvation. Any road defined by policies which lack the respect that is due to the dignity and the rights of people must, therefore, be seen as "the broad road" which leads to political destruction. Here, those who believe in the Lord Jesus, must be prepared, like His first followers, to leave "all things", all their partizan and sectarian political attitudes, and follow Him down the road of democratic justice and charity to whatever political destination it may lead.

The Church and the Dialogue of Peace

The Response of the Church

It follows, then, that when a conflict like the one in Northern Ireland has since some of the issues at stake in the present conflict pertain to the dignity of the human person and to his or her rights as a child of God and as a citizen in society, they also, by that very fact and for that very reason, pertain to the saving mission of the Church. This means that, in fulfilment of this mission, the Church must, through her representatives and ministers, and intervene directly in this conflict to preach the Word of God as it applies to it and to witness to those eternal Gospel values which define, uphold and protect the dignity and the rights of the person.

It is also her mission, in face of this conflict, to preach the message of hope and courage by pointing continually to the Lord Himself as the Saviour who is always "in the midst" with the power that can resolve every conflict and the compassion that encompasses every participant, including those who inflict injustice as well as those who are afflicted by it.

These guide-lines for the pastoral role of the Church in a situation of The Church, then, has a pastoral duty to respond to a political situation when (but only when) moral and humanitarian issues are at stake. Political matters, as such, which belong to the sphere of democratic opinion and choice are not her business and she has no role, from her mission, to play in them except to insist that, in all matters, the first role must be given to God-like compassion for people because it is the supreme value in human affairs and the first principle of all human relationships including those of politics.

Translated into practice, this means that the only Christian and human way to conduct political affairs and to resolve the conflicts that arise from them is the way of communication and dialogue, practised by every participant, with the respect and the compassion that are due in justice and charity to every other participant.

As a process of listening and responding to what is humanly true and just in the position of every participant, political dialogue in this sense takes as its base the common humanity of all the participants and makes it the common ground where all can meet in harmony of principle to seek and to find the common good of all and, when necessary, to resolve political conflicts justly and democratically.

Given that this kind of dialogue is the Christian and the human way to conduct political affairs and to resolve political conflicts, the Church has a pastoral responsibility to use her resources, her influence and her lines of communication to encourage, promote and, when necessary, even to facilitate it.

The Church and the Dialogue of Peace

It follows, then, that when a conflict like the one in Northern Ireland has become violent and is causing suffering and bloodshed, the Church has a missionary and pastoral duty to intervene directly and to do all she can to bring its violent dimensions and their tragic consequences to an end. Here her role may be to facilitate the necessary dialogue between the relevant parties especially when all lines of communication between them have broken down and the tragic dimensions of the conflict cannot and will not be ended unless and until they are restored. She must then use her political neutrality, her moral credibility and her own lines of communication to provide the kind of sanctuary setting where the parties to the conflict, who sincerely wish to use political and democratic methods to achieve justice and peace, can meet together for the necessary dialogue without damaging their own political or moral credibility and without compromising or appearing to compromise any of their own political or democratic principles.

These guide-lines for the pastoral role of the Church in a situation of political conflict are given here because they explain the background and introduce the purpose of the pastoral intervention represented by the proposal for "a democratic over-all political and diplomatic strategy for justice, peace and reconciliation" which follows.

Such a strategy which has already taken place, particularly between the SDLP and Sinn Fein. It is not an original proposal, therefore, but one which dialogue and the agreements which, in general at least, emerged from it.

A Pastoral Offer

A careful consideration of present opportunities for ending this conflict suggests that an agreement in principle on a political and diplomatic strategy for justice, peace and reconciliation between the Irish Government and the two main parties on the nationalist side in Northern Ireland, namely, the SDLP and Sinn Fein, could lead to a real break-through in the search for a just and democratic settlement. It is clear, however, to those who believe this that, on the one hand, such an agreement could not be made without the kind of political dialogue already described and, on the other, that, under present circumstances, such dialogue would not take place between the relevant parties unless special arrangements were made to facilitate it.

Given this view of the present prospects for peace, the pastors concerned believe they have a missionary and moral duty to intervene directly by suggesting to the parties concerned that a common strategy would help the cause of peace and by offering to facilitate the dialogue that would be necessary to organise it.

THE PROPOSAL

A Pastoral Request

Their only interest in all this is to save life and to protect people from suffering. They are intervening, therefore, on behalf of all those people who, because of the continuing conflict, will be killed, maimed or imprisoned and all those families who will be shattered as a result over the coming weeks and months.

They could not, however, fulfil this saving mission without the co-operation of all the parties concerned and so they have decided to ask each party for its co-operation. By making this request, they are, in fact, asking the parties to facilitate the Church by helping her to carry out her pastoral responsibilities in the present conflict. More, indeed, than that, they are, through this request, inviting each party to take an active part and to play its own role in the Church's own mission for justice, peace and reconciliation.

A Democratic Overall Political and Diplomatic Strategy for Justice and Peace

The following proposal for a democratic overall political and diplomatic strategy for justice, peace and reconciliation is based on the dialogue about such a strategy which has already taken place, particularly between the SDLP and Sinn Fein. It is not an original proposal, therefore, but one which reflects that dialogue and the agreements which, in general at least, emerged from it.

1. To persuade the people of the Unionist tradition that their consent to and their participation in the creation of a new and independent Ireland, in which their rights would be fully guaranteed, would best serve their own fundamental, long-term interests and the interests of the people of Britain, and would provide the best basis for lasting peace.
2. To seek the active support and encouragement of the British Government for No. 1 above so that they would use their influence and resources to persuade the people of the Unionist tradition that they would best serve their own fundamental and long-term interests by coming together with the people of the Nationalist tradition to build a new Ireland in which traditional diversity would be accommodated and where there would be a new relationship with Britain.
3. To persuade the British Government that, in accordance with the policy (as outlined in No. 1 above) for the creation of a new and independent Ireland based on the principle of national self-determination and the principle of democratic consent, they should plan for a democratic and peaceful withdrawal from Ireland over a determinate period of time.

THE PROPOSAL

6. In keeping with the social and economic principles of the 1916 Proclamation, it would also be the function of the Convention to consult on the formation and implementation of policies, relating to the island as a whole, which

At the request of the elected representatives of the Nationalist community, the Irish Government would agree to organise a formally constituted Irish Peace Convention. The Convention would consult on the formulation and implementation of a political and diplomatic strategy to achieve justice, peace and reconciliation in accordance with the following policy objectives:-

1. To persuade the British Government, in the best interests of the people of Ireland and the people of Britain and in accordance with the principles of national self-determination and democratic consent, to adopt a policy to encourage or allow for the creation of a new and independent Ireland, based on agreement between the people of the Nationalist and Unionist traditions and on friendship and co-operation between the people of Ireland and the people of Britain.
2. To persuade the British Government that the 1920 arrangements have failed and to facilitate the coming together of the people of Ireland of both traditions to determine their own future by calling, as and when appropriate and jointly with the Irish Government, a Constitutional Peace Conference representative of all the people of Ireland to enable them to decide their own future in agreement and peace; and, then to support by legislation any agreement reached between them.
3. To persuade the people of the Unionist tradition that their consent to and their participation in the creation of a new and independent Ireland, in which their rights would be fully guaranteed, would best serve their own fundamental, long-term interests and the interests of the people of Britain, and would provide the best basis for lasting peace.
4. To seek the active support and encouragement of the British Government for No. 3 above so that they would use their influence and resources to persuade the people of the Unionist tradition that they would best serve their own fundamental and long-term interests by coming together with the people of the Nationalist tradition to build a new Ireland in which traditional diversity would be accommodated and where there would be a new relationship with Britain.
5. To persuade the British Government that, in accordance with the policy (as outlined in No.1 above) for the creation of a new and independent Ireland based on the principle of national self-determination and the principle of democratic consent, they should plan for a democratic and peaceful withdrawal from Ireland over a determinate period of time.

6. In keeping with the social and economic principles of the 1916 Proclamation, it would also be the function of the Convention to consult on the formation and implementation of policies, relating to the island as a whole, which would promote the social and economic progress of the Irish people and so provide a secure future and increased prosperity for everyone.
7. The policy objectives set out above would form the basis of an over-all political and diplomatic strategy for justice, peace and reconciliation. In combination with the Convention, the Irish Government, without prejudice to the continuing exercise of its normal responsibilities, would actively promote, through its executive organs and representatives, any agreed strategy and seek effective support for it from the Irish abroad and from the wider international community.
8. This Irish Peace Convention would be:-
 - a. Open to the democratic representatives of all the people of Ireland.
 - b. Without prejudice to the duties and functions of Dail Eireann, the Oireachtas and the Government under the Constitution, and to Ireland's existing international obligations.
 - c. Formally constituted by agreement between the parties to it with a foundation-charter based on the democratic principles of the 1916 Proclamation and in keeping with the true Republican vision of an Ireland embracing all Irish men and women, irrespective of their history, traditions and beliefs. This foundation-charter would define and set out its policy objectives, the methods for implementing them and the procedures which would govern debate and decision-making within the Convention.

Given, then, that the kind of strategy for justice and peace proposed above would become available to the national and republican people of Ireland should the people of the Republican Movement decide to end their military campaign, a new and compelling moral reason for doing so comes into focus and must be faced and acknowledged with the kind of courage, tenacity and determination which history shows are native to the spirit of real and living Republicanism. The trust, therefore, must be that, under the inspiration of this spirit, the people of the Republican Movement will give a positive and co-operative response to this proposal.

- 7 -

7. Other issues mentioned by the Bishop included the efforts of the Catholic and Church of Ireland Chaplains in the Maze to move the paramilitaries away from violence. This initiative

This strategy is proposed as a credible and realistic way forward to a new, just and independent Ireland on the grounds that it would have the support of the vast majority of the people of the nationalist community and be powered by all the political and diplomatic forces at the disposal of the Irish Government. As a strategy for justice and peace, supported and powered in this way, it could, in operation, mobilise for the achievement of common objects, the greatest resource that Ireland possesses, namely, the talent and energy, the ingenuity and vision of the Irish people themselves.

By its very nature, therefore, the kind of strategy proposed above would have an inherent capacity for achieving the traditional aims of nationalism and republicanism in Ireland which would be far greater and far more efficacious than any now available. For this reason, it is proposed, in particular, to those who still believe that they must take up arms to resist political injustice in Ireland and to forward the traditional and just cause of Irish republicanism.

It is also proposed to them because it is clear that, not only the operation but even the very existence of a common, nationalist strategy for justice and peace will depend on whether or not it has been accepted in common and is being supported in common by every significant section of the nationalist community and this, given their powerful and unyielding commitment to Republican ideals, must include the people of the Republican Movement. In other words, not only the operation but the very existence of the proposed strategy depends on whether or not it is accepted as 'an alternative to arms'.

It must also be said that the continuing use of arms in the pursuit of nationalist aims is, as every day makes clear, also continuing to divide the nationalist people fundamentally among themselves and, therefore, against themselves and the achievement of these aims. This means that, without the co-operation of the people of the Republican Movement, the people of the nationalist community, as a whole, will not have the kind of political unity and cohesion among themselves which alone can give them the political strength and sense of purpose they will always need if they are to pursue the cause of Irish dignity and independence efficaciously and with the courage that can never be daunted. Nil neart gan cur le cheile.

Given, then, that the kind of strategy for justice and peace proposed above would become available to the national and republican people of Ireland should the people of the Republican Movement decide to end their military campaign, a new and compelling moral reason for doing so comes into sharp focus and must be faced and acknowledged with the kind of courage, honesty and compassion which history shows are native to the spirit of real and living Republicanism. The trust, therefore, must be that, under the inspiration of this spirit, the people of the Republican Movement will give a positive and co-operative response to this proposal.

10. Bishop Daly went on to say that, while he recognised the "immense moral dilemma" of any contact with Sinn Féin and the IRA, it would be regrettable if the present feelers from this quarter were left unanswered. He did not know, however, how to take the issue further at this stage.

7. Other issues mentioned by the Bishop included the efforts of the Catholic and Church of Ireland Chaplains in the Maze to move the paramilitaries away from violence. This initiative started with talks between the IRA and the UVF in the Maze but has since moved on (as reported by Mr. McMahon) to meetings between the Chaplains and, initially, Sinn Féin and, more recently, a group which included both Sinn Féin personnel and members of the IRA Army Council.
8. At the last such meeting, the Army Council personnel said that they would be prepared to consider a cease-fire in return for a guarantee of "meaningful talks" with the British, either at political or civil service level. Bishop Daly saw this as a considerable movement forward from previous positions which demanded "declarations of intent", etc. In putting forward their proposal, the IRA leaders said it reflected no weakness in equipment or personnel - in fact the direct opposite was the case - but was an effort on their part to contribute to the peace process.
9. In the light of this development, it was decided that the Cardinal and Archbishop Eames should approach the Secretary of State and convey the proposal directly to him. This was done a few days before the Cardinal left for Lourdes. As a result of the Cardinal's death, the only report on what occurred at this meeting came from Archbishop Eames and he was "not to be trusted in any way". According to Eames, Brooke said he would reflect on the development but gave the impression that any encouragement or response on his part might be unhelpful to the present talks initiative. Eames said the British also wondered if the names of the Army Council personnel might be conveyed to them in order to help authenticate the proposal; Daly thought this an appalling reflection on the credibility of the Chaplains as well as having possible safety implications for both the Chaplains and their contacts.
10. Bishop Daly went on to say that, while he recognised the "immense moral dilemma" of any contact with Sinn Féin and the IRA, it would be regrettable if the present feelers from this quarter were left unanswered. He did not know, however, how to take the issue further at this stage.

SECRET

Chaplains' Initiative on Paramilitary talks

In the light of recent developments, it might be useful to summarise the history of this initiative and provide an update on recent developments, based on my conversations over the weekend with Fr John Murphy, Catholic Chaplain in the Maze.

History:

In earlier reports I outlined in some detail how, over two years ago, Fr Murphy, along with his Church of Ireland colleague in the Maze, Rev Will Murphy, launched an initiative designed to facilitate the establishment of talks involving the paramilitaries on both sides of the divide. This initiative was based on the thesis that there will be no cessation of violence until such time as those actually engaged in the campaign of violence are involved in the search for a basis for peace in Northern Ireland.

The initiative was given the go-ahead by the Four Church Leaders at the time (the late Cardinal O'Fiaich, Archbishop Eames, Bishop Poyntz and Bishop Cahal Daly). That "go-ahead" was by way of a general endorsement of their effort - none of the church leaders have become involved in any of the detail of the discussions. [To a considerable extent, the support of the church leadership appears to have been based on two considerations - (1) the fact that the initiative was born in the Maze would help its status and credibility in paramilitary circles; and (2) the high regard in which both clergymen are held by their respective churches - perhaps most notably in the case of Fr Murphy. He has been working in the Maze for the past 15 years, appears to have the respect of the republican movement, and has a track record in terms of his involvement in the hunger-strike negotiations - where his interlocutor on the British side was Sir John Blelloch, recently retired Permanent Under-Secretary of the NIO.]

The initiative began within the Maze over two years ago and involved both the IRA and the UVF. The initiative subsequently moved outside the prison. In the course of these discussions the UVF leadership made it clear that they saw their campaign as purely reactive -ie: a cessation of the IRA campaign would automatically result in a cessation of the UVF campaign. [The UDA have not become involved in the initiative at the (not unreasonable) insistence of the UVF who view the UDA as gangsters and totally infiltrated by the security services.] At first there was some involvement with the Sinn Fein leadership, following which the matter was handed over by Sinn Fein to the Army Council of the IRA.

Developments - April/May 1990:

Following a number of discussions with the IRA leadership, both Chaplains reported to the Church Leaders in April of this year that the IRA were willing to seek an alternative to the campaign

of violence and, with this objective in mind, were prepared to enter exploratory discussions with the British Government. These discussions could be either private or public and, if judged meaningful by the IRA, could lead to some form of cease-fire or laying down of arms. The Chaplains were convinced of the sincerity of their interlocutors in this matter. While there was no definition of what the IRA might judge as "meaningful", in the Chaplains' view, some sort of formulation outlining Britain's limited and conditional commitment to the maintenance of the Union; coupled with some agreement on the withdrawal of troops from the streets; along with some sort of programme of releases/amnesty; might help to induce a change of direction on the part of the republican movement away from the campaign of violence.

As a result of this development, both Cardinal O' Fiaich and Archbishop Eames had a meeting with the Secretary of State on 1 May 1990 where they informed him of the IRA's position. At that meeting, the Secretary of State was apparently taken aback; expressed interest in the initiative; and expressed his anxiety that information on the initiative be kept absolutely quiet for the moment (possibly because of the initiative involving the constitutional parties - then at a critical stage).

Developments - September 1990:

The sudden death shortly thereafter of Cardinal O' Fiaich inhibited further development of the initiative. In that context, both Chaplains became progressively more sceptical as to whether Archbishop Eames was really supportive of their efforts. [Fr Murphy recently commented that Eames had probably initially given his endorsement to the initiative on the basis that it would get nowhere. Now that it showed some possibilities, he felt that Eames probably saw major difficulties in selling anything which might emerge from this process to his own community.] Growing frustration with Archbishop Eames' inertia led Bishop Cahal Daly to take action himself by seeking a meeting with the Secretary of State in September. At that meeting, Brooke again expressed interest in the initiative and scheduled a further and more detailed meeting involving Bishop Daly, Sir John Blelloch and the then head of the Political Affairs Department of the NIO (John McConnell).

Recent Developments:

Since then there have been further contacts with the IRA who have expressed continuing interest in talks with the British - either in public or in private and assured the Chaplains that "they would not be found wanting" in any such talks process. At the same time the IRA have cautioned the Chaplains to ignore statements from Sinn Fein which they implied were purely for public consumption.

Bishop Cahal Daly was in Rome for much of October and Fr Murphy had been keeping him informed of developments during that period. However, in the face of a growing reluctance on the part of the Church of Ireland leadership (Eames apparently was quite firm in telling them both not to get involved in negotiations) and the

concern which this engendered for both Chaplains that the NIO were not being told the full story, and in the absence of Bishop Cahal Daly in Rome, the Chaplains decided "to take the bull by the horns" and sought a face-to-face meeting with Sir John Blelloch at the end of last month. That meeting, which lasted some hours, involved Blelloch and the new head of the Political Affairs Department of the NIO (Danny McNeill).

Since that meeting, the Chaplains have received positive signals which appear to indicate a heightened interest in the initiative on the part of the British -viz-

- N.B. //
- McNeill sought out the Chaplains at a recent routine lunch meeting devoted to Prison issues. After the meeting, McNeill asked both of them to stay back. He told them (a) that the original approaches by the church leaders had been fully understood; (b) that they must understand that they (the British) would have to go public on this - something which at the time worried both Chaplains but which they now see as a reference to the Secretary of State's speech; (c) that the idea that any talks would be private would be "palatable" from their point of view; (d) emphasised that "you will have to move at our speed".
 - The previous day (9 November) the Prison Service held its annual Remembrance Day Service at the Training Centre in Millisle. Fr Murphy studiously avoids such occasions and did so again this year. Traditionally, Ministers rarely attend the Service. However, on this occasion, John Cope attended and apparently "made a bee-line for Rev Will Murphy" and asked whether Fr Murphy was present. The occasion was a public one and when asked by Cope how his work was progressing, Rev Murphy replied that "he was still working for peace", to which Cope responded that "we are very very happy with what you (plural) are doing".

Future Developments:

Both Chaplains were delighted with Brooke's speech on 9 November which they see as reflecting much of the language of their discussions to date. The next stage is that the New Permanent Secretary of the NIO (Chillcot) along with Danny McNeill are to meet Bishop Cahal Daly tomorrow (13 November). Following that meeting, both Chillcot and McNeill will meet with the Chaplains.

Fr Murphy agreed to keep in close touch on developments over the coming weeks.

RS

Brendan McMahon
Anglo-Irish Division
12 November 1990

cc A/Sec Gallagher; R. Murphy

cc PST, PSM; Mr. Kelly, PPS, Mr. Anderson

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

Form to be completed and inserted in the original record
in place of each part abstracted

- (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: **S230/08/05/00310**
- (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: **1**
- (iii) The date of each such document: **October 1990**
- (iv) The description of each document: **Note regarding a security issue.**
- (v) Number of pages: **2**

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- (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention:
(b)(c)

Section 8 (4) (a) (b) & (c) of the National Archives Act, 1986

[These will be the reasons given on the certificate under section 8(4)]

Name: **Shivine Kelly**

Grade: **AP.**

Department/Office/Court: **Taoiseach's Department**

Date: **27/11/19.**



note.

I understand from the Secretary
to the President - that - the President -
Received the local authority groups
from here on 19/10/90 as
planned.

The occasion was successful.

There were no photographs
from the media present - but -

The visiting groups brought

that were photographed to

attend the occasion. JH

23
10
90

J. 16281B

20 Feabhra, 1984.

An Rúnaí Priobháideach
An tAire Dlí agus Cirt

I am to refer to the memorandum No. 1/84 dated the 15th February, 1984, submitted by the Minister for Justice concerning the question of proscription of Provisional Sinn Féin and to inform you that, at a meeting held today, the Government agreed that members of the Government or Ministers of State should not meet deputations which include members of Provisional Sinn Féin unless they publicly disassociate themselves from the IRA campaign of violence.

DERMOT NALLY

Rúnaí an Rialtais

An Rúnaí Priobháideach
An tAire Airgeadais(2)/Gach Aire eile/Gach Aire Stáit/An tArd Aighne. Aire/Aire Stáit/Ard Aighne.

FRANK MURRAY

Extract from
Dail Debates
3/5/88

5

Questions—

3 MAY 1988

Oral Answers

6

Unionist parties and the Unionist tradition, necessary as it is, which must for the moment be carried on outside the framework of the Anglo-Irish Agreement should not in any way put in jeopardy the objectives of the agreement itself?

The Taoiseach: I have already said that any dialogue of the kind we would all wish to take place can and should take place without taking from the Anglo-Irish Agreement processes in any way.

An Ceann Comhairle: I am calling Deputy Cooney for a final supplementary.

Mr. Barry: I wish to put a brief supplementary question.

An Ceann Comhairle: I have dwelt rather long on this Question but I will allow Deputy Barry to put a brief supplementary question.

Mr. Cooney: Does the Taoiseach see the Anglo-Irish Agreement as an impediment to dialogue with Unionists?

The Taoiseach: No.

Mr. Barry: This is the second time the Taoiseach has referred in the House to his invitation to the Unionists to come and discuss with him whatever problems they have. Has he formally put this to them or is this invitation just a response to a journalist's question at a news conference about a month or five weeks ago? Has he used the channels available to him to issue a formal invitation to Unionists to come to see him?

The Taoiseach: I have dealt with that matter several times in this House. The Deputy is not being very accurate or fair in saying that in issuing this invitation I was only responding to journalists. I issued the invitation at the most important platform available to me from the point of view of my party, that is our Ard Fheis, which was given full publicity.

Mr. Barry: The Taoiseach also referred to it prior to that.

The Taoiseach: Subsequently I elaborated on it in this House. It was not just a reply to journalists' questions. I also indicated that in my judgment at this stage I would prefer to leave it at that rather than take the step of issuing some sort of formal invitation which might not be the best step to take at this point.

An Ceann Comhairle: I am calling the next question.

Mr. T. Fitzpatrick rose.

An Ceann Comhairle: I am sorry Deputy, I have called the next question.

(Interruptions.)

An Ceann Comhairle: The Chair must be obeyed in such matters.

✶ Talks with Sinn Féin.

2. **Mr. Deasy** asked the Taoiseach if he is in favour of having talks with Sinn Féin leaders.

The Taoiseach: The only circumstances in which talks with Sinn Féin could be contemplated by an Irish Government would be if they rejected violence and accepted that constitutional politics are the only legitimate way to achieve economic, social and political objectives.

Mr. Deasy: I am sorry I did not hear the beginning of that reply.

The Taoiseach: The only circumstances in which talks with Sinn Féin could be contemplated by an Irish Government would be if they rejected violence and accepted that constitutional politics are the only legitimate way to achieve economic, social and political objectives.

Mr. Deasy: My question is prompted by a report which was attributed to the Taoiseach in America in which he said he welcomed the talks between the SDLP

Extract from
Dail Debates
3/5/88

7

Questions—

3 MAY 1988.

Oral Answers

8

[Mr. Deasy.]

and Sinn Féin. As Sinn Féin are a thirty-two county party I was wondering if he would extend his viewpoint by initiating discussions with Sinn Féin in an effort to persuade them to do exactly what he has said in his reply and, that is, to discontinue violence. Would the Taoiseach consider it in that light? Is it true that the Taoiseach welcomed the talks between the SDLP and Sinn Féin?

The Taoiseach: No. I do not know to what the Deputy is referring. I do not know if I ever used those words. What I have said about the talks between the SDLP and Sinn Féin is that I accept John Hume's judgment and assessment of that situation and if he believes that something worthwhile or beneficial particularly from the point of view of the cessation of violence can be achieved, I would be prepared to accept his judgment in the matter. That is as far as I have ever gone on that issue. The Deputy would have to understand that there would be a very great difference between John Hume as the leader of a political party in Northern Ireland having conversations and the Irish Government, as a sovereign Government, having the same type of conversations. There is an enormous difference between those two processes.

Mr. Deasy: Would the Taoiseach exclude any consideration of having talks

with Sinn Féin until they repudiate violence completely?

The Taoiseach: Of course.

Mr. Deasy: The offer made to the Unionists in conjunction with the talks which have taken place between the SDLP and Sinn Féin seem to indicate that there is a contradiction or a certain void where the supporters of the political organisation of Sinn Féin are concerned.

The Taoiseach: I will have to advert to a very clear distinction and that is that my invitation or, indeed, the invitation of any of the major parties in the Republic, to a representative Unionist tradition would be to representatives of constitutional political Unionist parties.

Údarás na Gaeltachta.

3. D'fhiafraigh **Mr. M. Higgins** den Taoiseach cé mhéad spás monarchan atá i seilbh Údarás na Gaeltachta faoi láthair i ngach ceantar Gaeltachta; cé mhéad atá tugtha amach ar chíos nó geallta do thogra éigin; cé mhéad atá ar fáil le haghaidh tograí nua agus cé mhéad atá dá thógáil faoi láthair agus an dtabharfaidh sé an t-eolas go léir briste síos de réir na mórcheantracha Gaeltachta.

Aire Stáit ag Roinn na Gaeltachta (Mr. D. Gallagher): Is i bhfoirm tábla atá an t-eolas (a fuarthas ó Údarás na Gaeltachta) agus cuirfead timpeall sa Tuarascáil Oifigiúil é:

| Contae | Spás iomlán (méadair chearnacha) | Méid spás ar cíos nó geallta do thograí áirithe (méadair chearnacha) | Méid spás folamh (méadair chearnacha) | Méid spás á thógáil faoi láthair (méadair chearnacha) |
|--------------|--|--|--|---|
| Dún na nGall | 86,061 | 76,688 | 9,373 | — |
| Maigh Eo | 25,745 | 21,349 | 4,396 | — |
| Gaillimh | 64,260 | 61,438 | 2,822 | 104 |
| Ciarráí | 7,074 | 5,376 | 1,698 | 208 |
| Corcaigh | 10,959 | 10,137 | 822 | 200 |
| Port Láirge | 1,308 | 1,308 | — | — |
| An Mhí | 5,166 | 5,166 | — | — |
| An tIomlán | 200,573 | 181,462 | 19,111* | 512 |

*Tuigtear go bhfuil tograí á bplé do 2,808 m.ch. den mhéid sin.

FAX TRANSMISSION

DATE: 17/10/90

TO: Mr. F. Murray

FAX NO: 766830

NUMBER OF SHEETS IN THIS TRANSMISSION
(including this sheet) 2

FROM: ARAS AN UACHTARAIN

FAX NO: 710529

COMMENTS (if any) _____

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786830

BAILE CHOIMISINÉIRÍ NA SIONNA

(SHANNON TOWN COMMISSIONERS)

Baile-Chléireach:
Tomás Mac Cormaic
Halla an Bhaile
Bóchar an Ghóir
An tSionna
Teil: 62319



Town Clerk:
Tomás Mac Cormaic
Town Hall
Gort Road
Shannon
Tel: 62319

AD ALTIORA

October 17th 1990

Do Peig Ní Mhaile,
Runai an tUachtarain,
Aras an Uachtarain,
Phoenix Park,
Dublin, 8.

A Chara,

The following are the members of the Shannon Town Commissioners who will be visiting An tUachtaran at Aras an Uachtarain on Friday next October 19th 1990:

Mrs. Geraldine Lambert (Chairman)

Mr. Pat O'Brien

Mr. Michael Mc Kee [S.F.]?

Mr. Tom O'Shaughnessy

Mr. Sean Driscoll

Mrs. Brigid Makowski (unconfirmed)

This is a maximum of six people from this council, unfortunately Commissioners Patricia Mc Carthy, Kathleen Ryan, Dermot Hammond and Town Clerk Tomás Mac Cormaic will be out of the country on that day and regret that they are unable to attend.

Is mise, le meas,

Baile-Chléireach

~~Mr. H. C. Longley~~
9.10.90
SECRET

For Sinn Féin file

Discussion with John Hume

Taoreach
To see please
8/10

Hume-Adams Talks

1. In a discussion last Saturday, John Hume told me that he had a further approach in the past week from the intermediary who organises the meetings between Gerry Adams and himself; in this approach, the intermediary had asked if the paper Hume had promised to the Sinn Féin leader some time ago had yet been prepared. (It will be recalled - see my report of 10 September - that Hume, in his last meeting with Adams, had argued in favour of an alternative approach by the Provisionals: specifically that they would lay down their arms in return for a request from the SDLP to the Government to call a conference of all parties (including Sinn Féin) on the island; presuming the Unionists would not attend, this conference would become a forum where all the nationalist parties would work out a common plan/strategy on the basis of which they would seek to convince Unionists of the value of a united Ireland. In response to this suggestion by Hume, Adams asked that Hume let him have a private paper which he would then put to the IRA).
2. Hume, in reply to the intermediary, said that he had taken the view that Adams' request for a private paper had now become academic in the light of a recent interview with an IRA spokesman in the London Independent. In this interview the spokesman had said: "We can state absolutely, on the record, that there will be no ceasefire, no truce, no cessation of violence short of a British withdrawal. That, as blunt as that, is our position." (However the spokesman went on to qualify the position somewhat by saying that "should the British Government at any stage genuinely seek dialogue, then we are more than willing to engage in dialogue with them").


3. The intermediary responded quite strongly to Hume's interpretation of the interview and said that the position had not in any way been changed by it; that there was still the same "pliability" on the part of Adams as had been conveyed to Hume at the time the request for the private paper had been made.

Possible Statement by Secretary of State

4. Hume also mentioned that he had been told by his NIO contact (John McConnell) that the text of the statement the SDLP leader had been suggesting for some time might be made by the Secretary of State - in which Mr. Brooke would emphasise that the British had no longer any vested economic, social, strategic or military interest in staying in Northern Ireland - was now close to being finalised. (It will be recalled that Ambassador Fenn had made a speech along these lines at the recent Magill Summer School - it is by no means clear, however, that the Secretary of State would wish to go on record in the same terms himself).

Meeting between Senior Northern Official and Adams

5. Finally, Hume told me that he had been advised in private by Gerry Loughren, an Under-Secretary at the Department of the Environment in Belfast (who originally comes from West Belfast and whose wife was an active member of the SDLP at one time), that he had been instructed recently to brief Gerry Adams on the NIO's economic plans and programmes for West Belfast. Hume specifically asked that we not let the British know we were aware of this meeting, as it could compromise Loughren. Hume said he was taken aback at the meeting and saw it as a further proof that the British were "not to be trusted".


Dermot Gallagher
4 October, 1990

National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988

ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8

Form to be completed and inserted in the original record
in place of each part abstracted

(i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: **S230/08/05/00310**

(ii) How many documents have been abstracted: **1**

(iii) The date of each such document: **September 1990**

(iv) The description of each document: **Copy note of informal discussion, D/FAffairs.**

(v) Number of pages: **5**

[Where appropriate, a composite description may be entered in respect of two or more related documents]

(v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention:

(b)(c)

Section 8 (4) (a) (b) & (c) of the National Archives Act, 1986

[These will be the reasons given on the certificate under section 8(4)]

Name: **Elaine Kelly**

Grade: **AP**

Department/Office/Court: **Taoiseach's Department**

Date: **27/11/19.**

From: Sir Nicholas Fenn KCMG, HM Ambassador



ANNEX 1

BRITISH EMBASSY,
DUBLIN.

28 August 1990

John Hume Esq MP MEP
5 Bayview Terrace
LONDONDERRY

Dear John,

It was good to see you again at Lahinch last week and to witness in person the important speech which you delivered to the Merriman Summer School. As I explained at the time, I do not agree with every word in it, (In particular the changes to which you referred are not in my view due "entirely" to developments in the European Community). But I welcome and applaud the trenchant arguments you addressed to the IRA and endorse your view that - whatever may have been the case in the past - it is nonsense to suppose that the British presence in Northern Ireland is due to the defence of economic or strategic interests.

As I promised, I venture to enclose a copy of the speech I contributed to the MacGill Summer School at Glenties on 15 August. The immediately relevant passage is "the underlying reality" at paragraphs 21-23. But you might find some interest in the second half of the speech beginning at paragraph 14.

I have lost no time in reporting your speech to the FCO and the NIO, drawing their attention not only to your appeal to the IRA to lay down their arms but also to your suggestion for a joint declaration by the two Governments. As I warned you, Mr Brooke is away this week and part of next but I have told his office to expect a call from you.

Yours sincerely,

Nicholas Fenn

ANNEX 2

E. UNDERLYING REALITY

21. There are two underlying political realities: a crucial formula: the principle of consent; the two Governments affirm that the future of Northern Ireland should be decided only by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. As Mr Tom King used to observe, this means self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland.

a. The first is that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom in British and International Law, and will remain so unless and until a majority of its people decide otherwise.

b. The second is that, whatever emerges from present uncertainties, there can be no return to the dictatorship of the majority which for fifty years was called democracy. Neither community in Northern Ireland can impose its will on the other.

22. The British Government have views of their own about Northern Ireland. But they have no preconceived blueprint for its ultimate destiny. There is no secret strategic or economic motivation. Whatever view one takes of the past, the present reality is not sensibly seen as a residual colonial problem. To a British diplomat, proud of the way in which, in my lifetime, we have divested ourselves with reasonably good grace of the greatest empire the world has ever known, it seems absurd to see the problem in such terms. The issue is not something called "the British presence in the north of Ireland". We are not talking about real estate, but about people: one million Irishmen profoundly alienated from the Republic and determined to be British. A secure future cannot be built upon fantasy. Northern Ireland remains British because that is the declared and continuing desire of a majority of its people. They will not be betrayed.

23. Article 1 of the Agreement commits both governments to a crucial formula: the principle of consent: the two Governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland". As Mr Tom King used to observe, this means self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland.

25

AS ÁTA CLIAĀ
R A T I O N O F D U B L I N)



CITY HALL
DUBLIN 2
IRELAND

With the Compliments
of the
Minister of State
at the

11th July, 1990

Department of the Taoiseach

State
Taoiseach,

Note
Correspondence with
Mr Simpson covered
to Mr Michael Power
25/7/90
17/7/90

Dear Mr. Power,

I wish to refer to your letter of the 9th July, 1990 addressed to the City Manager and enclosed correspondence from Mr. Derek Simpson, Department of Microelectronics & Electrical Engineering, Trinity College, regarding the making available of the Mansion House Public Rooms for the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis.

First may I point out that the Ard Fheis is held in the Mansion House Public Rooms and not the Lord Mayor's Residence. These Rooms, as the name implies, are hired out to the public for a multitude of uses including dances, exhibitions, sales of work, auctions, meetings, etc. It is used for events which elsewhere in Ireland might be held in town, parochial or community halls.

Political meetings have been held there on many occasions by all of the recognised political parties in Ireland including Sinn Fein. Needless to say the hiring out of the Rooms does not in any way imply that the Corporation subscribes to the aims or aspirations of the hirers. The question of whether the premises should be let to Sinn Fein has been considered within the Corporation from time to time. The view taken up to now is that it is a function of the State to decide what political parties should be registered and that it is not up to the Corporation to discriminate between political parties. Sinn Fein has been registered by the State as a political party and it is on this basis that the letting is made.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew McHugh
Andrew McHugh
Acting Assistant Principal Officer

X
C.C. B. M. C. Carthy

ΒΑΡΘΑΣ ΑΤΑ ΚΛΙΑΤ
(CORPORATION OF DUBLIN)

halla na Caḗraḗ
baile Áta Cliaḗ 2
Tel 6796111



CITY HALL
DUBLIN 2
IRELAND

11th July, 1990

Mr. Pat Power,
Private Secretary,
Office of the Minister of State
at the Department of the Taoiseach,
Dublin 2.

Dear Mr. Power,

I wish to refer to your letter of the 9th July, 1990 addressed to the City Manager and enclosed correspondence from Mr. Derek Simpson, Department of Microelectronics & Electrical Engineering, Trinity College, regarding the making available of the Mansion House Public Rooms for the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis.

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Yours sincerely,

Andrew McHugh

Andrew McHugh
Acting Assistant Principal Officer

X
C.C. B. M. Carthy



OIFIG AN AIRE STÁIT AG ROINN AN TAOISIGH
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2
DUBLIN 2

9 July, 1990.

W. Lynch
To see what I return
10/7

Mr. Derek Simpson,
Department of Microelectronics and
Electrical Engineering,
Trinity College.

Yours sincerely,

Dear Mr. Simpson,

The Minister of State and Government Chief Whip, Mr. Vincent Brady, T.D., has asked me to refer to your letter to him about the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its annual conference.

The Mansion House is not a Government building and is, in fact, owned by Dublin Corporation. Accordingly, the responsibility for matters relating to the use of the Mansion House by outside bodies lies with Dublin Corporation under legislation which provides local authorities with full powers to manage, let, rent or lease properties under their control. Decisions on the use of these properties are arrived at on a purely commercial basis and the Government have no statutory power to intervene or to countermand decisions reached by a local authority acting within its sphere of responsibility in this area. The question of letting the Mansion House to Sinn Fein for its annual conference, is therefore a matter for Dublin Corporation to decide. A copy of your letter has been forwarded to the Corporation.

The commitment of the Government and the Irish people to combatting terrorism is consistent, comprehensive and effective. This State will spend approximately £170 million this year on security connected with the Northern Ireland situation. That continues to represent almost four times per capita the level of expenditure by the taxpayer in Britain in respect of Northern Ireland. That expense has been incurred at a time of financial stringency



OIFIG AN AIRE STÁIT AG ROINN AN TAOISIGH
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2
DUBLIN 2

- 2 -

when the Government have had to implement cutbacks in certain areas of the economy. The Taoiseach is on record as having said "our commitment in this area is freely given in the common interest of society, North and South, to ensure that the forces of terrorism - whether of domestic or international origin - do not prevail".

Yours sincerely,

Pat Power,
Private Secretary.



OIFIG AN AIRE STÁIT AG ROINN AN TAOISIGH
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2
DUBLIN 2

9 July, 1990.

Mr. F.J. Feely,
City Manager and Town Clerk,
Dublin Corporation,
City Hall,
Dame Street,
Dublin 1.

Dear Mr. Feely,

The Minister of State and Government Chief Whip, Mr. Vincent Brady, T.D., has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter he received from Mr. Derek Simpson, along with a copy of the reply which issued.

Yours sincerely,

Pat Power,
Private Secretary.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir.....

To: Mr. McCarthy

From: B. Collinge

Re: Letter to Taoiseach from Mr. Derek Simpson,
Department of Microelectronic and Electrical Engineering
Trinity College

6-7-90

*re by collinge
ple amend draft
letter, as discussed
and proceed
as discussed
Mr. Howard
To see all
before submission
cross to
Min of State
Gavin
discuss
Per 3 with
you when
discuss
B.C. 5/7/90*

1. The above named has written to the Taoiseach and to the Minister of State, Mr. Brady, complaining that successive governments have allowed Sinn Fein to use the Mansion House for their annual conferences. He says he is a member of the minority community here and asks that a ban be put on the use of the Mansion House by this party who, he says, are involved in a campaign of genocide against his community in Northern Ireland.

2. From our files it appears that this matter was raised before with the former Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, by a Mr. Eugene Green who wrote to him in 1984. A copy of your submission at the time is beneath which suggests that members of Dublin Corporation have the power to direct the Corporation management not to make the Mansion House available to Sinn Fein. It seems that the then Taoiseach wrote to the Leader of the Fine Gael Group on Dublin Corporation suggesting that the Fine Gael group might consider tabling a motion which would review for future years the making available of the Mansion House to Sinn Fein. He also wrote to the Taoiseach in his then capacity as Leader of the Opposition and to the Leader of the Labour Party, Dick Spring. Copies of the correspondence are beneath.

→ 3. It is a matter for consideration as to whether the issue should again be raised at this time.

4. The draft reply across, more or less on the same lines as the one which issued in 1984 to Mr. Green, is submitted for consideration in the interim, please.

B. Collinge
Brian Collinge
8th June 1990.

P.S. The Minister of State could reply after the letter issues from the T's Private Office
BB



OIFIG AN AIRE STÁIT AG ROINN AN TAOISIGH

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TAOISEACH

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2

DUBLIN 2

25 May, 1990.

Mr. Derek Simpson,
Department of Microelectronics and
Electrical Engineering,
New Square,
Trinity College,
Dublin 1.

Dear Mr. Simpson,

Thank you for your letter of 11 May, 1990 and enclosures
addressed to the Minister of State and Government Chief
Whip, Mr. Vincent Brady, T.D.

The Minister of State is making enquiries in the matter and
will be in touch with you shortly.

Yours sincerely,

Pat Power,
Private Secretary.

Dept of microelectronics & Electrical Eng
New Square
Trinity College Dublin.

11/5/90.

Dear Vincent Brady T. D.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to your party leader on the 5/2/90 last, also enclosed is the reply I received on the 9/2/90 To-date I have received no further communication on this matter. "I don't think I will". I am therefore sending copies to other T.D.'s like yourself to see if you can raise this issue on my behalf. I look forward to your reply.

Yours sincerely

D Simpson



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

9 February, 1990.

Mr. Derek Simpson,
Department of Microelectronics & Electrical Engineering,
New Square,
Trinity College,
Dublin 1.

Dear Mr. Simpson,

Thank you for your recent letter.

Your letter will be brought to the attention of the Taoiseach as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Private Secretary.

Oifig an Taoisigh, Tithe an Rialtais, Baile Átha Cliath 2.
Office of the Taoiseach, Government Buildings, Dublin 2.

Dept of Microelectronics & Electrical
Eng.
New Square

Trinity College Dublin.

Dear Sir.

5/2/90.

As a member of the minority community here, in the Republic, I would like to express my anger at successive governments for allowing Sinn Fein the use of the Mansion House for their annual conference. I don't know whether you know that this so called "party" is "involved" in a campaign of genocide against my community in Northern Ireland. Since the Mansion House "a government building" has been used by this "party" for a number of years, leaves me to believe that successive governments condone their activities. I would like you and your colleagues, from all sides, to wake up and take action on this issue and put a ban on this "party" from using public property in the future.

Yours sincerely

D Simpson.



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

16281
(main)

14 January, 1985.

Mr. Charles J. Haughey, T.D.,
Leader of the Opposition.

Dear Charlie,

I have recently written to the Fine Gael members of Dublin City Council concerning the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its Annual Conference.

I think you will agree with me that the spectacle of Sinn Fein's Annual Conferences which consistently support the I.R.A.'s campaign of violence is totally abhorrent. I understand that the members of the City Council would have the power to direct Corporation management not to make the Mansion House available to Sinn Fein. I have put it to the Fine Gael group that they should consider tabling a motion which would review for future years the making available of the Mansion House to Sinn Fein. Obviously the value of such a motion would be considerably greater if it could be a cross Party initiative. Would you consider bringing this matter to the attention of the Fianna Fail Councillors?

I am also writing to the Leader of the Labour Party.

Yours sincerely,

Taoiseach.



Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

14 January, 1985.

Mr. Dick Spring, T.D.,
Tánaiste and Minister for Energy.


Dear Dick,

I have recently written to the Fine Gael members of Dublin City Council concerning the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its Annual Conference.

I think you will agree with me that the spectacle of Sinn Fein's Annual Conferences which consistently support the I.R.A.'s campaign of violence is totally abhorrent. I understand that the members of the City Council would have the power to direct Corporation management not to make the Mansion House available to Sinn Fein. I have put it to the Fine Gael group that they should consider tabling a motion which would review for future years the making available of the Mansion House to Sinn Fein. Obviously the value of such a motion would be considerably greater if it could be a cross Party initiative. Would you consider bringing this matter to the attention of the Labour Party Councillors?

I am also writing to the Leader of the Opposition.

Yours sincerely,



Taoiseach.

2nd January, 1985.

An Taoiseach,
Dr. Garret FitzGerald T. D.,
Government Buildings,
Dublin 2.

Dear Taoiseach,

I wish to thank you for your recent letter concerning the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its annual conference.


As you will appreciate this has been a source of great embarrassment to a number of city councillors and at present, efforts are being made to table a motion which would have the effect, if passed, of directing the Corporation management not to make the Mansion House available to Sinn Fein.

Taoiseach, I have been firmly of the belief that a motion of this nature should be signed by as many members of the City Council as possible. I am pleased to note from your letter that you are writing to the Tanaiste and to the Leader of the Opposition. I sincerely hope that your intervention in this matter will have the desired effect of obtaining all-party agreement on the proposed motion.

If all-party agreement is not forthcoming then I will, as you suggest in your letter, request the Fine Gael Group to consider tabling a motion as outlined by you.

With my very best wishes.

Yours sincerely,


CLER. JOE DOYLE T.D.

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original document***



Óifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

28 December, 1984.

Councillor Joe Doyle, T.D.,
14 Simmonscourt Terrace,
Ballsbridge,
Dublin 4.

Dear Joe,

In your function as Leader of the Group on Dublin Corporation, I wonder would you consider bringing to the attention of the Fine Gael members the question of the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its Annual Conference.

I think you will agree with me that the spectacle of Sinn Fein's Annual Conferences which consistently support the IRA's campaign of violence is totally abhorrent. I understand that the members of the City Council would have the power to direct the Corporation management not to make the Mansion House available to Sinn Fein. It is my opinion that the Fine Gael Group should consider tabling a motion, with adequate notice, which would review for future years the making available of the Mansion House to Sinn Fein.

I intend to write to the Tanaiste and to the Leader of the Opposition, telling them that I have written to you on the subject.

Yours sincerely,

GABRIEL FITZGERALD
Taoiseach

Taoiseach.



Misc.
F. 2.

ROINN AN TAOISIGH

Uimhir...16281 (Indiced)

To: Mr D Kelly
From: B McCarthy

I submit a reply to Mr Eugene Greene of Goodalls of Ireland Ltd who has complained to the Taoiseach about the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its annual conferences. The reply points out that the use to which the Mansion House is put is a matter solely for Dublin Corporation and that the Government has no function in the matter. The reply does of course draw attention to the Government's policy in relation to meetings with members of Sinn Fein.

The members of Dublin Corporation would have the power to direct the Corporation management not to make the Mansion House available to Sinn Fein. This would require a vote in a full session of the Corporation after adequate notice of motion, etc had been given. It would be for the Taoiseach to decide, in the light of political considerations, whether the reply to Mr Greene should be strengthened by including a suggestion that the Taoiseach would consult his Party's members on Dublin Corporation with the aim of reviewing, for future years, the making available of the Mansion House to Sinn Fein. The Tanaiste would also need to be consulted in this matter.

*but the Chairman
hasley
have passed
my or
wrote
to B
K. McCarth,
with office,
action
29 12
1984*

[Signature]

57/12/84

No, but this should be followed up with the parties in the Corporation. Please send me [Taoiseach]



Oifig an Taoiseach
Office of the Taoiseach

10 December, 1984.

of Sinn Fein unless those persons publicly disassociate themselves

Mr. Eugene Greene, ~~son of violence.~~
Director,
Goodalls of Ireland Limited,
Clonliffe Works, ~~ins the position.~~
Dublin 3.

Yours sincerely,

Dear Mr. Greene,

Thank you very much for your letter of 6 November, 1984, concerning the use of the Mansion House by Sinn Fein for its Annual Conference. I regret the delay in replying to you.

The responsibility for matters relating to the use of the Mansion House by outside bodies lies with Dublin Corporation under legislation which provides local authorities with full powers to manage, let, rent or lease properties under their control. Decisions on the use to which these properties are put are arrived at on a purely commercial basis and the Government have no statutory power to intervene or to countermand decisions reached by a local authority acting within its sphere of responsibility in this area. The question of letting the Mansion House to Sinn Fein for its Annual Conference, therefore, is purely a matter for Dublin Corporation to decide.

Nevertheless, the spectacle of Sinn Fein's Annual Conferences, at which unequivocal support is consistently given to the IRA's campaign of violence, is abhorrent to the Government and the overwhelming majority of people in this State. The Government, for their part, have refused to meet delegations which include members

/...




Oifig an Taoisigh
Office of the Taoiseach

-2-

of Sinn Fein unless those members publicly disassociate themselves from the IRA campaign of violence.

I hope this explains the position.

Yours sincerely,



Taoiseach.

Goodall's

EG/EMCF.

6th November 1984.


The Taoiseach,
Office of the Taoiseach,
Government Buildings,
Dublin 2.

Dear Taoiseach,

I cannot understand how Sinn Fein can obtain the Mansion House for its Annual Conference.

On the grounds that this property belongs to the State, I object to it being rented out to Organisations of this sort.

Yours faithfully,
for GOODALLS OF IRELAND LIMITED.



EUGENE GREENE,
DIRECTOR.

*DIRECTORS: E.Greene N.J. McCarthy F.W. Stirling.
REGISTERED OFFICE: Clonliffe Works, Dublin 3.
Registered in Dublin, Ireland. No. 8373.*

***Goodalls of Ireland Limited,
Clonliffe Works, Dublin 3
Telephone 376182
Telex 33025 GDALEI***

S E C R E T

NOTE

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
✓
30/5
H. G. 'C' Conroy
hmc
30-5-90

Hume's efforts to encourage Sinn Féin dialogue

1. In order to give a new impetus to the internal Sinn Féin debate, John Hume has had as an objective for some time to convince the Secretary of State that he should - to quote Hume's recent Sunday Independent article - "directly address their own (i.e. Sinn Fein's) stated reasons for what they call armed struggle and demonstrate that those reasons no longer exist". Hume would, therefore, like to see the Secretary of State take an early opportunity to put on the record that the British have no longer any diplomatic, security, military, economic or financial vested interest in staying in Northern Ireland and that the issue of self-determination is one on which the Irish people themselves must seek to reach agreement.
2. Hume recently drafted a text (Annex 1 attached) which he has passed to the NIO and asked that it be considered as a basis for the suggested speech by the Secretary of State. He has also handed over to the NIO a text which he has received from a source who has sought to interpret Sinn Fein thinking on this issue and who is working with Hume in trying to advance the dialogue within Sinn Fein (Annex 2).
3. The limited indication we have to date suggests that the British remain very cautious and circumspect about the Hume approach.

[Handwritten signature]
Dermot Gallagher,
28 May, 1990.

Annex 1.

Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA have repeatedly stated that their objective is a united Ireland without a British presence, and have argued that it can only be achieved by force. One of the reasons for this advanced by their spokesmen is that Britain has some interest of her own in staying in Northern Ireland and is therefore engaged in some way in defending those interests by force and by military strength.

Britain of course has an interest in Northern Ireland which is to respond with warm goodwill and friendship to the needs of the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. (We respect and admire the contribution which they have made to the Union in peace and war.) But let me be very clear! In the second half of the 20th Century, no matter what has been the position in the past, the British Government has no political, military, strategic or economic interest in staying in Ireland or in the exercise of authority there that could transcend respect for the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland. If the people were freely to decide that they wished to unite with the South then not only would the British Government not stand in the way, they would facilitate and legislate for the change.

What that means in clear terms is that Irish unity is a matter for Irish people and for no one else. If those Irish people who want unity can persuade those who do not, Why should a British Government stand in the way? That being the case, the question asked by most British people is, What is the possible justification for the use of force in such circumstances? I now ask the same question.

We also hear calls from time to time, calls for round-table conferences involving elected representatives of the Irish people, North and South, to discuss the future and future relationships between the people of Ireland. It seems to us at the present time that agreement on such a conference is extremely unlikely, but if it were the British Government would not stand in the way. Indeed, we would give it our encouragement.

In the meantime and in the absence of agreement on all these matters, the British Government continues and will continue to exercise its responsibilities in Northern Ireland and to do our best to ensure peace, stability and some measure of economic prosperity there. We would only wish that all the people and parties there would give us their full co-operation in achieving these objectives.

The Provisional I.R.A say that they are fighting a "War of Independence" to win the freedom of self-determination for the people of Ireland. They maintain that force must be used to persuade the British Government to acknowledge such a freedom because it has a "colonial" self-interest in remaining in Northern Ireland and in exercising authority there.

This interpretation of the political situation in Northern Ireland is based on the false assumption that Britain has some interest of her own in remaining there and is, therefore, engaged, in some way, in defending those interests by force and military strength.

Britain, of course, has an interest in Northern Ireland which is to respond with warm good-will and friendship to the needs of the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. (We respect and admire the contribution which they have made to the Union in peace and war.) But let me be very clear! In the second half of the 20th century, no matter what has been the position in the past, the British Government has no political, military, strategic, or economic interest in staying in Ireland or in the exercise of authority there that could transcend respect for the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland.

The political and security situation, as it has now developed in Northern Ireland, is due to the historical, political, religious and cultural divisions which separate the people of the Nationalist tradition from the people of the Unionist tradition in Ireland. These divisions are at the root of the conflict there and not any self-interested, dominion policies of the British Government.

The central issue in the conflict, therefore, is not to persuade the British Government to decide on the question of self-determination in Ireland but to bridge the divisions between the people of both traditions there in a way that will enable them to decide it, freely and democratically, for themselves.

The political consensus and agreement which would bridge these traditional divisions and so open the way to a peaceful resolution of the question of Irish self-determination, can only be achieved through the processes of political debate and dialogue between the people of both traditions.

Should they, through their political representatives, agree to engage in such dialogue, the British Government would do everything possible to accommodate and facilitate it. It would, for example, provide the necessary frame-work and forum which could take the form of an on-going Conference or Convention composed of the official representatives of the people of both traditions. It would confine its own role in such a dialogue to that of facilitator and so would not officially take part in it or much less, seek, in any way, to dictate to it.

This means that the British Government is prepared to withdraw from the central area of historical, political, religious and cultural conflict and from the

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general forum of political debate that would seek to resolve it, so that the parties to the conflict, namely, the people of the Nationalist tradition and the people of the Unionist tradition, could engage, freely, independently and democratically in the political dialogue and agreement-making which would bridge their divisions.

Should this dialogue result in agreements, based on the consent of the people of the two traditions, which would bridge the political divisions between them and define the forms of new political structures which would embody, institute and organise such agreements, the British Government would respond with the necessary legislation.

...

[Faint, illegible handwritten text]

~~Blair~~

The British Government is also supposed to encourage any dialogue among Nationalist and Republican representatives which would seek to replace violence by a new and purely political strategy for achieving their democratic aims.

Note: It is better to say "the Provisional I.R.A. are fighting a "War of Independence" to win the freedom of self-determination for the people of Ireland (as in document 2) rather than that their objective is a united Ireland." (as in document 1) Sinn Féin and the I.R.A. make a distinction between the political objective of a 32 County Republic and the military objective of winning the ~~right to~~ ^{exercise} of what they see as the right of the Irish people to self-determination.

END of file